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In this thesis I investigate how policies aiming to enhance and increase 
opportunities for political participation for people with mental disabilities are 
currently being implemented in residential psychiatric rehabilitation. These 
practices form part of the implementation of the United Nations Convention of 
the Rights for Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) Article 29 – the right to equal 
opportunities to participate in public and political life.  
In answering how Article 29 is substantiated, I deconstruct the micro-social 
interactions relevant to politicisation in psychiatric treatment and the effect policy 
implementation has on constituted identities and social roles available to service-
users and staff. Politicisation refers to the mechanisms by which people become 
politically aware or engaged to act politically. These mechanisms, in observation, 
were fundamentally pedagogical. This raises a number of important complexities 
which inform a theoretical discussion of power, benevolence, indoctrination and 
empowerment. The phenomenon under investigation is the anthrogogies of politics 
applied in the course of residential mental health treatment. The implications of 
this research go far beyond the mental health institution. 
The evidence presented in this thesis indicates that ethical and political 
environments in mental health services, whether imposed by staff or co-produced 
with service-users, determine exclusions and inclusions in political life through 
processes of social recognition. Particular roles are naturalised in the mental 
health treatment process. The doctor patient ‘act’ required within institutional 
settings can often frustrate attempts to expand and enhance opportunities for 
service-users and providers to adopt political identities and be recognised 
respectively as political members of the community. 
At one level, this study demonstrates that practices of politicisation face 
significant challenges when implemented in psychiatric rehabilitation. Many 




mental institutions surveyed did not practically implement any positive support 
for political inclusion. Even in the three pioneering facilities studied there was low 
uptake of voting rights by service-users who appeared broadly to lack motivation, 
access to information and resources, and opportunities to engage in political 
discourse. Staff appeared to accord low priority to political action and expression. 
They sometimes elevated electoral participation to a characteristic of mentally 
healthy ways of being and applied didactic pedagogies of citizenship and ethics. 
Staff and service-users alike appeared to be disempowered and disenfranchised by 
strict adherence to particular rituals, traditions, identities and roles attached to 
the mental institution. This demonstrates that implementation of practices of 
political inclusion often slip back into medicalised practices of assessment and 
treatment creating rational reasons for disengagement. 
At a theoretical level I argue ethical worldviews, in the sense of conceptualisations 
of what the good life is or should be, influence capabilities to exercise political 
agency and action. Psychiatric services, in their everyday functions, appear to 
impose ethical worldviews on service-users. Pedagogical approaches in supporting 
political inclusion ranged from didactic banking approaches based on 
rehabilitative intervention, to co-constructivist and dialogical approaches based 
on humanistic, person-centred recovery. Political empowerment in the former 
approach is understood as in the gift of staff and practitioners but in the latter as 
a process of co-construction.  
A Foucauldian theory of power and Butlerian theory of co-constructed identity is 
applied and adapted to the empirical data in an iterative process to understand 
how policies of political inclusion are implemented. Based on this analysis, as well 
as engagement with debates in educational philosophy about indoctrination and 
empowerment in adult education, I conclude that spaces in which law, policy, and 
institutional ritual are denaturalised facilitates and encourages connectedness, co-
production and conflict. Such spaces are in turn productive of political 
opportunities. Greater opportunities to engage in conflict and cooperation with 




other members of the community , in spaces where the significance of the law and 
psychiatric epistemology is reduced, appears vital in the case of people being 
treated in mental rehabilitation to enable staff and service-users to play at, and 
develop, political identities and capabilities. 
These findings have radical implications for the mental health law, policy and 
practice and speak to an inherent contradiction at the heart of the UNCRPD. 
Participation rights such in the UNCRPD attempt to redistribute power from the 
top down so that people with disabilities can exercise greater agency. This views 
power as a resource owned by powerful actors and distributed through law. By 
using legal mechanisms premised on that very conceptualisation of power, and by 
addressing states and mental health service-providers as the principle actors in 
stimulating political change, UNCRPD implementation can have the unintended 
effect of reducing the political agency of people with mental disabilities. By 
contrast, understanding political inclusion, and by extension mental health care 
itself, as a process of dialogical education represents a more promising way forward 
in substantiating participatory rights. 
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This study critically investigates the implementation of policies of political 
inclusion in psychiatric rehabilitation. In studying implementation analysis 
became increasingly focused on the educational strategies used by practitioners to 
support service-user’s participation in public and political life. These strategies 
are referred to as anthrogogies of politics. 
I outline and describe the intricacies of implementation and explore the micro-
social processes involved in political interaction in psychiatric services. Foucault 
and Bourdieu provide some base concepts for analysing human interactions on the 
basis of power relations and capital in different social fields. Goffmanian 
dramaturgy and Butlerian co-construction are also applied to tease apart the data 
and produce detailed theoretical understanding of the processes of politicisation 
under scrutiny. This theoretical framework was developed after data collection but 
is introduced early in the thesis to allow the reader a better understanding of the 
data presented in later chapters. 
Using empirical data, I show how English mental health services implement 
policies of political inclusion. These policies seek to establish equal opportunities 




to engage in public and political life for people with mental disabilities. In 
analysing the empirical data, I observe how implementation, when done well, de‐
emphasise the boundaries between the mental health practitioner and the patient 
and between the political field and everyday life. I apply a theoretical framework 
to understand how political roles are supported through anthrogogies of 
citizenship and ethics and how political identities are constructed, performed and 
recognised in these contexts.  
I clarify how certain social conditions of connectedness and co-construction need 
to be fulfilled if participants are to be reasonably accommodated to increase 
equality of opportunities for political participation. If certain conditions are not 
met, the recognition of persons with mental disabilities as political agents’ risks 
emerging as a fabrication (Goffman, 1974). Where service-users and providers 
shared a belief in a more comprehensive recovery, in which wider political 
empowerment was part of the process and not an outcome, practices of political 
inclusion appeared more effective and had a broader focus. The assumption that 
equal political participation was not practically attainable, and in any case was of 
little value, frequently became a barrier to the substantiation of political rights. 
In addition, the spectre of medicalisation of political expression, based in rituals 
of assessment and containment, was a source of demotivation and alienation. 
Despite a recent surge of interest in recovery, co‐production in care, and political 
inclusion for persons with mental disabilities, social scientists and legal researchers 
have not yet produced detailed research on the everyday implications of 
implementation (Fotaki 2011, Tuurnas 2015, Voorberg et al. 2015). Detailed 
ethnographic study exploring the interactions occurring during implementation of 
policies of political inclusion in mental institutions are necessary if we are to move 
beyond abstract theories of political agency and recovery and towards an 
understanding of its co-production in everyday interactions (Kirkegaard & 
Andersen, 2018). This thesis is a response to this critical need for knowledge. 




In the following chapters I scrutinise positive support, provided to psychiatric 
patients in mental health rehabilitation facilities in England, to enable equal 
opportunities for participation in politics. This is front-line implementation of 
Article 12 and 29 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (UNCRPD) (2006). The policies implemented in these settings aimed 
to enhance and increase opportunities for political participation for persons with 
mental disabilities so they were commensurate with opportunities available to the 
general population.  
In this introductory chapter I provide an overview of the topic by looking at trends 
emerging from the literature relating to political participation in Britain. I then 
explain the research focus and questions.  
 
1.2. Mental Disability and Political Participation  
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(UNCRPD 2006) requires reasonable accommodations to be made to support the 
equal opportunities of people with disabilities to participate in public and political 
life (Art.29). It is the substantive implementation of this right, in the context of 
residential mental health services, that this thesis concerns.  
There have been a number of campaigns, policy initiatives and legislative changes 
in the UK over recent decades that reflect a commitment to change societal 
perceptions of mental illness, as well as improve the capabilities and opportunities 
of people with mental disabilities to participate in political and civic life (Sayce, 
2016 ch.3-4; Mckinley & Yiannoullou, 2011). The Electoral Administration Act 
2006 and the Representation of the People Act 1983 (amended in 2000) now grant 
people detained in mental health institutions, and those without mental capacity, 
a right to vote. 




Expansion of political rights has occurred concurrently with policies of ‘person-
centred care’ seeking to increase patient inclusion in care decisions. The 
participation of service-users in governance and regulation of the mental health 
systems is identified as a fundamental principle in the WHO Mental Health Action 
Plan (WHO, 2012). Across Europe, policies are being implemented aiming to 
positively support public inclusion in health policymaking and implementation. 
Approaches widely refer to concepts such as ‘voice’, ‘representation’ and ‘choice’ 
and generally focus on participation in the politics of public health institutions 
(WHO 2006: 7).  
Patient participation in commissioning and implementing health services has 
become a widespread policy in the UK. In Scotland NHS Boards have duties to 
involve the public alongside duties to ensure equality of opportunity under the 
NHS Reform (Scotland) Act 2004 (s.7). Similarly, in Northern Ireland a duty of 
personal and public involvement in health and social services has been established 
by the Health and Social Services (Reform) Northern Ireland Act 2009 (s.16-20). 
This has been accompanied by various policy commitments to ‘increase user 
involvement in the design and delivery of services’ (Heenan 2009: 454).  
In England and Wales, the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health 
Act 2009 (s.221) imposes a duty on public bodies to involve service-users in 
governance and service provision. The Health and Social Care Act 2012 replaced 
Primary Care Trusts and Strategic Health Authorities with Clinical 
Commissioning Groups which have a legal duty to involve service-users in 
commissioning services (s.26 ss.14U; ss.14Z2). The inclusion in mental health law, 
policy and practice of people treated in mental health services has been identified 
as a key area for improvement (Lewis, 2014).  
Although a range of forums in the health care sector are being opened up to 
participation of their ‘clients’ and ‘consumers’ the benefits of implementation for 
people with disabilities remain insubstantial and abstract and assume that health 




policy is their main political concern. According to Lewis ‘There are elements of 
the current UK mental health policy context which are unfavourable to the 
progressive development of user involvement, beyond a consumerist approach’ 
(Lewis 2014: 8.5). An aggravating factor is the degradation of health care work 
associated with technocratic pursuit of ‘neoliberal efficiencies’. According to 
Mckeown (2015) it has undermined the capability of psychiatric nurses to exert 
influence and involvement at all stages of the nursing process and patient journey. 
Participation in public and political life, for adult citizens, may minimally be 
understood as casting a ballot in an election every four or five years. Other, and 
perhaps more transgressive forms of political action and expression may be 
considered inappropriate even for average citizens, but particularly so for persons 
with mental disabilities (Walker, 2019). Some forms of political action, when 
performed by particular actors, may be cast as symptomatic of mental illness and 
trigger capacity assessments and coercive treatment. 
This possibility can render the threshold for what counts as legitimate political 
participation significantly higher for people with mental disabilities than for the 
general population. The voices of people with mental disabilities are currently 
rarely heard directly and when they are, can be delegitimised on the basis that 
they do not convey ‘real’ experiences. In medical contexts “inappropriate” political 
action and expression may be restricted and discouraged for reasons relating to 
risk and capacity notwithstanding their political rights. By extension, more 
mundane forms of political participation may also become less appealing as action 
and expression is put under intense scrutiny creating rational reasons for 
disengagement. 
The substantive implementation of Article 29 of the UNCRPD should expand 
opportunities for political action for service-users. The data shows however that 
mental health settings are replete with rules and rituals of interaction which 
encourage some and discourage other types of political performances. This renders 




implementation complex. In fact, practices mandated by implementation can have 
the unintended effect of reducing political agency by imposing educational 
initiatives that expand psychiatric management of behaviour to the political field. 
If we understand politics as being a process of conflict and cooperation, treatment 
for prolonged periods of time in residential mental health services can create 
restrictions on the ability and opportunity to construct political identities and 
worldviews by framing even productive conflict as problematic. Furthermore, the 
very imposition of psychological interpretations of the personal can reduce 
opportunities for developing subversive worldviews, political identities and 
capabilities (Kitzinger, 1993).  
Further, researchers such as Bleyen et al. (1998) frame differences between service-
user, carer and service-provider perceptions of political inclusion as problematic. 
They imply that difference and conflict between therapists and their clients are 
detrimental to the recovery and rehabilitation processes (Ibid). Much of the 
literature assumes that conflict is inimical to the recovery and rehabilitation 
processes and frame differences in worldviews and opinions between service-user, 
carer and service-provider as problematic (Tambuyzer & Audenhove, 2013: 676) 
Although institutional restrictions on political expression and action may apply 
to patients and staff in equal measure, it is important at this early stage to 
consider the corrosive disadvantages faced by people with mental disabilities in 
trying to contribute to political decisions and debates. Disengagement with 
electoral participation in the general population is correlated with low socio-
economic status (Electoral Commission, 2005; Lijphart, 1997; Whiteley et al 2001; 
Kessler et al., 1994; Macran et al., 1996; Murali & Oyebode, 2004), low educational 
attainment, lack of contact with politically engaged peers, and mental and 
physical disability (Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999). Mental illness is associated with 
poverty, unemployment, low levels of education and social isolation (Mental 
Health Foundation 2007: 37-8; Meltzer et al., 2002; Singleton et al. 2000). The 




literature indicates people with mental disabilities are often affected by a cluster 
of mutually reinforcing social disadvantages (Wolf and De-Shalit, 2007).  
Social influences on behaviour, and idiosyncrasies of personality, interests and 
perspectives mean that the exercise of political agency and choice are not always 
conceptually distinguishable from symptoms of a mental disorder or the social 
causes of disability. This means that arbitration between appropriate and 
inappropriate political action becomes pertinent. A ‘mistake’ could increase the 
likelihood of paternalistic or coercive treatment being applied. Diagnostic 
categories of mental illness may affect this process of mis/mal-recognition but 
there is no research at present looking at this question in detail. 
Studies have shown that supportive practice during elections may increase 
registration and voting rates (Nash 2002, Keeley et al 2008; Mcintyre et al 2012, 
Okwerekwu, McKenzie, Yates, Sorrentino, & Friedman 2018, Kelly & Nash 2019). 
Voting and registration rates, though important, do not take account of the 
institutional politics occurring in the processes of rehabilitation and recovery - 
politics with a small p – nor of the anthrogogies of ethics and citizenship that are 
a prerequisite of successful engagement with politics on a society wide scale. 
Furthermore, the Article 29 of the UNCRPD requires support to provide equal 
opportunities to participate in public and political life and voting is merely a small 
aspect of this social field. 
Rights to equal participation in public and political life for people with mental 
disabilities suffer from a lack of substantive implementation and thus remain 
obscure, abstract and partial (Rees & Reed, 2016). Rights and policy 
commitments can slip into rhetorical illusions of inclusion whereby progress is 
defined as ‘talking about the issue differently’ or ‘changing attitudes’ with no 
substantive change in practice or behaviour (Thornicroft 2006; Sayce 2016). Nash 
for example argues that seeing service provision as a means of achieving social 




inclusion for those with mental illness can relegate it to a principle of treatment 
compliance (Nash, 2002). 
The realisation and importance of service-user’s participation in both ‘big-p’ 
Politics (electoral participation) and small-p politics (of care and recovery) has 
been assessed in the literature using a variety of measures: convergence of 
practitioner and ‘consumer’ conceptualisations of participation (Anthony and 
Crawford 2000; Glasby et al. 2003; Lammers & Happell 2003; Lloyd & King 2003); 
availability and communication of information (Anthony and Crawford 2000; 
Connor 1999); education for staff and service-users to enhance decision making 
(Beresford 2007; Connor 1999; Linhorst et al. 2005; Warne and McAndrew 2007) 
and procedures for involvement in institutional governance for service-users and 
carers (Cawston and Barbour 2003; Cleary et al. 2006). 
These measures capture some aspects of small-p political inclusion. However, there 
are issues in applying supportive interventions as they broach the line between 
‘levelling the playing field’ and ‘differential treatment based on mental disability’. 
In this thesis I move beyond psy-epistemologies and social care paradigms and 
consider some insights from political science. This allows us to problematise the 
assumption that mental incapacity and illness is the cause of political apathy and 
look at the social barriers to functioning in this context in line with the social 
model of disability enshrined in the UNCRPD. It is partly for this reason that the 
question of whether mental health diagnosis is an important factor in political 
engagement, and if so how, is not a central focus of the analysis. 
Power in psychiatric institutions is exercised through a strict hierarchy. Certain 
professional practitioners exercise power (both epistemological and legal) to reify 
service-user’s identities as disordered and delegitimise their contributions on this 
basis. They also use power to arbitrate conflict and restrict cooperative activities. 
Service-users also exercise power in extracting care and resources from staff, 




sometimes using unusual or antisocial methods. The exercise of, and conceding to, 
such powers requires explanation.  
In the contexts under study the exercise of power appears superficially to depend 
on The Mental Health Act 1983 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005. As we see in 
later chapters, these laws grant legal powers to suspend normal rights and 
responsibilities based on the need to assess and treat mental illness and protect 
the patient and public from harm. The ascription of role and identity and the 
construction of worldviews is based on authority derived from psy-epistemologies 
(Rose 1990). Power in the institution is much more polycentric than this legalistic 
understanding of power suggests.  
The sociology of health and illness can help elucidate two issues relevant to these 
the exercise of power in mental institutions: the issue of reification and that of 
narrative power (Brown, 1995; Jutel 2009). This expanding literature examines 
the way in which diagnostic categories representing behavioural patterns are 
ascribed and the processes by which they are enforced and internalised.  
Gill and Maynard attempt to capture some of the empirical aspects of these 
processes in their ethnomethodological approach to labelling (1995: 13). Labels 
and counter-labels are applied and constructed. These in turn influence 
recognition and reification processes and inform worldviews. However, the effects 
of labelling in terms of political opportunities are multifarious and contradictory. 
Labels are applied and policed within institutions and in wider communities in 
such a variety of ways that labelling theory sometimes suffers from being so 
general as to be useless in analysing the micro-social interactions under study. 
My research indicates much greater complexity than can be grasped by a binary 
understanding of compliance and deviance defined by powerful actors using labels. 
Power is exercised by all on all. For example, my observations and interviews 
demonstrate structural, social, political and personal motivations for adopting 
certain names for one’s identity and naming other actors and actions. These 




interacted in both deterministic and agential ways to place actors in particular 
narratives. Labels may more fruitfully be understood in this context as ways of 
constructing worldviews. Actors perform such labelled identities with a range of 
different audiences in mind (Hollin & Pilnik, 2018; 1216). Performance can 
reconstruct the meaning of a given identity label and labels can be reclaimed. 
Labels can be both empowering and disempowering depending on context, 
performance and audience and are ascribed, embraced and subverted by service-
users and staff.  
Rather than situating our understanding of these processes as an aspect of 
labelling and deviance theory, it is perhaps more enlightening to understand these 
processes in terms of role, performance and narrative identity construction 
(Goffman, 1974; Butler, 1988). Forms of resistance and transgression may provide 
a way of positing alternative approaches to rehabilitation, recovery and the good 
life. At the same time labels such as ‘political citizen’ can be ascribed in 
interaction in ways that expand opportunities and freedoms.  
Whilst power may be used to expand opportunities it can also be used to restrict 
them. In institutions professional actors have the resources to overcome political 
resistance by defining it in ways that justify coercive control. This can result in 
implementation of policies of inclusion becoming a form of managed autonomy. 
People (including staff) are required in law to perform in ‘autonomous’ ways to 
humanise and personalise the healthcare provided. Psy-epistemology requires 
service-users to perform as ‘autonomous’ actors to demonstrate recovery. Laws 
and policies requiring people to act in humanistic and autonomous ways can result 
in political roles being performed and enforced to demonstrate compliance (Callon 
and Rabeharisoa 2004: 13). 
The centralised management of participation activities in spaces that are not co-
owned, (i.e. restricting service-user participation in governance meetings to a 
single representative on managements terms), ensures that some possibilities for 




performing autonomy arise in non-threatening areas while other, more risky 
possibilities are eliminated (Hacking 1995, Hollin, 2017). Transgressive discourses 
may be co-opted to sustain existing power relations. For example, person-centred 
approaches, and the social model of disability can have the unintended effect of 
supporting existing power relations between service-users and practitioners by 
dressing coercive treatment in the narrative of supporting autonomy (Armstrong 
2002, Aspis 1997, Buchanan & Walmsley 2006).  
Acts of resistance may be defined as inefficiencies to be dealt with by evidence-
based practice and thus delegitimised as political contributions. Acts which 
attempt to unsettle diagnostic practices in situ may, therefore, ultimately be 
disregarded. There may be instances where acts of resistance are themselves 
interpreted as evidence of clinical pathology confirming and legitimising the power 
of clinicians. This has been observed in the diagnosis of autism whereby resistance 
and role distancing behaviours are defined as symptoms contributing to diagnosis 
(Hollin & Pilnik, 2018; 1228). 
Mental illness, in legal argument and in the practice of mental health treatment, 
often refers to everything that mentally ill people do. The way in which mental 
disorder discursively infects a person’s whole identity, so that all actions are seen 
in terms of their mental health, appears particularly acute for people with 
personality disorder and schizophrenia. In distinguishing between actions related 
to personality and those caused by schizophrenia a psychologist providing evidence 
to the European Court of Human Rights said: 
‘It is impossible to make any reliable distinction between symptoms… and those 
which are due to an individual’s personality... in the case of a patient known to 
suffer from schizophrenia, it would be usual to assume that the symptoms were due 
to the schizophrenic illness.’ (Keenan v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 
27229/95, (2001) 33 EHRR 38) 




Psychiatric distinctions between political and disordered behaviour are therefore 
problematic because once a categorisation of mental illness is applied any 
behaviour deemed socially unacceptable can be interpreted as aspects of their 
mental disorder. This can undermine attempts to present oneself as a political 
citizen.  
Psy-epistemology can also collapse Bios (public life and the determination of the 
good life for human beings to be decided by political conflict and cooperation) 
into Zoê (the private, natural or biological life only included in the polis by its 
exclusion from politics) by associating mental health with the good life. Agamben 
(1995) and Snoek argue that: 
‘Managing the health of citizens is now the central task of politics and simply being 
alive has become more important than the good life. At the same time simply being 
alive is not acknowledged as a human life and politics is searching for the bios of 
the zoê, the form of life, the humanity of the living being… in trying to find the 
humanity of simply being alive, life becomes stripped of all specific characteristics 
and loses its value. With this loss of value, life loses its political rights and comes 
to stand outside politics’ (Snoek, 2014: 54-5) 
The collision of psychiatric epistemology with democratic conceptualisations of 
personhood plays out in interactions between staff and service-user in mental 
health wards in the attempt to include people with mental disabilities in politics. 
During elections political roles are performed in accordance with certain rules and 
rituals derived from popular understandings of what political citizenship is. 
Service-users, in being supported to participate, are thus subjected to, and engage 
in, anthrogogies of politics. It is how, and on what basis, this educational 
interaction progresses which is a central focus of the thesis. My findings indicate 
that this practice often slips back into medicalised rituals of assessment and 
treatment which can demotivate participation. 




Having introduced the general topic of inquiry the remainder of this chapter will 
outline some more specific themes running through the socio-legal literature on 
the substantiation of participation rights. Namely the concepts of benevolence, 
agency, power and indoctrination.  
 
1.3. Benevolence, Agency, Power and Indoctrination 
In 2006, the UNCRPD was introduced. It is founded, in part, on the principle of 
participation for disabled persons in public and political life. Article 3(c) states 
that participation is one of the general principles of the convention. Article 1 
incorporates ‘full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with 
others’ into the definition of disability. 
Practical realisation of the UNCRPD, and more specifically the right to equal 
opportunities to participate in public and political life (Art.29 UNCRPD, 2006) 
implies radical and far reaching changes to the mental health system. Bartlett 
neatly captures some of the difficulties of attempting to transform practice in line 
with UNCPRD principles: 
‘reform does not occur in the abstract, but on the ground, in the context of existing 
environments and institutions… the issues that arise are not merely geographically 
and socially specific, but they may also raise issues in fields beyond disability… 
they may involve human rights situations that are pressing and immediate, where 
precise requirements of the [UNCRPD] may yet be unclear, and where those 
charged with reform… may not intuitively support its objectives. The precise 
direction of reform in such situations may be unclear, and even if clear, may not 
be politically achievable. Even if politically achievable, such reforms may not be 
implemented on the ground, through intransigence or hostile incomprehension of 
people in the system. Approach to reform in these situations is, therefore, complex.’ 
(Bartlett, 2014: 178) 




It is an exploration of this complexity, in all it’s richness, that my thesis attempts 
to provide. 
The UNCRPD re-affirms a number of human rights for persons with mental 
disabilities. Obligations are placed on state parties to make reasonable 
accommodations that reduce barriers to equal participation. In particular Article 
12 and 29 UNCRPD create rights for people with disabilities to have reasonable 
accommodations in place to ensure their inclusion on an equal basis with others, 
in public and political life. Political citizenship for people with mental disabilities 
is concerned with influencing both the ‘content of social rights and obligations’ 
and the ‘various social arrangements whereby ... benefits are distributed to different 
sectors of society’ (Turner, 1993: 2–3).  
These rights are potentially transformative in both symbolic and practical ways. 
They are addressed to States and thus reflect a view of progressive change and 
power redistribution as a process of top-down reform. Rummery’s theoretical work 
on citizenship in the welfare state indicates that the policy focus on developing 
and improving political capabilities for people with mental disabilities through 
top down policy reform can work against political inclusion. In other words, that 
the application of law and policy in the management of political participation 
potentially strengthens the role of practitioners in ways that can potentially 
disempower service-users and reinforce social exclusion (Rummery, 2006). 
Participation rights are applicable in both the private and political sphere. Social 
and political rights to participation thus overlap and intersect in complex ways 
(Sandland, 2017). Sandland argues that participation rights are concerned with 
providing conditions in which people with disabilities can autonomously form and 
pursue their version of the good life.  
Whilst protection and provision rights are concerned to secure the conditions of 
possibility for a good and meaningful life, participation rights in the [UN]CRPD 
are concerned with living that life, and seek to provide appropriately modified, 




person-centred, versions of traditional adult civil and political rights to self-
determination and involvement in the polis. (Sandland, 2017: 93-4). 
Increased and enhanced political inclusion for people with mental disabilities can 
support their autonomous pursuit of the good life in a variety of ways: from 
therapeutic improvements (Gordon 2006; McCann et al. 2018) increasing a sense 
of empowerment (Felton and Stickley 2004; Frisby 2001), better knowledge and 
information (Nilsen et al. 2006), to improved social and economic conditions 
(Crawford et al. 2002). All these factors can potentially contribute to both 
political inclusion and person-centred recovery. Inclusion also has institutional and 
reputational benefits in that it supports satisfaction rates, improves health 
outcomes and strengthens arguments for recommission (Stringer et al. 2008).  
Human rights discourse focused on such outcomes can however be criticised for 
embracing conceptualisations of the political citizen as consumer and subject 
(Thomas, 2007). The introduction of rights to political participation reflects 
general trends towards corporatisation, consumerism and user involvement in 
mental health (Sandland, 2017). Increased political participation of people with 
mental disabilities means they are associated more and more with self-serving, 
individualistic and independent citizenship. This can have benefits as well as 
drawbacks in the form of re-responsibilisation – i.e. direct accountability for one 
actions (Tisdall, 2008; Sinclair, 2004).  
Participation rights require people in positions of power and authority to respect 
the agency of subjects of that power, with ‘participation’ requiring more than 
increased voting and registration rates or tokenistic patient representation in 
hospital governance. As aspects of the thesis concern educational initiatives 
applied to better support political capabilities, and data collection includes young 
adults supported to vote for the first time, debates around Article 24 UNCRPD 
and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) can 
offer useful insights. In the UNCRC children’s participation is understood to aim 




at providing conditions in which they can develop a sense of self-worth, capacities, 
and confidence (Sandland, 2017). It is also said to mean ‘better outcomes, both for 
young people and for organisations’ (Kirby et al, 2003: 18). Better participation, 
in theory, enhances the accountability of institutions, and democracy itself, by 
creating the conditions in which active members of the community can exercise 
power in ways that hold those in authority to account. However, participation 
may be premised in practice on performing the identity of a ‘good citizen’ and 
even when autonomous participation is achieved subversive contributions may be 
readily dismissed. Participation is thus dependent on the participant being a 
governable subject and recognised as an acceptable member of the polis. 
Participation rights are constructed in ways intended to help members of the 
community ‘learn how their views… are taken into account and shape the outcome 
of [decision making] processes’ (United Nations Committee on the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (UNCCRC), 2009, para. 3). This ‘should not only be a 
momentary act, but the starting point for an intense exchange… on the 
development of policies, programmes and measures in all relevant contexts of 
[their] lives’ (UNCCRC, 2009, para. 13). Participation rights under the UNCRC 
appear to require radical changes aiming to empower people from the bottom up. 
Participation rights under the UNCRPD, as the data will show, are implemented 
in the same way – as a educational intervention. 
The application of participation rights appears to incorporate a multiplicity of 
aims. Some of these aims are contradictory. As we have seen above participation 
rights aim at the production of political citizens. Other articles however seek to 
curtail state influence on the formation of political views. Article 12 of the 
UNCRPD for example requires undue influence to be policed but at the same 
time requires capacity to be supported. In mental health practice supportive 
interventions are under scrutiny for undue influence. This can cause practitioners 
to distance themselves from the educator role and could conceivably have a chilling 
effect on political socialisation for people confined in mental institutions.  




At this point it may be useful to consider the dichotomy between empowerment 
and indoctrination in the education through which we seek to empower members 
of the community to become active political agents. Momanu (2012) traces the 
etymology of the term indoctrination and shows that the previous meaning of the 
verb to indoctrinate was: to instruct, to provide someone with knowledge, to teach 
a science (Robert 1957, 1564). When applied to the anthrogogies of politics and 
citizenship, which involve socialisation into political ideologies, the term undergoes 
a process of pejoration. According to Momanu’s reading (2012) of Robert, the 
term has come to denote a set of principles stated as true that aim to guide or 
govern people’s actions (Robert, 1957: 1564), and indoctrination thus relates to: 
“the attempt to make somebody adhere to a doctrine, an opinion, a point of view” 
(Ibid). In relation to participatory rights the UNCRPD and the MCA 2005 aim 
to both impose duties to support people’s political inclusion and to impose 
safeguards against undue influence – a form of indoctrination. 
The contradictory aims of participatory rights (to both socialise people into a 
political system and also empower the individual to pursue their own individual 
version of the good life), creates difficulties in evaluating policy implementation 
in the case of Art.29 UNCPRD. Positive support from those in authority can 
superficially increase political participation but may reduce agency by inculcating 
closed-minded views. In addition, responsibility for substantive realisation is 
placed on those in functional authority, in authoritarian institutions, creating a 
risk of indoctrinating pedagogies being applied in spite of good intentions. 
Various models have been developed that can help in this regard (Kirby et al., 
2003; Storm & Edwards, 2013; Hart, 1992). The main mechanism by which adults 
gain opportunities to participate in political and civic life on these perspectives is 
in casting a ballot. Recovery from mental illness under the patient-centred care, 
shared decision-making, patient participation and recovery models are also 
presented as emancipatory. However, voting poses practical and social challenges 
for people detained in mental health rehabilitation and represents only small 




possibilities for empowerment in their everyday lives. Political empowerment is 
not something that is only performed on the small and infrequent stage of the 
polling station. One of the problems encountered in implementation is that 
political rights are seen as exclusively about voting. 
Sandland argues that the substantiation of participation rights in the mental 
health context can be understood in terms of the tension between autonomy and 
benevolence: participation implies agency and, to some extent at least, constitutes 
the displacement of benevolence—as well as of… power and authority over 
populations constructed as incapable. The construction of power as a resource to 
be redistributed in the realisation of political rights means that arguments for 
more and better participation are frequently addressed not to people with 
disabilities but those charged with their care. In this frame the principal actors 
are not disabled people themselves but beneficent others (Tisdall, 2008). In the 
discourse, participation for persons with mental disabilities is seen to be dependent 
on the cooperation of professionals, carers, family and friends and their ‘sharing 
power’ (Storm & Edwards, 2013: 317). It is they who must grant power to those 
under their care and manage its exercise. Thus, the grating of political 
participation rights is conceived at inception as a top down exercise of power 
redistribution rather than a bottom up system of political mobilisation.  
Whilst the taking on of responsibility for those apparently not able to represent 
themselves is potentially justifiable, giving a profession the power to assess the 
risk of someone’s political views being somehow ‘ineffective’ or ‘risky’ is a poor 
starting point for empowerment. Such a system endorses a political environment 
based on the rules of ownership and appropriation. Rather than power being 
something which can be owned and exchanged, it may alternatively be understood 
as something which is exercised on all by all (Sandland, 2017; Foucault, 1983: 
220). In applying this to anthrogogies of politics it is useful to consider the 
educational strategies that might be used to support such autonomy. 




Taylor (2017: 47) argues that the open-minded agent is “broadly motivated to 
pursue truth and understanding, and is specifically motivated to give due regard to 
available evidence and argument when forming new beliefs and understandings and 
when maintaining or revising already established beliefs and understandings”. To 
develop autonomous political agency service-users must adopt the open-minded 
motive. This requires intellectual modesty but also the courageous and 
intellectually diligent pursuit of knowledge. This also requires one to embrace the 
role of student. 
This understanding has several implications for the implementation of rights for 
political participation. Power and authority are not seen in abstract terms but 
rather as embedded in educational interaction. Power may be understood in terms 
of ‘actions upon actions’ and as characteristic of normal human relations 
(Sandland, 2017).  
Article 12 and 29 of the UNCRPD requires state parties to operate their mental 
health systems so as to both develop the personality, talents, abilities, and 
capacities of the service-user to their fullest potential, and to prepare them for 
responsible life in a free society. The aims of policies of political inclusion require 
mental health practitioners to teach people to become autonomous political 
citizens. Political citizenship is associated with a shared worldview and a common 
vision of good governance. It also involves taking responsibility to be both 
governable and governed. 
The risk of imposing anthrogogies of politics, which understand power in the 
former sense of ownership, is that people are ‘re-responsibilised’ or forced to be 
free political agents through top down policy. In this approach freedom can feel 
very much like coercion. An additional issue for institutions is that the freedoms 
‘granted’ exceed the boundaries of appropriateness imposed on their exercise. The 
autonomous subject, educated in the mental health rehabilitation to be a political 
citizen, might exercise this capability to resist a given worldview or version of the 




good life and cease to be governable by mental health practice. ‘There are no 
relations of power without resistances’ and resistance ‘exists all the more by being 
in the same place as power; hence, like power, resistance is multiple’ (Foucault, 
1980: 142).  
Sandland argues that ‘notions of power based on ownership or possession, and 
which see it as alienable, seem inadequate to capture all the competing and 
conflicting actions and flows which together constitute the operation of power and 
resistance in the politicised mental health ward’ (Sandland, 2017: 96). This can 
limit our ability fully to evaluate the risks and benefits of the implementation of 
rights to political participation. 
 
1.4. Identifying the Research Topic 
Having outlined some issues and dilemmas that arise in direct implementation of 
participation rights for people with mental disabilities, we can begin to see some 
of complexities that face practitioners in attempting to positively support political 
participation in the course of mental health treatment. The presence of these 
philosophical and practical issues, and a lack of empirical investigation into their 
consequences, justifies taking frontline implementation as the focus of the 
empirical field work.  
Policy implementation is studied in a wide range of disciplines and according to a 
variety of epistemological approaches (Hill & Hupe, 2014). Pragmatism is required 
in choosing the right conceptual tools suited to the context in which empirical 
work will take place (Saetren, 2005). 
As a topic of theoretical and empirical inquiry, the political participation of people 
with mental disabilities is a field which does not respect disciplinary boundaries. 
This thesis explores how policies of political inclusion are being implemented in 




mental health services from a socio-legal perspective. The main focus is on the 
processes and relations inherent in implementation and understanding them in 
theoretical terms rather than evaluating them on the basis of therapeutic 
outcomes or voting and registration rates. However, as the research process 
progressed participants interrogated and evaluated the policy on their own terms 
and recommendations were co-constructed. This process of inquiry to some extent 
becomes circular as it in part seeks to model the phenomenon of participation 
that it purports to interrogate by encouraging participants to engage in open-
minded study of the process of politicisation they engage in.  
Implementation of a policy of political inclusion for mental health inpatients is a 
complex undertaking. Some of the policy outcomes are ambiguous. For example, 
in person-centred and personalised practice the desired outcomes are idiosyncratic 
to individual service-users who are motivated to political action and expression 
for a multitude of different reasons. In addition, service-user, service-provider and 
regulator expectations diverge, and service provision regularly involves coercive 
practices occurring alongside liberating intervention. Therefore, to base the 
current research project on whether certain outcome variables were realised 
entailed choosing a fixed interpretation of the policy aims. This did not seem 
reasonable in a research project in which I was keen to foreground the voices of 
service-users and staff who had a more fluid view of policy aims. 
The oscillation between broad and narrow definitions of policy outcome is one of 
the processes of implementation that this thesis seeks to explore, analyse and 
explain. I wanted to identify some of the environmental and social variables that 
influence the performance of those implementing the policy and those subject to 
it. This helped to explain variation in political opportunities available within the 
network of individuals at the sites in question. 
Implementation theory suggests that performances are heavily influenced by the 
role a performer plays in the organisation and in inter-organisational relations. 




Different rules and roles pertain to different situations and environments (Hill & 
Hupe, 2014). Thus, a staff member, a ward manager and a service-user may all 
operate in distinct political environments within the same institutional setting. 
This backdrop allows us to engage with some of the systemic and organisational 
variables in policy outcome by exposing some of the influences on institutionally 
ascribed, and personally (co)constructed roles. 
 
1.5. The Research Questions 
The practice of providing positive support for political action raises a number of 
interesting complexities. How does one enhance and support political participation 
positively through professional services whilst ensuring that undue influence is not 
applied to voting decisions? How do service-providers and users manage the 
‘optics’ of such an interaction? How does one provide an unbiased and neutral 
range of political information to sheltered patients in long term residential rehab 
wards without risking indoctrination? How does the perceived therapeutic or 
rehabilitative effect of political participation influence practitioner’s assessment of 
patient capacity and risk? How does one reliably distinguish between appropriate 
political expression and action in the mental health wards and inappropriate or 
pathological behaviours?  
All these questions expose a fundamental tension in psychiatric practice between 
the use of power to (a) close down risky and dangerous options in order to protect 
people from unwise decisions, and (b) to expand the range of options available to 
members of the community to pursue the good life. 
Even larger questions may be raised about what this practice says about the 
epistemological and ontological roots of the current mental health system and 
democracy itself. What does it say about our approach to political participation 
for the general citizenry and what are the implications for electoral democracy? 




What does it mean for our understandings of personhood, agency, and mental 
disability? These are questions that cannot be answered in this thesis, but which 
must be acknowledged as a backdrop for the chapters to come.  
In conducting an exploratory research project based on ethnographic methods it 
was difficult to pinpoint a specific research question that neatly encompasses the 
entirety of the project undertaken. In addition, ethnographic work is unsuited to 
the proposing of a specific hypothesis or research question that is then tested or 
straightforwardly answered. However, I narrowed my topic of inquiry down to the 
following set of questions. 
How are policies aiming to enhance and increase opportunities for political 
participation of people with mental disabilities being implemented in residential 
psychiatric rehabilitation; what barriers or difficulties are encountered in achieving 
that aim;  and how might a policy to enhance political participation be more 
successfully implemented? 
In exploring this broad area of inquiry, I found it useful to identify three subsidiary 
questions which go beyond description towards more comprehensive 
understanding and evaluation: 
1. On what basis are such policies being implemented? 
2. What are the principles that underpin the distinction between 
appropriate and inappropriate political action and expression for people 
undergoing psychiatric treatment? 
3. What are the wider implications of practices of political inclusion being 
implemented in this way? 
The research questions interact to inform a cyclical process of inquiry that moves 
from exploration towards explanation and back again (Marshall and Rossman, 
2006). The study aims to elucidate the conditions which may better advance the 
rights of people with mental disabilities to participate in politics on an equal basis 




with others. Whilst I do not offer any definitive answers in relation to how mental 
health practitioners might fully substantiate the political rights of psychiatric 
patients; this thesis demonstrates the complexities of policy implementation and 
suggests some possible routes to further research and progress. 
The thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by presenting rich 
empirical observations about political inclusion and participation from three sites 
of implementation. I thereby generate contextualised understandings of how 
participation of people with mental disabilities has been interpreted and enacted 
in the everyday lives of people with mental disabilities. In addition, I contribute 
theoretical and methodological developments building on Foucault (1980), 
Goffman (1961; 1974), Butler (1988) and Van der Eijk (2017; 2018). 
Through an analysis of three strategically selected cases I show how an 
incongruence of legal, symbolic and social boundaries, and restrictions on co-
construction, role and identity can undermine politically inclusive practice. The 
institutional requirement to entrench social roles within mental health services 
indicates that symbolic boundaries are continuously reconstructed between 
mentally disabled political actors and other members of the community. These 
boundaries mean that actors may be explicitly restricted from, or not be convinced 
of the value of, political participation (Kirkegaard & Andersen 2018). I also 
observe aspects of positive practices that inculcate open-minded political agency 
and seek to describe and explain these differences in theoretical terms. 
 
1.6. The Scope of the Thesis 
The research project is concerned with how we are supporting those detained in 
residential psychiatric care to participate in public and political life. This focus is 
born out of a concern that people with significant mental disabilities who are 




institutionalised by the state should attract greater obligations to make 
opportunities for inclusion in public and political life available and accessible. This 
is because significant restrictions on such opportunities are likely created by 
coercive mental health treatment. In addition, policies to support political 
participation for people with mental disabilities appear to be mainly located in 
residential rehabilitation facilities. For these reasons, the project concentrates on 
people with mental disabilities detained in mental health rehab and not the wider 
community-based services.  
This means that the findings are not generalisable to the wider population of 
people with mental health challenges. However, the conceptualisation of political 
action and the theorisation of mental health treatment as a process of civic 
education are transferable to a wider range of contexts. More research is needed 
to establish the prevalence of policy and practice in community based mental 
health services seeking to implement the obligations imposed by Article 29 
UNCRPD as well as the way psychiatric and mental impairments, in interaction 
with social barriers such as discrimination and lack of economic opportunities can 
impact on political participation. Although this is beyond the scope of the current 
research project it lays some of the theoretical and methodological groundwork 
for further study in these areas. 
Political inclusion therefore is positioned in the thesis as something that is not 
only attainable following achievement of good health, educational attainment, 
employment and the establishment of a settled social and family life but something 
that all human beings do in the course of their everyday lives in seeking influence 
over decisions that affect them. Political inclusion is not subordinated to the 
principles of functional rehabilitation and treatment and the language and 
assumptions of psychiatric practice are not adopted as the lens through which 
phenomenon are observed. This has important consequences for the data and 
analysis in the thesis. 




The conscious choice was made to avoid constructing political inclusion as 
dependent on psychiatric staff ‘giving’ people with mental health difficulties the 
opportunity to participate. Although participation whilst in treatment may be 
dependent on the provision of support and reasonable accommodation for those 
with significant mental impairments, the assumption that this is broadly the case 
for mental health service-users is unfounded. Political autonomy is not a binary 
status (i.e. you have it or you don’t) but is a matter of degree and increases and 
decreases according to cognitive function as well as the support offered, and the 
opportunities presented, in a given context. 
For those service-users with significant impairments, increased implementation of 
policies of political inclusion can support and enhance their development and 
recovery. Whether or not they will eventually be able to fully participate in public 
and political life, even partial participation in the politics of their everyday lives 
remains a worthy goal and people can be involved whether or not they are ‘sick’ 
or ‘well’.  
It is often very difficult for practitioners to support autonomy whilst seeking to 
manage difficult and significant behavioural and social problems. However, it is 
also a form of mis/mal-recognition to justify coercive treatment on the basis that 
an individual is not properly autonomous. In everyday life, no human being is 
completely autonomous as freedom is a complex characteristic which is not 
susceptible to easy measurement. If you increase freedom in one area (for example 
in relation to political action) then freedom in other spheres may be reduced (e.g. 
freedom to do what you want on election day). In addition, we often can only 
achieve an enhanced degree of freedom in action and influence in political decisions 
through our relationships with others and in carving out a role for ourselves as 
relevant stakeholders. This requires compromise. We all exercise degrees of 
autonomy within the physical, economic, social and ethical constraints imposed 
upon us. The contemporary understanding of autonomy of individuals, originally 
used in reference to a form of social organisation that foregrounds self-governance, 




has acquired meanings as diverse as liberty, rights, privacy, individual choice, 
freedom of will, causing  one’s  own  behaviour,  and  being one’s  own  person  
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). 
Differing theoretical perspectives offer a range of interpretations of autonomy, 
however there is little agreement about the nature, scope, or application of 
autonomy in the psychiatric setting. Those following Kant argue that autonomy 
is a “freedom of will” (Kant, 1785/1964, p. 97) and takes absolute priority over 
other ethical principles. Other theorists define autonomy as the capacity to act 
rationally and do not imply that autonomy has priority over other principles 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). These theories have the unfortunate consequence 
of casting people with mental disabilities as lacking autonomy by linking it with 
the capacity for rational thought. Mental health diagnosis is often a general 
determination that an individual is lacking in this capacity for autonomy to some 
degree. 
Some theorists therefore adopt a relational analysis of autonomy that offers a 
conception of autonomy that is more nuanced. Relational autonomy introduces 
the idea that people are embedded socially and that one’s identity is moulded 
through social relationships and an intricate intersection of gender, race, ethnicity, 
age, class and health status (Sherwin, 1998 & 2000; MacKenzie and Stoljar, 2000). 
People can be both constrained by the pragmatics of their ascribed and chosen 
roles, but this also allows them greater freedoms in other spheres of action. 
Autonomy is a quality that people possess in variable degrees according to context 
and social position. It is constantly in flux and not only a characteristic of the 
individual but of their social situation. An example is that adopting the mental 
health patient role can restrict a person’s freedom of movement and choice in 
relation to medication, so restricts autonomy in the personal sphere, but could 
provide access to education, social support and a community of peers that provide 
opportunities for political action and influence in the public sphere.  




On the other side of this coin many people ascribed the role of mental health 
patient engaging in political action may find that they are dismissed as irrational 
in both the personal and public spheres. Their worldviews are readily denigrated 
as fantastical and their proposed solutions as unrealistic. It is clear that the 
distinction between appropriate and inappropriate political action, within 
psychiatric rehabilitation, presents significant difficulties for mental health nurses 
and other psychiatric professions and has wider implications in how residents of 
such institutions engage in the public sphere. The principles on which this 
distinction is made require clarification and this is done in the concluding chapter 
of the thesis. 
 
There are a number of key limitations to the present study and a number of 
avenues of inquiry that were bracketed off. These limitations should be 
highlighted, and the areas excluded brought back to light to enable readers to 
evaluate the quality of findings and identify the areas ripe for further research. 
Because the practical implementation of policies of political inclusion is relatively 
rare in England the number of sites and participants was very small. This means 
that by design the research was contextual and the findings therefore obviously 
not statistically generalisable. It is also the case that, while I think it would be an 
extremely fruitful exercise to seek to apply my conclusions beyond the contexts 
studied, great care and sensitivity would be needed to take full account of the 
uniqueness of any new sites. 
Problems of access and recruitment were overcome by allowing NHS trusts and 
the private service-provider to self-select participants. This meant that only one 
responsible clinician (and a rather radical one at that) was involved in the study 
at the consultation stage. The practice of responsible clinicians in the application 
of policies of political inclusion is important to consider in further research. In 




addition, the absence of mental health advocacy in the process of politicisation 
may be another avenue of inquiry to pursue in the future. 
The research was based to some extent on the assumption that greater 
participation of persons with mental disabilities in politics would be of benefit for 
themselves, mental health services and for society generally. The research therefore 
became focused on the benefits of inclusion and participation and how to best 
implement these principles.  
One of the main issues in designing the research method was in finding an 
appropriate conceptualisation of politics to define the phenomenon under study 
and to select appropriate research sites. In choosing to adopt a very broad 
definition of politics (Van der Eijk’s aspect definition) I had a conceptual indicator 
which allowed identification of appropriate practices to study, but that was not so 
narrow as to exclude the social meanings attributed to politics by the participants 
themselves. This allowed me to conduct an ethnographic inquiry without imposing 
a narrow and dogmatic understanding of what politics was in interview and 
observation. I am however aware that the debate around the nature of politics 
and power is deep and extensive and that I have only been able to touch the 
surface.  
An appreciative inquiry approach was adopted which meant that the critical edge 
of the data collection may have been compromised to some extent. In consultation 
I also perhaps got too close to staff participants and became somewhat of a staff 
insider. This temporary adoption of staff perspectives, in developing resources and 
reforming policies at the research sites may have diminished the ability to perceive 
the negative aspects of policy and implementation. Moving away from this 
perspective and re-establishing a more balanced view was achieved by withdrawing 
somewhat from the process of policy reform in the institutions and extensive 
consultation with service-user participants. I then had to withdraw from these 
relationships too in order to concentrate on writing up the thesis. I have attempted 




to convey the diverse perspectives of participants as accurately as possible given 
the multiple levels of interpretation that occur in the process. 
The thesis only considers people with mental illnesses detained in mental health 
rehabilitation and not the wider community-based services which may be more 
proactive in this area. This is largely because the barriers to participation are 
likely to be much more acute in residential services and therefore more 
accommodation is required in these settings under the UNCRPD principles to 
equalise opportunities. 
Further limitations result from the choice of research questions. The thesis 
concentrates on exploring examples of positive practice due to issues with gaining 
access to institutions less proud of their initiatives in this area. I therefore do not 
present any evidence on what is happening in services less keen on implementing 
policies of political inclusion. Broader surveys and access to a wider range of 
institutions is required to present generalisable results. However, many of the 
findings and insights may be readily transferable to similar contexts so long as 
careful attention is paid to the similarities and differences between settings. I do 
not present as much data as I would like on supportive practices for political 
participation outside of elections either. As we will see, those who are not eligible 
to vote were often excluded from the remit of the formal policies (but not from 
Art.29) and so this was a practical restriction rather than one explicitly chosen.  
As participating institutions were responsible for recruitment to the research 
project for reasons related to the assessment of capacity to consent those who 
were ineligible to vote are not represented in the data collected either. This is 
because these individuals were not considered beneficiaries of the policies in 
question by service-providers. This assumption is discussed and criticised in the 
thesis and recommendations are presented that seek to ameliorate these issues. 
Broader surveys and research are required so a fuller range of cases and 
participants can be studied. 




The research questions do not seek to test hypothesis relating to the theoretical 
framework developed. The theoretical framework developed emerged inductively 
from the data and was an outcome as well as a foundation for theoretical 
development in the later stages of the project. Therefore, the methods and 
methodologies were used as a tool for exploration of the diverse issues and 
dilemmas that practice presents. This in turn was used as a basis for hypothesis 
generation rather than testing. Despite some minor misgivings we can say with 
confidence a number of useful insights have been gleaned from the research 
process. 
 
1.7. Reference Key 
Policy documents are referenced by the title of the document the site number and 
the date when the policy was drafted (e.g. - Voting Rights and Procedure for 
Inpatients, Site 1, July 2016). 
The references to interviews include the site where the data was gathered, the 
transcript number, the date and the role of the individual in question – (e.g. Site 
1, Transcript 1, 2017, WM). Roles are referenced using the following 
abbreviations:  
MHN – Mental Health Nurse 
OT - Occupational Therapist 
RC – Responsible Clinician 
SALT – Speech and Language Therapist 
SMHN – Senior Mental Health Nurse 




SU – Service-user 
SW – Social Worker 
WM – Ward Manger  
The observation notes are referenced similarly including the site, title of the 
document and the date at which observation occurred – (e.g. Site 1, Observation 
Notes, 2017). Consultations with participants to discuss findings and 
recommendations are referenced by the site, consultation, the date and the role of 
the individual I talked to – (e.g. Site 2, Consultation, 2018, RC). The research 
journal is referenced simply by the date at which the entry was made – (Research 
Journal, Jan 1st 2018) 
 
1.8. Structure of the Thesis 
In this introductory chapter I have provided an overview of the topic by looking 
at trends emerging from the literature relating to political participation. I have 
also explained the research focus and posed some questions to be explored 
throughout the thesis.  
In the following introductory chapters I elucidate the law and policies on political 
inclusion of people with mental disabilities (Chapter 2) and present the conceptual 
framework developed on the basis of the data (Chapter 3). This framework is used 
as a machine of thought to generate deep understandings of how policy 
implementation proceeds. I then discuss the context and pragmatics of mental 
health institutions (Chapter 4) and the methods used to collect data in these 
settings (Chapter 5).  




Armed with knowledge of the law, concepts for analysing processes of 
politicisation as both a rehabilitative and educational technology, and thorough 
contextualisation of the setting in which implementation proceeds we move onto 
description and analysis of how political participation is facilitated and scaffolded 
in the everyday life of three mental health rehabilitation facilities (Chapters 6-9). 
I conclude the thesis with a discussion of the benefits, issues and dilemmas that 
arise from this practice and present my findings, principles and recommendations 
developed collaboratively with service-users and providers (Chapter 10). 
  







2. Law and Policy on Participation of Persons 




The purpose of this chapter is to elucidate the current legal and policy context 
from which specific institutional policies spring. It aims to give an account of the 
wider political, legal, and ethical environments in which current policies of 
political inclusion are nested. I do this by outlining: 
1. The legal restrictions on political participation for people with mental disabilities 
found in the common law of capacity, the Mental Health Act 1959 and 1983, and 
in the Representation of the People Act 1983. 
2. The distinction between supported and best interests’ decisions derived from the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005. 
3. The positive duties to support and enhance political participation for people with 
mental disabilities derived from the UNCRPD and other International 
conventions. 
4. The safeguards in place to restrict undue influence and indoctrination. 
 
 




2.2. The Mental Health Act  
In previous centuries, even if someone qualified for the franchise based on strict 
property ownership requirements, those who were deemed to lack mental capacity 
were deprived of their right to vote. Even when the franchise was extended to a 
broader range of the population, restrictions on mentally disabled people’s ability 
to participate in elections were practically restricted. Persons with mental 
disabilities who were institutionalised were prevented from participating in 
elections due to the exclusion of ‘any establishment maintained wholly or mainly 
for persons suffering from mental disorder’ from being a legitimate place of 
residence for registration purposes (Representation of the People Act 1929 s.2(3)). 
The detachment of mentally disabled people from their homes and the added 
bureaucracy imposed have long been identified as restrictions on political rights 
(Hale, 1976: 173-5). 
There were also traditionally restrictions on the ability of persons with mental 
disabilities to hold public office. The MHA 1959 created a procedure for ejecting 
Members of Parliament from the House of Commons on the basis of mental 
incapacity that results in compulsory detention for over 6 months (MHA 1959 
s.137). The Act also made some provision for the removal of barriers to other 
forms of political participation. Medical institutions and their staff were 
prohibited from withholding patient mail addressed to Parliamentarians as well 
as other privileged communication such as that with the court and the hospital 
administration (MHA 1959 s.36(2)). It therefore appears that some limited 
opportunities for political action and expression of opinions remained open to 
inpatients of psychiatric hospitals during this time. 
By the 1970s the mental health system and discourses of mental health had 
changed. Anti-psychiatry, partly in response to the failures and abuses of the old 
asylum system, was gaining popular sympathy (Laing, 1967). Legislative reform 
was proposed to update the legal framework to reflect these developments. The 




MHA 1959 was also criticised by practitioners for failing to provide a clear process 
by which mental health practitioners could coercively impose treatment on 
patients with the mental capacity to refuse.  
Studies of institutionalization by Goffman (1961) and Wing & Brown (1970) 
highlighted the poor quality of life of mental inpatients creating a political and 
social movement towards community care. In 1961, Enoch Powell gave his 
renowned ‘water tower’ speech in support of the dissolution of the asylums, and 
in 1962, the Hospital Plan for England and Wales predicted the closure of half of 
all mental health beds by 1975 (Ministry of Health, 1962). 
Policy makers began to accept the arguments that a new legal framework was 
required to better regulate the compulsory treatment of mentally disabled people 
and to better protect their civil and political rights. The Mental Health Act 1983 
(MHA 1983) emerged from this reform agenda armed with a new updated 
nomenclature. This reflected the changing discourse around human rights for 
people with disabilities. The language of lunatics and idiots was replaced by 
definitions of mental disorder, impairment and psychopathy.  
Under the MHA 1983 persons can compulsorily detained either for treatment or 
assessment under sections 2 and 3. Thus a range of legal powers is granted to 
responsible clinicians to treat in absence of consent, and the wide discretion to 
make sovereign declarations of necessity relating to the need for treatment or 
assessment, is regulated by law. In order for a person to vote whilst detained under 
the MHA 1983 they must be able to register. To visit a polling station, service-
users also require leave from hospital under s.17. Leave should be planned in 
advance and agreed in consultation with all relevant persons included in the 
patient’s care and treatment. Responsible clinicians can also make leave subject 
to any condition, which he or she considers necessary in the interests of the patient 
or for the protection of other people. 




Significant restrictions on opportunities for political inclusion and participation 
are created by the law, policy and practices that regulate coercive mental health 
treatment in the UK. These restrictions are something that appear in various 
degrees around the world and represent a major stumbling block for practitioners 
seeking to substantiate the rights underpinning the UNCRPD. 
 
2.3. The Representation of the People Act 
Under the Representation of the People Act (RPA) 1983 a person is eligible to 
vote if he or she: 
a. is registered in the register of parliamentary electors for that constituency; 
b. is not subject to any legal incapacity to vote (age apart); 
c. is either a Commonwealth citizen or a citizen of the Republic of Ireland; and 
d. is of voting age (that is, 18 years or over). 
Here ‘legal incapacity’ refers to exclusion from the franchise based on the common 
law of mental capacity or exclusion based on rules governing the 
disenfranchisement of convicted offenders (Rees & Reed, 2016). However, the term 
‘incapacity’ can be readily interpreted in practice to refer to mental incapacity 
under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 discussed later in this chapter. 
Compulsory patients deemed to lack capacity are, under the RPA regulations still 
able to register to vote, but this process is often dependent on family members 
and cohabitants remembering to put them on the form when it arrives at previous 
residence as well as being granted leave to return to the constituency or organising 
a postal vote. Attending a polling station may be logistically difficult if treatment 
facilities are far from the service-user’s home. 




There are also potential problems with registering and voting for people detained 
in mental health facilities that could arise from a failure, in practice, to keep up 
with patient transfers.  
Prior to the amendments to the RPA 1983 in 2000, during the period of twelve 
months prior to the qualifying date, mental health patients could make a 
declaration of local connection only if he or she could do so without assistance 
(unless this was required because of blindness or some other physical incapacity). 
Therefore, mental incapacity could have been a practical disqualifier for making 
the declaration. The declaration procedure required inpatients to make a 
declaration as to their place of residence at the hospital without reasonable 
accommodation of mental disability. The address of the hospital and the address 
of the residence they would reside in if not in hospital (or any address in the UK 
where she or he had previously resided) was required as well as age and citizenship 
status. People receiving treatment in hospital for mental health challenges could 
alternatively apply to the registration officer for an absent vote if it could be 
shown to the officer’s satisfaction that the applicant’s circumstances were such 
that he could not reasonably be expected to vote in person (RPA 1985 s.7(1)). 
The RPA 1983 was amended in 2000 to change the rule that accommodations of 
mental capacity should not be made (RPA 1983 7B(2)). Under current law 
assistance can and should be provided in the declaration processes. After 2000 the 
eligibility criteria remained the same, but a distinction was drawn between 
offenders who were detained under the MHA 1983 and convicted persons detained 
in penal institutions who were to be wholly disenfranchised. Persons prohibited 
from registering and voting by the RPA 1983 s.3A(1), (2) include only those:  
i. detained under s.37, 38, 22, 25A, 27, or 51(5)1 [MHA 1983]; 
 
1 i.e. ‘Where a person is convicted before the Crown Court of an offence punishable with 
imprisonment other than an offence the sentence for which is fixed by law, or is 
convicted by a magistrates’ court of an offence punishable on summary conviction with 
imprisonment, and the person is suffering mental disorder’ – MHA 1983 




ii. subject to provisions under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1962 and 
equivalent judgements made by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division); 
iii. or would so be detained if he were not unlawfully at large 
Although these prohibitions are potentially justifiable and legitimate in individual 
circumstances under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
Protocol 1 art.3 (i.e. proportionate), it was decided by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) that such blanket prohibitions on the right to vote may 
be disproportionate in Hirst v United Kingdom (2006, 22 EHRR 21). 
Patients remanded to hospital under sections 35 or 36 under the MHA 1983 or 
remanded prisoners transferred to hospital (s.28) remain eligible. If those on 
remand are detained for a length of time significant enough to be regarded as 
resident at the hospital they can register at the hospital (RPA 1983 s.7A(2), (6)(b) 
& (c)). This residence rule applies to informal and compulsory patients who are 
not subject to the criminal diversion procedures outlined above (RPA 1983 s.7(1), 
(2)). Non-offender informal and compulsory patients may be registered as either 
in the hospital or somewhere else so long as they can be considered resident there 
or made a Declaration of Local Connection under ss.7(5), 7A(5)). 
Although the reformed registration procedures make voting more accessible for 
people with mental disabilities, there may remain in practice numerous 
administrative hurdles, and practical restrictions for inpatients to surmount before 
being registered and able to vote as there were under the previous regime (Hale, 
1976). Although the Declaration of Local Connection no longer requires people 
with mental disabilities to make the declaration without assistance (RPA 1983 
7B(2) the first two policies discussed in Chapter 6 will show that in making 
declarations of local connection, assistance may remain restricted long after the 
RPA 2000 changed the law in this regard.  
Practical ‘hang-ups’ from the previous legal regime may remain so long as there 
is little legal or professional guidance available to practitioners and service-users 




in accommodating political rights. Guidance and examples of good practice should 
be more widely available so that perceived or manufactured incapacity for political 
action or in registering to vote can no longer used to justify exclusion of people 
with mental disabilities from public and political life.  
 
 
2.4. The Mental Capacity Act 
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MHC 2005) codifies, adapts and exists alongside 
various common law elements of capacity law and policy. Where there is overlap, 
the provisions contained in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 were intended to be 
subordinate to the procedures set out in the Mental Health Act 1983 (HL Deb, 
25 Jan 2005 Column 1247). 
A threshold was created by MHC 2005 to guide practitioners more closely in 
substitute decision making. The threshold of capacity at which supported decision 
making is triggered is contextually dependent and incorporates duties to support 
people in ways that allow them to reach the requisite thresholds in each area.  
To be regarded in law as lacking capacity to make a particular decision a person 
must be assessed as unable to: understand the decision; retain the information; 
weigh and assess the relevant information; and communicate their decision (MCA 
2005 s.3). If a person is incapable of making a decision then mental health 
practitioners are required to support capacity to do so and, if this cannot be 
achieved, to make that decision themselves in his or her best interests.  
The MCA 2005 s.4 requires that in determining what is in a person’s best 
interests, the person making the determination must, so far as reasonably 
practicable, permit and encourage the person to participate, or to improve his 




ability to participate, as fully as possible in any act done for him and any decision 
affecting him. Donnelly (2009) shows that although frequently applied in practice, 
the best interests standard is often treated as if its application requires no more 
than general good will on the part of the decision-maker.  
The Act specifically excludes the decision of who to vote for in an election from 
being subject to replacement decisions on the basis of best interests (MCA s.29). 
This does not exclude people deemed not to have the decision-making capacity to 
vote from being supported and facilitated to reach a higher threshold of capacity 
however. It means that if that threshold cannot be reached a replacement decision 
cannot legally be made. The Code of Practice points out that no one may vote on 
behalf of a person who lacks the capacity to do so (Department of Constitutional 
Affairs, 2007). When the MCA 2005 was first introduced, service-users on civil 
detention under the MHA 1983 were not subject to any blanket restriction on 
voting rights. However, mental incapacity to vote could be still be used as a 
justification for exclusion from public and political life under the common law. 
This potentially conferred legitimacy on decisions by practitioners to exclude 
people from positive support to participate in elections on the basis of mental 
capacity as defined under the Act and this may have become an established ritual 
in practice around elections. The doubt and lack of recognition implied by the 
imposition of a capacity assessment in relation to voting also potentially represents 
a symbolic restriction on the performance of political identities for service-users. 
Although capacity assessment of political competencies may be permissible to 
determine what support and accommodation is required in individual cases, how 
political capacities are to be fairly assessed, and what the legal consequences of 
such assessments are remains uncertain. In addition, the potential dangers of 
mis/mal-recognition of individuals as incapable of political thought and action 
inherent in assessment procedures should also be highlighted as they could create 
rational reasons for disengagement with political support practices.  




Capacity assessment may in theory still be applied to check whether incapacities 
are present, and to determine what support is required, but can also constitute 
an unnecessary and demotivating process that some service-users may consider 
inappropriate. It could reflect that mistaken belief that people with mental 
disabilities are by definition incapable of exercising political agency. 
Taylor (2015) has argued that although considerable efforts have been made to 
improve training in how to use the MCA persistent gaps in practitioner knowledge 
are evident. Willner et al (2011) for example show that although a majority of 
staff have undertaken MCA training, those who had been trained had the same 
level of understanding as those who had not. Principled and consistent application 
is lacking even within specialist staff such as learning disability psychiatrists 
(Sawhney et al, 2009). Further guidance and training in application of the MCA, 
including how it applies to supporting political participation, is required (Alonzi 
et al, 2009).  
 
2.5. The Electoral Administration Act  
The earliest example of the common law of capacity in England is the De 
Prerogativa Regis 1322 or the Royal Prerogative (Andrews et al, 1997: Ch. 8; Baly, 
1995; Fry, 1864; McGlynn, 2003 and 2005; Wright & Digby, 1996). The common 
law, up until 2006, essentially meant that ‘persons of unsound mind’, could in 
theory be excluded from voting and standing in elections. Capacity depended on 
how far an individual understood: 
“in broad terms what he is doing and the effects of doing it (i.e. choosing his 
representative in Parliament, for no one can appreciate all the effects of a 
particular voting decision)” (Hale, 1976: 173-5) 




Just prior to the UNCRPD being ratified in the UK, Lord Rix tabled an 
amendment to the Electoral Administration Act (EAA) 2006 which abolished the 
common law rule of legal incapacity as an eligibility criterion to register and vote 
in elections. In doing so he argued that: 
 ‘Incapacity is an important concept in the law around disabled people's decision 
making… Yet it has a different meaning in electoral law, for it means legal 
disqualification from voting, rather than a physical or mental condition which 
makes voting difficult. For the purposes of this Bill, it seems best to avoid 
suggestions that disabled people have any kind of incapacity… The changes I 
propose are of great symbolic and practical importance to people with a learning 
disability and to other disabled people’ – Lord Rix (HL Deb, 15 May 2006 Column 
122) 
The EAA 2006 was intended to do away with any vestiges of the common law 
power to disqualify electors on grounds of mental incapacity. This means assessing 
capacity to vote should only be permissible if used to identify if, and what, support 
is required for supported decision making. Even in these circumstances the 
imposition of capacity assessments could institutionalise a form of mis/mal-
recognition of mentally disabled people’s political expression and create rational 
reasons for self-exclusion. Replacement decisions cannot be made in relation to 
voting and there are various restrictions on undue influence that practitioners 
must consider. In this way voting decisions are designated a special legal status 
(alongside decisions as to sex, marriage and permanent medical operations) that 
requires the agency of the individual to be exercised. 
Agency, rather than benevolence, must be prioritised in supporting access to the 
political field. However, agency does not imply absolute freedom from constraint 
in thought and action. Whilst all persons with mental disabilities should have an 
equal right to participate in political and civic life average members of the 
community  are not free to adopt and pursue change anything that they choose. 




We all must negotiate contexts, rituals and roles that cast certain actions and 
expressions as in/appropriate.  
Lord Rix, in advocating for the abolition of the common law of capacity, was not 
arguing that all members of the community  should have complete freedom in the 
formation and pursuit of political worldviews. He merely took aim at the legal 
language of mental incapacity (particularly the terms ‘idiot’ and ‘lunatic’) as well 
as the legal disenfranchisement of persons with mental disabilities. The purpose 
of the abolition of the common law was therefore to discourage the assumption 
that persons with disabilities should be disqualified from voting: 
“existing case law governing people's legal capacity to vote specifically states that 
"idiots" cannot vote, while "lunatics" can vote only during their lucid moments. 
[T]his… has important symbolic and practical effects. The symbolic effect is to say 
to people with learning disabilities and mental health problems that calling them 
idiots and lunatics is acceptable… The practical effect is that, even today, it is 
widely and mistakenly believed that people with a learning disability or mental 
health problems do not possess that most basic of rights in a democracy—the right 
to vote and have a say in who represents them and governs the country. (HL Deb, 
13 Feb 2006: Column 1028) 
The EEA 2006 removes a symbol of prejudice and exclusion from the common 
law, and provides positive recognition that disabled people retain political rights 
whatever their mental capacity. The EAA 2006 therefore symbolically recognises 
the enduring political citizenship of persons with mental disabilities. The reform 
is also of practical importance. The legal presumption of legitimacy for disabled 
people’s political expression and action explicitly prohibits psychiatric institutions 
from restricting voting rights on the basis of mental incapacity. 
 
 




2.6. UN Declaration and The European Convention of 
Human Rights 
The changes in British electoral law documented in previous sections were 
intended to enhance and support political rights for people with disabilities. These 
developments were in part a response to international human rights law and the 
momentum generated by increased participation of minority groups in the political 
process of drafting these treaties. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) 1948 constructs political inclusion in transparent and open elections as 
a primary method of driving the establishment, implementation and enforcement 
of the rights contained. The right to participatory government is therefore of 
particular importance. The UDHR Article 21 states: Everyone has the right to 
take part in the government of his/her country, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of 
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which 
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot or by 
equivalent free voting procedures. 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights introduced in 1950 
and enshrined under Protocol 1, Art 3 (1952) established the right to free and fair 
elections (although not a specific right to vote) and the right to non-discrimination 
in the application of ECHR rights on the grounds of protected characteristics. 
Therefore a lack of positve state support for people treated in mental health rehab 
to participate in politics was increasingly recognised as discrimnatory.  
The principle of non-discrimination in the ECHR jurisprudence was quite limited 
in the sense that it was infrequently applied and mostly in relation to other articles 
of the convention. In addition discrimination on the basis of physical or mental 
disability is consigned to the category of ‘other status’ and had to be infered into 
the intention of the article. Glor v Switzerland (13444/04, Unreported April 30, 
2009 ECHR, Grand Chamber) indicates a shift in such limited interpretations and 




confirms discrimination on the bassi of disability falls within  the articles scope. 
According to this ruling non-discrimination encompasses not only direct 
discrimination but also discrimination that is indirect or covert. The Glor ruling 
also indicates that the UNCRPD provisions will directly influence the ECtHR’s 
interpretation of ECHR rights when considering disability discrimination cases 
(Stravert, 2010). 
The right to free and fair elections in the ECHR is not absolute and may be 
restricted in certain cases. In the case of W.X.Y.Z. v. Belgium (1975) 
2D.R.E.Comm. HR. 110 it was decided by the ECtHR that certain limited groups, 
and specifically prisoners, could be excluded from elections but that such 
exclusions could not be arbitrary nor disproportionate. In Hirst v the United 
Kingdom (No 2) 74025/01 (2005) ECHR 681 the ECtHR demonstrates how the 
right to vote is viewed as a privilege that may be revoked on the basis of breach 
of the social contract.  
Citizens can be lawfully disenfranchised, in the ECHR jurisprudence, if this is 
proportionate and necessary to maintain a fair and representative democracy. On 
this basis the UK government, until the EAA 2006 restricted voting rights for 
persons presumed to be incapable of making independent voting decisions (on the 
basis they are underage or are mental disabled), and those who forfeit some of 
their civic rights by engaging in criminal behaviour warranting custodial sentences 
(thus seriously breaching the ‘social contract’).  
This indicates that the principles underpinning political rights in international 
law have historically been based on ideas of democracy that are inherently 
exclusive. The Rawlsian idea that only rational citizens should be included in 
political decisions about the governance of social relations and the nature of 
society may provide ready philosophical justifications for exclusion of people with 
mental disabilities. Political inclusion is often seen as a privilege to be earned. 




This privilege may be rescinded under the ECHR in order to protect a ‘fair and 
representative democracy’.  
 
2.7. The United Nations Convention of the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities 
The role that political inclusion plays in ensuring respect for human rights is 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (1950), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (1989) and many other international human rights documents. The most 
important for our purposes is however the UNCRPD (2006). 
The UNCRPD catalysed and/or confirmed a series of significant changes in 
English electoral law and represents a paradigm shift away from “medicalised” 
approaches towards a “social model of disability” in the protection of rights for 
disabled people (Bartlett, 2014). In a medicalised approach disability is considered 
primarily a result of physical or mental impairment. Conversely the social model 
defines disability by the social restrictions that, in interaction with impairment, 
cause exclusion.  
The introduction of the UNCRPD codifies a general shift in mental health 
discourse over the last few decades away from practices aiming at functional 
rehabilitation towards recovery based on patient’s conception of the good life 
(Burns, 2009). In theory both best interests and agency should be supported by 
mental health services. As we saw in Chapter 1 however, benevolence and agency 
in this context are prima facie irreconcilable aims if we understand them as 
embodying a hard distinction between constraint and freedom. 




The UK ratified the UNCRPD in 2009. Ratification of the optional protocol by 
the UK also means that individuals can complain directly to the UNCRPD 
Committee. The Committee also periodically may make interpretations of the 
meaning of particular Articles of the Convention. 
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities adopts the approach 
that persons with disabilities are not a homogenous group. They are, similar to 
the population of any country, individuals who are diverse in needs, interests, 
desires and abilities. Many countries internationally have election law which 
restricts the right of persons with mental health disabilities to vote. This is a 
violation of the principles of international human rights law, including the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which take an approach 
whereby human rights are not dependent on a person’s ability to exercise them. 
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities recognises the right to 
vote, and in order to equalize the rights for persons with disabilities, places an 
obligation upon the State to provide assistance to a person with disabilities who 
wants to vote and needs some help in doing so. Moreover, the Convention calls for 
equality and non-discrimination in Article 15. Any ban on the right to vote applied 
to all persons with restricted or limited legal capacity constitutes discrimination 
on the basis of disability.  
The UNCRPD Committee (CCRPD), in general comments, view all persons as 
requiring support to be free and autonomous. The intention was to break down 
the distinction in law between ‘able’ and ‘disabled’. This requires a radical 
reformulation of the law, policy and practice relating to the rights of people with 
disabilities (Mégret; 2008). 
The model embedded in the UNCRPD, requires that practitioners working with 
persons with mental disabilities give due respect to their ‘inherent dignity, 
individual autonomy… and independence’. (CCRPD, 2014, para. 4). In short, the 
UNCRPD requires practitioners to support 




‘full and effective participation and inclusion in society; respect for difference and 
acceptance of persons with disabilities as part of human diversity and humanity; 
equality of opportunity; accessibility… respect for the evolving capacities of children 
with disabilities and respect for the right of children with disabilities to preserve 
their identities.’ (Ibid) 
According to the UNCRPD Committee “Full and effective participation” (art. 3 
(c)) in society refers to engaging with all persons, including persons with 
disabilities, to provide for a sense of belonging to and being part of society. This 
includes being encouraged and receiving appropriate support, including peer support 
and support to participate in society, and being free from stigma and feeling safe 
and respected when expressing oneself in public. [Such inclusion] can also be a 
transformative tool for social change and promote agency and empowerment of 
individuals. (Committee on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities, 2018) 
Adult citizens with mental disabilities thus attract a wide variety of rights and/or 
responsibilities to be included on an equal basis with others in civic and political 
life and reasonable accommodations must be made to support the exercise of such 
rights. “Reasonable accommodation” means necessary and appropriate 
modification and adjustment to ensure persons with disabilities can enjoy, on an 
equal basis with others, all human rights and fundamental freedoms (UNCRPD, 
2006: art. 2). Such reasonable accommodations should not impose a 
disproportionate or undue burden on public services. In many cases proactive and 
positive support is needed to ensure opportunities are available and rights are 
substantiated. 
Although the UK Government defines mental disability narrowly under the 
Equality Act 2010 (requiring a mental health condition to last at least 12 months2) 
the UNCRPD does not define it exhaustively. The chair of the committee drafting 
the UNCRPD proposed that there be no definition because of the risk that groups 
 
2 https://www.gov.uk/definition-of-disability-under-equality-act-2010 




would be inadvertently excluded, but the disabled people’s organisations present 
wanted a definition to ensure that states could not adopt unduly narrow 
interpretations (Bartlett, 2014 and 2012; UNCRPD, 2006: art. 1) 
Articles 4, 8, 12, 19, 21, 22, 24, 29 and 33 (Appendix 1) of the UNCRPD are all 
relevant to State obligations to support persons with mental disabilities to 
participate in public and political life. This set of rights require states to provide 
a variety of reasonable accommodations to people with disabilities in exercising 
their political agency and legal capacity on an equal basis with others.  
The central right in the UNCRPD for the purposes of this thesis is contained in 
Article 29. Article 29 is the right to equal opportunities to participate in political 
and public life. It guarantees “to persons with disabilities political rights and the 
opportunity to enjoy them on an equal basis with others”. In order to achieve this 
goal, the Article goes on to list specific obligations placed on State Parties to 
ensure that persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in political 
and public life on an equal basis with others, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives, including the right and opportunity for persons with disabilities to 
vote and be elected, inter alia, by:  
(i) Ensuring that voting procedures, facilities and materials are appropriate, 
accessible and easy to understand and use; 
(ii) Protecting the right of persons with disabilities to vote by secret ballot in 
elections and public referendums without intimidation, and to stand for elections, 
to effectively hold office and perform all public functions at all levels of 
government, facilitating the use of assistive and new technologies where 
appropriate; 
(iii) Guaranteeing the free expression of the will of persons with disabilities as 
electors and to this end, where necessary, at their request, allowing assistance in 
voting by a person of their own choice. 




There is limited guidance from the UNCRPD Committee in interpreting the duty 
and how it should be implemented. In short: 
“a person’s decision-making ability cannot be a justification for any exclusion of 
persons with disabilities from exercising their political rights, including the right 
to vote, the right to stand for election and the right to serve as a member of a 
jury. States parties have an obligation to protect and promote the right of persons 
with disabilities to access the support of their choice in voting by secret ballot, and 
to participate in all elections and referendums without discrimination. The 
Committee further recommends that States parties guarantee the right of persons 
with disabilities to stand for election, to hold office effectively and to perform all 
public functions at all levels of government, with reasonable accommodation and 
support, where desired, in the exercise of their legal capacity.“ (CCRPD, 2014, 
para. 48-9). 
Around the world many UNCRPD signatories still restrict voting rights on the 
basis of cognitive disability and mental illness, either directly on the basis of 
mental capacity or indirectly on the basis of guardianship or detention in hospital 
(Barclay 2013). Even in countries like the United Kingdom, where mental capacity 
is no longer a restriction on the right to vote, the behaviour of mental health 
professionals, family and peers, and of political parties can restrict opportunities 
for people to meaningfully engaging in public and political life (ibid). In addition 
those detained in mental health hospitals following criminal conviction can face 
more extensive sentences than would be served by those without mental 
disabilities as so face exclusion from the political process for much longer than 
criminals without mental health challenges. 
The European Union has produced two substantial reports on the implementation 
of the right to political participation for people with mental disabilities. The 
authors, as with the member states they study, principally interpret Article 29 as 




requiring that persons with disabilities retain, and can practically exercise, their 
right to vote.  
The latest and most substantial report finds that ‘given an accessible and enabling 
environment, persons with disabilities are active citizens keen to be engaged in 
the political life of their communities.’ Political activity is defined broadly and 
includes membership of political parties, attending political meetings and 
contacting elected officials.  
Their analysis shows that in the majority of EU Member States, a lack of legal 
capacity automatically excludes many people with mental disabilities from the 
franchise. Such restrictions, being directly based on a disability, or a proxy such 
as assessed ‘capacity’, contravene the principles of the UNCRPD as interpreted 
by the CRPD Committee. 
In many Member States, procedures for persons with disabilities to request 
support or assistance to vote are inaccessible and implementation of Article 29 
has not provided a mandate to deconstruct these restrictive processes. For people 
living in institutions disenfranchisement can be caused by the lack of reasonable 
accommodation and support. When the right to political inclusion on an equal 
basis with others is not realised there are frequently no obvious routes to redress. 
The UK Initial State Reports (CCRPD, 2011; CCRPD, 2017), in reviewing 
implementation concentrated almost exclusively on numbers of disabled people 
who are elected representatives and party support for disabled candidates. It is 
also, as with the vast majority of other state reports from jurisdictions around the 
world, primarily concerned with accommodation of physical disability. This 
reflects a narrow interpretation of public and political life as primarily relevant to 
persons with physical disabilities having the opportunity to cast a ballot in 
elections.  




The state reports from other jurisdictions do shed some light on the Committees 
interpretation of how Article 29 may be interpreted and implemented by States 
in relation to persons with mental disabilities. The initial report on the 
Netherlands notes that: 
To safeguard voting by secret ballot without intimidation, as provided for in 
Article 29(a)(ii), and to ensure the principle of one vote per person, the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands declares that it will interpret the term ‘assistance’ in Article 
29(a)(iii) as assistance only to be effected outside the voting booth, except with 
regard to assistance required due to a physical disability, in which case assistance 
may also be permitted inside the voting booth. 
Consequently, assistance to persons with mental disabilities in casting a ballot 
can, in principle, only be provided outside the voting booth. By way of an 
exception, the Elections Act does permit assistance in the voting booth for voters 
with physical disabilities. Here the Government of the Netherlands is grappling 
with the issue of what they term ‘undesirable influencing’. Permitting assistance 
to persons with mental disabilities inside polling booths, they argue would no 
longer guarantee that the vote cast actually corresponds to the will of the voter. 
This is problematic in the sense that it may result in some persons with mental 
disabilities who want and request assistance in the voting booth, for example those 
who are unable to read the ballot paper or suffer from anxiety that they will make 
an error, being functionally excluded.  
This endorses the view that assistance in polling booths of persons with physical 
disabilities can be regarded as not jeopardising the independence of voting, but 
rather exclusively support the action itself (Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, 2019a). This seems to be a controversial assumption being based 
on such a broad and general distinction to make in practice.  




The example of illiteracy demonstrates the issue with making a hard distinction 
between ‘supporting the action itself’ and scaffolding some of the mental capacities 
behind the act of voting.  
The reporters here seem to assume that mental disability automatically means 
that an individual is vulnerable to undue or ‘undesirable’ influence. This is 
problematic. As we shall see in further chapters this can be the case, but should 
not be assumed as a general rule. Many people with mental health challenges are 
very well equipped to defend themselves from ballot tampering and would be able 
to identify and make complaints perfectly competently. In addition, the distinction 
between undesirable and desirable influence in political education is exceptionally 
difficult for practitioners to make. ‘Normal’ citizens are deemed to be capable of 
engaging with politically influential discourse without being determined by it and 
the same respect should be extended to persons with mental disabilities. 
Some states have used the argument that people with mental disabilities are 
uniquely susceptible to undue influence to justify their exclusion from the political 
process altogether. Hong Kong’s report states that: 
A person may only be disqualified from voting if he/she is found by the Court as 
incapable, by reason of mental incapacity, of managing his or her affairs… This 
arrangement is to ensure the fairness of the election through reducing the risk of 
a voter being subject to undue influence or manipulation. (Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2019b). 
Other states simply avoid this thorny issue altogether. The state report for New 
Zealand includes reference to the production of easy read voting instructions for 
those with learning and intellectual disabilities but does not make any reference 
to those detained in mental health hospitals with other types of mental health 
challenges (Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2013). 




In addition to Article 29 the right to inclusive education (Art. 24), the right to 
legal capacity (Art. 12) and the obligation of States parties to consult and actively 
involve persons with disabilities in UNCRPD implementation (art. 4 (3)) are 
relevant. The participation of persons with disabilities in the monitoring process 
(art. 33 (3)) is also relevant to building a wider concept of participation in public 
and political life based on UNCRPD principles.  The articles mentioned, together 
mean something more than a responsibility to support participation in electoral 
politics. Taking Article 29 on its own is not enough to understand rights to 
participation in public and political life and a broader definition of political 
participation is needed. Careful consideration of what constitutes appropriate 
support in practical term is also needed. 
Article 12 requires persons with mental disabilities to be seen as citizens capable 
of holding rights and responsibilities. Restricting access to political participation 
for people found to lack capacity, via an inappropriate conflation of legal and 
mental capacity, is therefore a violation of convention principles (CCRPD, 2014, 
para. 15). This is viewed by the CCRPD as discrimination and a violation of the 
participation rights of disabled persons (CCRPD, 2014, paras. 13, 45). 
Legal capacity and mental capacity are distinguished by the CCRPD. Legal 
capacity refers to a person’s capacity to hold rights and responsibilities and to 
exercise them. Mental capacity refers to the cognitive abilities to make decisions. 
Article 12 is seen as a prohibiting the use of capacity tests applied on the basis of 
disability (Sandland 2017). Substitute decision making is relegated to a measure 
of last resort, if appropriate at all (CCRPD, 2014, para. 13). 
The debates around the UNCRPD reflect a general endorsement of the approach 
taken by the CCRPD (Arstein-Kerslake & Flynn, 2016). However scholars such 
as Sandland (2017) and Richardson (2012), identify a contradiction: Articles 
12(1)–(3) require all persons to be recognised as having legal capacity, but Article 
12(4) suggests an inherent vulnerability to manipulation for people with mental 




disabilities and seeks to safeguard them by reintroducing substitute decision 
making procedures where necessary.  
Although substitute decision making on the basis of mental incapacity appears to 
contradict UNCRPD principles, article 12(4) requires state parties to provide 
‘appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse’ when supporting legal 
capacity, and permits substituted decisions to be made ‘Where, after significant 
efforts have been made, it is not practicable to determine the will and preferences 
of an individual’. (CCRPD, 2014, para. 21). Under the MCA 2005 voting decisions 
are excluded from these processes and this means that some individuals, even if 
their will and preferences in relation to voting were clear prior to losing mental 
capacity, may be deprived of the opportunity to participate in elections via proxy 
votes. 
The UNCRPD therefore requires states to make reasonable accommodations to 
ensure that people with mental disabilities can exercise their right to participate 
in public and political life on an equal basis with others. The UNCRPD 
Committee's interpretation of how this should be implemented is limited and has 
not reived much thought or attention. In their reports States concentrate on 
removal of legal barriers for persons with physical disabilities, accessible voting 
guides for persons with intellectual or learning disabilities and use the concept of 
undesirable influence to avoid the need to grapple with the thorny issue of 
reasonably accommodating those with mental illness. Political support for people 
with mental disabilities is often presented as posing a risk of 'undesirable influence' 
and this may undermine the substantiation of UNCRPD rights in practice. 
 
2.8. Undue Influence and Treatment 
As we have seen the UNCRPD in Article 12 requires safeguards to be put in place 
to prevent abuse of power in supporting decision making capacities. The 




prohibition of treatment and undue influence in the Representation of the People 
Act 1983 are an example of such safeguards. The criminal offence of treating a 
voter for the purpose of enticing her to vote or influencing their voting choice 
could potentially apply in the case where mental health practitioners encourage 
inpatients to vote by relaxing sanctions or offering inducements (RPA 1983, s.112). 
Undue influence is perhaps also a legal constraint on the types of positive support 
that are appropriate. The RPA 1983 states that: 
‘A person shall be guilty of undue influence… if he, directly or indirectly… makes 
use of or threatens to make use of any force, violence or restraint, or inflicts or 
threatens to inflict… any temporal or spiritual injury, damage, harm or loss upon 
or against any person in order to induce or compel that person to vote or refrain 
from voting… [or] if, by abduction, duress or any fraudulent device or contrivance, 
he impedes or prevents, or intends to impede or prevent, the free exercise of the 
franchise of an elector or proxy for an elector, or so compels, induces or prevails 
upon, or intends so to compel, induce or prevail upon, an elector or proxy for an 
elector either to vote or to refrain from voting.’ (RPA 1983, s.115) 
This clause potentially captures a wide range of behaviour. However, the offence 
has a relatively high threshold of evidence to establish wrongdoing (Rehman v 
Khan [2015] EWHC 2168). The concept of harm could readily include practices 
in mental health facilities intended to encourage or discourage certain voting 
choices, including the choice whether or not to vote. Threatening to write a 
negative health report about an involuntary inpatient who refuses to vote (that 
equates non-participation with poor mental health) could potentially be construed 
as threatening spiritual damage in court. These are the serious dilemmas 
practitioners face in managing access to political participation.  
If a ballot is cast on the basis of undue influence it is a criminal offence and may 
be investigated by the police. There are high evidential thresholds and the police 
generally will only investigate accusations based on the threat of physical force 




(College of Policing, 2017). In alleged cases of undue influence, the police are 
advised to consider the ‘political motivation’ of the complainant (Ibid). The police 
therefore set a high evidential threshold to establish claims. It is very unlikely 
that a ballot would be rendered void even if undue influence is established in a 
particular case. Isolated instances will not usually affect an overall result and 
judges are likely reluctant to invalidate an election result.  
The law is somewhat vague on the matter of undue influence in these 
circumstances and the Electoral Commission made clear in a consultation response 
in October 2018, that the law of undue influence requires greater clarity and a 
revised and more clearly defined offence should be drafted (Electoral Commission, 
2018). In later chapters I show that these safeguards and the consequent fear of 
being accused of undue influence inhibits some practitioners from engaging as 
equal political citizens with the ser-vice users in their care. 
In addition to the apparent legal constraints on the positive support for political 
participation in the law of undue influence, a range of other factors may affect the 
exercise of political rights for people treated in residential mental health facilities. 
These factors might include risk aversion, poor awareness of political rights, a 
culture of detached professionalism and even stigmatising attitudes towards people 
with mental disabilities. (Sayce, 2016 p.131) 
Positive and engaging support for inpatients of psychiatric institutions may be 
needed to fulfil positive legal obligations to support equal opportunities for 
political participation. It is not clear where the line between undue influence and 
positive and engaging support should be drawn however.  
The danger of drafting specific provisions in electoral law for persons with mental 
health conditions is that undue influence may be policed more rigorously for 
psychiatric inpatients compared to the general population. This may already be 
the case due to the assumption that people with mental disabilities are more 
vulnerable to manipulation. A restrictive system of surveillance that makes 




participation less attractive does little to support political agency and can restrict 
politicisation. Psychiatric staff and families of service-users who feel monitored, 
and self-censure their opinions to avoid accusations of criminal activity when 
supporting the right to vote, may be unengaging and overly cautious in engaging 
in political discourse with psychiatric inpatients.  
The concept of ‘autonomy’ is vital in the implementation of political rights under 
Article 29. In engaging political actions and expressions, a person should, in 
principle, be able to pursue their own conception of the good life and act on their 
own will and preferences. In the context of a political system in democratic 
societies however, influence is widespread, and it is not feasible to ask practitioners 
to constantly police an individual’s exposure and become an arbiter of 
‘undesirable’ or ‘desirable’ influence. Freedom and autonomy may often function 




In outlining the law and policy of political participation for people with 
disabilities, and approaches to implementation in a variety of different 
jurisdictions, I have shown by reference to the literature that a number of issues 
and dilemmas arise when implementation is pursued within medicalised 
environments and institutions. 
In the UK mental incapacity is no longer a legal justification to prevent someone 
with mental disabilities from voting. The RPA 2000 and the EAA 2006 abolish 
any vestiges of the common law rules of incapacity to vote and so the right to 
vote is no longer linked to mental disability or mental capacity although the 
criterion of ‘legal capacity’ remains. This has the potential to be misinterpreted 
by psychiatric practitioners as equivalent to mental capacity.  




Mental health practitioners retain powers to deny a person permission to go to 
the polling station on polling day, by refusing MHA 1983 s.17 leave or even by 
restricting positive support for registration and declarations of local connection. 
People with mental illness or learning disability may therefore still be prevented 
from voting indirectly through restricted access to information and by closing 
down opportunities for politicisation.  
The MCA 2005 excludes voting decisions from replacement decision making 
procedures. It also creates a mental capacity test which, if applied to capabilities 
to engage in politics, may present rational reasons for disengaging for fear of being 
subject to such scrutiny and mis/mal-recognition.  
Positive support is therefore required to level the playing field, however concerns 
over the susceptibility of people with ‘mental illnesses’ to undue influence can 
provide justifications for a non-committal approach. Discrimination on the basis 
of protected characteristics is prohibited under both UK and international law 
(HRA 1998, EA 2010, UNCRPD). However, failure to provide reasonable 
accommodation in this area carries little consequence and can be justified by 
reference to lack of autonomy if the general assumption of vulnerability to political 
manipulation is maintained. Such general and blanket assumptions about people 
with mental disabilities are unwarranted and potentially discriminatory.  
The principles underpinning political rights in international law have historically 
been based on ideas of democracy that are inherently exclusive. The Rawlsian 
idea that only rational citizens should be included in political decisions about the 
governance of social relations and the nature of society may provide ready 
philosophical justifications for exclusion of people with mental disabilities (Rawls, 
1971). Political inclusion is often seen as a privilege to be earned. This privilege 
may be rescinded under the ECHR in order to protect a ‘fair and representative 
democracy’.  




The UNCRPD by contrast unequivocally requires states to make reasonable 
accommodations to ensure that people with mental disabilities can exercise their 
right to participate in public and political life on an equal basis with others. The 
UNCRPD Committee's interpretation of how this should be implemented is 
limited but in their general comments appear to adopt a wide interpretation. 
States discuss the removal of legal barriers for persons with physical disabilities, 
accessible voting guides for persons with intellectual or learning disabilities in 
state reports. Some use the concept of undesirable influence to avoid the need to 
grapple with the thorny issue of reasonably accommodating those with mental 
illness. Political support for people with mental disabilities is often presented as 
posing a risk of 'undesirable influence' and this may undermine the substantiation 
of UNCRPD rights in practice. 
The concept of ‘autonomy’ is vital in the implementation of political rights under 
Article 29. In engaging political actions and expressions, a person should, in 
principle, be able to pursue their own conception of the good life and act on their 
own will and preferences. In the context of a political system in democratic 
societies however, influence is widespread, and it is not feasible to ask practitioners 
to constantly police an individual’s exposure and become an arbiter of 
‘undesirable’ or ‘desirable’ influence. Freedom and autonomy may often function 
as a convenient fiction that justify a lack of adequate support and reasonable 
accommodation for those in mental health hospitals. 
Although the general shift away from benevolent rehabilitation and towards 
agency-based recovery is a positive step, notions of both rehabilitation and 
recovery may also be applied in a legalistic way that ultimately disempowers.  
Support may thus be premised on stigmatising assumptions. People may be asked 
to make choices without the freedom, understanding or guidance necessary to 
make informed autonomous choices (Dzeng et al. 2015). In addition, promotion of 
political inclusion in the course of coercive mental health treatment may prove 




difficult for staff who have to manage the optics of such interactions to allay 
concerns of manipulation and undue influence. There is a potential conflict of 
interests in allowing practitioners to choose whether and who to support to 
participate in politics and what types of political issues to promote and discuss. 
This raises a number of complexities in implementation. 
There are a number of contradictory principles and duties inherent in the provision 
of positive support for political participation: 
i. The legal requirement not to deny, and to positively facilitate, political 
engagement versus the duty of care to avoid real risk.  
ii. The tension between facilitation and support (which necessarily implies education 
and curating information for vulnerable persons) and the duty not to influence or 
manipulate. 
In addition, a choice to not exercise the right to vote is as legitimate and worthy 
of respect as the right to vote and so the policy of supporting participation rights 
does not have any clear and measurable outcome. We should not be tempted to 
take numbers of users voting or not voting as a criterion of success. It should also 
be borne in mind that voting is only one method of political participation that is 
relatively infrequent in the everyday lives of citizens. There are numerous other 
opportunities to engage in public and political life that do not rely on registration 
and visiting a polling station so even those who do not have the right to vote 
should attract obligations and reasonable accommodations under the UNCRPD. 
These issues are a direct result of legislative, institutional, and cultural context in 
which there are irreconcilable contradictions between the advancement of patient-
directed recovery. The institutional context has traditionally served to contain, 
normalise and rehabilitate so implementation in medicalised environments raises 
the issue of undue influence, indoctrination and alienation. These themes will be 
further developed in later chapters 






In this chapter I described the formation and nature of the current law and policy 
and applied it to the political participation of inpatients in mental health hospitals 
in Britain. The legal restrictions on political participation in the common law of 
capacity the Mental Health Acts 1959; 1983, and the Representation of the People 
Act 1983 have been abolished and replaced by positive duties to support and 
enhance political participation for people with mental disabilities. The rights of 
persons with mental disabilities to participate in political and civic life is broad 
and premised on a philosophy of individually enforceable right. A number of 
safeguards have also been imposed to restrict undue influence and indoctrination 
in the process of supporting political participation. 
Under British law capacity to vote and participate in other aspects of public and 
political life is assumed for members of the community detained in mental health 
institutions, whether formally or informally. Capacity assessment, if at all 
applicable to political views and action, is thus relegated to an articulation of 
what is needed in terms of support to enable individuals to exercise their rights.  
Significant restrictions on opportunities for political inclusion and participation 
are however still possible under the law, policy and practices that regulate coercive 
mental health treatment in the UK. These restrictions are something that appear 
in various degrees around the world and represent a major stumbling block for 
practitioners seeking to substantiate the rights underpinning the UNCRPD. 
Citizens can be lawfully disenfranchised, in the ECHR jurisprudence, if this is 
proportionate and necessary to maintain a fair and representative democracy. On 
this basis the UK government, until the EAA 2006 restricted voting rights for 
persons presumed to be incapable of making independent voting decisions (on the 
basis they are underage or are mental disabled), and those who forfeit some of 




their civic rights by engaging in criminal behaviour warranting custodial sentences 
(thus seriously breaching the ‘social contract’). 
The EEA 2006 removes a symbol of prejudice and exclusion from the common law 
and provides positive recognition that disabled people retain political rights 
whatever their mental capacity. The EAA 2006 therefore symbolically recognises 
the enduring political citizenship of persons with mental disabilities. The reform 
is also of practical importance. The legal presumption of legitimacy for disabled 
people’s political expression and action explicitly prohibits psychiatric institutions 
from directly restricting voting rights on the basis of mental incapacity. 
In the next chapter I move on to outline theoretical and practical approaches 
inductively developed to answer the question of how the policy of positively 
supporting political participation is implemented on the ground in mental health 
institutions. This provides a basis for a more detailed understanding of the way 
these laws and policies are playing out in the everyday lives of people with mental 
disabilities. 
  







3. Theoretical Approaches to Studying 





In this chapter I provide working definitions of political participation as a form of 
expressive and agential performance and elucidate the social pragmatics in which 
interactions are labelled as having political characteristics. I suggest theoretical 
approaches (by no means exhaustive) that may be adopted to theorise the practice 
of political inclusion in mental health institutions. I use Goffmanian dramaturgy 
and Butlerian theory of performativity and identity co-construction to aid 
understanding in these respects.  
Prior to data collection I was working primarily with political theories of 
mobilisation based on individual resources and characteristics (Rosenstone and 
Hansen, 1993) and the capabilities approach developed by Nussbaum (2011) and 
Sen (1993). However, after engaging with the fieldwork it became increasingly 
clear that other theoretical frameworks were required to grasp the phenomenon 
under study in all their complexity. This chapter presents this conceptual 
framework. The framework is an outcome of the project largely studied and 




developed after field work on the basis of emergent themes in the data. Theoretical 
perspectives derived from the literature were adapted and combined in new ways 
and applied to novel contexts. This was an iterative process whereby the data 
presented a number of issues and dilemmas and the literature was then used as a 
machine of thought to understand these in theoretical terms. I then went back to 
the data and applied theoretical understandings to the issues arising. This 
prompted certain adaptations of theory.  
In this chapter I first set out two definitions of politics used throughout the thesis. 
It is important to understand for the purpose of the analysis that I talk about 
facilitation of politics in both the small-p and big-P senses of the term. Secondly, 
I outline key concepts used in deconstructing the process of policy implementation. 
These concepts flow inductively out of the empirical work but also dovetail with 
existing theory and literature. The empirical work described later is enlightened 
by the theoretical work presented here and vice versa. For example, the data 
demonstrates practical applications, modifications and challenges to previously 
abstract conceptualisations of political identity construction and politicisation in 
social performance. 
 
3.2. Defining Politics 
Politics in western democracies is a concept derived from deep roots in the 
philosophies of ancient Greece (Whitehead, 1929). Plato believed that political 
capacity was exercised in the process by which people seek to attain the truth and 
to use this truth for the rational and virtuous ordering of human affairs. Plato 
believed that conflicting interests can be harmonized in the political process. 
Politics on this view is ultimately a question of deciding what is just through 
ethical dialogue. The best, rational and righteous, political order, according to 




Plato, leads to a harmonious unity of society and allows each of its parts to 
flourish, but not at the expense of others (Plato, 2000: 331d-335a).  
According to Plato, Socrates critiqued these democratic principles and argued 
that politics is not principally about the exercise of democratic freedom through 
participation in forming and administering the state (Mara 1997: 107-9). He 
argued that politics is rather about achieving arête or excellence in individual 
lives. Therefore, politics is generally about nourishing good and virtuous human 
beings (Ibid).  
Aristotle built on, and critiqued Plato’s understanding of politics. He similarly 
described a process through which human societies produce and enact ideas about 
the ideal constitution of human affairs. In addition, he defines citizens as persons 
who participate in forging constitutions of State and in administering that State 
once constituted. He argued that citizenship will vary according to the 
constitution and that therefore the search for universal characteristics of 
citizenship is misguided. 
Aristotle significantly introduced the idea that politics is an inherent aspect of 
human interaction (Aristotle, 1982: 59 1253a1). He emphasised political 
participation as having intrinsic value for participants themselves (Kymlicka 2002; 
Oldfield 1990: 6). Failure to participate, according to this view, renders a person 
‘radically incomplete and stunted’ (Oldfield 1990: 187). Politics on this view is a 
process by which societies are constituted and participation is a valuable and 
unique aspect of human life without which we become bestial and savage.  
These ancient ideas form a contradictory historical basis for contemporary 
conceptualisations of politics. These debates are still ongoing. It is assumed by 
many contemporary theorists, in the Socratic tradition, that politics is primarily 
a means of achieving a satisfactory private life rather than participation being an 
end in itself (Kymlicka 2002: 295). Where Plato and Aristotle promoted the 
sacrifice of private liberty to promote political life, modern political theorists most 




frequently view politics as a means to protect enjoyment of private lives so long 
as this doesn’t infringe the liberty of others (Ignatieff 1989; Mead 1986; Rawls 
1971; Elshtain 1981). 
For centuries, ideas about politics and democracy have been interpreted and 
implemented in multifarious and contradictory ways and no single definition has 
been sufficient to capture everything that the term politics refers to (Van der Eijk, 
2017). This leads us to the argument that politics and citizenship are themselves 
essentially contested concepts (Gallie, 1955: 169) to be forged through political 
action and performance.  
Van der Eijk argues that: The common element in the multitude of attempts to 
clarify what politics entails are insufficient to arrive at a fully encompassing and 
universally agreed definition (Van der Eijk, 2017: 13). Politics is thus a complex 
concept that derives its meaning from multiple components in open social systems. 
No single operationalised measure of political participation would be able to 
capture the many reasonable interpretations of the concept.  
Contemporary definitions of politics, according to Van der Eijk, can be categorised 
into two groups; definitions that rely on identifying an institutionalised political 
sphere associated with government, governance and public administration. At any 
given moment in time there is a certain domain or sphere which you can say that 
is governmental affairs and whatever happens there is political. Definitions based 
in this tradition are henceforth referred to as domain, or big-P, Politics. A second 
type of definition relies on identifying specific processes in handling, and 
attempting to resolve conflict, relevant to a community as a whole. This category 
of definitions may be referred to as aspect, or small-p, politics (Van der Eijk, 
2017).  
Below I consider the pros and cons of using domain or aspect definitions. 




3.2.1. Domain Politics 
The domain perspective proposes that politics is exclusively related to a specific 
context of organisations, institutions, and actors. Politics, on this view, is to be 
found in particular domains or spheres of action. The domain is usually referred 
to as government, public administration, or the public sphere. This is the more 
prevalent ‘everyday’ definition of politics (Van der Eijk, 2017: 5). 
The domain perspective locates politics in the sphere of the state and state actors 
in public institutions. The mental health system, as a state provided service, is 
arguably such an institution. It is publicly funded and the subject of much 
governmental law and policy. Mental health professionals may be seen, at least 
partially, as agents of the state acting to protect citizens from themselves and 
from the consequences of mental distress. In this context clinicians effectively 
make sovereign decision as to the suspension of normal rights and responsibilities 
on the basis of necessity and place citizens in the sphere of mental health law. On 
the domain perspective this is implementation of political decisions rather than a 
political process in itself. It is a form of governance.  
In the practice of mental health treatment, a particular version of the ‘good life’ 
is advocated for and perceived to be legitimately imposed upon people with 
mental disabilities. These practices socialise individuals to internalise beliefs about 
themselves and the world and the mechanisms by which change is affected. 
Individual rather than systemic change is recommended. These worldviews inform 
behaviour by presenting particular roles and actions as natural and others as 
inappropriate and illegitimate. When these behaviours and beliefs are reinforced 
and internalised political identities are shaped and pushed towards certain 
expressive outlets. Mental health treatment educates service-users into a set of 
political norms. The anthrogogy of politics applied is clothed in a scientific 
epistemology with the good life redefined as ‘good mental health’. This serves to 
naturalise political and ethical worldviews. 




The domain perspective implies that actors in contexts outside the political sphere 
cannot act politically. Because mental health treatment is defined as a 
technocratic space outside of the domain of politics, actors within this space are 
treated as apolitical until they visit the ballot box. A division is made between 
matters to be dealt with politically and those to be dealt with on the basis of 
other decision-making processes.  
Politics and the achievement of the good life (bios) may be viewed as a democratic 
space that accords equal importance to each citizens perspectives and opinions. 
Bare life (or zoê) may be viewed as a technocratic space to be dealt with using 
principles of necessity, or epistemologies that require scientific evidence and/or 
expertise. Such distinctions draw a line between the public and private spheres 
which are difficult to reconcile with the systems of participatory rights currently 
in place.  
As I show in subsequent chapters, mental health service-providers are public actors 
intervening in the private lives of citizens on the basis of perceived necessity and 
in this process a version of the ‘good life’ is applied as a definition of mental good-
health often through a didactic and authoritarian educative practice. In residential 
mental health institutions, the bare essentials of social life, i.e. being alive and 
minimal functioning in the community, are indicators of the good life and can 
become reified as an embodiment of the good life (bios). In many cases the 
socialisation into ways of ethical living is necessary and positive. However, the 
paramountcy in this process of psy-professionals applying such processes alongside 
mental health treatment may be less justifiable. This is because (as I will later 
argue) political anthrogogy in mental health rehab often seeks to impose a 
conception of the good life on people who are categorised as incapable of defending 
and implementing their own interests.  
In conclusion domain politics is one of the more prevalent interpretations of what 
politics consists of but is far too narrow to include all the things that the 




UNCRPD is intended to encompass in Art.29. In addition, the mental health 
system, in implementing policies of political inclusion, has the power to define the 
field of legitimate political action in ways that restrict opportunities. 
 
3.2.2. Aspect Politics 
Aspect definitions rely on identifying common characteristics in processes of 
handling or resolving conflict. On this view, politics occurs both inside and outside 
of ‘political’ institutions. Proponents argue that political behaviour is observable 
in all aspects of human interaction. The claim is that not everything is political, 
but that politics is everywhere. Dahl identifies the aspect that defines political 
behaviour as a persistent pattern of human interaction that involves, to a 
significant extent, power, rule or authority (Dahl, 1998). Lasswell and Kaplan 
similarly argue that the central focus of political analysis is on processes that 
influence the exercise of power whatever the domain (Lasswell & Kaplan 1950). 
Schattschneider argues that conflict is the key process through which power is 
shaped, associated with certain roles and exercised in a language of conflict 
(Schattschneider, 1960: 1–2). Van der Eijk argues that both conflict and 
cooperation are equally important. Conflict is inevitable, and so is cooperation. 
Together they constitute the basis of politics. (Van der Eijk, 2017: 27) 
Van der Eijk concludes that aspect politics may be defined as the handling and 
resolution of conflict on matters that must be settled for the community as a 
whole (Van der Eijk, 2017: 19). The concept of community is a flexible one which 
may be applied to both small- and large-scale groups bound together by proximity, 
common institutions and shared social rituals. As we will see later, residential 
mental health services often form a relatively bounded community and various 
processes of conflict and cooperation occur between and within the staff and 
service-user teams. Mental health treatment involves the exercise of coercive 




power, staff monopoly of discretion to interpret rules, and the authority to apply 
and make new rules based on necessity. The practices of political participation in 
elections are interesting therefore because they do not adhere to, and in fact 
contradict, this mode of governance. 
The interactions studied in the field work occur in totalising institutions (Goffman 
1961: 15-22; MacKenzie & Porter, 2019). These are institutions that function by 
separating the components of individuality in ways that tend towards the dispersal 
of ‘individuals’ across the whole social field, often in conflictual and contradictory 
ways. For example, the mental health patient role may be internalised and/or 
reified by actors as natural rather than political whilst in election cycles patents 
are encouraged to adopt the role of political citizen.  
Van der Eijk’s aspect definition of politics allows service-user action and 
expression to be interpreted as political across various social fields. Using this 
perspective, we can perceive processes of politicisation in the everyday life of the 
institution and not exclusively in relation to support to access the vote. In a 
methodological sense we can also perceive the differences in how participants 
define the boundaries of the political sphere. Although voting and registration 
rates are important, they are far from satisfactory indicators of political 
participation and inclusion more generally. Aspect politics is a broader definition 
that encompasses the wide range of behaviours that Article 29 is intended to 
cover. It is therefore a more appropriate working definition to use for the purposes 
of this research project. 
 
3.2.3. The Definition of Politics  
How one defines politics determines what counts as political participation. In 
mental health law policy and practice, definitional power is claimed by mental 
health professionals. In this study, political action in domain politics and aspect 




politics are of interest. How implementers define politics is of practical significance 
in that it effects the uptake of opportunities for political action. This is relevant 
in answering the research questions posed in Chapter 1.  
As aspect politics is broad and encompasses both big-P Politics and small-p 
politics, I adopt this as the working definition. Therefore, political action is defined 
as the handling and resolution of conflict on matters that must be settled for the 
community as a whole whether this process occurs in elections, political 
institutions or elsewhere (Van der Eijk, 2017: 19).  
 
3.3. Key Concepts 
In this section, I consider issues of power, governmentality, democracy and ethics 
within the context of a mental health rehab ward by adopting an analytical style 
and conceptual language developed by Goffman (1961; 1963; 1969a; 1969b; 1971; 
1974), combining this with Butlerian ideas of co-construction of political identity, 
agency and ethical worldviews (Butler 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2005 and  2006) 
and then applying key questions of political analysis provided by Van der Eijk 
(2017; 2018). In this way I seek to build a set of concepts that allows me to 
describe the processes of politicisation that were observed and discussed in field 
work and to convey the richness of human experience. This allows us to 
understand participants experiences as they described processes of playing at and 
becoming political citizens and how this is supported through educational 
practice.  
Dramaturgical analysis is premised on the idea that social acts are ‘staged’, 
whether intentionally or not, and therefore may be fruitfully analysed as theatrical 
performances. Goffman (1959), used theatrical enactment as a metaphor to 
understand processes in everyday life and thus “social life can be understood as a 
series of performances” (Brissett and Edgley, 1990: p. 36). According to Hare and 




Benford (2015) applying the theatre metaphor focusses analysis on how people 
perform in collaboration and conflict, and project social roles, in everyday social 
interaction. In this tradition, dramaturgists such as Burke (1968, 1969) reject the 
application of dramaturgy as ‘mere metaphor’. Proponents of this approach 
contend that ‘life is but a stage’. In other words, theatrical performance portrays 
all the elements of ordinary social life. Thus, concepts used in theatre production 
can used in the production and analysis of the social behaviour more generally.  
Even without choosing between these ontological positions, dramaturgical analysis 
illuminates how people construct reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) and sustain 
role, meaning and narrative (Goffman, 1983). As Edgley argues ‘stripped to its 
essentials, dramaturgy is about the ways in which human beings, in concert with 
similarly situated others, create meaning in their lives’ (2013: p. 2). This shared 
understanding of role and common worldview, provides interactants with a shared 
set of assumptions which act as a foundation  on which individual and communal 
narratives can be build.  
In my view, there are important differences between theatrical performances and 
the dramaturgical performances in everyday life analysed in this thesis. In theatre, 
there is a clear and sustained distinction between actors and audiences in which 
audience direction and production of the performance is supressed. By contrast, 
in everyday life such boundaries are more unstable. One is, in any given 
interaction, intermittently both actor and audience. In addition, an important 
audience in everyday action is oneself. A person can, even during performance, be 
a critical or accepting audience based on the perception of ones ‘true’ or inner 
self. I do not mean to argue here that there is in fact a true self which provides a 
basis for evaluating the authenticity of one’s performance but merely to point out 
that performance has multiple intended audiences one of which is one’s internal 
sense of self. Proceeding from this general sociological perspective, I lay out in 
the following sections the conceptual tools developed to analyse the data following 
the field work.  





3.3.1. The Nature of the Ritual Order 
Before discussing Goffman’s conception of the ritual order, Bourdieu's theories of 
the cultural construction of social hierarchies and power are useful to consider. 
The concepts of capital, habitus and field are important backdrop to the 
development of a ritual order. Capital refers to all kinds of resources which allow 
a person to gain status within a social field and thereby to exercise more power 
relative to others (Bourdieu 1986). Different types of capital may be distinguished: 
Cultural capital (knowledge), economic capital (command of resources) and social 
capital (a network of social relationships of mutual cooperation and recognition) 
(Ibid). Political capital may refer to types of cultural, economic and social capitals 
relevant to the exercise of power in relations of conflict and cooperating on matters 
relevant for the community. This allows us to analyse discourse aiming to produce 
and represent its own importance and credibility in the political field (Bourdieu 
1992).  
Habitus is similar to what Goffman called the ritual order. Habitus is the 
performance of culture i.e. the socially constructed rituals of thinking, being and 
acting, that are associated with particular groups, classes or institutions and which 
are repeated and subverted by individuals in interaction (Bourdieu 1977, 1990a: 
52 - 65, 1990b: 63 and Reay et al. 2001).  
The notion of ‘fields’ refers to aspects of social interaction that are structured 
according to articulated rules of interaction or pragmatics (Bourdieu, 1993). Social 
fields are characterized by struggles for hierarchy and positive face. They are 
competitive in that agents compete for the resources and seek to co-construct 
positive identities with one another and for external audiences (Warde, 2004). The 
‘rules’ of engagement may be co-constructed in immediate interaction, codified in 
a constitution or contained in ritualised orders of interaction (Bourdieu 1990b). 




Playing the game well may involve playing by the rules or attempting to subvert 
them. The power to construct worldviews and realities is symbolic and is 
distributed according to perceived capabilities for perception and evaluation 
(Bourdieu, 1992). The arbitration between legitimate and illegitimate 
participation incorporates conflict and cooperation, on the basis of political 
capital, in the process of constructing reality (Bourdieu, 1992; 1993; 1996).  
The ritual order of an institution is, according to Goffman, a set of social 
pragmatics pertaining to a particular set of actors, in a particular place and time. 
Inappropriate conduct is defined as action that breaches pragmatics pertaining to 
the individual and his place.  
In looking at how people interact with ritual orders Goffman argues that we do 
not engage in rational strategies to enhance our status on the basis of a clear 
understanding of the current state of play and our position in it. Rather a man 
might: 
‘[insulate] himself by blindness, half-truths, illusions and rationalisations. He 
makes an adjustment by convincing himself with the tactful support of his intimate 
circle, that he is what he wants to be and that he would not do to gain his ends 
what others have done to gain theirs. And as for society, if the person is willing 
to be subject to informal social control – if he is willing to find out from hints and 
tactful cues what his place is, and keep it, - then there will be no objection to his 
furnishing his place at his own discretion… (Goffman, 1969b, 34).  
Therefore, Goffman’s ritual order is much more specific than Bourdieu’s habitus. 
It is about assimilating a person into an existing social organisation and/or 
maintaining a place and status inferred from, or ascribed by, their social milieu. 
It is a mechanism whereby people are rendered governable subjects and is 
protective of a person’s currently ascribed identity: 




‘To protect this shelter [a person] does not have to work hard, or join a group, or 
compete with anybody; [a person] needs only to be careful about expressed 
judgements [they] place [themselves] in a position to witness. Some situations and 
acts and persons will have to be avoided; others, less threatening, must not be 
pressed too far. Social life is an uncluttered, orderly thing because the person 
voluntarily stays away from the places and topics and times where [they are] not 
wanted and where [they] might be disparaged for going’ – (Goffman, 1969: 35)  
In the empirical analysis it will be important to consider whether the ritual order 
of the rehabilitation unit implies to service-users that political environments are 
places that they ‘might be disparaged’ for going. If politics is out of bounds for 
people with mental disabilities, then service-users may very well become complicit 
in this exclusion to save face and to gain credits in the psychiatric pathway. 
Likewise, recognition by those in authority, for both service-users and providers, 
may depend on avoiding political discourse. The structure of the ritual order may 
mean there is much to be gained from avoiding political identities for both service-
users and providers. “Tortured learning may be associated… with tortured 
performance of what is learned…” (Goffman 1963: 21). “At the same time minor 
failings or incidental impropriety may… be interpreted as a direct expression of his 
stigmatised differentness.” (Goffman 1963: 26) 
Strauss et al. (1963; Strauss 1985) argue that the hospital is not a fixed object, 
but a set of relationships that produce the structure that influences interactions 
(Nugus, 2019). These relationships inform patients’ care pathways and the ethical 
environment in which they develop new roles and identities. Nugus (2019), 
building on Strauss states that without a comprehensive overview of perspectives, 
policies, procedures, networks and relationships ‘no one knows what the hospital 
‘is’ on any given day’ and it is therefore ‘continually being established, renewed, 
reviewed, revoked [and] revised’ (Strauss et al. 1963: 164 as quoted in Nugus 2019). 
This means that the rules of appropriate conduct are continually reconstructed 
and can cause confusion and anxiety if they are destabilised by political praxis.  




However, ‘organisations are not in a permanent state of flux...[they] are more or 
less stable at particular points in time’ (Allen 2000: 331) and established 
hierarchies of mental health hospitals appear to achieve remarkable stability 
despite this continual reconstruction. Furthermore, collective work practices and 
institutionally ascribed identities influence, to an extent, individual behaviour 
(Berger and Luckmann 1967; Carmel 2006). Nugus (2019) argues that 
institutional power and stability stems from ‘specialised knowledge of inpatient 
doctors’ and is reinforced by formal organisational boundaries. 
Institutional power, and by extension political agency, is excercised 
disproportionately by health professionals, according to a ‘dominant institutional 
logic’ that is ‘reinforced and routinised in interaction’ (Nugus 2019; Scott 1987). 
Power can be both a dominative and a co-constructed response to service-users 
voice and the claim to better represent the patient voice and interest can be used 
by staff to accumulate political capital in relation to other professions (Nugus 
2019: 380; Salhani and Coulter, 2009). On this basis the ritual order is not 
necessarily restrictive of political action but simply provides a systemic framework 
which directs it and defines it in ways that advance institutional aims. 
Goffman argues the ritual order is not premised on principles of participation or 
justice in social relations but on the principle of maintaining face in the exchange 
of communications. People who breach or subvert the ritual order in some way, 
are not always subject to negative sanctions because such breaches may be by-
passed, misunderstood or tactfully conveyed. Subversion may also have the effect 
of changing the ritual order itself. 
The main principle of the ritual order is not justice but face, and what the [persons 
breaching the ritual order] receives is not what he deserves but what will sustain 
for the moment the line to which he has committed himself”. (Goffman, 2005: 44) 
Actors in interaction build a context based ritual order by participating in a 
mutually reinforcing drama of interpersonal interaction. It is the sum of these 




interpersonal interactions, relating themselves to an imagined ritual order, which 
can reinforce the benefits of taking particular lines. Members of a community or 
institution are mobilised to act in accordance with certain lines, roles and faces, 
in order that they be self-regulating participants in social interaction and that 
pragmatics of ‘appropriate conduct’ be maintained. The exercise of institutional 
power and political agency is therefore dependent on service-users colluding in 
this performance. 
I present arguments in later chapters that the way that mental health institutions 
sustain boundaries of appropriateness based on psychiatric understandings of 
mentally healthy ways of being (i.e. the ‘good life’). The definition of reality and 
the drivers of change are thus constructed as the preserve of a few powerful actors 
with specialised knowledge.  
The regulating forces of reputation and maintaining face are compromised by the 
spoiled identities implied by the institutional ascription of patient identities which 
are then reified and internalised (Goffman, 1963). The mental health discourse 
and the ritual order of psychiatric services potentially teaches service-users to be 
less aware of decisions relating to line and face as they are often told their 
behaviour is determined by mental illness. At the same time mistakes in 
performance of line and face gain a special significance and become the focus of 
interventions. Practitioner decisions relating to line and face are by contrast 
defined as treatment decisions based on objective observation. Service-users may 
be taught that the feelings they have attached to their idea of self are potentially 
erroneous and caused by ‘illness’. They therefore can be socialised in ways that 
reduce opportunities to perform honourable, dignified, and authoritative identities 
and be recognised as legitimately inhabiting appropriate political roles. Forms of 
recognition, necessary for political agency, expression and influence in political 
and civic life to flourish, are therefore restricted: 




The general capacity to be bound by moral rules may well belong to the individual 
but the particular set of rules which transforms him into a human being derives 
from requirements established in the ritual organisation of social encounters. 
(Goffman, 2005, 36) 
The negotiation aspects of Strauss’ (1963; 1985) theory of organisational structure 
are useful in understanding Goffman’s ritual order and the organisational 
structure. Strauss’ understanding of negotiated orders emphasises the variety and 
fluidity of influences on individual behaviour. Any ritual order depends on 
negotiation, and orders change over time due to dynamics of conflict and 
cooperation (Strauss 1978). Participation in co-constructing ritual orders can 
therefore help develop political capacities while exclusion can internalise 
depoliticising tendencies. Yet, ritual orders have relatively stable boundaries. The 
significance of stable boundaries is that, although they are continually 
reconstructed, they have concrete consequences (Strauss, 1985).  
The ritual order of an institution is, according to Goffman, a set of social 
pragmatics pertaining to a particular set of actors, in a particular place and time. 
Inappropriate conduct is defined as action that breaches pragmatics pertaining to 
the individual and his place. The concept of the ritual order of an institution is 
therefore a vital concept in understanding how appropriate and inappropriate 
conduct in relation to political action is defined in the institutions studied. 
This section discussed Goffman’s concept of ritual order and other theories of 
organisational structure. I elaborated, following Nugus (2019), on the oft-
neglected structural aspects of negotiated order in their occurrence as observable 
effects in interaction. Paying greater attention to “the structural aspects of 
negotiated order makes it possible to discuss structural power and political power 
derived from formal structure, without assuming that the organisation is a fixed 
and unchanging entity” (Nugus 2019: 389). This allows us to observe the way in 
which anthrogogies of politics are applied under the guise of specialised knowledge 




and ensures power is exercised only by those adopting certain roles. I now move 
on to discuss the subject and identity as a co-constructed and malleable entity. 
 
3.3.2. The Subject 
Butler conceptualises the ‘subject’, ‘actor’ or ‘agent’ as a discursive construct. The 
body is not a “mute facticity” (Butler 1990: 129), i.e. a fact of nature. Rather the 
body is produced by discursive practice. This theoretical approach allows us to 
perceive the mechanisms by which discourses during mental health treatment can 
reify the subject as incapable and apolitical or alternatively as a political agent 
and citizen.  
Butler’s work also allows us to perceive dynamics of change within the ethical and 
political environments in which mental health treatment occurs. Loizidou argues 
that Butler’s re-reading of Antigone’s claim illuminates the relationship between 
the ethical, legal and political as an agonistic one (Loizidou 2007). Butler argues 
that the legacy of Antigone’s defiance to Creon’s law appeared to be lost in the 
contemporary efforts to recast political opposition as illegitimate if it 
demonstrates disrespect for law and authority. A misguided aim of political 
resistance is to seek the legitimacy of the state in the espousal of your worldviews 
(Butler, 2000: 1-26). Engaging in conflict and cooperation with others in the 
political environment of the rehab service, in defiance of law policy and 
institutional pragmatics, present opportunities for agentic and resistant 
subjectivity that allow for substantive inclusion. It is agonistic relationships 
between ethics, law and politics which gives rise to the space and conditions for 
greater participation in the decisions that affect our lives and the lives of those 
around us (Mouffe, 2013).  
The argument that there is no “natural body” that pre-exists its cultural 
inscription indicates that a political citizen is not something one is, it is something 




one does, an act, or more precisely, a sequence of acts, a verb rather than a noun, 
a “doing” rather than a “being” (Butler 1990). Fraser’s work on recognition and 
distribution, and Goffman’s work on the practical mechanisms by which doing 
performs a legitimate identity, provide the additional insight that social 
recognition of role depends on it being legitimately and competently performed. 
A socially ascribed identity may not be perceived as ‘being’ even if it is being 
acted out. For example, when the actor “obstinately attempt[s] to employ an 
unconventional interpretation of the character of his social identity” (Goffman 
1963: 21) The actor may not recognise herself as legitimately inhabiting the role 
and therefore distance themselves from it in the course of performance. He or she 
may use stigma for ‘secondary gains’, as an excuse for ill success (ibid). 
Butler’s thinking in Indefinite Detention (2006) on the place of law in relation to 
the question of how to promote a liveable and viable life, and its relation to the 
spheres of ethics and politics (Loizidou, 2007), is important. Butler’s thinking in 
light of the works of Foucault, Agamben, Sorel and Benjamin on sovereignty, 
governmentality and violence, particularly at the moment when law is suspended 
by the sovereign in a state of emergency (Agamben, 2005) is also relevant in that 
it suggests that the exercise of diffuse powers through systems of governmentality 
(in the construction of good subjects) can act simultaneously with sovereign 
powers to suspend rights in times of necessity (Butler, 2006: 53). Whereas the 
suspension of law can… be read as a tactic of governmentality it [also makes] room 
for the resurgence of sovereignty. (Butler, 2006: 55). 
On this basis a reification of identities based on psychiatric diagnosis places a 
body in a permanently threatened state of exception in which a very small space 
for resistance remains. This process is potentially more acute in cases of psychosis, 
schizophrenia and personality disorder as these service-users are seen as uniquely 
delusional thus reducing their ability to present their views and opinions as 
legitimate criticisms of how they are treated. This threatened state of exception 
is justified by the potential necessity of making replacement decisions due to 




mental incapacity. Dissent is potentially interpreted and considered not only 
unintelligible but moreover dangerous, a threat to national security and cohesion 
(Loizidou, 2007: 125). A threat to the mutual ‘act’ constructed in performance. 
According to Butler agency is found ‘within the possibility of a variation on the 
repetition’. Therefore, the requirement to ‘be’ a given identity in performance 
‘produces necessary failure’ (Butler 1990: 145). Butler thus considers that bodies 
come to be resistant and political by engaging with the deconstruction of the norm 
(Loizidou, 2007). In challenging and subverting the ritual, and ethical order within 
an institution, conflict and cooperation around what those norms should be can 
arise and spaces opened up for political participation. 
Alternatively, the political and ethical environment might be designed in such a 
way that challenge and subversion are suppressed and punished as inappropriate 
conduct. In such circumstances a court trial or tribunal becomes the only 
legitimate space for resistance, agentic subjectivity being precisely possible 
through the performative linguistic space that a legal adjudication allows. 
Applying this to mental health practice the political and ethical environment 
created can reduce the space for legitimate patient resistance and agential 
subjectivity to challenging the grounds for detention in mental health tribunals 
and official complaint procedures. This can function to delegitimise and thus 
reduce antagonistic or agonistic political relations. The spaces where conflict is 
permissible may be reduced to complaint through bureaucratic or legal systems. 
Such systems require competence in the technical language used, are formal, 
intimidating and require high levels of commitment. In these sorts of 
environments, playing at political roles becomes much more difficult. 
Opportunities and capabilities for resistance and agential subjectivity are reduced. 
In applying these ideas directly to the mental health rehabilitation facility, I found 
it necessary to adapt them. As I show in later chapters, although subversion and 
challenge are useful in developing political identities for service-users, accepting 




and adapting to the system and ritual order are also functional in expanding 
opportunities for political participation and inclusion in the everyday politics of 
the ward. Processes of assimilation and normalisation, associated with 
rehabilitation and recovery, are potentially functional in expanding some political 
capabilities. By adopting and utilising the language of psychiatry and mobilising 
it in defence of their own interests, service-users can accumulate political capital 
and develop political agency. In this way subscription to the norm provides 
opportunities for agency.  
The constitution of the self, or 'the subject' is a process that occurs in construction 
between people in interaction. Although subversion and challenge are undoubtedly 
important in developing a sense of political identity for service-users, accepting, 
and adapting to the system and ritual order, are also functional in expanding 
opportunities for political participation. Embracing assigned identities can 
function to open opportunities for inclusion in the everyday politics of the ward 
and institution more generally. Processes of assimilation and normalisation, 
associated with rehabilitation and recovery, are ways of expanding political 
capabilities also.  
When this strategy is translated into wider political environments problems may 
then arise as people have skills to conform to particular social norms but not to 
transgress, subvert and change them in accordance with their conception of the 
good life. Playing the game well, rather than subverting and challenging it, 
becomes a way of developing political agency in the small politics of the ward but 
can become a passive identity that gestures towards impotence in wider political 
processes. Self-exclusion may be a rational choice based on increased risk of mis-
recognition whereby transgressive and emotional political performance is seen as 
indicative of mental ill health (e.g. symptomatic of antisocial personality disorder). 
The forms of control and coercion applied to people with mental disabilities in 
institutions means that ethical principles of obedience and compliance may be 
prioritised over passionate and transgressive expression.  








My use of the term recognition comes from Fraser’s analyses of 
recognition/distribution (1990). The term refers to a normative and psychological 
form of audience feedback. Recognition implies that you accept obligations to 
treat an actor in a certain way and recognise a specific normative status of the 
other person. Recognition is also necessary for performers to embrace themselves 
and their projects as valuable.  
Throughout the thesis I also use the terms mis-recognition and mal-recognition. 
These are slightly more specific applications of the concept. Mal-recognition 
carries not only the implication of a mistake but also of actual harm – it is a 
technology of power in that it labels a person or group in a way that identifies 
them as inferior and justifies practical exclusions. Whereas mis-recognition is more 
innocent in the sense that it is merely the unreflective use of practices of 
categorisation. Collective recognition refers to acknowledgement of the agency 
amongst and between corporations, cultural minorities, political parties, and 
various other social groups. It is not clear that these relations are best understood 
within the same conceptual framework as recognition between individual agents – 
referred to as individual recognition. 
Some readings of recognition (e.g. Honneth, 1995; Taylor, 1992) build on Hegelian 
insights. Ikäheimo (2002a) for example argues that recognition is achieved by 
treating the ‘other’ as a person in such a way that they understand and appreciate 
this treatment. Recognition is a response to personhood, but also constructs it in 
a self-fulfilling process (Ikäheimo, 2007). Individual recognition of personhood is 




important in signalling to potential political agents that their contributions will 
be considered legitimate. 
Only persons can be recognised in the Hegelian sense of the term but at the same 
time we are persons only through being recognized (Hegal, 1984). Charles Taylor 
argues, recognition of this kind is a ‘vital human need’ (Taylor & Gutmann, 1992). 
He identifies institutionalisation or learned helplessness as an instance of this need 
remaining unfulfilled. This is related to the ‘quest for wholeness’ of identity that 
Lacan discusses in the context of the subject of lack (Ruti, 2008). The ability to 
convey or perform a coherent and relatively ‘whole’ identity in social interaction 
and the ability, and willingness of others to accept that performed identity is 
fundamental to functional human organisation. 
It is often thought that our needs for recognition should be reflected in the 
structural design of a society. Thompson (2006), in an overview of political 
theories of recognition concluded that it is recognition that holds the key for 
determining what is just in a society, and more fundamentally what a good society 
is. Recognition distinguishes ‘deserving’ from ‘undeserving’. It sorts persons from 
non-persons and so is an exclusionary concept. The freedom of people to form and 
join exclusive associations is important in identity formation and associations 
provide opportunities for mutual recognition and confirmation. It is only through 
other people ‘knowing us’ that we come to have a coherent knowledge of ourselves. 
To know oneself is to be known to others through recognition and identification 
with broad identity categories. Broader political identities (such as race or 
religion) are performed and concretised in small social groups. This process is both 
inclusive and exclusionary in that membership is constructed through the 
identification of out-groups who don’t share the interests and perspectives of 
members.  
Recognition is important for the development of political agency and identity but, 
in the act of recognition, exclusion is almost always implied because to be 




recognised as one thing means to have other potential roles and identities 
excluded. Recognition of one identity can restrict the possibility of performing 
others. There is also potential for the incompetent performance of the role one is 
recognised as trying to play. 
Personhood plays a fundamental role in politics. Recognition is multi-dimensional 
and historical. Relationships take different historical forms based on different 
assumptions about what it is to be a person. These assumptions are based on 
rituals and norms of performance between teams and individuals in social fields 
where power is associated with a hierarchy of institutional roles. The assumptions 
can be challenged, and roles reconfigured as performers tend to be responsive to 
competent and appropriate acts that represent positive reform.  
Honneth’s (1995, 129) distinctions between love as emotional support, respect for 
moral responsibility, and esteem for traits and abilities gives us three forms of 
recognition that are responsive to different aspects of historically defined 
personhood. These forms of recognition are, in turn, solidified in the institutional 
world and form institutionalised recognition frameworks, in the light of which 
individuals may grant normative statuses to each other (Honneth, 2004).  
Recognition in mental health service provision may be restricted to particular 
types of personhood. Therefore, a quest for recognition entails risks as well as 
benefits depending on what type of performances are expected. Our individualistic 
conceptualisation of the classical liberal subject (independent, hardworking and 
self-sufficient) can impose burdensome responsibilities to embrace roles and 
perform them appropriately in civic and political life.  
 





It is useful to consider at this point some of the concepts Goffman uses in his 
conceptualisation of role. In his book Where the Action Is (1969) and Interaction 
Ritual (2005) he outlines how important the concept of role is in the social 
anthropological tradition and teases apart role concepts described in this 
literature. 
A status is a position in some system or pattern of positions. It is related to other 
positions in the unit through reciprocal ties, through rights and duties that may 
be binding on actors. Role consists of the activity the actor would engage in were 
he to act solely in terms of the normative demands upon someone in his position. 
Role in this normative sense is to be distinguished from role performance or role 
enactment, which is the actual conduct of a particular individual while on duty 
in his position. The individual’s role enactment occurs largely through a cycle of 
face-to-face situations with role otherxzs - that is relevant audiences (Goffman 
1969).  
To understand this way of thinking about role it is useful to outline three key 
distinctions that Goffman makes which are fundamental to the development of his 
operationalised concepts. 
1. Expressions we give and expressions we give off - The former is the 
concretely intended and conscious form of expression, as epitomized by verbal 
communications using language. The latter is the non-verbal, presumably 
unintentional, form of communication that is not concretely expressed in speech 
but nevertheless has efficacy in communicating, consciously or unconsciously, 
some things about the person expressing it. It is important to keep in mind that, 
while the former is always intentional, the latter does not necessarily have to be 
unintentional. In fact, people are capable of manipulating the tacit 
communications they give off in strategic ways. 




2. The symmetry vs. the asymmetry of these two modes of expression 
- Symmetry occurs whenever there is a congruence between what these two modes 
of expression communicate, asymmetry is whenever these two do not express the 
same things. Thus, when a student who had been yawning through a lecture, 
nevertheless says he had enjoyed the talk greatly, there is asymmetry.  
Because people are capable of manipulating non-verbal expression to a 
considerable degree, there is a possibility for a type of game to set in. This may 
take the form of a cycle of concealment, discovery, false revelation, and rediscovery, 
all geared to the goal of giving off as advantageous a set of impressions as possible. 
3. "Working consensus" - People interpret the social situations they are in as 
signifying various acts or role relations. There may be consensus, or the 
interpretations may conflict. "Working consensus" is a type of consensus, which is 
not an agreement in any absolute sense, but a tentative agreement as to whose 
claims and definitions are to be honoured in particular circumstances. Also, in 
accepting other's definitions of social situations, Goffman notes the crucial 
importance of information people possess initially concerning fellow participants, 
for all subsequent actions and responses would be based upon this initial 
knowledge frame. Following this, these frames set a plan for the co-operative social 
activity that ensues.  
Goffman notes that accepted or dominant narratives can acquire moral and 
imperative character, in that they now guide actors as to role and behaviour. 
When people subvert or violate these definitions actors may engage in defensive 
practices to restore the act to a working consensus. This analysis allows us to 
elucidate the methods people employ to reconcile the discrepancies between their 
own actions as they are, the social meanings and impressions they desire to give 
off and the audience interpretation and recognition of these meanings and 
impressions. This understanding is vital in analysis of processes of politicisation 
in the context of mental rehabilitation.  





3.3.5. Play, Becoming and Engulfment 
Schur, described the concept of "role engulfment" as ‘the process whereby persons 
become caught up in the deviant role as a result of others relating to them largely 
in terms of their spoiled identity’ (1971: 79). This is a form of labelling theory 
that emphasises the potential for mis/mal-recognition of the line an individual 
takes. In playing at a role which is consistently mis-recognised a person can 
eventually come to be engulfed by the pejorative role attributed and even embrace 
it. This is not a deterministic process but one of co-construction with implications 
for political identity and agency. Embracing a purported negative label (for 
example ‘mad’) is itself a potentially subversive and political act and does not 
necessarily follow the negative pattern predicted by labelling theory or models of 
deviancy. Through this process of iterative reification, a role may become 
dominant in a person’s identity narrative and can be used to accumulate political 
capital as much as it may be used to restrict a person’s agency.  
Conversely, the individual may themselves embrace the role (or roles) by 
expressing attachment and commitment. “In describing individual’s attachment 
to role, it is sometimes said that they have committed their self-feelings to it"' 
(Goffman 1969b: 43) Performance of defining roles or ‘master roles’ is reified as 
real compared to other ‘played at’ roles. Role ‘domination’ where a particular role 
comes to dominate all other roles can occur at a particular time or in a particular 
context but can also be destabilised by role or audience segregation – a capacity 
to support in the life cycle, calendar cycle or daily cycle a schedule of ‘where and 
what the individual is to be when’ (Ibid: 44). Following role engulfment there can 
be role abandonment where there is detachment from other goals, priorities, and 
roles. These processes are never final and although playing at can result in 
substantially becoming (in relation to a particular performance and in the eyes of 
a particular audience), we are always in the process of re-(and de-) constructing 




the person that is projected. Thus, role and identity cannot be reified as a fixed 
point and may be more fruitfully seen as unstable products of contextual 
interaction. 
Playing at different roles is to be distinguished from role engulfment by ascription 
which is a processes of reification. To become a played at role it must be embraced 
and recognised in a process of co-construction but it is constantly eroding and 
shifting (see s.3.3.2). The term ‘playing politics’ is a shorthand for adopting the 
role of political agent without political identities being reified as fixed points. That 
we all are seen as ‘playing politics’ is not intended to be pejorative of patronising. 
I simply use the term to indicate that we play a variety of roles in any given 
political process and engage in a process of experimentation and discovery of what 
works in the social situation we find ourselves in. 
In later chapters I will describe this process of playing at and adopting political 
identities as an educational practice that allows people to become, in an ephemeral 
and non-essentialised sense, political citizens in performance. 
 
3.3.6. Role distance 
For Goffman, role-distance refers to “actions which effectively convey some 
disdainful detachment of the performer from a role he is performing” (Goffman, 
1961a: 110). He develops his idea after observing children of various ages riding a 
merry-go-round. A two year-old, he observed, cannot maintain sufficient “role 
poise” to maintain physical, and hence emotional, security under the multi-
directional movement vectors the machine creates; they therefore “find the 
prospect too much for them” (Goffman, 1961a: 106). Three and four-year-olds, 
however, perform enthusiastically. “The task of riding a wooden horse is still a 
challenge, but apparently a manageable one, inflating the rider to his full extent 
with demonstrations of capacity.” At three and four, “the rider throws himself into 




the role in a serious way, playing it with verve and an admitted engagement of all 
his faculties” (Ibid). Goffman concludes that for this age group “doing is being, 
and what was designed as a ‘playing at’ is stamped with serious realization” (Ibid). 
This synthesis of doing and being is described as “embracement” of the performer’s 
role.  
At age five, everything changes again. “To be a merry-go-round horse rider is now 
apparently not enough, and this fact must be demonstrated out of dutiful regard 
for one’s own character” (Goffman, 1961a: 107). By five, “irreverence begins, and 
the child leans back, stands on the saddle, holds on to the horse’s wooden ear, and 
says by his actions: ‘Whatever I am, I’m not just someone who can barely manage 
to stay on a wooden horse.’ The rider is hence “apologizing,” not for “some minor 
untoward event that has cropped up during the interaction, but the whole role” 
(Ibid). “Whether this skittish behaviour is intentional or unintentional, sincere or 
affected, correctly appreciated by others present or not, it constitutes a wedge 
between the individual and his role, between doing and being,” Goffman concludes 
(Ibid 107/8).  
Extending this to adult performance Goffman describes how a surgeon sings 
limericks while wielding the scalpel so as to assure co-physicians and staff that 
beneath his professional role lies an well-rounded human being; the waitress smirks 
to show that beneath her apron lies a yet-unsung poet or stage performer. “Know 
that I am not who I appear to be” is the message such asymmetry between 
expression conveys. These behaviours demonstrate the prevalence of role distance 
in everyday lives: we do not wish to be seen either as locked into - or as failing to 
live up to - our adult roles. This applied to the roles of doctor and patient in 
psychiatric facilities as much as anywhere else. 
Understanding the real-life aspects of these terms helped to clarify and demystify 
several important issues encountered in the empirical work presented later in the 
thesis. In playing political roles, for example, what seemed like role-distancing was 




interpreted by practitioners as a poor performance and even evidence of declining 
social function. It made me aware of the way possibly diverse interpretations might 
operate in context. For example, a behaviour may well constitute a subversive or 
problematic performance given the expectations of role embracement but if role 
embracement is defined as healthy and role distancing as unhealthy then the scope 
for individual agency and choice in political decision making may be reduced. 
Persons engaging in role distancing behaviours are not being “dishonest” or 
“insincere”. Rather, they are holding on to Goffman’s “dutiful regard for [their] 
own character,” (Goffman, 1961a: 110) as they understand it. Role embracement, 
after all, may carry with it the perceived threat of identity effacement, as well as 
of accusations of deceit and hypocrisy. Such critiques of performance portraying 
“the real” against, by implication, “the false” both mis-state the technical 
distinction and overstate the moral or ontological one in a process of identity 
reification. What is potentially necessary, in such cases, is not for the actor to 
progress into a generic and ill-defined world of “reality” but to regress into the 
role embracement of the three-year-old. This is neither moral nor ontological. It 
is rather a matter of rediscovering the art of play.  
It is also helpful, in this regard, to recognize that Goffman did not limit himself 
to placing role embracement and role distance simply as bi-polar performative 
behaviours but rather as disparate points on a continuum of real-world self-
identification, on which we can find discrete gradations of role distance appearing 
at age five, eight, eleven, and adult years.  
As we have seen in previous sections, the playing at and embracement of roles 
does not occur in a vacuum. Audiences are required, and cooperation and 
recognition from other actors, and sometimes conflict in the assertion of specific 
scripts or ascription of roles. These all influence the process intentionally or 
unintentionally.  




The concept of role distance is helpful for my studies in that the politicization of 
psychiatric patients in rehabilitation units involves casting them as ‘political 
citizens’. This is potentially intimidating for people who are not used to performing 
that role, especially if previous attempts to influence decisions have, due to their 
mental health status, been dismissed. Further, the performance of an explicitly 
political role is full of pitfalls – it is challenging to perform persuasively, often 
resulting in tricky conflicts or contingent alliances. Long-term performance may 
be necessary to display authenticity and conviction. These daunting challenges 
can lead to the adoption of role distancing behaviors whereby an individual in his 
performance displays a lack of commitment to the role in order to lower 
expectations.  
 
3.3.7. Face Validity 
Every citizen must continuously negotiate a matrix of social encounters with other 
citizens and it is profoundly important to each person to maintain what Goffman 
defines as ‘face’ in these interactions. A pattern of verbal and nonverbal 
communication is used in each encounter (‘acting out a line’) to establish a set of 
assumptions about the pragmatics of each individual interaction and this is 
important in forming and expressing a view of oneself to the other participants. 
These strategies are not necessarily consciously planned (Goffman, 1969). They 
are an important aspect of contingent identities that emerge in social encounters. 
For example, if a mental health practitioner is interacting with a service-user and 
is purporting to support and enhance political participation, he or she will take a 
certain ‘line’ and this will be influenced by, and in turn influence, the ‘line’ taken 
by the service-user. Participants in an interaction defined as political will usually 
assume that these ‘lines’ are freely chosen and taken at the participants’ 
discretion. Professionals therefore must act upon the impressions that are 
expressed by service-users as if they were valid. 




However, in the context of an interaction between a citizen ascribed the identity 
of ‘person with mental disorder or disability’ the lines and faces expressed are not 
necessarily assumed to be an act of free choice or proper discretion. This is what 
the practice of capacity assessment is premised on. This creates a friction and 
potential conflict between the line the ‘person with mental disorder or disability’ 
is attempting to express, and the impression formed by the audience.  
Goffman defines face as the positive social value that a person attempts to claim 
for herself. By taking a particular line in social interaction a certain face is 
presented in the hope that it will be received, reinterpreted and ‘recognised’ by 
the person’s audience. If that audience routinely ignores a person’s ‘face value’ 
and prioritises assumptions about the characteristics of a person’s line on the basis 
of a written record, then a person can find themselves in a situation where they 
are unable to effectively express a positive face and this can be a source of 
frustration and conflict. Such frustration can encourage protest or disengagement 
which may then be reflected as mental symptomology in the written record. The 
institutional context can reinforce a cycle of ritualized behavior which is 
consistently mis/mal-recognised as symptomatic. 
Goffman argues that a person tends to experience an immediate emotional 
response which is triggered by contact with others: 
‘he cathects his face; his feelings become attached to it. If the encounter sustains 
an image of him that he has long taken for granted, he probably will have few 
feelings about the matter; If events establish a face for him that is better than he 
might have expected he is likely to ‘feel good’; if his ordinary expectations are not 
fulfil led one expects that he will feel bad or feel hurt ’ (Goffman; 1969: 3).  
It is also important that this face should be confirmed by evidence conveyed 
through impersonal agencies in the situation, i.e. both interpersonally in a medical 
interaction, and in the notes and judgements appearing in any written record. This 




is referred to by Goffman as ‘face validity’. I talk about this in subsequent chapters 
in terms of valid or legitimate political identities. 
Face is not an essential attribute, but a product of the flow of events and 
interactions engaged in. It becomes manifest only when events and interactions 
are read and interpreted (recognised). However, institutional settings can narrow 
the range of choices available in institutional interactions and thus the possibilities 
for constructing face.  
If a mental health inpatient is inducted sufficiently into a social practice or has 
their role in that social practice recognized in interpersonal interaction and in the 
official record they may be said to possess a positive face in relation to that role. 
They may respond with feelings of confidence and assurance in performance and 
in medical notes be said to have improved mental health. Firm in the line he or 
she is taking and confident in its recognition he or she can participate in that 
social process with security. Increased levels of confidence may also be achieved if 
the members of the audience, although feeling a performer is in the wrong face or 
incompetent, successfully hide these judgements and perform as if they recognise 
the legitimacy of the role being played. 
A person’s personal face or identity may be seen as a sensitive possession over 
which full ownership and control can be a great source of security and pleasure. 
But a person’s face or identity, is not an object to be possessed and worn but a 
public performance that is never entirely one’s own. Because of the need for 
recognition, both social and political faces are co-constructed with others. 
Although people may seek to become the sole authors of this process recognition 
can be withheld or withdrawn. 
Positive interpersonal interactions co-construct norms that become a comfortable 
constraint. As Goffman states: “approved attributes and their relation to face make 
of every man their own jailor; this is a fundamental social constraint even though 
each… may like his cell” (Goffman 2005: 10). In this way they restrict potential 




action while also facilitating it by creating a structure in which relations of conflict 
and cooperation occur according to ritualized norms.  
Information about social worth, and mutual evaluations, can be exchanged by 
subtle bodily communication or explicitly articulated. These communications will 
be witnessed, and the fact they have been witnesses acknowledged:  
“An unguarded glance, a momentary change of tone of voice an ecological position 
taken or not taken can drench a talk with judgmental significance.” – (Goffman: 
1969: 26). 
It is not hard to see that this is of particular importance in the institutional setting 
of psychiatric wards. From a theoretical perspective, in the community established 
in a totalizing institution, wherever the possibility of spoken interaction arises a 
system of practices, conventions and procedural rules come into play. These 
pragmatics of interaction function as a means of guiding and organizing the co-
construction of identities. Goffman identifies some general strategies of such 
interactional encounters:  
“a person determines how he ought to conduct himself during an occasion of talk 
by testing the potential symbolic meaning of his acts against self-images that are 
being sustained. In doing this, he incidentally subjects his behavior to the expressive 
order that prevails and contributes to the orderly flow of messages” – (Goffman, 
1969: 31) 
Goffman identifies useful functions of the ritual order of interaction  
“From the point of view of saving face then, it is a good thing that spoken 
interaction has the conventional organisation given to it; from the point of view of 
sustaining an orderly flow of messages, it is a good thing that the self has the ritual 
structure given to it.” – (Ibid) 




However, I would add some qualifiers to this statement. If the ritual structure 
given to an interaction becomes distorted in a way to systematically undermine a 
person’s ability to save face, for example being subject to the exclusive 
interpretation of one party to the interaction (for example the psychiatrist), this 
can become a barrier to the potential for political expression and participation of 
the person excluded. As Goffman rightly points out:  
“Fear over possible loss of his face often prevents a person from initiating contacts 
in which important information can be transmitted and important relationships 
established. He may be led to seek the safety of solitude rather than the dangers of 
social encounters.” (Goffman, 2005: 39) 
It is precisely these sorts of processes that might have the potential to discourage 
and exclude people being treated in rehab units from developing capabilities and 
skills needed to participate in political processes of conflict and cooperation in 
matters that must be settled for the community of residents and the polity as a 
whole. This aspect of institutionalisation can also affect social skills and 
capabilities more generally. 
 
3.3.8. Teams  
People often cooperate in creating a joint impression thus forming a performance 
team. A performance depends on all members of the team and they have to trust 
each other to play their parts competently and in a way that communicates the 
agreed narrative or ‘face’. Successful performance may result in a form of collective 
recognition of the team. The mutually reinforcing needs for individual and 
collective recognition evoke a special relationship between team members, often 
characterized by relative equality and informality. This relationship is further 
supported by the fact that they share information about performance inaccessible 
to the non-members. The extent of informality between team members may have 




limits - for instance, though members of one team, they have to play for themselves 
in the internal conflict and cooperation occurring within the team hierarchy. 
It can be advantageous if the audience is unaware of the fact that the performers 
form a team, for an impression can appear more credible if it comes from seemingly 
independent sources. These team performances are also made more credible if they 
occur in the right setting and with the appropriate backdrop – if they are properly 
staged. 
"Frontstage" in the presence of the audience and "backstage" with fellow (or 
competing) actors operate with different rules of interpersonal engagement. For 
Goffman, "frontstage" behaviour is how we act when others are noticeably 
observing. We behave according to certain pragmatics and expectations when we 
are conscious of an audience. Frontstage behaviour reflects the internalized norms 
and expectations for our behaviour that are shaped in part by the climate of ideas 
about values, the particular role we play on stage, and our physical location and 
appearance. Frontstage performances are often intended as ways to increase or 
maintain ‘face’ or reputation and can quickly become ritualised and habitual. 
Frontstage behaviour typically follows a routinized and enforced social script 
shaped by ‘cultural’ norms. 
Backstage behaviour, by contrast, is unobserved. Actors are freed from the 
restrictions and rules that apply to frontstage behaviour. We are often more 
relaxed and comfortable when backstage, we can share personal experiences, and 
we might reveal our emotional reactions more readily. We are not as precious 
about maintaining a particular ‘face’ required for acceptable frontstage 
performance. Staff members in a rehabilitation ward may feel that they have to 
act as an authoritative doctor with patients when frontstage which could in theory 
rule out overtly ‘political’ actions and expressions, whilst backstage they may be 
freed from these professional norms.  




When we are backstage we can practice certain behaviours or interactions and 
play at roles in a way that can support more confident performances frontstage. 
When we are backstage, the climate of ideas about how we should live still exerts 
influence and we remain aware of frontstage norms and expectations. In our 
backstage lives we often have a small team with whom we still interact, close 
family and peers, but with whom inhabit different roles from what is expected 
when we are frontstage. 
The residential rehab ward is sometimes constructed as a backstage area of 
service-users lives where they can practice behaviours and roles in a way that can 
support more ‘healthy’ performances when they return to the wider community. 
In theory, political roles and performances may be played at in the therapeutic 
environment of the ward with the staff and other service-users as part of a 
supportive backstage team. Conversely, the ward may be experienced as a 
frontstage area in which staff and other service-users are particularly inscrutable 
audiences with various and contradictory expectations. 
When a performance typically reserved for one area makes its way into another 
confusion, embarrassment, and even conflict can ensue. Often actors make great 
efforts to ensure the backstage and frontstage aspects of their lives remain separate 
and distinct. In mental health institutions, the way the space and environment is 
organised into different categories of stage can vary massively. In some facilities 
staff areas are strictly out of bounds to patients, ensuring a secure backstage area 
for staff. In others the staff and patient areas may be integrated and porous. 
Alternatively, the residents might prevent staff from coming into their private 
rooms to ensure a secure backstage for themselves. These idiosyncratic 
organisations of space may be dependent on the specific pressures on different 
services, the ethical environment in which the institution is based, as well as what 
might be termed institutional culture.  




There are of course various stages each with their front and backstage etiquette 
and specific assumptions on the part of the audience. Each implies distinct roles 
and rules of performance. We may think of them as exemplifying diverse cultures, 
or games with different sets of rules. In everyday social life we are likely to be 
acting on multiple stages simultaneously and mental health practitioners, and 
service-users are no exception to this. One important audience for practitioners is 
other professionals, managers and ultimately the regulator. This may be the stage 
upon which ‘professional’ identity is cultivated and this professional face may be 
presented both front and backstage in the hospital setting. A second important 
audience for practitioners is of course the service-users themselves. 
 
3.4. Processes of Politicisation  
By politicisation I refer to processes by which people become politically aware or 
engaged to ‘act politically’ and in the capacity of political citizen. These practices 
form part of the implementation of the United Nations Convention of the Rights 
for Persons with Disabilities article 12 and 29 – the right to equal opportunities 
to participate in political and civic life. 
Playing at political roles or acting politically is, according to the framework 
presented, the expression of views in interaction with audiences which seek to 
present the ‘face’ of a politically engaged citizen by taking certain ‘lines’ which 
are recognised as, (or intended to be) explicitly political and as contributions of a 
political agent acting at their own discretion. I distinguish three fundamental 
aspects of the politicisation process: Political identities, Political praxis/poeisis, 
and Recognition/Embracement. 
1. Political Identities  




Political identity, based upon the arguments explicated in the present chapter, is 
built upon engaging in conflict and cooperation to influence decisions that should 
be settled for the community as a whole. In the mental health rehab ward political 
identity is co-constructed through both resistance and subversion and well as 
through adherence to, and embracement of the ritual order and ethical norms. It 
may be built upon a sense of participating through individual acts which seek to 
change the environment in accordance with a worldview. Such an identity may 
also be built on cooperation with others in forms of group agency to achieve 
change – this requires adherence to a specific worldview shared by other adherents, 
a view of how to change the realities of this world, and the power and agency to 
achieve such changes in collaboration and conflict with ‘the other’. 
2. Political Praxis and Poeisis  
Political expression and action are expressed in persons taking certain ‘lines’ and 
presenting certain ‘faces’ in interaction with other political agents and audiences. 
Political participation requires social recognition of the person’s role as political 
agent. The adoption of resistance strategies rather than ‘acceptance’ or 
‘embracement’ of the role does not necessarily deprive expressions and acts of 
their political character. Political participation can thus incorporate both praxis 
(actions that aim at changing the world in accordance with worldviews) and 
poeisis (gestures symbolically performing political agency and inclusion). 
3. Recognition and Embracement 
For action on the part of service-users to be effective in decision making and in 
instigating the formation of political identities their aim to influence decisions 
that affect their lives needs to be recognised by practitioners and other audiences 
as located explicitly in the political sphere or as having the characteristics of 
legitimate political action. The exercise of power must be directed towards acts 
that increase agency rather than those that restrict action according to principles 
of capacity and necessity.  




At the same time, it needs to be acknowledged that the use of narratives of illness 
can be useful in the political sphere in terms of being granted access to resources 
by gatekeepers. Narratives of illness and the mentally disabled identity are also 
potentially useful in stimulating self-directed processes of recovery (Ersfjord 2018). 
The literature emphasises the risks involved in stimulating and reinforcing the 
adoption of the psychiatric and medicalised narratives which inscribe social and 
political problems into the body and mind of the individual. The dangers 
highlighted include the risk that patients adopt unhealthy self‐monitoring 
strategies and reify their lack of agency and responsibility in ways that could 
conceivably have negative implications for political development (see for example 
Alexander et al. 2015, Burrows 2017, Powell and Fitzpatrick 2015). Ersfjord (2018) 
by contrast argues that the adoption of such narratives in rehabilitation should 
not always be understood as negative or dangerous but can be productive and 
help people cope with their illness in more self-directed ways for example by 
transitioning from ‘I am’, to ‘I suffer from’. 
 
3.5. Conclusions 
The process of politicisation for service-users involves taking away responsibility 
in order to provide conditions in which it may be reinstated. This occurs within 
an ethical environment (a climate of ideas about how people should live) and in a 
specific political environment (dynamics of conflict and cooperation) in which 
actors and teams engage in conflict and cooperation according to specific roles, 
under defined rules of engagement and under a specific regime of resource 
distribution. This educational process occurs throughout the course of 
rehabilitation and not only in implementation of policies of political inclusion 
during elections. 




In this chapter I introduced the idea of politics as an essentially contested concept 
and provided a brief overview of operationalised concepts used throughout the 
thesis. In constructing a set of conceptual descriptors for the objects under study 
I have consciously drawn the definition of ‘the political’ broadly. Politics is viewed 
as an aspect of behaviour that can occur in any social situation and in which 
cooperation and conflict occurs over matters which must be settled for the 
community as a whole. The concept of community is one which can be applied to 
small scale and large-scale polities.  
I also outlined a number of concepts (derived principally from the work of Goffman 
Butler and Fraser) to be utilised in understanding processes of co-construction, 
reification and exclusion of the political subject and in developing performative 
agency.  
Goffmanian dramaturgy enables us to understand the ethical and political 
environments that service-users experience during residential mental health 
treatment and in staff and service-user’s performance of various roles relevant to 
political engagement. A microsocial understanding of both individuals and 
networks, it is argued, is necessary to capture a broad picture of policy 
implementation in all its complexity. Goffman also allows us to view political 
behaviour as a playing at political roles. For people to adopt and embrace a role 
(‘becoming’) it is often necessary to be recognised as qualifying for such a role by 
authoritative others in a process of co-construction. These processes are important 
for people in constructing political identities and motivating engagement. 
In the next chapter I build on these ideas and draw on the literature to develop a 
theoretically informed view of politicisation processes in the medicalised 
environments of mental health wards.  
 
  






4. The Political Environment 
 
 
4.1. Introduction  
So far, I have set out the legal obligation’s incumbent on the state and mental 
health practitioners in relation to supporting opportunities for political inclusion 
in the course of mental health treatment on an equal basis with others. I have also 
set out several theoretical concepts useful in understanding the process of political 
socialisation and participation. 
In the previous chapter we saw that political identities, expression and action can 
be placed into particular narratives and individuals are assigned and adopt or 
resist certain roles. In residential psychiatric care these processes are not 
equivalent to the political experiences of average citizens and so raise issues of 
differential treatment on the basis of mental disability.  
I begin this chapter by applying the dramaturgy of Goffman to the mental health 
institution to contextualise policy implementation. I then turn to Nancy Fraser 
and Judith Butler who provide insights into how political identities are 
constructed and given adequate recognition in the political environment. Finally, 
I discuss theoretical basis of adult education to both analyse and critique the 
various ways in which support for political participation might proceed in 
psychiatric care. At the end of the chapter I introduce and adapt the theory of 
andragogy as a model of inclusive educational practice which in later chapters is 




used as a tool of evaluation. As these theoretical discussions were built inductively 
from the data I use some examples of practices observed. 
 
4.2. Political Roles for Psychiatric Patients 
Goffman, as discussed in the previous chapter, provides a number of fundamental 
concepts that may be used to interrogate the process of policy implementation. 
The concepts of role, role engulfment and role distance are fundamental to the 
analysis of how implementation proceeds in practice. The theory of dramaturgy, 
which Goffman used to tease apart the characteristics and dynamics of social 
interaction in mental health services, involves the analysis of social groups or 
‘teams’ of individual actors, on a ‘stage’ with an ‘audience’. This presents social 
interaction as a drama or theatre in which roles and scripts are provided and the 
drama proceeds on the basis of certain rituals dictated by the pragmatics of the 
institution as well as guided by the will of actors attempting to present positive 
‘faces’ to their audience. However, Butler’s work indicates this theory should be 
adapted to accommodate performativity, identity (re)formation and 
destabilisation. 
Role engulfment is a process whereby persons become caught up in the deviant 
role as a result of others relating to them largely in terms of their spoiled identity 
(Schur, 1971). This is a form of mis(or mal)-recognition. In playing at a role or 
being consistently mal-recognised a person can ‘become’ the role attributed in 
other eyes. Even playing off script can be interpreted in ways that confirm his or 
her position. Through this process of iterative reification, a role may become 
dominant in a person’s identity narrative through repetition. Butler indicates that 
none of these identities are necessarily ‘real’ or authentic and this problematises 
Goffman’s concept of role distance as a way to assert one’s ‘own’ authentic identity 
whilst performing an inauthentic role. 




Role distance can be employed to pre-empt criticism, for example where we do 
not wish to be seen either as locked into, or as failing to live up to, our adult roles. 
This applies to the roles of doctor and patient in psychiatric facilities as much as 
anywhere else. 
Persons engaging in role distancing behaviours are not being “dishonest” or 
“insincere” Rather, they are holding on to Goffman’s ‘dutiful regard for [their 
ascribed] character’ (Goffman, 1990). Role embracement, after all, may carry with 
it the perceived threat of identity effacement, as well as of accusations of deceit 
and hypocrisy. Critiques of performance pitting “the real” against – by implication 
- “the false” misstate the technical distinction and overstate the moral or 
ontological one in a process of reification. What is potentially necessary, in such 
cases, is not for the actor to progress into a generic and ill-defined world of 
“reality” but to regress into the role embracement of the three-year-old. This is 
neither moral nor ontological. It is rather a matter of rediscovering the art of play 
and destabilising rituals of law and policy in ways that allow them to be 
reconstructed according to principles of co-construction and co-ownership. It is a 
political strategy whereby roles can be subverted. 
To borrow from theories of theatrical role-play, role distancing may be similar to 
the concept of verfremdungseffekt3. Brecht asserts verfremdungseffekt is a form of 
de-familiarisation from the role one is currently performing. To do this whilst 
sustaining a convincing performance requires long training. It is most effective 
when based on an understanding of role and its place in wider social and political 
environments and performances (Brecht & Willett, 1964). Political identity 
performance is not simply a variant acting technique, but an outgrowth of the 
 
3 Translated literally: prefix ver = strong; adjective fremd = foreign; noun Effekt = effect. Because 
of the historically contested nature of its English translation, I use the German word 
Verfremdungseffekt in place of ‘de-familiarisation‘, ‘alienation‘, or ‘estrangement‘ 




normal human process of identity construction and recognition. To embrace such 
identities requires relearning how to ‘play’ act, and how to present a role while 
also maintaining a dutiful regard for one’s previous character.  
It is also helpful, in this regard, to recognize that Goffman did not limit himself 
to placing role embracement and role distance simply as absolutely bi-polar 
performative behaviours but rather as disparate points on a continuum of real-
world self-identification (Goffman, 1990). Brechtian on-stage estrangement is also 
incremental across a continuum ranging from “short” to “long” distance. 
Actors, in participating in political practices, must learn to eschew socially 
desirable role distancing in order to fully embrace, in the Stanislavskian sense of 
becoming (Crowley & Benedetti, 1998), a character in a wider narrative of 
political change. The chosen political role must be presented as enduring and 
strong enough to fit into narratives of alliance and conflict in a political 
environment. A competent performance requires that “something of oneself” is 
preserved and performed while simultaneously engaging in rituals of interaction 
appropriate to the context. 
Various opportunities for role adoption and enactment (for example when debaters 
argue the case for an opinion they disagree with, or a patient writes their own 
psychological assessment) could encourage playful improvisation which could in 
turn increase political capabilities. Educational techniques include drama 
exercises. For example, dramatic scenes may be performed simultaneously to 
create a playful atmosphere. This could take the form of multiple groups 
performing scenes in parallel or even doing plays within plays. In such situation’s 
actors can more fully embrace their played-at roles without the distraction of an 
audience to whom they feel a need to perform a ‘real’ persona (Cohen, 2004). 
Worldviews and political messages could be conveyed through art, music, dance 
or any other medium. Social connections and camaraderie can be nurtured 




through sport and other collaborative activities. Techniques like these could be 
used in political education to enthuse and engage service-users. 
The long training that Brecht considered necessary to properly perform the 
verfremdungseffekt is best achieved by a full consideration of the root causes of 
role distance, thereby permitting the actor to develop this capability through 
disciplined intentionality rather than falling back on simply the “bad acting” 
caused by ontological insecurity. 
Role distancing is not a problem to be reduced. It is a useful capability in political 
and public life if done with competence and tact. Lack of motivation, lack of 
confidence in oneself or ones opinions, are potential reasons for falling back on 
role distancing however. These are problems that might be better addressed using 
creative role play and engagement with cultural and social activities. Such 
activities provide opportunities for the natural development of political roles and 
identities. 
 
4.3. Developing Political Identities Through Resistance 
and Play 
Judith Butler work is relevant to the formation and nature of political identity 
and builds on, and often adapts and challenges, Foucault’s theories on power and 
resistance so it is worth briefly putting her work into context. 
Foucault, in his historical analyses, indicates that resistance to power in itself is 
often not just pointless but pernicious because power is something that is inherent 
in human relations and is applied by everyone, on everyone (Foucault, 1977; 
2000a). This fits with Cees van der Eijk’s contention that political action is 
inherent in human interaction rather than restricted to particular domains. In 
some situations, resistance enhances or confirms existing power/knowledge 




dynamics (Foucault, 1980; 1981; Knights, 2002). As I hope to show in later 
chapters, a concrete example of this dynamic is the way in which protests by 
service-users in mental health rehab may be read as mental illness thus confirming 
their incapacity for political agency. 
Foucault’s rejection of grand narratives of progress, in favour of a theory that the 
exercise of power is constant and polycentric, leaves him according to some 
critiques (Fraser, 1989) with difficulty in accommodating political mobilisation 
and change. Foucault can be read as insisting that control is always rendered 
perfect because resistance must be framed by narratives of those in power. 
However, if power proliferates far beyond the bounds of the state then cultural 
hegemony may be subverted in its application. Power is applied by different people 
for different ends and is not necessarily based on the same technologies and 
worldviews. In almost every aspect we are governed through everyday technologies 
of power, but we are also governors in interpreting and applying these 
technologies. Power is not necessarily malign and oppressive but merely a medium 
of human interaction (Foucault, 1980). Likewise, institutions present both threats 
to, and opportunities for, the exercise of power. 
Foucault argues that when those usually spoken for and about by others begin to 
speak for themselves, they produce a "counter-discourse." Counter-discourses 
constitute a practical engagement in political struggles (Deleuze and Foucault, 
1977). Lazarus (1991) and other critics like Ehrenreich (1992) argue that 
Foucauldian political theory relies on the idea that truth is a social construction 
determined by dominant discourses, and that there is no greater Truth. These 
critics argue that radical politics is unsustainable when Truth becomes obsolete 
and only a vacillation between competing discourses remain. Truth, on these 
readings, is assumed to be the foundation of political change. Moreover, it is 
argued that Foucault assumes a "structural determinism," which leads to a 
"conception of the subject which is purely epiphenomenal" (Appiah 1991: 67). 




Theorists like Butler (1988), and later McKinley (2010) elucidate the concept of 
‘performativity’ which provides a complementary framework that avoids this 
deterministic tendency and thus moves beyond Foucault’s perceived weaknesses. 
Using Butler’s work on identity we can develop our understanding of the politics 
of identity within the mental health rehab facilities visited. It is upon these 
theoretical foundations that we can build a robust analysis of practices of 
politicisation in mental health services. 
According to Butler, identity categories are never merely descriptive, but always 
normative, and as such, exclusionary. This is not to say that the term ‘mentally 
disabled’ should not be used as a category of personhood. On the contrary, if 
disability rights studies presupposes that "mental disability" designates an 
undesignatable field of differences, one that cannot be totalized or summarized by 
a descriptive identity category or through medical notes, then the very term 
becomes a site of permanent openness and resignifiability (Butler, 1995). Identity, 
as a reified end-in-itself becomes an impossible ideal, that compels a ‘daily mime 
that can, by definition, never succeed in its effort to approximate that ideal’ 
(Benhabib et al., 1995: 122). However, opportunities for the formation and 
recognition of positive agential identities (albeit provisional and incomplete) is a 
necessary pre-condition for facilitation of equal opportunities for participation in 
political life.  
For Foucault, power operates at the most mundane level of practice. It is in the 
processes of conflict and cooperation in everyday life that define Van der Eijk’s 
definition of aspect politics. Power and the processes of political accountability 
that regulate its exercise, do not only operate at meta levels of ‘the economy’, ‘the 
state’, or even ‘modes of production’ but in everyday interaction (Fraser, 1989: 
18; Hoskin, 1992; Rowlinson & Carter, 2002).  
Butler criticises Foucault’s conceptualisation of the relationship between power 
and resistance. For Foucault, resistance is to exercise power and vice versa. As 




Žižek (1999: 252) puts it, ‘the very subject who resists these disciplinary measures 
and tries to elude their grasp is, in his heart of hearts, branded by them, formed 
by them’ (see also, McCarthy, 1994; Sawicki, 1991). Foucault deliberately did not 
confront this issue as he argued that power is not concentrated in a single set of 
institutions but proliferates throughout society. Power is not ‘contained’ in state 
apparatuses nor ‘held’ by a class. So a person is both shaped by power but also 
exercises power and shapes the powers being enacted. For example the power of 
mental health professionals is provisional and contingent on people accepting that 
they are patients and recognising the person treating them as a doctor. Therefore, 
resistance is a push against a particular contextually held power as well as a push 
against one’s own power and one’s own identity through counter-discourse. 
For Foucault, power does not ‘originate’ or ‘end’ and is “ceaselessly ingenious in 
its ideological cloaks and insidious practices” (McKinley, 2010; Clegg et al., 2006). 
Resisting what Foucault calls ‘the rancorous will to knowledge’ is necessarily an 
unequal struggle with ritualised forms of power. Resistance and self-constitution 
should not therefore be confused with the destruction or redistribution of power 
(Foucault, 1978; Han, 2002). Whether writing about the prison, the asylum or 
sexuality, Foucault was interested in the interplay of power and the subject. Power 
has meaning only where subjects have some degree of freedom, agency, and choice. 
In ‘The Subject and Power’, he makes this point explicitly  
‘Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. By 
this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of 
possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse 
comportments may be realised. Where the determining factors saturate the whole 
there is no relationship of power; slavery is not a power relationship when man is 
in chains.... Consequently there is no face to face confrontation of power and 
freedom which is mutually exclusive (freedom disappears everywhere power is 
exercised), but a much more complicated interplay. In this game freedom may well 
appear as the condition for the exercise of power (at the same time its precondition, 




since freedom must exist for power to be exerted, and also its permanent support, 
since without the possibility of recalcitrance, power would be equal to physical 
determination)’. (Foucault, 1982: 790). 
Butler offers a radically different version of the power/resistance dichotomy where 
disciplinary practices open a Pandora’s box of discursive alternatives, a diversity 
of practices that defy restriction. Far from restricting choice and ensnaring 
resistance, disciplinary practices encourage oppositions that range from small-
scale, micro-protests (such as sarcasm and irony) to the public spectacle of riotous 
disorder (Žižek, 1999). 
Butler begins where Foucault and Goffman end (McNay, 1999b). Foucault wrote 
of the enclosure, normalisation, and control of the clinic, the asylum, and the 
prison: Goffman of the total institution. They study the regulation of modern 
individuals through dreary routine. Butler, by contrast, speaks of a life of 
possibilities outside of institutions, beyond the reach of normalisation, however 
temporary. The starting point for understanding practices of political inclusion in 
psychiatric facilities, and the potentiality of newly possible identities this creates, 
are not to be found in dry institutional information sessions, but in the 
demonstration of identities that challenge hegemonic understandings of human 
nature, beauty and value. This depends on creating spaces, discursive and 
physical, in which law and policy are destabilised (the door of the law closed4) 
and co-owned rules are studied and scrutinised in dialogue. In this way the law 
and the politics that constitute it may regain significance (Snoek, 2014). 
Butler’s understanding of identity involves both constructivism and post-
structuralism (Bell, 2007; Lovell, 2000). Social constructivism maintains that 
identity is, at least in part, a reflexive process between the individual and social 
practice (Haynes, 2006). Here identity becomes obstinate, an exchange between 
the knowing individual conscious of their limits and the limits of ritualised social 
 
4 See Before the Law by Franz Kafka - https://www.kafka-online.info/before-the-law.html  




practices. In post-structuralist accounts, identity is always – indeed, is only – 
process. Identity is never fixed or stable, even provisionally, but always becoming.  
The insight provided by Butler’s work, building on Foucault, is that subjection 
contains both subjectivity and subjugation (Disch, 1999). Butler attempts to go 
beyond Foucault’s understanding of subjectification as a dialectic of freedom and 
constraint. It thus allows us to interrogate more deeply the ways in which agency 
is developed in relations of benevolence in the mental health treatment context. 
In interview Foucault attempted to distance himself from a conceptualisation of 
the subject as a discursive effect, and conceded a lack of emphasis on agency in 
identity formation (see McNay, 1999a). Foucault’s later work on ethics and 
sexuality are read by McKinley (2010) as an attempt to address agency, autonomy, 
and time in identity formation (Foucault, 1988).  
The subject, on this perspective, ‘is not determined by the rules through which it 
is generated because signification is not a founding act’ (Butler, 1990: 125). The 
construction of political identity is thus ‘a regulated process of repetition that both 
conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through the production of 
substantializing effects’ (Ibid). Performativity is thus a pivotal concept. It avoids 
an understanding of identity construction on the basis of unilateral determinism 
without casting agency as operating in a vacuum.  
Performativity is not to be confused with performance. Performance suggests an 
actor who consciously follows – or refuses to follow – a script (Kirby, 2006; Scrhift, 
1995). The individual is not free to choose an identity. Equally, the individual is 
not condemned to simply act out a structurally determined identity. 
Performativity is a process concept that seeks to escape – or at least to reject – 
the dualism and reconstruct it as a site of introspection and political change. It 
casts people as active students of themselves and in this way can offer ‘ways out’ 
of reification processes and provide space for identity reconstruction on the basis 
of individual conceptions of the good life (Snoek, 2014). It thus allows us to better 




understand the way in which capabilities for political agency may be scaffolded 
through measures that prima facie appear benevolent restrictions on agency and 
freedom of thought. 
Here, Butler is extending Foucault’s notion of the productivity of power in that 
the very possibility of an identity norm (e.g. gender) is at the same time that 
which allows resistance and subversion. For Butler, identity is enacted through 
the ‘forced reiteration of norms’ (Butler, 1993: 2). Butler’s insistence on the 
enactment of identities in everyday life roots political performativity in mundane 
daily experience. This idea flows out from Foucault’s elaboration of the deadening 
routines of disciplinary lives that can help in theorising the ways in which the 
ritual order restricts opportunities for political performativity (Chambers & 
Carver, 2008).  
Structural and discursive constraint is constitutive but not exhaustive of the 
‘performed’ nature of political identity. Discourses are performative to the extent 
that they co-produce what they name. Not all speech acts are, therefore, 
performative. Performative speech acts can prescribe and prohibit; cajole and 
command; censure and sanction. In all cases, to be performative, a speech act 
must categorise an individual, group, behaviour or attitude and, simultaneously, 
allow others to recognise the difference signified. Butler is a post-structuralist to 
the extent that she argues that even reiteration presupposes performative agency 
and may indicate political capabilities. Performativity is the materialisation of 
norms, a process that is inherently unstable, latent with the possibility of 
resistance, subversion and transgression. Performativity refers both to the fragility 
and the stubborn consistency of identity narratives and thus gives us ways of 
restructuring discourse to increase opportunities for political performativity in all 
contexts including mental health rehab. 
If I have understood Butler correctly, she understands all identities as socially 
constructed narratives that produce the effects of identity. As McKinlay notes this 




raises logical problems: ‘every performative moment inevitably stimulates analysis 
that reveals yet another layer of performativity: this is an analysis of infinite 
regression.’ (2010; 236). The infinite regression of performativity potentially 
undermines the value of a concept’s analytical application and recasts political 
action and expression as merely gestural (Digeser, 1992). On the basis of Butler’s 
work, identity and difference appear shaky foundations for social or political 
mobilisation because pointing to difference as part of a social theory or a political 
strategy reproduces ‘the hegemony of binary oppositions’ and falls into the trap 
of reproducing the discourse that it intends to resist. 
Butler has responded to these issues: 
‘I like the moment when the terms don’t work. Or where the epistemological 
uncertainty, the semantic uncertainty of the term is brought into light in the way 
that makes people think: Well I’m not quite sure that I can use that word anymore, 
or, I’m not quite sure what I mean when I say X. And that’s, I think, a very 
creative moment, an intellectually interesting moment’ (Butler & Rabinow, 2001: 
22). 
Her theoretical work therefore appears not to be attempting to deconstruct 
narratives but to destabilise them in ways in which new meanings can be inserted 
and in which discourses may be re-purposed.  
In addition, many political actions and expressions can be viewed as productive 
and important despite their essential character being ‘gestural’. The gesture, as 
Kafka’s literary works reveal, is an important way of initiating real and symbolic 
changes in political environments (Benjamin 1999; Snoek, 2014). Gestures are 
actions that can be both poiesis (actions that have ends beyond themselves) and 
praxis (actions that are ends in themselves) (Aristotle, 1926: 1140 b 1-5) and 
political action can be important in both respects for people with disabilities. 
Political participation is an end in itself in that it symbolises inclusion in the polis 




of political citizens. Political participation can also have ends beyond itself in the 
way it shapes decisions and holds decision makers to account.  
There are serious difficulties with using Butler’s work to elucidate the 
phenomenon of political identity formation and action. Her work is primarily 
abstract and does not easily lend itself to contextualisation in real world settings. 
There is however potential for political performativity to be used as a tool for 
individuals to study the subtleties of their own, and others, role in the context of 
the mental health rehabilitation service and how this can restrict or enhance 
possibilities for political inclusion.  
Butler, Agamben and Snoek therefore provide explanations that fill gaps in 
Foucault’s work. This allows us to interrogate the relations between specific forms 
of power and identity formation in the process of politicisation in a wide variety 
of contexts including mental health rehabilitation.  
 
4.4. Political Identity and Benevolence 
In the services visited the relations between staff and residents were shaped by 
the ever-present potential for coercive and/or inappropriate behaviours to be 
identified in the ‘other’ team. The constant policing of behaviour was conducted 
on the basis of reified rules which tended to be both discursively immutable and 
practically unstable. Both staff and residents felt to some extent coerced into 
behaviours that they resent on the basis of rules which often lost their significance. 
For example, residents are told to behave in socially acceptable ways according to 
mental health practitioners’ judgement of what is appropriate. But this law often 
became arbitrary in application. Some residents pursue their goals against the 
guidance of professionals by asserting rights to self-determination. This may 
proceed through complaint procedures, micro-protest (e.g. sarcasm or irony), and 
even non-cooperative, or aggressive behaviour vis-à-vis staff and other residents. 




In this thesis such behaviours are defined as potentially performing political 
gestures. Through such behaviours service-users and providers play at and 
construct political and agential identities and develop ethical worldviews. A 
routine response to vignettes relating to service-user political performance in 
hospital is to shut down such activities through segregation. A potential effect of 
functional rehabilitation is therefore to encourage the internalisation of the regime 
of rules imposed by professionals and to undermine capabilities for active political 
citizenship.  
Disputes over the assessment of resident’s interests, and the dismissal of certain 
goals deemed unreasonable, creates conflict. This conflict is often viewed by staff 
as problematic when initiated or continued by residents and necessary when 
caused by staff interventions. Staff constructed their duty in terms of resolving 
these disputes either by separating the combatants or arbitrating the ‘facts’. But, 
if we agree with the argument that conflict is a fundamental aspect of social 
relations in any situation then intolerance of such conflict may constitute a 
restrictive rather than supportive practice. Residents may be socialised into 
political communities where they are systematically denied explicitly political 
roles. 
Conflicts that arise from the problematic behaviour of staff (one example 
discussed with participants featured a care worker who didn’t let residents go for 
cigarettes when it was raining) tended to be rationalised and justified by reference 
to service-user behaviour. On the other hand, residents often viewed conflict 
initiated and continued by staff as expressions of personal dislike, malice or 
incompetence. Some viewed transgressions of staff as exploitative or as a violation 
of human rights. Service-user’s own problematic behaviour was regularly 
rationalised and justified by reference to staff or to other residents’ behaviours. 
Conflictual situations were officially recorded on a resident’s record and this was 
used as justification for, and even obliging, coercive behaviours. The recourse to 




the use of power was invariably described as necessary to resolve conflict. Power 
was often used to shut down the possibility of residents choosing risky options 
rather than as opening up new possibilities.  
A reliance on coercive strategies for dealing with conflict could become significant 
restrictions on resident’s ability to develop skills associated with articulating and 
persuading others in less demanding ways. Such a system of socialisation may 
produce an over–reliance on conflict as a political strategy of service-users to 
acquire attention and resources. Conversely the intolerance of conflictual 
situations on the part of staff might encourage apathy in some residents who 
associate politics with conflict and conflict with negative consequences such as 
chemical and physical restraint or extended deprivation of liberty. 
There is a significant asymmetry in available resources (including abstract 
resources such as power) available to staff and those available to patients. In 
Nancy Fraser’s terms there is a problem of both distribution and recognition 
(Fraser, 1990). Staff at Site 1 and 3, in the political environment of the ward, were 
made responsible for making decisions about the distribution of resources and this 
concomitantly reduces the power of residents to pursue their goals and interests 
in a self-directed way. Political expression and action may be managed and 
controlled by staff through the distribution or restriction of resources such as staff 
escorts or transport. Some staff at Site 1 were frustrated that hospital managers 
were restricting their ability to distribute resources for recreation purposes and so 
managers had much more power in terms of the distribution of financial resources. 
However, staff at all three sites had power over where to dedicate their time and 
attention. At Site 1 I observed scarce resources being rationed on the basis of 
‘good’ behaviour.  
In addition to this asymmetry there was a difference in the importance attached 
to each conflict and this varied across the sites. For staff members each conflict 
occurring on their watch was a risk to their established credentials and a challenge 




to their authority. Therefore, dealing with such situations became important in 
his or her everyday practice. A staff member’s ability to resolve conflict quickly is 
an important criterion when it comes to their status in the organisation. There 
are consequences for staff if they do not quickly resolve conflict and a strong sense 
of professional accountability for pragmatically inappropriate behaviour.  
For residents by contrast the importance of a given conflict has a much lower 
threshold of potential importance. The consequences of a conflict might result in 
a change of future circumstances based on their propensity to aggressive 
behaviour, however, because they are not personally accountable to others on a 
mental health ward (because behaviour is constructed as the result of mental 
health rather than choice, and the community is ephemeral), these consequences 
may be experienced as abstract. If someone has been told a mental illness is in 
fact responsible for their more problematic acts, then the consequences of such 
acts may have reduced import. In addition, there may be some perceived benefits 
for residents in seeding conflict in focusing attention on their needs, in retribution, 
or simply in asserting some power through micro protest.  
The political environment of the institutions studied is one in which a class of 
citizens, possessing the right to equal participation in communal and political 
decisions, are separated from normal society by an ascribed mental health status 
and through relocation to long stay residential facilities. Service-users are given 
little choice in the design and management of their separated communities and 
conflicts are arbitrated on the basis whether it is the citizen or their illness making 
such demands.  
If a resident wanted to gain immediate political capital in this sort of environment 
two strategies were pertinent: compliance or challenge. Both strategies are 
achieved through performative gestures which constitute forms of political agency. 
Part of the restriction of opportunities for political participation is manifested in 
the way mental health discourses and treatment practices absolves residents of 




social accountability for the way they exercise power through such gestures. This 
reduced the importance of developing skills to negotiate conflict in a more 
articulate and respectful way.  
Adapting political environments through pedagogy means legitimising residents 
exercise of power in negotiating conflict. In this modelling of, and playing at, 
political identities participation in political processes and dialogue may become 
more appealing for service-users. Learning the language of political gesture and 
action appears most beneficial to service-users when the pedagogical approach 
had features of mutual learning. 
Narratives are important in orientating us to be able to adopt appropriate roles 
and identities in particular contexts. According to neo-Aristotelians such as 
MacIntyre (1981; 1984) and Nussbaum (1995) humans are story-telling animals 
who learn and develop political and moral agency by engaging with the stories of 
others. D'Olimpio (2018) argues that political agents use rational emotions to 
empathise with others and to engage in moral ways (i.e. appropriately) with them. 
D’Olimpio and other educational theorists (GIVE REFS) advocate engagement 
with and creation of narrative art (i.e. plays, novels and films) as an opportunity 
to imaginatively and sympathetically explore diverse characters and scenarios in 
the safe spaces created by fictional worlds. In the process D'Olimpio’s (2018) 
argues students’ political education might usefully develop from engaging with 
practical philosophy, a praxis, taught and learned in the context of what she calls 
a ‘Community of Inquiry’ (CoI) where narrative artworks can provide useful 
stimulus material to engage students in processes of politicisation and motivate 
philosophical dialogue and the formation of good habits. In a similar vein, by 
practising what Nussbaum calls a ‘loving attitude’, both staff and service-users in 
mental health rehabilitation might develop identities and capabilities that lead to 
forms of practical wisdom or phronesis. Practitioners implementing policies of 
political inclusion could draw on this literature in ways that open up more diverse 




opportunities to engage in appropriate political action and be recognised as 
political agents. 
 
4.5. The Anthrogogical Approach 
In the mental health rehabilitation centres under study, political education and 
support was provided to adult service-users. In order to build on, and apply 
Freirian approaches to education, it is important to consider the theory of adult 
education or ‘andragogy’. Andragogy seeks to develop a more targeted discipline 
of adult specific education useful in the implementation of policies of political 
inclusion. 
Freire discussed the political education of oppressed citizens under the heading of 
‘pedagogy of the oppressed’. The etymology of pedagogy is originally derived from 
the Greek paidagogos ‘slave who escorts boys to school and generally supervises 
them,’ and later from ‘a teacher,’ and ‘pais (genitive paidos) meaning ‘child’.  
Thus, pedagogy originally meant leading children, although the meaning is 
somewhat broader in modern usage denoting educational theory and practice more 
generally. Constructing political education as a form of pedagogy in mental health 
services is potentially infantilising and poses the danger of reinforcing the 
hierarchical relationship between teacher and student. The term andragogy helps 
to focus theoretical and practical development onto adult education in healthcare 
settings. However even andragogy is not without problematic connotations. 
Andragogy (‘andro’ – meaning man, male or masculine) refers exclusively to 
teaching men. I therefore use the neologism, anthrogogy to denote leading or 
teaching adult citizens whatever their gender. 
The perspectives on andragogy (or anthrogogy) as a discipline are varied. 
Savicevic (1991, 1999). Comparing differences of perspective between several 
European countries, identified five distinct approaches:  




1. Anthrogogy as a sub-discipline of pedagogy.  
2. Anthrogogy   as an integrative science, with disciplines such as sociology and 
psychology being unified.  
3. Anthrogogy as a pragmatic and practical field, focusing on managing the 
behaviour of teachers and learners in adult education. 
4. Anthrogogy as a field of research belonging to established sciences such as 
sociology, psychology, and anthropology.  
5. Anthrogogy as an independent scientific discipline with its own scientific 
structure, specific fields of research, and a system of sub-disciplines.  
A full discussion of the numerous theories of andragogy is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, but, in this section I introduce and adapt the theory of andragogy as 
a model of inclusive educational practice which in later chapters is used as a tool 
of evaluation 
Adult educational theory can be separated into three discrete paradigms: 
Behaviourism, Cognitivism and Constructivism. Behaviourism, advocated by 
people like Watson and BF Skinner is premised on five key concepts: 1) contiguity; 
2) reinforcement, 3) stimulus-response, 4) operant conditioning; and 5) 
contingency. Adult learning is a process, according to behaviourists, of creating 
external conditions that reinforce ‘correct’, and/or discourage ‘incorrect’, 
behaviours. Conditions in which learning becomes possible, in this paradigm, 
involve those in authority providing external social and material reinforcement. 
This advocates a highly structured situation in which teachers condition students 
to behaviour in the correct manner. Correct behaviours are dictated to students 
by teachers. Learner’s mistakes are problematised as inappropriate and 
antithetical to the learning experience. Mistakes must be avoided and students 
must be guided through simple to complex tasks, step by step. 
This approach is dehumanising in that it treats people like objects to be shaped 
or animals to be trained by a master using positive and negative reinforcement. 




This ignores people’s idiosyncratic worldviews, their perspectives and the need for 
adults to have social status and recognised as independent agents.  
Cognitivist approaches to education, by contrast, seek to interpret cognitive 
processes, such as reasoning, in mechanical terms using concepts such as 
information handling and organisation (Legendre, 2005). Key concepts in the 
cognitivist approach focus on 1) Procedural (know how) and non-procedural 
knowledge, 2) Short and long-term memory, 3) Knowledge transfer, 4) 
Metacognition 5) Cognitive dissonance and; 6) Simple to complex learning 
sequences. Cognitivists see learning as an internal processes that responds to 
external conditions. The students representations, strategies, and procedures are 
considered and the curriculum adapted to these internal structures. Cognitive 
conflict, or problem situations create situations conducive to discovery and 
motivate open minded exploration. Within this process, mistakes become a central 
source of knowledge, because they generate cognitive conflict. The educational 
processes is iterative going from complexity to simple to complex again.  
This approach has also been criticised in application for treating adult learners as 
machines equivalent to computers. This obscured the contexts and relations of 
power operating in the educational processes. Responding to such criticisms 
cognitivists like Bruner (1996, 2009) whilst accepting the parallel between human 
and computational learning processes, insists, that the mind of an individual 
always operates in a specific cultural setting which has an influence both on the 
subjective production of meanings and the internal organisation of information. 
Bandura (1977, 1994) expanded the cognitivist approach by integrating the social 
perspective in his analysis of learning processes. Learning is explained by internal 
processes, but the emphasis is on social mediation so is contextualised. The focus 
for Bandura is on cognitive processes, social interaction processes, and 
acknowledgeable results. Here the forces that drive learning include both social 
and cognitive conflict, problem situations and the notion of proximal development 




zone. The proximal development zone refers indicates that open situations 
permitting discovery and exploration are conducive to open-minded learning. 
Within this framework a learner’s mistakes are a source of learning, because they 
generate cognitive conflict and social confrontations, interactive regulations are a 
place where ideas can be articulated and challenged productively.  
Three humanistic variants of the cognitivist approach may also be considered 
useful for evaluating policy implementation and in identifying fruitful lines of 
inquiry in developing policies of participation in mental health settings. In analysis 
I concentrate on humanistic approaches as they are specific to human relations 
and context based requiring a focus on the human being in social interaction. This 
escapes the danger or universalised application being assimilated into ‘machine 
organisations’ in ways that reduce opportunities to perform political identities and 
exercise various types of agency outside the ritual order. 
Andragogy based on classical humanism, draws on the teachings of Plato and 
Socrates. “Know yourself” is a foundational principle. Education in this tradition 
places focus on inculcating capacities for reason, character, and self-knowledge 
(Thorpe, Edwards & Hanson, 1993).  
Rosenstock-Huessy posits a different approach to humanistic andragogy in which 
experience and dialogue are foregrounded over formal and logical reason (1970). 
The dialogical approach is called by some authors ‘dialogical humanism’. The adult 
is to be engaged in moral dialogue to allow satisfactory ways of living to be 
identified articulated and justified to others. Rosenstock-Huessy (Ibid) argued the 
construction of narratives about both past and the future, and the inner and outer 
lifeworld becomes possible through this subtle interplay of ideas. This approach 
aligns with the reformed approach at Site 1 as well as some aspects of practice 
observed at site 2. 
The third perspective on humanistic andragogy was developed by Knowles 
(Knowles, 1970, 1980). Knowles, posits a more individualistic approach which 




omits any emphasis on social and political transformation as a goal. Wain (1987) 
dubbed this a form of romantic humanism in reference to the humanistic 
psychology of the 1960s, with the theories of Maslow (1943; 1954) and Rogers 
(1959; 1961) as an important basis for his thinking.  
Loeng argues that Knowles theories are ‘not about the human being meeting 
something “greater” than himself/herself in order to develop’ but are rather ‘aimed 
more at individual needs and the self-sufficiency of the individual’ (2018: 11). This 
form of adult education is about personal development in absence of any grander 
social and political perspective. Due to these individualistic tendencies, and the 
apparent need for a grand narrative/worldview in motivating political action, 
Rosenstock-Huessy’s approach appears a more appropriate basis for the 
development of a modern political anthrogogy of citizenship. 
Despite his individualising tendencies, Knowles provides some useful practical 
assumptions that might assist in the implementation of policies of political 
inclusion (1970; 1980). These inform strategies aimed at motivating adults to 
engage in self-directed educational activities:  
 As people mature self-concepts move from that of a dependent to a self-
directed learner.  
 Adults accumulate vast experience that becomes a fruitful resource for 
self-directed learning.  
 Adults' motivation to learn is dependent on enhancing and developing 
their social roles.  
 Adult perspectives shift from one based on postponed application of 
knowledge to immediacy of application.  
 Adults' orientation toward learning shifts from subject centeredness to 
problem centeredness.  




This indicates that educational initiatives that are presented as a form of didactic 
schooling, whereby individuals learn from a teacher as they did in childhood, are 
inadequate in constructing empowering educational practices for adults.  
It is useful to also consider the concept of Bildung. Bildung, reflects a process of 
engagement and self-criticism when facing different and often alien perspectives, 
in the process of constructing and reconstructing the self. It is a dialectic, between 
the possible and what appears unattainable, in a given professional or social 
culture. The relationship between self and the world is a necessary opposition that 
generates interplay. Bildung does not come from gaining competencies as we saw 
in the discussion of self-mastery, but rather grows out of an inner process of 
formation and cultivation (Gadamer, 2001, 2003). The endpoint of this processes 
is an appreciation of the constant process of self-formation and cultivation.  
Bildung invites a dialogical approach to the different calls of system and profession 
being made on the practitioner. Developing practice becomes a dialogical response 
to power being exerted on the practitioner and informs progressive development. 
Applying these principles of dialogical self-formation may help us better 
understand the ways in which rights to participation in public and political life 
can be supported in more person-centred ways. 
One central methodology advocated by educationalists is building a Community 
of Inquiry (CoI). The CoI is based on democratic, student-led discussions where 
the teacher acts as a facilitator instead of being the one source of all knowledge 
(Cam, 1995). This models the idea of interchangeable teacher and pupil roles. 
Once these more inclusive political environments are built the boundaries of 
appropriateness in political action and expression are potentially changed.  
The CoI is built up with the use of tailored narratives (appropriate for the ‘pupils’ 
context and capabilities) or other stimulus texts which is then discussed in the 
group by following the interests and perspectives of all the interactants (rather 
than being directed by the teacher). The CoI is arranged in a circle with chairs 




facing inwards so that students can listen to and speak with each other, rather 
than aiming their dialogue solely towards the teacher standing at the front of the 
classroom. (D'Olimpio & Teschers, 2016) The role of the teacher is adapted as the 
teacher facilitates discussion rather than managing and evaluating students’ 
contributions. They follow where the conversation leads without a specific 
outcome in mind (Kennedy, 2015).  
The trained facilitator encourages critically reflective thinking and open-
mindedness as interactants engage in political debate and build upon or challenge 
their own worldviews and those of others (Sharp, 2007). Lipman defines critical 
thinking as ‘thinking that (1) facilitates judgment because it (2) relies on criteria, 
(3) is self-correcting, and (4) is sensitive to context’ (Lipman, 1991, p. 116).  
However, critical thinking is not sufficient to enable people to fully engage in 
public and political life. Laurance Splitter and Ann Sharp highlight “caring” and 
“creative” thinking as equally important skills that political agents should be 
capable of utilising in shaping and changing the world (Lipman, 1991; Splitter & 
Sharp, 1995). In this way the critical thinker will not just know what the right 
thing to do is; they will also know how to go about accomplishing that action 
while being sensitive to the context and others involved in the situation. It is this 
contextual application of knowledge and the transferable thinking skills that form 
the basis of appropriate political action and expression (Sharp, 2007, p. 13).   
Three main practical implications could be derived from the anthrogogical 
approach to political education:  
a. priority should be given to the development of meaning and 
understanding rather than to behavioural training,  
b. those temporarily adopting the role of teacher in supporting 
political participation should presume that learners’ actions and 
reactions are rational, considering how learners give meaning to 
their reality,  




c. learners’ errors and unexpected responses should be interpreted as 
opportunities to know how they are grasping reality. (Legendre, 
2005, p. 290, translated by Pätzold, H. (2011). Learning and 
Teaching in Adult Education: Contemporary Theories. Verlag 
Barbara Budrich.) 
Lave and Wenger (1991) similarly see the learning processes as “participation in 
communities of practices”. They situate knowledge acquisition in the context of 
everyday experience and of their specific participation in social and political 
processes. Using an anthropological perspective, Lave and Wenger observed and 
conceptualised how people develop and mobilise knowledge in relation to a specific 
context. Observing learning processes as a form of participation in communities 
of action, they find that people’s internal recognition of themselves as competent 
actors, and external recognition of these performed identities as legitimate is 
conducive to learning and participation more generally. 
Lave and Wenger (1991) conceptualise the dynamic relations between the actors 
and the social world as a process of conflict and cooperation in constructing 
knowledge. This is based on four assumptions that: a) knowledge always undergoes 
construction and transformation, b) learning is an integral aspect of human 
activity, c) what is learned is always problematic, and d) acquisition of knowledge 
is not simply a matter of absorbing it, it requires personal search for pertinence 
and then mobilisation of such knowledge in the immediate context. The learning 
process, therefore, always takes place in “situated activities”. The construction of 
professional and personal identities within a community of practice is therefore 
not a passive process of socialisation, but an active and interactive one (Wenger, 
1998). 
 





The idea of political mobilisation in this thesis is shaped by Foucault’s (1980, 
1982) claims that power is distributed in complex, contradictory and ‘micro-
capillary’ ways. I have established that every interaction where power is exercised 
contains potential for role-distancing and counter-discourse, or alternatively role 
embracement and assimilation. Both strategies provide opportunities for political 
agency. Role distancing and other forms of micro-protest evident in the conflictual 
relations that sometime flare between staff and residents of mental health wards 
support the idea of hidden political agencies inherent in processes of conflict and 
cooperation. Conflict, far from being an aspect of the human condition that can 
be ‘treated’ out of existence, is an inevitable and healthy aspect of social 
interaction. The power of gesture is important as political performativity and by 
extension identity includes aspects of both praxis and poeisis. 
The principled foundations of inclusive political environments on mental health 
wards is therefore to be found in ideas of political performativity and mutual 
learning in the Freireian and Anthrogogical models. Conflictual political inclusion 
of people with mental disabilities already exists, in dialogical processes of identity 
play, reformation and recognition but these processes can be recast as 
incorporating gestures that indicate political action and expression as appropriate 
and acceptable. While moments of resistance to, and assimilation with the ritual 
order and institutional norms are often fragmented, chaotic and random, they 
reflect agency of persons with mental disabilities to influence their political 
environments in defining appropriate and inappropriate political participation. 
This supports the idea that ‘service-user empowerment’ in both the politics of the 
institution as well as in the political community at large, are vital in broadening 
opportunities for inclusion.  
Inclusive political practice in mental rehabilitation thus requires the 
destabilisation of role and identity for both staff and service-users and ‘closing the 




door of the law’ i.e. creating spaces in which the law and policy are suspended 
and so participants in interaction must construct and co-own rules of appropriate 
interaction. An educationalist approach based on the theory and practice of 
political anthrogogy may be one way of evaluating implementation of these 
principles. By creating spaces in which creative identity play, and mutual 
dialogical learning can occur, and where Law and policy are de-naturalised, new 
significance may be attributed to law and policy as social constructs. In turn this 
could help motivate participation in the Law’s interpretation and application. If 
the door of the Law is closed rules can be (re/co)constructed in ways that allow 
the Law to regain its significance. 
  






5. Methodologies and Methods 
5.1. Introduction 
Epistemological approaches and associated research methods can quickly become 
problems in the field, raising unforeseen practical, moral or political questions as 
the process unfolds (Marshall and Rossman, 2006). From the outset, the research 
methodology and methods chosen should as far as possible be appropriate tools 
for interrogating the research questions at hand (Punch 1998). For this reason I 
sought in previous chapters to elucidate what Denzin and Lincoln call the ‘the 
paradigmatic lens through which relevant phenomena are perceived and 
understood’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2003: 368). Denzin and Lincoln (Ibid) define an 
appropriate methodology as the one most likely to produce the richest data and 
that which can best be considered in relation to the relevant literature 
They pose four questions that I kept in mind as I designed my research: 
1) How does the research design seek to interact with the paradigmatic lens through 
which relevant phenomenon are perceived and understood? 
2) How will these materials allow the researcher to speak to the problems of praxis 
and change? 
3) Who or what will be studied and how will the research interact with the academic 
and professional construction of the object? 
4) What methods or research tools will be used for collecting and analysing empirical 
materials? (Ibid) 




In establishing the rationale for the choice of research methods I drew on examples 
from other research. Maconochie’s ethnographic study of children’s participation 
in the governance of Sure Start centres (Maconochie, 2013) was one of the main 
inspirations for the methods used. I also consulted an advisory committee 
including experts by experience, established academics in the field such as Redley, 
and practitioner researchers such as Khwaja and Clarke. 
Previous research concerning the implementation of policies of political inclusion 
has focused on measuring the number of persons with mental health problems 
registering on the electoral register and voting in elections prior to, and after 
implementation (Keeley et al 2008; McIntyre et al 2012). This suggested the aim 
of policies of political inclusion was increased voting and registration rates. This 
approach may reflect the requirements of governmental decision makers for 
statistically representative measures of policy efficiency and success but does not 
necessarily address the benefits of such policies for real persons with mental 
disabilities. In contrast there is relatively little research that deploys a more 
detailed ethnographic approach to the implementation of such policies in 
secondary mental health facilities. 
I have identified a need for detailed, rich, contextual data to adequately explore 
the as yet unanticipated issues and dilemmas surrounding practical support 
offered to psychiatric patients in exercising political rights. In order to inform an 
inquiry into how the new policies of inclusion are introduced, and the effect they 
have on staff and patients in treatment of significant mental disabilities, data 
regarding the diversity of experiences, contextual pragmatics developed between 
staff and residents, and the opportunities available for political action were 
identified as relevant in mental health rehabilitation (see Chapter 2). 
Mason asserts that to deal with this type of data the analysis must be grounded: 




in a philosophical position which is broadly interpretivist in the sense that it is 
concerned with how the social world is interpreted and understood, experienced or 
produced… (Mason 1996: 4) 
Denzin and Lincoln (2003) also point to the fact that humanist research is multi-
method and by implication generates data that is both diverse and detailed. 
A philosophy of knowledge that foregrounds both pragmatism and 
interdisciplinarity is appropriate for an exploratory study seeking to produce rich 
and detailed data in a socio-legal field which engages social and medical 
epistemologies, political science, philosophy, sociology and legal theory. Bourdieu 
advocated an epistemological approach that reflected these pragmatic principles 
called methodological polytheism, which I propose to adopt (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant 1992). 
In this research I am attempting to describe, and analyse theoretically, real life 
instances of political participation being supported in mental health 
rehabilitation. An appropriate method was therefore to observe people in the 
setting in which they live and participate in their day to day activities in and 
around elections. I also needed to understand individual perspectives and 
narratives and that meant talking to people in a fairly unstructured, flexible and 
open-ended way. Further, the study of how policies of political participation are 
implemented in mental institutions means examining interactions in naturally 
occurring settings by means of methods which capture their social meanings and 
ordinary activities (Brewer, 2000). Broadly speaking this study can therefore be 
described as ethnographic (Burgess, 1982; 1984; Atkinson & Hammersley, 1998). 
Ethnographic research usually involves the researcher directly participating in the 
setting, if not also the activities, in order to collect data in a systematic manner. 
Researchers in the field of education such as Maconochie (2013: 72), James and 
Prout (1997: 9) argue that ethnography and field observation are particularly 
useful methods. They provide participants a more direct voice and participation 




in the production of data. This is not possible through experimental or survey 
styles of research. Ethnographic approaches enable participants’ capabilities and 
voices to be respected because they control what they do, when and with whom 
(Tudge & Hogan, 2005). 
In applying these methodologies, the researcher should be careful not to impose 
meaning on actions but to describe the meaning attributed to them by 
participants. This is part of the reason why I chose such a broad and encompassing 
definition of politics in order to capture the diversity of meanings it had for 
participants. 
Although some aspects of human behaviour are easily quantifiable (such as the 
registration or voting rates) other aspects are less so (e.g. symbolic, personal or 
communal benefits of greater political engagement) (McLeod 2003). Therefore, 
in-depth ethnographic and micro-sociological approaches, in combination with 
survey data and documentary analysis, were initially chosen as appropriate   
The chosen research methods were therefore: 
a) By the researcher on the researcher 
 Research Journal 
b) By the researcher on publicly available data 
 Analysis of CQC survey data 
 Analysis of policy documents 
c) By the researcher with participants 
 field observation and semi-structured interviews at hospital sites;  
 consultation and joint consideration of future practice. 
These methods were designed with the intention of enabling me to collect a 
considerable range of policy documents and to gain knowledge of and access to 
and appropriate sites for the field study. In this way I hoped to generate a detailed 
and rich dataset which would give me a comprehensive understanding of the issues 




and dilemmas arising from the practices in question. In the event, as I go on to 
describe in the following sub-sections, the survey did not deliver the range of 
documents needed, nor a nationally representative picture of policy 
implementation so the main method was the field study in three sites.  
 
5.2. Research Methods 
5.2.1. Survey 
The survey was to enable me to collect a range of policy documents and to gain 
knowledge of and facilitate access to appropriate sites for the field study. It was 
not, and was never intended to be, nationally representative.  
The sample of wards in the study was constructed using a convenience sampling 
technique of mental health wards in England and Wales i.e. the wards the CQC 
happened to be inspecting during the summer of 2017. Specialist mental health 
care is provided by both NHS trusts and independent mental health providers in 
England and Wales. In 2017, there were 54 NHS trusts and 221 independent 
mental health locations providing such services consisting of a total of 764 
specialist wards (Care Quality Commission, 2017). In the survey conducted the 
CQC completed 68 inspections over a three-month period at which the survey 
questions were asked.  
The CQC inspections were Mental Health Act monitoring visits. These visits can 
be conducted on each ward of any hospital that detains patients under the MHA 
on a 18 – 24 month cycle. The CQC prioritise visits within this timescale based 
on types of ward and acuity of patients, locally-known risks, previous visit findings 
and the frequency of admission to the ward type. These criteria determine the 
basic visit schedule for each individual ward (Care Quality Commission, 2020). 
The basic schedule is flexible however and visits might be pulled forward if the 




CQC has a particular concern. This means that the sample of survey participants 
were to some extent randomly distributed across services that are rated good, 
requires improvement, and inadequate. It was of course, by no means a random 
sample. Self-selection bias, i.e. wards with written policies being more likely to 
respond, was limited. All wards visited responded to the survey questions but only 
four policy documents were collected.  
CQC inspectors during these visits asked two questions of the respondents. The 
questions were: 
1. Is there a policy on inpatient voting rights applicable to the ward? (such a 
policy might, for example, require inpatient wards to provide timely written 
guidance to both staff and patients on eligibility criteria, voting rights and 
the process of registration before elections, and require that staff discuss 
practicalities of registration and voting with inpatients as part of their care 
plans). If yes, please request a copy of the policy to return with this form.  
2. Have patients likely to be resident on the ward in June 2016 been helped to 
participate in the EU referendum? (such help might include help with 
registration, or advice or support about practicalities in voting in the 
referendum, or providing access to referendum campaign materials on the 
ward). If yes, please give brief details in the space below.   
The data from the survey was analysed using descriptive statistics but also 
analysing the sparse data for indications of substantive practices of political 
inclusion, even in absence of written policies. This information was also 
triangulated with other contextual data on the type of ward and treatment being 
provided. The sample was not randomised and responses were inevitably 
influenced by the context of a regulatory inspection; however, the findings serve 
to build a preliminary picture of the state of practice at present relating to 
implementation of policies of political inclusion and was particularly important in 
identifying cases for further study. 





5.2.2. Document Analysis 
The three policy frameworks gathered through the initial survey all declared the 
aim of increasing and enhancing opportunities to exercise the right to vote for 
mental health service-users’. This, it was implied, was sufficient to protect the 
right to effectively and fully participate in political and public life on an equal 
basis with others (Art. 29 UNCRPD). The policies were sourced from five distinct 
institutions although sites 2 and 3 were covered by the same NHS Trust-wide 
policy: 
1. A private mental health hospital (Site 1) 
2. Open rehabilitation facility (Sites 2) 
3. Closed rehabilitation facility (Site 3) 
4. A medium secure mental health facility (Site 4) 
5. An elderly person’s ward (Site 5) 
A document analysis of the four policy documents was conducted following the 
survey. This was conducted using both thematic and comparative analysis. 
Thematic analysis is used as “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting 
patterns (themes) within data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 79). Thematic analysis 
provides a detailed, and nuanced account of data (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
Thematic analysis can be conducted within a constructionist paradigm, by which 
the policy texts are seen as constructing particular realities for persons charged 
with implementation and for those intended to benefit (Ibid). The policies were 
texts created to be seen, read, interpreted, and acted on. They were therefore 
analysed with such uses, and intended audiences in mind (Krippendorff, 2019). 
Inductive thematic analysis was useful as there were no previous studies dealing 




with the policies in question, and therefore the themes are derived directly from 
the text data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). 
 
5.2.3. Case Study Selection 
I applied for and received ethical approval from the East Midlands - Nottingham 
1 NHS Research Ethics Committee (17/EM/0165) to conduct the field work at 
five potential sites. I acquired institutional approval to access three; one under the 
jurisdiction of the third policy discussed (s.5.2.3) and two under the jurisdiction 
of the NHS policy discussed last (s.5.2.4). 
The research sites consisted of a private mental health hospital (site 1) and two 
NHS run rehabilitation services (site 2 and site 3) identified by the research officers 
at the relevant trust. All three sites were implementing policies of political 
inclusion. Observations occurred during general and local elections between 2017-
2018. An elderly peoples ward and a medium secure facility (discussed in chapter 
6) did not grant access. Being self-selected this skewed the data towards sites 
which were enthusiastic about facilitation of political rights. 
Site 1 was a closed rehabilitation service providing mental health treatment in 
excess of 70 service-users. The facility was separated into staff areas and wards 
which were organised to enhance surveillance capabilities of staff. Staff and patient 
areas were strictly segregated. There were hatches through which medications 
were distributed. 
The service-users here tended to have long-term mental health problems. Many 
had been hospitalised for significant periods of time. The facility had medium and 
low security wards and number of people detained at the site were under s.37/41 
orders. Many of the people were detained under s.3 MHA 1983 and were 
constructed as high-risk. Staff wore alarms at all times, and doors were always 
locked. The four service-user participants at the site had a range of mental health 




diagnoses including learning disability and personality and anxiety disorders. The 
service-users I talked to and observed had little experience of voting prior to data 
collection. Three of the participants had been in institutions their whole adult 
lives.  
I liaised with the social worker at this site who was in charge of policy 
implementation and who nominated staff and service-users for observations and 
interviews. I observed a visit to the polling station and information sessions based 
on supporting capacity and interviewed the social worker, a mental health nurse, 
a speech and language therapist, an occupational therapist and a ward manager 
as well as the four service-users. During the observation of morning governance 
meetings, I distributed consent forms and information sheets to all attendees and, 
prior to interviews and observations, presented information sheets and took 
informed consent despite this also being completed prior to my arrival.  
Site 2 and 3 were both operating in large cities and had capacity for treating 
between 12-18 service-users. I liaised with the policy drafters initially to identify 
these two sites which may have meant that services were chosen specifically to 
demonstrate the benefits of the policy. This self-selection was necessary to gain 
access. 
Site 2 was a community based open rehabilitation facility and was structured like 
a house. They had a kitchen and communal dining area for both staff and service-
users to eat together and the rooms were not on closed wards. Alarms were not 
used, and service-users were frequently granted leave from the hospital to visit 
local shops or even just to go for a walk. Many were there informally. Staff areas 
were porous to service-users. Service-users were constructed as low risk and 
progressing towards recovery and step-down services. The service-users here were 
diagnosed with a range of mental disorders from psychosis and paranoid 
schizophrenia to personality disorder, anxiety disorder and depression. I liaised 
directly with the general manager of the facility who selected and recruited staff 




members for participation in the study and who subsequently identified and 
recruited service-users subject to the policy. I interviewed three service-users, two 
mental health nurses, an occupational therapist and the ward manager. I also 
observed a mental health nurse escorting one service-user to the polling station. 
Ethnographic data collection took a week at this facility. 
Site 3 was a locked rehabilitation facility structured in a similar way to Site 1. 
Many of the service-users were detained under s.3 MHA 1983. Six service-users 
were detained under 37/41. The facility was used as a step down from medium 
secure or low secure units. Here I only attended for a single day and interviewed 
the ward manager, a nurse who had escorted a service-user to the polling station 
and the service-user who had been escorted. No observation was conducted as on 
polling day observations were done at Site 2. 
The duration of ethnographic field work was 10 days at Site 1, 7 days at Site 2 
and 1 day at Site 3 so was relatively short for conducting the detailed inquiry 
proposed.  The brevity of the field work was necessary to keep disruption of the 
day to day services to a minimum and was largely dictated by the ward managers 
granting access. In compliance with the requirements of the NHS research ethics 
committee and with the University of Nottingham School of Law code of ethics I 
used consent forms and information sheets for each aspect of the research and 
deferred to responsible clinicians at the sites to conduct capacity assessments for 
participation in the study. The recruitment strategy was essentially based on a 
‘snowball’ sampling method. Ward managers/policy champions were recruited 
first. Through this first contact willing and appropriate staff and clinicians on the 
ward were identified and recruited for interviews and observations. Front line staff 
then conducted capacity assessments and distributed information sheets and 
consent forms to recruit service-user participants. The inclusion criteria were as 
follows: 
Staff: 




 The participant must be employed within a mental health service currently 
implementing policies designed to increase political participation. 
 The participant must be involved in the interpretation or implementation of the 
relevant policies. 
Service-users: 
 Participants must be eligible to vote in the UK. 
 Participants must be in contact with secondary mental health services 
implementing policies of political inclusion  
The restriction of participants to those who were eligible to vote had important 
implications as it meant that the sample of participants was skewed to those who 
already had important political rights recognised. As discussed in previous 
chapters the right to participate in political and public life is a broad one and is 
not restricted to casting a ballot in elections and therefore reasonable 
accommodations and support for people with mental disabilities should also be 
extended to the excluded group of service-users. As the research recruitment 
process was delegated to the staff members implementing the policy, and 
implementation was restricted to those who were eligible to vote this resulted in 
the sample being restricted to this population. Further research should however 
be designed explicitly to include these service-users who were excluded in order 
to capture the opportunities and restrictions on political participation pertaining 
to all service-users. 
In data collection, focus was placed on the practical implementation of policies of 
political inclusion and involved observation of wards in the run up to, and on 
polling day of general election and local elections between 2017 and 2018. 
I conducted two observations of practice on a polling day: one during a General 
Election with 4 participants and the second during local elections with 2 
participants. In accordance with the ethical approval observations were conducted 




only on interactions between individuals who had read information sheets and 
returned consent forms. This included attending morning governance meetings, 
visiting wards, eating lunch with participants and being taken on tours around 
the facilities with a minder. Ethnographic observations at Site 3 lasted only a day 
so the scope of data collection was more limited. On each day of observation, I 
went through the information sheet again with participants to review continued 
willingness to participate and capacity. In total 22 people participated in the 
observations and interviews. 
 
5.2.4. Observation 
Observation of practice was a primary technique of data collection. As well as 
formal observation of policy implementation, the general workings of the mental 
health hospital was a focus. The information produced in this process forms a 
dataset on which to base analysis of micro sociological processes situated in wider 
social systems.  
Observations drew on visual and audible data as well as other non-verbal cues to 
try and understand phenomena (Bowling, 2002). I also took the opportunity to 
read as much of the media content available on the ward including internal 
magazines/newsletters, posters and photos that were available to visitors. This 
method produced detailed information regarding the duration, frequency, 
consequences and nature of behaviours and discourses relevant to the policy 
implementation. The observation was structured in collaboration with the policy 
coordinators after an initial visit prior to the data collection. I allowed the policy 
coordinators to direct me to locations in which the relevant practices would occur. 
Rather than actively imposing a structure on the policy coordinators I wanted to 
take a passive role in observing the policy implementation. This theoretically 
allowed the relevance of many behaviours and discourses to emerge more naturally 




(Duxbury et al, 2010). Knowing that the aim of the project was to support the 
realisation of participatory rights for patients inevitably influenced the way in 
which the hospital staff presented their practices. In order to reduce this influence, 
I avoided any prescriptions for practice in my communications with the 
participants prior to the data collection and attempted to be a small and 
unobtrusive presence. This was not always successful. 
In addition to visual audible and other data I collected some information on the 
diagnoses of service-user participants. However, the laws and policies being 
implemented were not conditional on capacity or the nature of impairment and so 
practices studied did not divide service-users into diagnostic groups and adapt 
practice on this basis.. Although reasonable accommodations presumably should 
be tailored to specific service-users’ circumstances and conditions diagnosis 
specific such approaches were not observed in any of the three sites. Instead 
general educational approaches were adopted. 
Although it does nothing to weaken the imperative of UNCRPD policy for all, the 
different practical issues of behaviour accompanying an individual’s diagnosis or 
the level of severity of a collective of service-users in a ward creates a context 
which has a direct impact on the way implementation is pursued. Therefore, the 
relation of diagnosis to implementation is an urgent topic for future research. This 
thesis can only make limited contribution to that issue.  
A second reason why the diagnoses are not emphasised in the analysis is because 
there was a small range of diagnoses (limited to learning disabilities, personality 
disorder, anxiety, depression, schizophrenia and psychosis), little detail of patients 
medical histories, and idiosyncratic combinations and manifestations of 
symptoms. The decision was made not to write the thesis as an exploration of 
how particular mental health conditions affect and impact on political capabilities. 
This is because a social model is adopted in the UNCRPD which places focus on 
the environmental restrictions rather than underlying impairments.  




Of course, there are real practical difficulties in enhancing political participation 
that may be attributed to different diagnoses. For this reason, I explicitly 
acknowledge, explain and discuss the behavioural presentations of service-users 
that do have impact on institutional and practitioner policy and behaviour where 
possible. However, it is not just individual diagnoses, but the collective severity of 
behavioural presentations of service-users gathered in different wards according to 
levels of risk, that impacts politicisation. An example of this was the different 
conceptualisations of appropriateness at the more secure sites (hatches, strictly 
separate areas for staff and service-users etc) compared to other more ‘relaxed’ 
sites. Given the limitations of assessing the impact of diagnosis on political 
inclusion within the current project, a future research agenda should include 
finding, studying, appreciatively critiquing, celebrating, explaining and 
disseminating good practices that seek to overcome some of the restrictions 
inherent in certain psychological and psychiatric ailments.  
In asking questions of participants during the participatory observation (Bergold 
& Thomas 2012) I adopted the role of an ‘acceptable Incompetent’ in that I 
assumed a ‘naive stance’ giving verbal and non-verbal cues to signal to the 
participant that I was a sympathetic listener. This is an important aspect of 
appreciative inquiry as real or perceived social, or even clinical judgments of the 
content of the communications between researcher and participant will, in the 
context of a CQC regulated mental health hospital, potentially change the 
emerging and constructed discourses significantly. Judgment implied in verbal and 
non-verbal ways can indicate a certain meaning to the interaction (i.e. as an 
inspection rather than a non-judgemental interaction). Therefore, the importance 
of empathy, complicity and accumulation of shared experience – i.e. co-
construction - was foregrounded in accordance with participatory action research 
principles. 
 




5.2.5. Semi Structured Interviews 
After gathering observation data interviews with staff and residents were 
conducted in order to better understand their experiences of implementing, and 
being subject to, the policy in question. Both these sources of data allowed an 
analysis to be conducted on performativity, power dynamics, the impact of 
organisational structures and the relationships between residents and staff. 
The chronological sequence of data collection meant that the interview responses, 
which relied on individual’s articulation of their experiences, is potentially subject 
to the effect of a triple hermeneutic (Green & Thorogood 2004). Increasing the 
specificity of interviews to participants own experience was important. 
Participation in policy implementation introduced proximity and this meant that 
experiences conveyed by participants were distorted less by spatial and temporal 
distance. As reality was transformed into participant experience, then into 
linguistic symbols in interview to be interpreted by the researcher, it was necessary 
to take account of the number of such conversions and translations. This process 
can introduce mutations of meaning subsequently amplified by the research 
process. 
The study included interviews with service-users, ward managers, therapists, 
social workers, psychologists, care assistants and mental health nurses. I also 
engaged in consultation with a social worker, a responsible clinician and a service-
user after data collection. Half of the interview participants were service-users.  
If a participant appeared uncomfortable or anxious during data collection they 
were asked if they wanted to continue. In one instance an interview was terminated 
after 6 minutes due to the service-user stating he had said everything he wanted 
to say. 
Interviews with ward managers were conducted to explore the nature of specific 
policies and their implementation. Information sheets were read and consent forms 




filled in at the start of each interview. I electronically recorded interviews and 
transcribed the data in anonymised form. All transcripts and observation notes 
were coded and analysed using NVivo 12. Interviews with staff and practitioners 
were utilised to access retrospective accounts of professional practice on the ward 
and to discuss issues and dilemmas in implementation. Accounts of the purported 
facilitation of political participation was explored with service-users. 
Ethnographic research based in the humanist tradition traditionally uses face to 
face audio recorded interviews with participants as a primary method of data 
collection. Researchers using an interpretative phenomenological approach in 
accordance with critical realist epistemologies find the data that interviews 
produce is invaluable in accessing the lived experiences of participants, and not 
just the surface ‘reality’ of phenomenon. Fontana & Frey (2000) note that the 
formal rigid approach of the structured interview has given way to the more 
informal approach of the semi-structured or unstructured interview in the 
postmodern era. My own decision to use semi-structured interviews as a tool for 
data collection in this project was influenced by the existing relationship built up 
with the participants during the course of the observations. This made formal and 
structured interviews inappropriate and restrictive of more open and free-flowing 
discussion.  
Relatively open-ended interviews were a useful method to use in this investigation 
as they were a means of accessing attitudes and values that are difficult to 
ascertain from observation, fixed choice questionnaires and even structured 
interviews. Such a technique also allowed for depth and complexity to emerge. 
Approaches to interviewing, encouraging reciprocity, support and understanding 
by allowing the participant a view of the researcher’s personality and experience 
potentially allowed me to explore voices and experiences more comprehensively. 
However, the contention that this gives access to previously inaccessible and 
unheard voices is problematic as ‘voice’ does not necessarily equate to ‘experience’ 
(Kitzinger & Kitzinger, 2010). The discussions, dilemmas and issues arising from 




these interviews were co-constructed and the ascription of authenticity should be 
avoided. 
Interviews with staff members reflected a slightly more structured interview 
technique with the direct use of vignettes (see Appendix 4). In addition, questions 
asked specifically about practices intended to increase opportunities to participate 
in politics, the language and intention of the policy behind such practices and the 
ways in which the practice could be improved. Potential participants for these 
interviews were selected by the policy coordinator in run up to the observations 
during elections.  
Following Koslander & Arvidsson, (2007) an interpretative phenomenographic 
approach was used in the interview process and analysis of emergent themes. 
Phenomenography is a technique developed over the past 30 years based on 
research on learning processes in higher education. It has since been utilised widely 
in research relating to health care and nursing (Fridlund & Hildingh, 2000). 
Phenomenography is essentially critical realist in that it accepts there is a reality 
independent of human constructions of it but that this can only be accessed 
through constructing it in a way that is relevant and cognisable to people. 
Phenomenography distinguishes between reality - the first-order perspective; and 
what it is conceived to be - the second-order perspective (Marton, 1981). The 
approach focusses on the underlying patterns in the variability of conceptions and 
is particularly useful for my purposes as it enables the elucidation of variation in 
the way relationships and contexts are interpreted and acted upon on the basis of 
the principles of the new policy of political inclusion. These conceptions may 
represent something axiomatic or implicit, that has not previously been reflected 
on by participants so has potential to be a positive and fruitful experience (Marton 
& Booth, 1997).  
Kvale (1996) argues that the construction of interview schedules in terms of the 
content and sequence of questions are key elements to consider in securing a rich 




body of data. In structuring three interview schedules used in the research (one 
for resident participants, and the other two for clinical staff and management), 
the notion of the interview as a process was foremost in my mind. In this, 
participants are taken through a sequence of interactions with the researcher that 
progress the conversation from introduction, to the main part of the interview and 
finally to a close. The specific way in which I adapted this for my own purposes 
is outlined in table 3.3. below: 
Table 3.3. Interview schedule summaries 
 Ward managers/clinical staff 
o Hypothetical vignettes exploring practical responses to political 
actions of residents 
o Questions exploring the embedding of political education into 
everyday mental health practices 
o Questions exploring the restrictions on the staffs’ realisation of 
the policy aims 
o Questions exploring the benefits of the policy 
o Questions exploring the boundaries between appropriate and 
inappropriate support for residents’ political expression 
o Open ended question leading to closure  
 
 Residents 
o Introduction, information about the research, myself as a 
researcher and ethical issues 
o Biographical questions about the participant – e.g. tell me a little 
about yourself, are you generally interested in politics are you a 
political person? – what did you do before you were in this 
hospital? 
o Questions exploring the experience of receiving support for 
political participation 




o Questions exploring previous political actions undertaken 
o Questions exploring what residents want in relation to the policy 
o Questions relating to the development of political identity 
o Open ended questions leading to closure 
Although the structures detailed in table 3.3 do reflect some of the characteristics 
of the modernist interview by employing chronological sequences in part, the scope 
of the questions went beyond an assumption and concern with the political 
participation of people being treated in mental health facilities and into other 
aspects of identity and their relationship with social, political and professional 
contexts and pragmatics. 
Thematic analysis of the interview schedules was conducted by firstly familiarising 
myself with data then transcribing it, whilst at the same time noting down initial 
themes and interesting points. I then proceeded to generating initial codes again 
systematically noting down interesting or surprising features across the entire data 
set, and collating data relevant to each code using NVivo (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
In defining and naming themes I collated codes into headings. I then re-read the 
data reviewing where they tended to emerge, their prevalence and character. This 
allowed me to test whether each theme worked in relation to the coded extracts 
and the entire data set (Vaismoradi, Turunen & Bondas, 2013; Braun & Clarke, 
2006). 
In writing the thesis, a final analysis of data occurred, whereby quotes and 
extracts were related back of the relevance to the research question and links were 
made with relevant aspects of the literature.  
In the last phase of the project practice was evaluated in terms of ethical and legal 
obligations and analysed using sociological and legal concepts in collaboration 
with three research participants and the advisory committee. I then fed findings 
back to the service-providers in site specific reports and engaged in constructive 




dialogue to develop ideas and principles to inform practical reforms on the basis 
of more robust theoretical understanding of the educational dimensions of policy 
implementation. 
 
5.3. Critical reflexivity 
Because the focus of this research project is on the human experience in 
implementation, a strictly positivist conception of validity of knowledge is 
inappropriate (Richardson 2000). The qualitative methodology chosen is 
potentially open to criticism that it does not sufficiently guard against too readily 
jumping to conclusions on the basis of prejudice, going beyond the evidence or in 
ruling out alternative perspectives. 
It is the case that I bring to the task of research my own set of values and 
prejudices including a desire to ensure that the implementation of the policy of 
political inclusion has positive implications for the lives of the people meant to 
benefit. This unavoidable personal positioning means that continued vigilance was 
required in relations with participants in fieldwork, in the interpretation and 
analysis and in drawing conclusions.  
An example of the application of critical reflexivity appears in the research 
journal: 
[Following the consultation and development of resources at Sites 2/3] I… got too 
close to the staff perspective and this is distorting my analysis. I have ended up 
reducing the conclusions to what can be done to make policy implementation easier 
for staff and losing focus on the ways practice might be changed to improve 
opportunities for service-users. (Research Journal, Dec 2nd, 2018) 




Having observed myself adopting the staff perspective I discussed it with my 
supervisors and took the counter measure of stepping away from consultation 
work with staff. I countered this by consulting with service-users one of whom 
developed a blog about the political inclusion of service-users during treatment.  
Maintaining sense of critical reflexivity allowed me to deal with some of the 
methodological issues cited above. The research journal was essential in observing 
and dealing with the effect of my presence and positionality during data collection 
and throughout analysis and write up.  
 
5.4. Appreciative Enquiry 
The social skills and discursive strategies that made trusting and respectful 
relationships possible with service-users, staff and managers involved conducting 
data collection as an appreciative inquiry. The Appreciative Inquiry (AI) 
approach, has four distinct phases; discovery, dreaming, designing and destiny 
(Reed, 2007).  
‘Discovery’ is the start of the inquiry and is concerned with identifying best 
experiences rather than commencing from a problem focus. Although this phase 
aims at best experience, it inevitably also gathers information about experiences 
that are not ‘best’.  
‘Dreaming’ moves the inquiry on and changes the focus; it asks research 
participants to imagine how the subject under inquiry (for example, staff’s 
response to a resident with extreme political views) might be improved. Using this 
as a rough model enabled me to design interview schedules in ways that allowed 
staff to link their ‘best’ experience to how things may be further enhanced thereby 
highlighting elements and issues which are important to the research participant.  




‘Designing’ involves the research participant in identifying practices, relationships 
and processes which might be necessary to support the ideas outlined in dreaming 
and articulated as ‘best’ in discovery. The final phase of AI is ‘Destiny’ and 
concentrates on what is needed to maintain and sustain the changes that have 














The purposes of the survey were to enable me to collect a range of policy 
documents and to gain knowledge of and facilitate access to appropriate sites for 
the field study. As explained earlier it was not, and was not intended to be, 
nationally representative. All 68 institutions surveyed answered the two questions 
but only a small proportion (four) gave the inspectors a written policy document. 
Although this was not the ‘range’ of documents I had hoped for, it still proved 
useful to analyse them and the responses as they suggested themes to focus on in 
interviews and observation and in addition questions for a research agenda beyond 
the thesis. In this chapter I present and integrated analysis of the survey data and 
policy documents and discuss the import of five significant themes. 
1. Inclusivity and Mental Health Status  
2. The Conceptualisation of Politics 
3. Conditionality of Political Inclusion 
4. Influence and Vulnerability to Manipulation  
5. Supportive Practices  
6. Inclusion in Policy Implementation 
 




6.2. Policy Analysis 
6.2.1. Inclusivity and Mental Health Status 
In the initial survey we received three comprehensive written policies from the 
initial survey. This works out as 4.41% of the 68 respondent wards being able to 
provide a written policy on supporting political participation.  
One category of response was to say that implementing such a policy, even if there 
was one, would not be feasible due to issues with capacity and high turnover. 
Seven responses included references to capacity in relation to voting and 
registration forms or the patient’s ability to pass assessments on whether they 
granted leave to make a vote. One respondent stated that such a policy was 
inapplicable because the patients on the ward were ‘women with dementia’ 
implying that both gender and the fact of dementia, a degenerative condition, are 
relevant in determining people’s eligibility to vote. This implies that in the case 
of dementia, where service-user’s mental disabilities are seen as chronic, enduring 
and irreversible, political inclusivity is given low priority. This may be because 
the service-users are not seen as progressing towards a state of recovery. 
Another response from the survey simply read ‘Patients do not have capacity’. 
This indicates that in institutions dealing with people with diagnoses associated 
with enduring and significant capacity issues, political inclusivity is also accorded 
very low priority. It may be that, in some institutions, the majority of people lack 
legal capacity in the sense of being ineligible to vote. However, mental capacity is 
no reason for exclusion. Reasonable accommodations should be made for all people 
with mental disabilities who are eligible to vote and even those who are ineligible 
require accommodation to participate in public life. Only when it is reasonable to 
take no action whatsoever to support that capacity, is such a strategy permissible 
according to UK law and policy (see Chapter 3). Under the current legal regime 
simply citing a lack of capacity is not enough. The point at which it is reasonable 




to do nothing is something that has not, at the time of writing, been tested in the 
courts. Neither is it a subject that has seen much popular, academic or political 
debate. 
There were a variety of survey response referencing practices in place that support 
and facilitate political participation. The most frequently reported practice was 
discussion and debate of political issues in community meetings. Twelve responses 
referred to such meetings as places where the patients could make requests of staff 
for specific support or simply engage in political debate with others by discussing 
current affairs. Of the twelve responses in this vein, ten came from low to medium 
secure acute/PICU (psychiatric intensive care units) wards, one from locked 
neuropsychiatry and one from an eating disorders unit.  
Nine respondents alluded to the provision of information sources useful for the 
assessment of politicians, ideas and events relevant to political discourse, including 
posters reminding people to get registered and encouraging them to do so. These 
again generally originated from Acute/PICU wards, low and medium secure rehab 
clinics and services aimed at older people. Five respondents referred to a policy 
to register all patients. Again, these were from rehabilitation facilities, low secure 
general facilities and Acute/PICU. Four respondents stated that providers had 
offered general support for registration and had provided access to the internet to 
facilitate this. These responses came from Acute/PICU, locked neuropsychiatry, 
and open/locked rehab clinics. Four of the responses stated that the provider had 
facilitated leave for service-users to visit polling stations. These responses were 
from acute/PICU, low secure, and rehabilitation wards.  
The concentration of practices of political inclusion in low secure and acute 
settings indicates that people with diagnoses of more short term, acute mental 
illnesses are seen as more likely to benefit from political inclusivity than those 
whose recovery is seen as more uncertain. 




As already emphasised, we cannot draw any reliable generalisations from the 
survey data. However, it allows us to identify some important questions about the 
whole of the national system that need to be addressed in a future nationally 
representative survey.  Firstly, how widely are formal policies of political inclusion 
being implemented across England and Wales? Secondly, how prevalent is informal 
support for political participation? Thirdly, does the likelihood of implementation 
(formal or informal) vary with diagnosis (e.g. in rehabilitation services, 
Acute/PICU wards, low and medium secure rehab clinics, services aimed at older 
people or in high secure settings)? 
The question of the effect of diagnosis on the practical implementation of policy 
that the analysis of the survey highlights was also directly relevant to the analysis 
of the subsequent observations and interviews. Another relevant theme to emerge 
from the survey analysis is that cognitive or mental capacity, (and to some extent 
perhaps gender and age also) are deemed relevant considerations in whether 
policies of political support and inclusion are in fact implemented.  
This indicates a significant tendency in the mental health services surveyed to 
assume that political and public engagement is a low priority, and inappropriate 
for people with more severe mental disabilities and that many people detained in 
mental health facilities simply lack the necessary capacities. Indeed, this tendency 
is also evident in the written policies discussed in the next section. In general, the 
fact that policy implementation appeared more widespread in less secure settings 
indicates that political inclusivity is dependent not so much on diagnosis per se, 
but on how far along the road to recovery a particular group of service-users are.  
The assumption that people in more secure settings are less able to engage in 
politics in problematic as social and behavioural problems withing a cohort of 
patients detained in such settings will vary widely. Indeed, the breadth of 
capabilities within diagnostic groupings will vary as much as in the general 
population as security will be dependent on risk. These assumptions can 




potentially create the conditions of a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby reasonable 
accommodations and support are not provided rendering public and political 
engagement more difficult and inaccessible. 
 
6.2.2. The Conceptualisation of Politics. 
One respondent to the initial survey stated they were aware of the general 
institutional policy and the law but that patients on the high secure ward were 
not eligible to vote due to criminal convictions. This was used as a justification 
for the lack of policies on facilitation of inclusion in public and political life.  
Across all the policy documents analysed there was an exclusive focus on voting 
in national and local elections as the sole expression of political agency for service-
users. The survey results and the policy documents provided reflect a restrictive 
view of what implementation of Article 29 UNCRPD (the right to participation 
in public and political life), and by extension the substantiation of the principle 
of equal political inclusion, means in practice. 
Two examples illustrate this conceptualisation. On the 11th of May 2016 a MHAR 
visited a medium secure facility (Site 4). Staff there provided the inspector with 
a set of policy documents dated 1st of October 2015. The policy opens with a set 
of eligibility criteria for ‘inclusion in the electoral register’ based on criteria in the 
RPA 1983. This indicates that the policy drafters’ conceptualisation of political 
action is focused exclusively on electoral participation. This means that the policy 
of political inclusion is readily interpreted as applying only to those who are 
eligible to vote. This was common across all the policies that were gathered 
through the initial survey. 
In the mental health ward for older people with mental disabilities (site 5) visited 
on the 27 May 2016 the MHAR was provided with a comprehensive policy, written 




in 2013, designed to guide clinicians through the process of supporting patients to 
vote. The stated aim of the policy was political inclusivity and to ensure that 
inpatients can exercise their right to vote. The document lists the eligibility 
criteria for registration under the RPA 1983 as well as the additional criterion 
that they should be:  
“citizens [who] are not subject to mental incapacity.” (Site 5, Voting Rights and 
Procedure for Inpatients, August 2013) 
The RPA 1983 includes the criterion of legal incapacity. This is a legal concept 
quite distinct from mental incapacity. The elision of these two concepts is 
significant in that it contradicts the intention of the Electoral Administration Act 
2009, which sought to abolish common law (mental) incapacity to vote and creates 
an exclusion that contradicts international law under the UNCRPD. If the law is 
interpreted this way even in a small percentage of mental health wards then it 
would represent a significant and illegitimate restriction on many peoples right to 
political participation in the UK. 
The above interpretation was not common across all the documents. The first 
section of the policy document in force at site 1 for example, (a privately run 
closed rehabilitation service providing mental health treatment to around 80 
service-users) states that 
“Being a psychiatric in‐patient does not inherently change an individual’s right to 
vote… [they] have the same right to vote as anyone else” – (Site 1, Voting Rights 
and Procedure for Inpatients, July 2016) 
Although a more accurate representation of the law, we can see that the 
conceptualisation of politics at site 1 is also restricted to the service-users right to 
vote which again is much narrower than the rights and obligations imposed under 
article 29 of the UNCRPD. 




The policy covering site 2 and 3 also explicitly places the right to vote at the 
centre of political and civic life and the substantive aspects of the policy deal 
exclusively with protocols and procedures designed to enhance and support 
opportunities to register on the electoral roll and cast a ballot in elections. 
However, the policy characterises desired practice as that which will support 
“equality and responsibility” and “provide a political voice for people with mental 
health problems”. (Sites 2/3, Voting Rights for Service-users Policy, October 2015). 
This is a much broader and more inclusive interpretation of what inclusion and 
participating in public and political life might mean. This broader interpretation 
may be related to the fact that sites 2 and 3 were part of a trust which was 
actively implementing a ‘human rights based approach’ to mental health care. In 
addition, site 2 was a community-based rehabilitation facility with a humanistic 
and holistic approach to treatment.  
In more secure institutions dealing with people with more significant mental 
disorders and impairments there was a greater concern with containment and risk 
aversion. These priorities meant that such settings were likely to be less adaptable 
to facilitating sometimes disruptive political action as an aspect of everyday 
interaction. Thus, the narrow focus on electoral participation may function to 
limit obligations, and the expectations of service-users. 
 
6.2.3. Conditionality of Political Inclusion 
As already noted the survey data indicated that a number of institutions see 
political inclusion as conditional on capacity. The policy documents also indicate 
that a number of other conditions may be attached to reasonable accommodations 
being made. Some of the sites used the ability to complete a declaration of local 
connection without assistance, or the capacity to appoint a proxy, as a condition 
of participation and support. This may significantly limit political opportunities 




for service-users and arguably goes against the spirit of the EAA 2006 which was 
intended to abolish the common law relating to mental capacity to vote.  
The policy at site 4 for example, when outlining eligibility criteria to vote, states 
that this includes the ability to make a declaration. The declaration of local 
connection is merely a decision as to where the individual wants to register to 
vote at the mental health hospital (if she can be considered resident there) or their 
home address. It is not a complicated decision and should not pose a significant 
difficulty for individuals in contact with secondary mental health services 
providing they receive the necessary support and accommodations. Further, a 
declaration of local connection should only apply to those with no possible 
residence other than the mental hospital where they are receiving treatment. This 
policy at site 4, however, appears to apply the capacity assessment to make a 
declaration to all patients as a general rule. 
The people designated by the policy as the adjudicators of capacity to make a 
declaration are ‘Attesters’. According to the policy this role is taken on by the 
Ward Consultant Psychiatrist or Nominated Deputies and the Ward Managers or 
Nominated Deputies. Attesters are authorised, under the policy, to: 
“decide which service-users/patients… [have] the capacity to understand and 
complete the Declaration Form.” (Site 4, Service-user/Patient Voting: Forensic 
and High Support Services, November 2013) 
Further the policy states that the “declaration should be made without assistance.” 
The policy goes on to explain that the prohibition on making reasonable 
accommodations only applies to mental disability, as it ’does not preclude 
assistance necessitated by physical handicap or blindness’. (Ibid) 
The now repealed provision of the MHA 1983, (making eligibility conditional on 
the individual’s ability to make a declaration without assistance) provides a 




possible explanation for this exclusion. This does however directly contravene the 
spirit of both the UNCRPD and the EAA 2006.  
The policy at site 4 further requires the creation of a register of those with capacity 
to vote each year:  
“The Ward Voting Form should be completed with a √ against names of the service-
user/patients considered to have the capacity to register and vote, or an X against 
those they consider not capable.” (Ibid) 
The go ahead from a responsible clinician in terms of mental capacity precedes 
the patient being given the choice of a postal, proxy or in person vote. The list is 
compiled once a year which makes it difficult to include those with frequent 
fluctuation in capacity or for wards with high turnover.  
The policy imposes obligations on Attesters to encourage all eligible service-
users/patients to make a declaration if they are able to do so. It also encourages 
Ward managers to check the completed declaration forms to ensure they are filled 
out correctly before sending them back to the medical records office. There is 
perhaps some limited recognition here of the duty to assist people to fill out the 
forms on the basis of mental incapacities. Some administrative tasks are taken 
care of by hospital staff and therefore some of the burden is removed from those 
services users/patients deemed by Attester to be fit to vote. 
Although the policy for site 4 claims that their policy and procedures do not 
significantly disadvantage any individuals or groups on the basis of their protected 
characteristics the textual evidence suggests that it has great potential to do so 
and is not compliant with current domestic legislation nor our international policy 
commitments. 
The introduction of the criteria to be capable of making a declaration of local 
connection over and above the requirements made of other citizens, indicates that 




the implementers’ role is constructed as an arbitrator of mental capacity to vote. 
By requiring capacity to make a declaration of local connection, in addition to the 
capacity to vote mental health professionals are exercising the power to decide 
who may and who may not vote on the basis of mental capacity. Under current 
legislation mental health practitioners or attesters do not have the power to decide 
whether the person has capacity to vote or not. The law is clear that people with 
mental disabilities have that right irrespective of psychiatric assessments. Capacity 
should therefore be presumed to be present in all cases, and where it is suspected 
to be compromised by cognitive impairment an assessment may be made only to 
determine reasonable accommodations, and not in order to restrict participation. 
It is the staff and attesters’ duty to make reasonable accommodations to support 
and facilitate the individual’s ability to register and make a declaration if they 
are not capable of the decision at the outset. 
The document at Site 4 goes on to define incapacity thus:  
“Incapacity here refers to… the ability to understand what voting means, retain 
information relating to it, weigh up in the balance whether to vote and who to vote 
for and communicate their decision.” (Ibid) 
In addition to demonstrating that they have capacity service-users must also 
satisfy clinicians that the provision of support to vote is ‘appropriate’ under the 
policy at site 4. Responsible Clinicians are only required to authorise Section 17 
leave to allow patients to vote, and Advocates to provide support and accompany 
patients to vote or arrange a postal or proxy vote, when it is appropriate (Ibid). 
The wording of the document strongly indicates that the role of these practitioners 
is to support patient’s inclusion in the electoral process by authorising leave and 
having advocates accompany and help individuals when they actually go out to 
polling stations or make arrangements to vote in accordance with the EAA 2006 
amendments. However, the text also grants discretion to both clinicians and 
advocates to either facilitate or restrict any given patient’s right to vote on the 




basis of perceived risk. Given the lack of oversight there is a real possibility that 
this discretion could be applied arbitrarily or on the basis of reducing liabilities. 
This criterion of appropriateness presumably incorporates considerations of the 
public interest and risk to the patient and others but may also refer back to the 
eligibility criteria of which mental capacity is a key component. Ward managers 
and nurses are to provide support ‘as necessary’ which is a vague term that could 
be interpreted in a number of ways depending on what aspects of the ward’s 
practice are prioritised.  
Conditions attached to the exercise of political rights are common across the 
policy documents although they are not always as explicit as the policy at site 4. 
The way that the policy document at Site 1 distinguishes between patients who 
are voluntary (and thus ‘not subject to any restrictions’) from involuntary patients 
implies that some restrictions on involuntary patient’s right to vote are potentially 
necessary and compliant with the policy. This is despite the fact that detained 
patients ‘have the same right to vote as anyone else’. (Site 1, Voting Rights and 
Procedure for Inpatients, July 2016).  
Making support for political participation conditional on something like taking 
medication may conceivably result in lower, and poorer quality engagement. In 
some circumstances it may be perfectly reasonable for someone to refuse mind 
altering medication prior to casting a ballot.  
The policy at sites 2/3, under the definition of capacity, outlines who is included 
and who is excluded from practices of support mandated by the policy. Those 
detained under s.37 are excluded (Sites 2/3, Voting Rights for Service-users Policy, 
October 2015). This indicates that those inpatients who are detained in hospital 
having been convicted of a criminal offence by the courts attract no reasonable 
accommodations. Rights to political inclusion are often conditional on not 
breaking the social contract through serious criminal activity. However, people 
detained in hospital following criminal conviction may stay for much longer 




periods than a normal sentence for the same crime and therefore the restriction 
on voting rights may be in force for much longer. There is a larger question for 
national policy here about whether this is un-justified differential treatment based 
on disability. 
In any case Article 29 encompasses much more than the right to vote. People on 
s.37 orders are disenfranchised and therefore policy makes see them as legitimately 
excluded from all spheres of civic and political life. This is in keeping with a 
narrow interpretation of politics as something that only concerns official political 
institutions of state. Just because an individual does not have the right to vote it 
should not mean they are legitimately excluded from public and political life more 
generally. 
The policy details at length the law relating to patients’ right to engage in politics. 
Specifically, it identifies that “all patients on civil sections (part 2) of the MHA 
and prisoners remanded to hospital under the MHA on Sections 35, 36 or 48 of 
the MHA are entitled to vote” (Ibid). Authority for applying the eligibility criterion 
based on incapacity is identified as originating from the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
which only mentions voting decisions so as to exclude them from replacement 
decision making procedures. The Electoral Administration Act 2006 is not 
referenced.  
The categories of offenders who are legally incapable of voting under the RPA 
1983 s.3A provisions are detailed comprehensively. The document then goes on to 
explain that, although entitled, in order for patients to exercise their vote, they 
must be included on the Electoral Register. The named nurse should: “wherever 
possible help a patient to contact the Electoral Registration Officer at their local 
council to ensure that they are included on the Register.” (Ibid) 
The procedure includes the administration of a declaration of local connection to 
be administered only if the individual has no place of residence. A process is 
detailed in which nurses are implicitly expected to facilitate such patients to make 




such a declaration. The declaration of local connection procedure is therefore 
applied to the population of patients intended by the Act. 
In terms of eligibility the policy explains that 
“[The right to vote] may be exercised… if the RC has authorised the patient to 
leave the hospital on Section 17 leave.” (Ibid). 
The policy rightly states that ‘all patients on civil sections (Part 2) of the MHA 
and prisoners remanded to hospital under the MHA on Sections 35, 36 or 48 of 
the MHA are entitled to vote’ (Ibid), but hospital staff are still granted discretion 
to exclude some patients due to mental capacity. In the context of patients subject 
to legal compulsion under the MHA 1983 a responsible clinician or advocate can 
in practice prevent a patient form voting by restricting s.17 leave. 
Despite these problems the policy captures some of the legal principles 
operationalised in the UNCRPD. For example, it states that “where it seems 
helpful and appropriate [staff] should provide any necessary help to facilitate the 
patient to exercise their vote.” (Ibid). The policy also includes specific duties such 
as: 
“Assisting the patient in making arrangements for a postal or proxy vote by 
contacting the Electoral Registration Officer for their area. Helping with 
arrangements for a patient to vote in person, including provision of an escort 
where necessary.” (Ibid). 
The implementation process is detailed briefly and includes posting information 
on patient’s legal rights on the Intranet site, ward managers briefing the staff at 
team meetings and an awareness campaign to advertise the policy in the Trust 
newsletter and elsewhere. 
The analysis of these documents raises significant issues and questions to be 
addressed. It is clear from these policy documents that formalised practices of 




‘political inclusion’ interpret politics narrowly in ways that reduce the obligations 
for reasonable accommodation significantly, are still largely dominated by notions 
of exclusion and containment, and have significant conditions attached. This raises 
the question of how to substantiate rights political inclusion in ways that directly 
benefit people in residential mental health treatment, where most other aspects 
of practice remain steadfastly geared towards the assessment and treatment of 
mental incapacity and reducing the risk individuals pose.  
 
6.2.4. Influence and Vulnerability to Manipulation 
The policy covering sites 2 and 3, and by extension every site commissioned by 
the NHS Trust in question, was broadly similar in structure to that found at Site 
1. (Sites 2/3, Voting Rights for Service-users Policy, October 2015). After 
explaining the purpose and scope of the policy the document it goes on to define 
‘Eligibility to Vote’ (in the terms of the amended Representation of the People 
Act 1983), ‘Capacity’ and ‘Proxy Vote’. The definition of capacity appears to be 
particularly important: 
“A lack of mental capacity is not a legal incapacity to vote…… Regardless of 
capacity, the decision of an elector of whether and how to vote at an election must 
be made by the elector themselves, and not by any other person on their behalf. 
Those who may be a carer of a person or who make other decisions on behalf of a 
person may not make decisions on voting.” (Ibid) 
The caution inherent in this definition suggests that policy drafters assume that 
a lack of capacity indicates a particular vulnerability attributed to service-users 
in falling prey to persons who might want to unduly influence a voting decision. 
This assumption may be warranted in some cases but interventions to prevent 
undue influence must be proportionate and based on individual cases.  




As we saw in Chapter 2 the MCA provides no mechanism to make a best interests 
replacement decision regarding voting for a person lacking capacity, and no such 
power exists elsewhere in law (MCA 2005 S.29). It is unclear under the present 
law how a voting decision can legitimately be scaffolded in the same way as other 
decisions particularly in light of the legal safeguards and professional caution over 
political influence in any form. The implication that voting decisions should be 
made independently of outside influence should not be construed as prohibiting 
engagement in political discourse with peers. In fact, the concept of relational 
autonomy indicates that social encounters with influential others is essential in 
substantiating political agency. 
The second section of the policy document at site 1 requires practitioners to make 
a distinction between those patients who are entitled to vote and have no 
impairments on their capacity to do so, and those who have a condition that 
impairs their capacity to vote. The practical procedure prescribed in the latter 
case is as follows: 
“These individuals should be asked if they want to register to vote/want to vote 
and additional support offered to support them doing so. If they require assistance, 
they must be allowed to express their own intention of how they cast their vote” 
(Site 1, Voting Rights and Procedure for Inpatients, July 2016) 
This reinforces the assumption that if an individual cannot express their own 
intention of how they cast their vote then they are vulnerable to influence. In these 
cases, practitioner may be entitled to relinquish support in the basis that they 
want to protect the individual’s autonomy. This may create the kind of exclusions 
based on mental capacity in practice that the Electoral Administration Act 2006 
was intended to abolish. 
In these cases, the policy also offers a note of caution which hints at some of the 
issues and dilemmas that practitioners face in implementation: 




“It is important that a staff member, advocate, relative or carer does not influence 
their voting choice.“ (Ibid) 
This aspect of practice raises a number of important issues. Influence is central to 
political processes. It is the currency of political interactions and the expression 
of political power and capital. Between fellow citizens, exercising influence on one 
another is fundamental in politicisation and in the practice of politics itself. There 
is rarely a sharp distinction between undue and acceptable influence in such 
relations. Indeed, influence over the voting choice is often an explicit aim of 
political discourse between individuals and certainly between political parties and 
the public. Despite the centrality of the practice of influence, such action is 
prohibited in the policy between the service-users and staff, advocates, relatives 
or carers. 
A political party is an agent that is explicitly designed to influence and is subject 
to regulations in electoral law concerning the funds that can be allocated to this 
endeavour. But a staff member, advocate, relative or carers has power over a 
vulnerable adult and so, the policy drafters seem to assume, does not have the 
same legitimacy to influence. Indeed, it may be regarded as prima facie undue 
influence and against in the interests of the vulnerable adult. But arguments and 
evidence presented in this thesis will support the conclusion that this should not 
be a general rule.  
People in the general polity are constructed as capable of dealing with attempts 
by parties, parents and relatives to influence them in their opinions. But the policy 
constructs people with mental disabilities as vulnerable to influence from these 
sources and thus seeks to protect service-users from influential interactions. This 
appears disproportionate and restrictive of political socialisation where influence 
is appropriately exercised. I return to this important issue in the following 
chapters.  




The last phrase defined by the policy at sites 2/3 is ‘vote by proxy'. According to 
the policy, if a resident wants to vote by proxy rather than by post or in person, 
they could be restricted on the basis of mental capacity. Mental capacity is 
required to designate an appropriate person to act on their behalf. However, if a 
person detained in hospital deems that a vote by proxy is the most appropriate 
method they can effectively be denied the vote on the basis of capacity. As noted 
before, this is a restriction that is not applied to persons without mental 
disabilities and highlights a disparity. If mental incapacity is not a reason to deny 
the legitimacy of a vote cast in person, and if the appointment of a proxy is treated 
in law as a voting decision, then it follows logically that the appointment of a 
proxy should not be a decision that can be denied on the basis of mental 
incapacity.  
“A person must have capacity to appoint or to continue to have a proxy, as that 
can be taken to be a decision on voting.” (Sites 2/3, Voting Rights for Service-
users Policy, October 2015) 
This point of law was omitted from the policy at site 1. The process of applying 
for vote by proxy appears to be one that is not often used by service-users and, 
as we shall see in subsequent chapters, was not utilised by any research 
participants.  
 
6.2.5. Supportive Practices 
The survey data indicates a number of supportive practices across a range of 
institutions. These include: 
 discussion and debate of political issues in community meetings,  
 the provision of information sources useful for the assessment of 
politicians, ideas and events relevant to political discourse 




 posters reminding people to get registered and encouraging them 
to do so; 
 automatically registering all patients to the electoral roll 
 general support for registration 
 access to the internet for registration purposes 
The policy documents also provide evidence of supportive practices. The first 
substantive section of the policy at sites 2/3 details the procedures by which 
service-users may be supported to register to vote: 
“The [HCP] should… discuss registration with a service-user and where necessary 
support the service-user to contact the Electoral Registration Officer.” (Ibid) 
The outcomes of these policies were that at Site 2, four service-users voted out of 
11 residents at the site. One was escorted by a mental health nurse and the other 
three went on unescorted leave with family members to vote. At site 3 one service-
user out of the sixteen had been escorted to the polling station by a mental health 
nurse and the ward manager said that another had been transported on a mini-
bus to the polling station. 
The policy at site 2/3 states that ward managers and nurses have a duty to provide 
support as necessary to facilitate patients on their ward in exercising their right 
to vote (Ibid). Responsible Clinicians are also required to authorise s.17 leave to 
allow patients to vote when appropriate and advocates are given the role of 
providing support and company to patients when going out to vote or helping to 
arrange a postal or proxy vote.  
The policies aim to ensure that inpatients can exercise their right to vote provided 
that they fulfil certain criteria, including the need to be registered in a particular 
constituency: 




“A person is entitled to vote if at the time they are a resident in the area concerned 
are on the electoral register and are not subject to any incapacity to vote.” (Ibid) 
Travelling a large distance from the hospital may be impractical for individuals 
and may be an unreasonable demand on hospital resources. Postal or proxy votes 
are a good solution to this problem but are not always practical or desirable and 
require extra forms to be returned to the electoral office.  
Problems arising from out of area placements are covered by the policy in the 
following terms: 
“the named nurse should wherever possible help a patient to contact the Electoral 
Registration Officer at their local council to ensure that they are included on the 
Register” (Ibid) 
The policy then spells out in detail the procedure used when a person has been 
resident at the hospital for a significant period or where they have no other fixed 
address: 
“The use of a psychiatric hospital address for the purposes of registration is 
permitted so long as the period of time that the patient is in hospital is sufficient 
for them to be regarded as resident.” (Ibid) 
In addition to providing detailed guidance on how staff should support service-
users to navigate bureaucratic procedures relating to registration and declarations 
of local connection, the policy provides some practical advice to nurses: 
“Where it seems helpful and appropriate the patient’s allocated nurse should 
provide any necessary help to facilitate the patient to exercise their vote. This 
could include: Assisting the patient in making arrangements for a postal or proxy 
vote… Helping with arrangements for a patient to vote in person, including 
provision of an escort where necessary.” (Ibid) 




This is not an exhaustive list and gives practitioners a great deal of discretion in 
determining the situations in which it is helpful and appropriate to provide any 
necessary help to facilitate the person in casting their ballot.  
Support was constructed in the policy at Site 1 most often as an individual 
intervention. More expansive practices such as engaging service-user’s family and 
peers as a group to engage in political events and issues was not covered in any 
of the policies. This suggests that the practice of political support was formally 
approached as a professional responsibility. 
Further comparison of the policies for site 1 and that for sites 2 and 3 highlights 
some significant issues for further discussion. In the policy document for Site 1, 
the responsible staff member supporting the service-user in the act of voting is 
designated as ‘the patient’s allocated nurse’ (Site 1, Voting Rights and Procedure 
for Inpatients, July 2016).  while in the second policy document, they designate a 
broader range of staff roles – "named nurse/Case Manager/Care Coordinator” 
(Sites 2/3, Voting Rights for Service-users Policy, October 2015) 
A second important difference is in the practical suggestions made to staff 
members. The Site 1 policy suggests arranging postal or proxy votes by contacting 
the local Electoral Registration Officer or assistance in making arrangements to 
vote in person. The policy for Sites 2/3, having covered these two points, also 
requires: 
“Responsible Clinician to provide section 17 leave for eligible inpatients. Inpatients 
who have a residence outside the hospital can choose to vote by proxy or by postal 
voting. This might be practical where it is unlikely the patient will be able to return 
to their local area to vote on the day of the poll.” (Ibid) 
The imperative implied in this phrasing (“to provide section 17”) seems to be a 
strong requirement. A resident asking for leave to cast their vote should be 
facilitated in this by responsible clinicians making s.17 determinations. This 




indicates a differentiation in thresholds of risk applied in the case of patients 
requesting leave to vote.  
The effect of the recognition of political agency on general practices of risk 
reduction will be analysed in more detail in subsequent chapters where it will be 
important to note how the assessment of risk, and the thresholds at which 
acceptable risk is set, are changed and adapted in the context of granting s.17. 
 
6.2.6. Inclusion in Policy Implementation 
In its later sections, the policy document at Site 1 sets out the procedure for 
implementation. This section aims to facilitate the uptake of the policy and staff 
adherence. The document was posted on the institution’s shared drive so it was 
accessible to all staff. Staff were also required to read copies and sign them 
declaring they understand the policy. 
The policy is also ‘To be discussed at Carers meetings and copies shared with 
Advocates…… and implementation will be discussed and reviewed at the Local 
Corporate Clinical Governance meetings” – (Site 1, Voting Rights and Procedure 
for Inpatients, July 2016). The policy finally details monitoring arrangements to 
review policy implementation: 
“The operation of this policy will be kept under review, particularly at election 
times…. Issues will be raised at local and corporate Clinical Governance meetings.” 
(Ibid) 
There are no arrangements or requirements to include inpatients, service-users, or 
persons with mental health challenges in the review process specified although a 
single patient representative was meant to be present at Governance meetings. 
This means that monitoring and evaluation of policy implementation potentially 




lacks direct accountability to the persons it is intending to empower. The design 
of policies and practices of implementation would benefit from embedding to 
participatory ethos in every stage. This could, for example, be derived from 
strategies such as ‘evidence based participatory design’ (Donetto, Pierri,, 
Tsianakas, Vicki, & Glenn. 2015). 
A significant point of departure between the policies at site 1 and sites 2/3 was 
the inclusion, at sites 2 and 3, of a consultation process whereby the policy would 
be reviewed by: 
“All interested parties, national and trust level, including service-user groups, 
advocacy service, MIND, MENCAP, to be consulted on policy before finalisation”. 
– (Sites 2/3, Voting Rights for Service-users Policy, October 2015) 
The policy, therefore, requires service-users, and representatives of the population 
of people with mental disabilities, to be included in the review process. This 
indicates an intention to embed democratic values deeply into the ethical 
environment of the institution.  
 
6.3. The Policy Principles 
In the following sections I discuss in more detail what can be understood about 




One of the explicit aims across the four policies was to allow inpatients to exercise 
their right to vote more freely. However, support was often dependent on political 




participation being appropriate and adhering to institutional norms and 
expectations. Inpatients and other service-users have the right, but not necessarily 
the opportunity or capability when undergoing treatment, to participate in 
political and civic life on equal terms with average citizens. This is partly a result 
of the pragmatics of appropriate political action being assessed and policed in 
accordance with psychiatric norms rather than norms governing the actions of 
‘mentally healthy’ people.  
Because of this requirement, the right to participate in public and political life, 
including but not restricted to the right to vote, is subject to significant conditions 
relating to good behaviour, medication compliance, escorts, institutional efficiency 
and safety. These are not requirements placed on the general population who are 
perhaps given a much wider margin of appreciation when engaging in political 
activities before containment measures are considered.  
Article 29 of the UNCRPD is much broader than the right to vote but as we have 
seen, the policies discovered only provide an explicit mandate for mental health 
practitioners to support and enhance opportunities for certain patients to vote in 
elections and only under certain conditions. The restriction of appropriate political 
activity to meekly casting a ballot is problematic as political participation should 
not be a conditional right dependent on good behaviour, taking medication or any 
other factor that does not apply equally to other citizens without mental health 
difficulties. 
In mental health rehabilitation, performance of social role by patients attracts 
intensive scrutiny and symptoms of mental illness may be discovered in poor or 
inappropriate performance. Therefore, the support of political rights may be 
interpreted by staff as just another social sphere in which mental health treatment 
can be applied to (re)socialise or educate an individual into particular ethical, 
political and social norms. Using these justifications, significant conditions may 
be attached to the political inclusion of people with mental disabilities and 




reasonable accommodation or support may be withdrawn for what is considered 
by mental health professionals as inappropriate conduct. This poses the question 
for practitioners: What norms of action and expression are sufficiently 
uncontroversial to be taken as the desired outcomes of a (coercive) medical and, 
ultimately, educational intervention? Encouraging registration and voting is 
sufficiently “neutral” to satisfy this criterion but allowing people to challenge 
decisions within the institution or to attend political party meetings or protests 
may be seen as encouraging these activities and thus subjecting people to undue 
influence. As we have seen, some of the policies explicitly discourage influential 
interaction between HCPs and service-users. That political discourse between staff 
and patients is readily interpreted as undue influence and beyond the scope of 
staff responsibilities can have a stultifying effect of the adoption of political 
identities generally. This is particularly restrictive when the majority of a person’s 
time and social interaction occurs in the mental health institution.  
It is clear from the principles of the UNCRPD that the threshold at which political 
action and expression will be deemed inappropriate for people with mental 
disabilities should be set at exactly the same level as applied to persons without 
mental disabilities. Conditions attached to the perceived privilege of political 
participation, and the policing of participation on the basis of obscure rules of 
appropriateness, can create rational reasons for disengagement and can mis/mal-
recognise the political actions of people with mental disabilities as evidence of 
disorder or illness. This is a significant problem underlying the policy documents 
and the practices they imply. 
 
6.3.2. Equality of Opportunity 
We can see from the analysis of the policies above that there is an implicit 
assumption that people with mental disabilities and disorders lack political 




agency. This is reflected in the fact that equality of opportunity to participate in 
civic and political life for people with mental disabilities as compared to the 
general population is conspicuously absent as an explicitly stated policy outcome. 
A single reference to equality of opportunity appears at the end of the first written 
policy but is not constructed in the terms required by Article 29 of the UNCRPD: 
“This Policy should be carried out irrespective of race, gender, disability, 
orientation.” – (Site 1, Voting Rights and Procedure for Inpatients, July 2016) 
The comparator used to measure equality here appears to be equality of 
opportunity within the cohort of inpatients and not equality between the general 
polity and citizens with mental health challenges. This means that even very low 
registration and voting rates in a hospital can be presented as advancing 
egalitarian principles. 
Rather than starting from an assumption of incapacity policies may be made more 
inclusive by explicitly endorsing the assumption that every person, whether in a 
mental health facility or not, has capacity to participate in political and public 
life so long as the context and circumstance are designed in ways that reduce 
boundaries and increase opportunities.  
Equality of opportunities to participate in politics cannot be advanced if we simply 
assume that impairments preclude this possibility. No person, whether diagnosed 
with a mental disorder or not, should not be treated as incapable just because 
their opinions, actions or omissions may seem unwise or against their own or other 
people’s interests. Even if someone appears to lack the skills or knowledge 
necessary to make political decisions, and even if someone is denied the right to 
vote, they still have the right to public and political life on an equal basis with 
others and to pursue their own interests and perspectives. 
Political influence is the currency of politics and is not something that should be 
avoided in interactions between health care professionals and service-users. 




Political participation should not be a conditional right dependent on good 
behaviour, taking medication or any other factor that does not apply equally to 
other citizens without mental disabilities.  
 
 
6.3.3. Awareness Raising 
Raising professional and service-user awareness of political rights, and in relation 
to political issues and developments generally, was an explicit aim of the policy of 
political inclusion covering sites 2 and 3. The policy in operation at the second 
and third sites stated that its aim was: 
“to ensure that [NHS Foundation Trust] service-users are aware of their legal right 
to vote…” 
And went on to detail 
“the responsibilities of [NHS Foundation Trust] employees to support service-users 
in the uptake of this right ” – (Voting Rights for Service-users Policy, Data 
collection sites 2/3, October 2015) 
Policies sought to raise the awareness of professionals by requiring regular training, 
(“Service line leads to ensure all staff undertake education/awareness training on 
voting rights of service-users” (Ibid) and all staff to be given the policy as required 
reading. (“This policy is essential reading for the following groups of staff: All 
staff groups.” (Ibid) 
Lack of awareness on the part of staff and patients was cited on numerous 
occasions by research participants to explain the lack of participation among 
service-users. In all three facilities I encountered staff and service-users who were 




surprised that persons detained in mental health rehabilitation facilities were able 
to register and cast a ballot despite policies to raise awareness. Here is an 
illustrative example: 
 “An occupational therapist I spoke to was really surprised that the patients at the 
centre even had the right to vote and was worried they would ‘muck up his vote’ 
(Site 1, Observation Notes, 2017) 
This demonstrates that lack of awareness, combined with stigmatising attitudes 
remains a reality within the very institutions charged with supporting and 
enhancing opportunities for service-users to engage in politics.  
The policy assumes that service-providers are well placed to raise awareness about 
political rights and provide information regarding general political issues and 
developments. This assumption should be problematized as the political 
engagement of staff in rehabilitation facilities is as diverse as in any other group 
with some likely to be politically apathetic, and/or inexperienced in engaging in 
political practices themselves. A mental health support worker, responsible 
clinician or social worker should not be assumed to possess greater political 
capabilities or enthusiasm than service-users. For example, the social worker in 
charge of administrating the policy in Site 1 was not going to vote (Site 1, 
Observation notes, 2017) and many of the nurses or support workers had never 
voted themselves: 
“You’ve got unqualifieds who are eager and enthusiastic but young and a lot of 
them…… [have] never voted……“ – (Site 1, Transcript 7, 2018, SW) 
As we have seen, avoiding influencing service-users was a policy priority and policy 
implementers therefore often limited politicisation practices to the provision of 
logistical support to cast a ballot, and bureaucratic support to register on the 
electoral roll and in this way avoided difficult cases. There was a sense in the first 
closed institution (Site 1) that making service-users aware of their political rights, 




and providing access to political information, could result in some inpatients 
making unreasonable demands and causing disruption. The social worker in charge 
of implementation stated: 
“many of the other wards were too dangerous and disrupted to disturb due to the 
fact that one [ward] was brand new and the patients were ‘settling in’ and 15 others 
had a ‘forensic past’.” – (Site 1, Observation notes, General Election 2017) 
This implied that one of the prerogatives of those implementing the policy is to 
limit the explanation of voting rights and other political information, to those who 
can, in the view of staff, qualify for and ‘safely' perform the role of the political 
agent. If political agency was attributed to ‘unsettled’ patients and they were 
recognised by staff as having valid opinions, then the process of institutionalisation 
and progress of treatment may be undermined according to this logic.  
The policy of raising political awareness was sometimes subordinated to the staff 
need to prevent and reduce conflict. This was illustrated in the instance of the 
service-user who had failed to register in time. She had said to hospital staff that 
she wanted to vote but, because her polling card had been sent to a different 
mental health hospital as a result of her recent transfer, she could not be registered 
in the local constituency in time. The staff had ruled out traveling to the other 
constituency to vote (it is unclear why – possibly on the basis of risk and cost) 
and a postal vote could not be arranged as the deadline had passed. 
 “one of our ladies was still… registered at her old address … and consequently 
didn’t get a polling card…… we believe it was sent to her previous address, we don’t 
even know if she was registered or anything…” – (Site 1, Transcript 5, 2017) 
The service-user was told she couldn’t vote and was excluded from information 
sessions on the electoral system and party manifestoes. She remained under the 
impression that the election had been cancelled due to a terrorist incident. None 
of the staff had corrected this mistaken belief. (No, I would have liked to have 




posted but listen I heard they stopped the vote because of [a terrorist] incident is 
that correct? – Site 1, Transcript 1, 2017) 
The staff believed they had made an error in not contacting the previous hospital 
for details on her registration in good time.  
“we believe her card had been sent to [location around 60 miles away] and when 
we tried registering her for a postal vote that had been missed as well and I think 
that’s remiss of the staff” (Site 1, Transcript 5, 2017) 
I formed the impression that one of the reasons for not fully informing the patient 
was embarrassment at making a mistake. The restriction of information avoided 
potential conflict between staff and the service-user but also prevented her from 
making complaints and holding those responsible to account: 
 “…… complaints are often scoffed at. At the meeting [staff talked] about one of my 
participants [and] reference was made to her making complaints…… many rolled 
their eyes and some smirked…… “– (Observation notes, General Election 2017) 
In this way the political opportunities available to services users in influencing 
institutional governance can be systematically restricted in order to reduce 
service-provider accountability and to make staff’s lives easier. Under such 
circumstance’s alienation and disenchantment with small-p politics may be 
encouraged and seeds of distrust in authorities and politicians in national 
institutions sown. 
In sum, although awareness raising is an explicit aim of the policy covering Site 2 
and 3, information on political rights and information relevant to the 
determination of particular electoral events was restricted to certain classes of 
inpatient deemed competent and manageable. The policy of inclusion is generally 
subordinate to saving face and avoiding conflict; the principle of political inclusion 
applied more or less exclusively to electoral politics (i.e. political processes in 




political institutions of state); and increased opportunities for participation and 
influence over institutional politics were not outcomes envisioned in the policy 
documents. This functioned to protect the status and role of the institutions and 
staff. 
Having looked at awareness raising, I now want to discuss the way in which staff 
members used the policy as a performative demonstration of improving 
professional practice. 
 
6.3.4. Human Rights-Based Approach 
In addition to raising awareness of mental health and facilitating the exercise of 
human rights, a third aim became evident in the course of observations and 
interviews: the fulfilment of professional standards and bureaucratic requirements 
that demonstrate improvements of professional practice for outsiders and 
regulators. This process was described variously as a human rights-based 
approach, recovery-based treatment or person-centred, holistic, humanistic care. 
Such fulfilment establishes the organisation's credentials for progressive practice 
and provides a record of policy implementation that influences regulatory 
assessment and commissioning. One senior staff member stated this in stark terms 
as noted in my observation notes.: 
“[a senior member of staff] said that the development of a patient’s political agency 
with a view to recovery was not really an explicit aim of the policy but it might 
help indirectly. The aim of the policy (and all policies) in the words of the SALT 
was as a shield against the criticism of regulators and assessors.” – (Site 1, 
Observation Notes, 2017) 
Psychiatric rehabilitation facilities are required by regulators and assessors to 
apply rehabilitative treatment which is associated with normalisation, 




containment, and risk reduction. These requirements may be contrasted with 
person-centred recovery which provides service-users greater responsibility to take 
decisions and therefore opportunities to take risks. There is therefore a 
fundamental contradiction between the aims of policies of political inclusion, 
which is recovery orientated and the aims of normal everyday practice which is 
based on rehabilitation. 
By supporting service-users to participate in political processes such as 
registration and voting, an organisation can collect numerical evidence that 
demonstrates practice is moving towards a rights-based approach. This can occur 
within a rehabilitative paradigm but not without some distortion or narrowing of 
the concept of equal participation. The above quote suggests that implementation 
in some cases may be partially motivated by the managerial necessity to gain 
positive evaluations in Care Quality Commission (CQC) inspections and in 
commissioning processes. Prioritising aims related to evidence collection and 
bureaucratic fulfilment channel resources towards enhanced recording practices 
and lip-service. But practices promoting connectedness and co-construction are 
not easily recorded and the very act of measurement can distort the process.  
Records of which service-users did and did not express an interest in voting can 
be straightforwardly presented as evidence of the level of political inclusion, but 
they do not in themselves generate enhanced and sustained service-user 
experiences of support and can encourage a superficial rather than reflective 
practice - “the evidence is there, it’s on the paper…… it’s all documented on their 
notes…” – (Site 3, Transcript 8, 2018, WM). In fact, keeping such records can 
engender further alienation. 
In the services studied the first engagement practitioners had with the policy was 
during the electoral cycles in which data collection took place. The central 
management for the NHS foundation trust contacted individual ward managers 




shortly prior to elections in their constituency to remind them that certain 
categories of patient had the right to vote.  
This meant that local elections happening outside a hospital constituency, for 
which ‘out-of-area patients’ might be eligible could easily be missed. In addition, 
participation in political events and processes occurring outside of elections are in 
danger of falling outside of the policy remit.  
The information distributed to ward managers stated that both detained and 
voluntary patients generally had the right to vote. The documents further detailed 
the categories of excluded patients i.e. those on s.37 detentions. As managers were 
focused on the numbers of people registering and voting as evidence of the efficacy 
of the policy, those on s.37/41 orders (offenders detained in mental health 
hospitals) did not receive the same support as inpatients identified as having the 
right to vote.  
As discussed in Chapter 2 the Representation of the People Act (RPA) 
disenfranchises those who are convicted and detained in a penal institution and 
offenders detained in mental health hospitals on s.37/41 orders. It does not 
exclude them from the right to participate on an equal basis in political and civic 
life under the UNCRPD but simply bars them from a particular aspect of political 
and civic life – namely elections.  
Persons sent for mental health treatment following a criminal conviction face 
greater barriers to political participation than similar offenders who are sent to 
prison. Under s.41 of the MHA 1983 the Secretary of State can prevent the 
discharge of a person detained in hospital under s.37 indefinitely. These orders 
can maintain effect for sustained periods of time, sometimes much longer than a 
typical sentence for the crime. This discrepancy potentially constitutes unequal 
and discriminatory treatment of persons with mental health disabilities as they 
may be disenfranchised much longer than non-disabled criminals for similar 
offences.  




During the course of my observation of Site 1 I noted that there had previously 
been a visit from a local MP which did not include meeting service-users. This 
demonstrates this assumption of incapacity is widespread in our political culture 
and not limited to the mental health institution. 
“In the staff newsletter it says the hospital was praised by the local MP during a 
recent visit... The MP had not met any of the patients. He was shown around by 
the CEO...” (Site 1, Observation Notes, 2017) 
The MPs visit in 2016, and the way in which the staff newsletter describes it, are 
revealing of a specific way in which MP’s and the policy implementers construct 
the political agency of service-users as best represented by those charged with 
their care. Although the MP’s visit did not occur in the context of an election or 
referendum campaign (it was a few months after the EU referendum) the conduct 
of the visit was reported in the format of a factory visit in which the politician 
enters a place of work and discusses ways in which they can support the productive 
enterprise.  
This reflects an underlying theme revealed in analysis of the ethnographic data 
that practitioners saw the benefit of (and therefore a motivation for) their 
institution’s policy of political participation in raising the profile of mental health 
issues in the national political discourse and the strengthening of the case for 
greater investment in, and use of, mental health services. Paying lip service to a 
human rights-based approach, whilst making little effort to implement it in ways 
that have concrete benefits for service-users is a consequence of this mindset. 
 “2: I think it would be a really good exercise to meet local candidates…… it would 
be extremely good for the local candidates because I mean …… I seriously doubt how 
much knowledge or experience politicians have” – (Site 1, Transcript 2, 2017)  
 





The findings from the general survey conducted by the CQC show the majority 
of mental health wards surveyed had no official policy mandating practices of 
political inclusion. A higher proportion of wards had substantive, but informal, 
practices relevant to supporting service-users participate in public and political 
life in the discussion of current affairs in community meetings. Policies of political 
participation are most common on acute/PICU, low and medium secure facilities 
indicating that the categorisation of patients according to diagnostic criteria or 
proximity to recovery is a relevant factor in determining the level of political 
inclusivity.  
Although formal policies on political inclusion are rare of the three received all 
made participation conditional. Two (although one indirectly) made inclusion 
conditional on mental capacity which excludes people from political life on the 
basis of mental disability. This is a potential violation of the UNCRPD. All the 
formal policies aimed to support participation only for those eligible for and 
interested in voting: an unduly restrictive interpretation of the right to participate 
in political and public life. 
The intention of the policies appears to be to suspend medicalised practices of 
treatment and rehabilitation during elections which are the key focus of 
implementation of policies of political inclusion. During elections practices are 
mandated on the basis of human rights-based principles. 
The formal texts are however defensive and orientated to service-provider liability 
reduction which reduces the potential benefits service-users may gain from 
implementation. For example, the policies seek to avoid accusations of anybody 
over-influencing the voting decisions of service-users. Despite the aim of the 
policies being to increase active involvement in political decision-making, service-
users are allocated a passive role in developing political capabilities, designing 




political interventions to change the world, and in the implementation and 
evaluation of the policies of inclusion themselves.  
Decisions regarding who can exercise political rights, and when, were based on 
ideas about the nature of politics and assumptions of political incapacity 
associated with mental disability. In this way there appears to be a slippage from 
human rights based principles back to the psychiatric principles of assessment, 
treatment and containment. Because the policy defines the realm of the political 
in a restrictive ‘domain’ sense (concentrating on electoral politics) many relevant 
practices fall outside of the scope of the policies. The logic dictates that if a 
service-user doesn’t have the right to vote then support for political participation 
is not required. But, because political rights are reinstated following release from 
s.37/41 orders, and political rights for mentally disabled people are much broader 
than access to the franchise, support should perhaps not be withdrawn so readily. 
The emphasis on raising awareness about rights to inclusion in electoral politics 
has potentially far reaching implications. It places responsibility to participate on 
service-user and reduces expectations and service-providers’ duties of reasonable 
accommodation to putting up a few posters. The individualisation of political 
mobilisation in turn provides justifications for exclusion of certain service-users 
from more proactive supportive services as they can be cast as unmotivated and 
disengaged. The values underlying the implementation of the policy of political 
inclusion reflect a selective form of inclusion based on service-users proving they 
are sufficiently, and appropriately motivated. This is a function of policy being 
designed by and for mental health staff and institutions rather than by and for 
service-users.  
Because the policy only requires support for service-user participation in electoral 
politics, the development of capabilities for other types of political action and 
expression fall outside the policy remit. Further, as discussed in detail in the 
following chapter, political acts of service-users aiming to influence institutional 




governance and treatment/care planning decisions can be constructed as 
inappropriate or even pathological. This functions to protect staff’s authority vis-
à-vis patients and to reduce responsibility for providing positive support. 
Lastly, the performance of duties and responsibilities under the policy has a key 
audience in hospital management, regulatory assessors the CQC and 
commissioners. Action under the policy is deemed successful and sufficient if it 
avoids negative judgement from these audiences. Increasing accountability in 
decision making within the institutional political environments was not viewed as 
a policy requirement and inpatients were viewed as passive subjects and not the 
central audience towards which policy performance was orientated. Participatory 
design approaches are seen in the literature as a possible alternative. Embedding 
participatory design approaches into the policy development process could also 
address issues of disengagement and disillusionment from service-users about 
politics, democracy and social justice. (Donetto, Pierri,, Tsianakas, Vicki, & 
Glenn. 2015) 
In the next chapter I describe the policy outcomes and analyse the process of  it 
co-construction and subversion of roles in performance. 
  












As we have seen in the previous chapter one of the purported aims of mental 
health services is to ensure service-users will be able to think for themselves and 
exercise judgement in the political field. This relates in interesting ways to, and 
often contradicts, the more fundamental aim of safeguarding the individual and 
others from the risks posed by impaired mental capacities and disordered thought 
processes. For the purpose of safeguarding people with significant mental 
disabilities, legal powers are available to practitioners under the MCA 2005 to 
impose best interest decisions on the basis of mental disability in cases where 
capacity is absent and cannot be scaffolded.  
Political inclusion is constructed in mental health services as exclusively 
concerning participation in elections through the ballot box. Civic participation, 
of which voting is an important symbol, is seen as a aspect of self-actualisation 
above and beyond mere rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is seen either as a wholly 
separate aim or as contributing indirectly to political participation by providing 
solid foundations from which electoral participation can spring. In this way 




coercive treatment finds justification in the advancement of political inclusion in 
the long term even when suppressing it in the short term. As we will see in the 
present chapter, this justification is deeply problematic. Often suppression in the 
short term can create a sense of alienation and reduce self-efficacy that potentially 
demotivate political engagement in the form of registration and voting rates in 
both short and long term.  
Because political inclusion is seen as an outcome rather than an aspect of 
treatment resources and professional energy are directed towards assessing risks 
and benefits of political participation for residents to determine if they are ‘ready’ 
(i.e. have progressed sufficiently along a linear path towards recovery). Zoe (bare 
life) is thus prioritised over, or constructed as prior to, the achievement of Bios 
(the good life). Once bare life is sufficiently protected then the good life can be 
pursued. In this way the protection of bare life is constructed by staff as an aspect 
of the good life and as a fundamental political goal for service-users. 
Once capabilities are deemed sufficient (i.e. social skills learnt, and civic 
responsibility embraced) progress towards rehabilitation and/or recovery can be 
recorded in medical notes and the scope for autonomous decision making 
expanded. One aspect of this reintroduction is the provision of support for 
tentative participation in elections. Participating in political events can function 
as a test, and if successful as evidence of rehabilitation and recovery. It is seen as 
a way of demonstrating capabilities to engage appropriately with others. Political 
inclusion is not always the main aim of taking people to the polling station. People 
may simply be assessed on their ability to conform to a perceived norm of 
participation (despite the fact that many ‘normal’ citizens do not vote). As one 
ward manager put it: part of rehab is normalization... showing… how to be in 
public (Site 3, Transcript 1, 2018, WM). Support to cast a vote in elections is in 
danger of becoming a performance of normality for service-users keen, or required, 
to demonstrate their recovery. 




In line with this ritual for categorisation, based in the normal medical practices 
of mental health services, one aspect of implementation at all three sites was 
identifying those who was eligible for support. This was done broadly on the basis 
of whether a given individual was motivated to vote and was eligible to be 
registered. 
Encouraging people to register was an educative practice (i.e. explaining why this 
was important) but also supporting political participation in the substantive sense 
of voting was fundamentally educational. People could be socialised into political 
roles and taught how to be a good citizen through naturalistic engagement with 
others. Alternatively, they may be herded into polling booths. It was important 
to understand how these processes were conceived and practised in the course of 
mental health rehab. The teaching strategies applied by psy-professionals observed 
ranged from behaviourist or ‘banking’ approaches, whereby knowledge was 
distributed from the top down, to being co-produced and co-owned in interactions 
between equal persons in informal interaction.  
I show by reference to the data that mutual learning through dialogue appeared 
to be more effective in supporting service-users to think for themselves and 
exercise judgement in the political field. Embedding implementation in 
humanistic, person-centred and holistic mental health practices allows more 
contextualised understanding and management of power dynamics between 
service-users and providers. This in turn facilitates politically inclusive practice. 
By embedding political inclusion in everyday mental health practice, and finding 
frequent opportunities to reverse and subvert power dynamics within the patient 
doctor act, support in forming a view of the good life (bios) can be more open to 
service-user’s worldviews. This can contribute to the protection of bare life 
through recovery and rehabilitation (zoe) and may be appropriately applied at 
any stage in the treatment process rather than being conceived of as a pinnacle 
to be reached only by exceptional or well-behaved individuals.  




Before presenting the analysis I provide a bare record of policy implementation at 
each of the three sites observed. I do this for two reasons, first to give a sense of 
the  effectiveness of the policies in achieving their stated aim of encouraging 
service-users to register and vote, and to give the reader an overarching narrative 
of what happened at each of the sites in the hope that this will help comprehension 
of the microsocial and dramaturgical analysis of the ethnographic data. 
 
7.2. Overt Actions to Implement Policy at Each Site 
At Site 1, during the 2017 general election campaign community meetings were 
used to inform service-users of their rights to political participation, to deliver 
political information and to support political capacities through political debate. 
One mental health nurse running these community meetings encouraged them to 
vote for a particular party and attempted to encourage service-users to exercise 
their right to vote on the basis of partisan arguments. The social worker sent out 
a form asking whether residents wanted to vote in the General Election 2017 and 
whether they wanted support in doing so. On the same form he asked residents 
to delegate rights of correspondence with the Electoral Commission to the 
hospital.  
Four residents signed the form in the affirmative and three of these individuals 
were registered on the electoral roll by the social worker. The fourth was not able 
to be registered due to her being transferred recently form another hospital and 
missing the registration deadline. The three who wanted to vote were then told to 
attend information sessions in the week prior, and on the day of the election in 
which the SALT and a mental health nurse attempted to teach them about the 
political system and explain party manifestoes. Following these sessions, the three 
were escorted to the polling station where the SALT and mental health nurse were 
asked to provide assistance directly in the polling booths. Ward managers looked 




unfavourably at this practice and argued that support offered should be neutral 
and free from political bias. 
Policy implementation took on a different character following the appointment of 
a new social worker keen to support political participation outside of elections as 
well as the right to vote. She organised MP and Mayoral visits to the hospital and 
a trip to Westminster as well as forums in which the policy of political inclusion 
could be reviewed quarterly by a group of service-users and staff. 
At Site 2 during Local Elections, mental health nurses encouraged service-users 
to exercise their right to vote in community meetings and in one to ones. Informal 
political discussion was commonplace in communal lunches at the facility and the 
relaxed approach to politicisation in the institution allowed practitioners to engage 
with service-users as political citizens. If the service-users were amenable the 
mental health nurse attempted to organise family members to accompany the 
individual to the polling station. Three service-users were therefore accompanied 
to the polling stations by a father, a mother and a spouse. A fourth service-user 
was escorted by a mental health nurse with whom he had a good relationship. He 
declined the invitation to involve his family. He was escorted to the polling station 
and cast his vote with little or no support from the mental health nurse. She 
discussed his voting choices with him on the way there and thus provided some 
social support by being a kind of sounding board.  
At Site 3, again during Local Elections, the ward manager conducted a survey of 
the whole service-user cohort on her ward rounds. She collected information on 
who was eligible, who wanted to vote, and general comments. Informal discussion 
was reportedly made available on the wards through mental health nurses who 
were permitted to discuss such issues but it was deemed inappropriate for 
clinicians and ward managers to engage in political dialogue with service-users. 
The ward manager organised a mini-bus on polling day to transport service-users 
to the relevant polling stations but only one service-user used this service. A 




second service-user was escorted to the polling station by a mental health nurse 
having secured s.17 leave.  
 
7.3. Eligibility for Support 
Communication of information on voting rights and the inculcation of background 
political knowledge is preparation for concrete political action. In the following 
sections I consider the ways in which certain political actions were identified as 
attracting positive support and the types of service-user identified as suitable 
recipients. 
Practitioner and service-user participants described numerous incidents where 
inpatients were asked if they were registered to vote, encouraged to register if they 
were not, and supported to return relevant forms. In relation specifically to 
registration the support I observed fell broadly into the following kinds and 
sequence which I elaborate on in subsequent sections.  
1. Identification of: 
a. service-users who are eligible to vote; 
b. which eligible service-users were/were not registered; 
c. where service-users were registered; 
d. service-users who wanted to vote and; 
e. the necessity of additional support (e.g. declaration of local connection)  
2. Help with the Bureaucracy of Registration: 
a. Supporting service-users to fill in forms 
b. Supporting applications for a vote by post, or by proxy. 
 





One of the issues encountered by staff in supporting opportunities for political 
inclusion was the amount of time and effort required to identify the registration 
status of every inpatient so that appropriate support could be allocated and 
provided in time for polling day. This process of identification was more difficult 
in institutions which had a high turnover of service-users where audits had to 
occur regularly to avoid service-users falling through the cracks. For Site 1, the 
calling of a snap General Election in June 2017 meant staff had little over 2 
months to make preparations and to provide support. In retrospect the fact that 
implementation of practices occurs only around elections, on a reactionary basis, 
rather than being embedded into everyday practice was perhaps the real issue. 
Because of this staff were required to collect a significant amount of information, 
to organise time and resources appropriately, and provide support based on that 
information in a short space of time.  
The social worker at Site 1 rang the local electoral office to check who was 
registered to vote and was told that they couldn’t disclose the information due to 
confidentiality issues. They failed to get a service-user, who had expressed an 
intention to vote and asked for support, registered in time to vote. It was also 
tactless to send out a letter to all residents in Site 1 asking if they would like to 
vote because it therefore went to inpatients disenfranchised due to detention under 
s.37/41 orders. 
Individual ward managers or policy implementors determined what was necessary 
and how the information was to be collected a given ward. Different methods were 
used across and within the sites studied as different service-users were constructed 
as requiring different types of approaches. This was not necessarily on the basis 
of diagnosis but on the basis of service-users progress towards recovery. For 
example, those in more secure wards service-users were seen as less capable of 
engaging with political and public life than those who were progressing towards 




transfer to ‘step-down’ services. One newly established ward at Site 1 was deemed 
too ‘disrupted’ for any form of implementation at all. 
Bureaucratic tasks such as surveying the number of service-users who were eligible 
and wanted to vote appeared in more secure settings to be prioritised over human 
interactions in implementation. 
I… put everyone’s name down and ask[ed] them prior, do they want to vote… if 
they want to sign, if they want to comment. (Site 3, Transcript 1, 2018, WM) 
Eligibility to vote and registration status were not part of the main survey at Site 
3 so were investigated only for the cohort of inpatients identified as wanting to 
vote (Site 3, Transcript 1, 2018, WM). Being a specialist service catering to many 
‘out of area’ service-users identifying the location of registration was particularly 
important. This type of information was collected directly from service-users. In 
addition to the survey, registration and voting were also reportedly raised in carers 
meetings to inform people about their place of residence at the hospital and the 
implications for re-registration and voting on the day. 
At Site 2 staff talked with individual service-users about voting, encouraged them 
to register and identified their place of residence. In addition, staff sought to liaise 
directly with family to confirm the location of registration and receipt of voting 
cards as well as to engage the service-user’s family and peers in the election as 
part of implementation. Because Site 2 had fewer residents, were located in the 
service-users’ local community, and had extensive notice of the date of the local 
elections, a greater level of support could be provided to open opportunities to 
engage in political and civic life. The service-users were also generally nearing 
discharge into the community and were older than those at the other 2 sites.  
Dividing patients into definitive categories of eligible or ineligible is part of the 
way institutions seek to impose order in the ward environment. Institutional 
categorisations become so familiar in the discourse that they are not seen as a 




"way of ordering," but as "an order [inherent] in the phenomena" (Turner, 1983: 
192). The effect of these ordering practices was that service-users were divided 
into those who would be supported to engage in political and public life and those 
who would not. Only those who possessed the right to vote and who had stated 
explicitly that they wanted to vote in a particular election were to be supported 
to have equal opportunities for political and public inclusion. This is problematic 
in that the right to political and public inclusion is much broader than a right to 
vote and it is universal in its application to people with disabilities. All should 
have reasonable accommodations made and not just those whom it is most 
convenient to support. 
Identification practices were also determined to some extent on the basis of 
diagnosis. Those with personality disorders appeared to be treated with increased 
suspicion on the basis that they may use their right to engage in political and 
public life for apolitical reasons such as cynically acquiring section 17 leave or 
even simply to cause trouble for staff. One service-user falling into this category 
was deprived of the opportunity to vote because of a mix up with her registration 
papers being sent to her previous address and this was not effectively 
communicated to her. She was left under the impression that the election had not 
happened which served staffs interests in the sense that she did not make this a 
point of complaint and conflict. Another service-user with personality disorder at 
site 3 was given s.17 leave to vote but this was described as a ‘treat’ after having 
a bad day to appease him. He was also described as using political inclusion as an 
excuse to acquire leave. 
Those with psychosis had their worldviews subjected to increased scrutiny and 
questioning. Practitioners were wary that the political views of people with 
psychosis may be informed by unrealistic worldviews or assumptions based on 
disordered thinking. This resulted in at least two cases in a lack of confidence and 
self-efficacy in relation to the political actions and opinions. One service-user 
ended up voting ‘nobody’ and another was left with a great deal of anxiety when 




the topic of political opinions came up to the point that he was shaking and asked 
if he could leave.  
These differences in political socialisation, being based on mental health diagnosis, 
could be construed as illegitimate differences of treatment based on mental 
disability or reasonable accommodations based on individual circumstances. 
Practitioners need to continuously ask the question whether they are treating 
people in the same way as they would treat non-disabled people. Would we treat 
a person without a diagnosis who is espousing a worldview we consider to be 
untrue in the same way as some service-users were treated? Would we assume a 
disabled person only has an interest in politics in so far as it affects their health 
and social care provision? Would we withhold information about whether an 
election had been cancelled or not simply to avoid difficult questions? Would we 
subject non-disabled citizens political views to the same degree of scrutiny on 
whether it was ‘disordered’ or not? It seems to me that we would not as these 
actions communicate a lack of respect and recognition for these individuals as 
members of the political community. 
 
7.3.2. Registration  
As we noted above at Site 1, in order to identify who wanted to vote a letter was 
sent to all residents by the social worker months before the election. Out of 80 
people at the facility only four formally expressed a wish to vote by responding 
to the letter. These four were facilitated to be registered on the electoral roll and 
three of them were registered in time to participate in the General Election 2017. 
The registration process involved entering the individual’s name on a form sent 
through by the electoral commission if they had been at the hospital for a long 
time. 




“I got a document through which was from the electoral roll saying who’s here…… 
so I asked people but of course patients change you know” – (Site 1, Transcript 7, 
2018, SW) 
If an inpatient for whatever reason was not entered on that form to be registered 
at the hospital, they would be facilitated to register either online or by otherwise 
contacting the local electoral office. Inpatients with difficulties reading and writing 
were provided with additional support: 
“if someone can’t fil l out the registration forms, then we help… Say to patients… is 
there… anything that you would like me to support you with?...” – (Site 1, 
Transcript 2, 2017, SALT) 
This reflected the procedure of registration reported at Site 3 (“towards the time, 
[of] the ballot… we'll get a form from the local council. To say who’s here and you 
just update that list” – Site 3, Transcript 1, 2018, WM). Updating was a relatively 
simple task which residents could accomplish without a great deal of practical 
support. However, these processes were still often done by staff members rather 
than service-users been supported to do it themselves. The declaration of local 
connection was not required for any of the residents who participated in the study. 
The facilitation of service-users to complete the registration process was 
sometimes complicated by the residential status of inpatients, their placement 
outside their local constituencies (particularly for local elections), and their 
transfer between hospitals shortly before electoral events. As discussed previously 
there were some issues in relation to the registration of persons due to bureaucratic 
issues.  
Even well designed and efficiently implemented systems of support could be 
frustrated in unpredictable ways. In the course of attempting to get as many 
residents at the facility registered as possible the social worker at Site 1 
encountered resistance and protest from some service-users. “Some patients were 




apparently hiding their polling cards” – (Site 1, Observation notes, General 
Election 2017) 
From observation it seemed that the relationship between the social worker and 
some inpatients was not particularly amicable or trusting. His attempts to support 
them to get registered were treated with suspicion and seemed to have led some 
patients to distance themselves from the political roles offered. The quality of 
relationships between political supporter and supportee appear to be a crucial 
factor in the level of political participation for service-users. 
The power relations in the mental health institutions, whereby staff may become 
arbiters of appropriate conduct and have the ability to coerce service-users, can 
undermine the trusting relationships so important in facilitating political 
inclusion. The consequence of a mental health practitioner designating a political 
expression, action or omission as inappropriate is that it provides justification for 
suppression and discouragement. In the context of political education and support 
such punishment for not participating in the ‘correct way’ (e.g. registering as an 
elector and voting) should only be applied where it would be legitimate to do so 
in relation to a person without mental health difficulties.  
In addition, accommodations should be made so that people who are nervous 
about disclosing personal information and details to authorities are reassured. 
Alternative methods of participation in public and political life may be suggested 
and supported if people do not want to vote. Support should be provided by a 
person of their choosing if possible. 
 
7.4. Educational Support 
The term ‘playing political roles’ refers to the performance of political agency, 
through expression, gesture or action. For the people observed in rehabilitation, 




opportunities to play such roles were often restricted to ‘safe’ political 
environments explicitly designated by staff, where there was little risk of lasting 
reputational damage to service-users and where staff policed their own 
communications to reduce their ‘influence’ (see Ch.8). Certain spaces and 
situations were designed as educational spaces for implementation of policies of 
political inclusion. This meant that the majority of the environment was retained 
for medicalised practices. Where playing politics was permitted, it was appropriate 
for service-users to express political identities. In medicalised environments such 
conflict would be ‘resolved’ through suppression. After intensive observation it 
was clear that processes of political socialisation did occur throughout the whole 
spectrum of environments where rehabilitation took place. When roles are 
enacted, and identity construction occurs through a cycle of repetition in face-to-
face situations, processes of conflict and cooperation on political matters occur. 
In medicalised environments these processes are heavily managed by technocratic 
epistemologies of governance. In the spaces where policies of political inclusion 
were consciously being applied such management was withdrawn on the basis of 
avoiding political ‘influence’ and to enable more democratic engagement (with 
mixed success). The conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 3 was developed 
to scrutinise these processes in a contextualised and detailed manner.  
Spaces to play politics were rare at Site 1 and 3 which restricted political 
permissiveness to specifically designed situations and environments. These in turn 
were restricted to electoral cycles. In this way opportunities were narrowed and 
the scope of obligations and expectation for reasonable accommodation effectively 
reduced. 
This contrasted with Site 2 in which the political opportunities were more 
embedded into everyday practice. Practitioners at Site 2 talked about their 
practice as holistic, person-centred and humanising. Even in this setting the focus 
was mostly on voting in elections as the seminal political act. In addition, the 
ritual performances of individuals and teams in the medicalised environment 




established particular rules of appropriateness that in turn had negative effects on 
opportunities for politicisation by promoting passive and submissive political 
roles. This was alienating and exclusionary for some service-users.  
The following discussion makes a distinction between observations of ‘playing 
politics’ in organised sessions compared to political discussion emerging 
spontaneously in informal interactions. 
 
7.4.1. Organised play 
Staff at all sites were required by the policies to raise awareness of voting rights 
and at site 2 this extended to encouraging a sense of civic responsibility. The duty 
to inform service-users of their rights was not necessarily based on a duty to 
provide conditions that promote inclusion, on the basis of law and policy: 
“rights for people with mental health problems… is.. legal binding” – (Site 2, 
Transcript 6, 2018, WM) 
Didactic Education Sessions: 
At Site 1 information sessions were organised in which political information was 
communicated to service-users in a structured way by a speech and language 
therapist (SALT) who stood at the front of the class to service-users sat in rows. 
At all three sites community meetings were mentioned as fulfilling this function 
also, but in a circular seating structure. Both these situations may be described 
as ‘organised play’ because the practitioner took on the role of teacher with 
authority to convey and assess ‘correct’ knowledge and appropriate participation. 
The spatial arrangements were both symbolic and constitutive of power dynamics 
in the educational interaction. Political information was routinely made available 




in these forums during the election cycle across the three sites. This positioned 
staff as curators of political information. Here are two illustrative examples: 
 “yeh normally you know we have er newspaper group.” – (Site 2, Transcript 1, 
2018, SMHN) 
“we tend to discuss the news on a daily basis in our morning meetings” – (Site 1, 
Transcript 3, 2017, MHN) 
At Site 1 the SALT organised formal information sessions occurring the week prior 
to, and on the day of the 2017 General Election. The intention was to explain how 
the political system worked and to introduce party manifestos. The information 
sessions, and voting itself, were effectively rendered mandatory for the three 
individuals who had returned a form stating that they wanted to vote. This raised 
serious questions about whether the service-users were being supported to exercise 
political autonomy. 
The information session prior to the vote was organised as follows: 
the SALT proceeded to deliver the easy-read manifesto information as well as 
information on the political system as a whole and what the process of voting 
means – (Site 1, Observation Notes, 2017) 
The session was organised like a classroom with the SALT at the front and the 
three young men sat adjacent. The SALT, in the role of teacher proceeded to 
inform her students of a series of political facts. This was in stark contrast to the 
dialogue modelled at Site 2: 
cross cutting alliances were set up in the conversation with staff seeming genuinely 
interested in what service-users contributed. (Site 2, Observation Notes, 2018) 
Some aspects of the Site 1 information session involved assessment. For example, 
the students were tested on their understanding of how general elections worked 




and on their ‘retention’ of facts about politicians and major parties. There were 
similarities therefore with tests for mental capacity. Mental capacity tests are 
meaningless for establishing voting eligibility (see chapter 2) but these 
‘educational’ tests might easily be interpreted as informal assessments of capacity 
to vote. Testing for retention and understanding is a commonplace educational 
practice but while capacity testing may not have been the intention of the practice 
it might have resonated as such for users or interpreted that way by staff. Because 
of the effect of the determination of a lack of capacity in many other contexts this 
could become a real deterrent to participation. Whether or not this was the case 
the lessons resulted in residents becoming restless and disengaged. They appeared 
bored by the content delivered. They communicated that boredom with body 
language and tone which enabled them to demonstrate resistance to being 
patronised whilst ostensibly cooperating. This can be interpreted as a form of role 
distancing and may be constructed as an exercise of ‘soft’ political power of 
resistance. 
Senior staff deemed it inappropriate to conduct such formal sessions from a 
partisan perspective and this was also a source of discomfort for the staff involved 
across the three sites:  
 “Because as far as politics is concerned if we start [encouraging participation] we 
can influence our own ideas to them, there is a risk of that” – (Site 2, Transcript 
6, 2018, MHN). 
“it’s very difficult to speak to somebody about politics without your own political 
views influencing it” – (Site 1, Transcript 2, 2018, SALT) 
 
In the sessions observed at Site 1, it appeared important for staff to demonstrate 
neutrality and to avoid being perceived by other members of staff and the 
researcher as pushing a political agenda. This aversion was not universal. One 
session organiser stated explicitly she had unsuccessfully encouraged some of the 




service-users to vote for Labour (“Despite my encouragement to vote Labour 
nobody did…” – Site 1, Transcript 3, 2017, MHN). However, when confronted with 
vignettes in which conflicts arose due to particular political views being pushed 
by service-users, she recommended adopting a neutral position to quickly resolve 
the conflict. This demonstrates a double standard where service-user political 
influence is seen as inappropriate and potentially dangerous compared to other 
members of the community. This practice could also have negative implications 
for future political engagement if interpreted as a punishment.  
 “I [would] end that discussion and move it on to something more neutral… we 
would have to risk assess it” – (Site 1, Transcript 3, 2017, MHN) 
The ward manager at Site 3, implied that primary nurses could talk in more 
opinionated ways than clinicians and senior staff members: 
“If the clients want to, they can talk to their primary nurse” – (Site 3, Transcript 
1, 2018, WM) 
This may have been because they considered primary nurses were lower down the 
institutional hierarchy, had less authority and therefore their influence was 
thought less problematic. In addition, the doctor and patient roles were perhaps 
more established between responsible clinicians or ward managers vis-a-vis service-
users than they were between service-users and nursing staff and so there was less 
of a danger of their authority being undermined by politicising the situation. 
When two service-users asked, on the day, whether they ‘had to’ go to the polling 
station they received a reply in the affirmative. Despite autonomous political 
inclusion being mandatory for the three men they showed some reluctance, and 
role distancing in an asymmetry between expressions they gave and those they 
gave off. Their participation was closely managed by service-providers according 
to the working consensus that the service-users would comply with directions.  




“CM asked very quietly if he was coming out with the SALT who said briskly 
‘that’s right yes.’ CM asked ‘to go to vote?... I’m not going’. The SALT then asked 
sceptically ‘you’re not going?’…… He was unsure of himself and stammered ‘I 
though, you said…’ and then trailed off.. SALT replied yes and then moved on... 
[CM, RS and BB Arriving at the polling station] RS asked ‘So do I still have to 
do all of that?’ SALT replied ‘Yes you do’” - (Site 1, Observation Notes, 2017) 
This demonstrates problems in UNCRPD application more generally. A bottom 
up political community cannot readily be constructed through the application of 
top down law and policy addressed to service-providers. To force someone to take 
on a role as a free agent through top-down enforcement is a contradiction and 
further does not necessarily work to scaffold individual or relational autonomy. 
In mental health rehab commonplace educational practices, applied to processes 
of politicisation, potentially take on other meanings and significance for both users 
and staff. If political knowledge is assessed by staff in didactic educational sessions 
the similarity of the practice to capacity assessment may have a number of 
restrictive effects on the free expression of political identities. This demonstrates 
how the moral and political milieu of the mental institution can have a stultifying 
effect on practices of political inclusion. This is a result of the wide gulf between 
a situation in which you are free to express opinions about the people, system, 
and general world around you without restriction, and one in which all your 
actions and expressions are under scrutiny for signs and symptoms of mental 
disorder which could be recorded and used against you. It is a problem created by 
the panopticon of surveillance, the threat of consequences, and the reification of 
identity through a written record that characterise residential psychiatric care. It 
seems clear that in such situations healthy political relations are difficult to 
establish. 
 
Formal inclusion on agenda of community meetings: 




Although there was a lack of any direct observation and only a brief time spent 
at the institution Site 3 appeared to organise sessions dealing with political 
information also. This reportedly occurred in community meetings and ward 
rounds but was managed closely because of the fear that political conflict could 
lead to violence. 
“[I] obviously don’t mind people discussing their views but it’s got to be done in a 
more acceptable way because this is… a hospital… you know… one argument can 
lead… to physical assault”– (Site 3, Transcript 1, 2018, WM) 
Information about the right to vote was delivered in community meetings at both 
Sites 1 and 2. At Site 1 the need to explain the patient’s right to vote prompted 
staff to initiate a more detailed discussion about the political parties who were 
competing for electors’ votes.  
 “we just explained that everybody on our ward at that time had the right to vote 
and we… explained a little bit about the parties… and then…… every week in the 
community meeting we went through a different party” – (Site 1, Transcript 3, 
2017, MHN) 
As described above the subsequent sessions about each political party were 
conceived in a formal didactic style where facts about each party were delivered 
to service-users by a member of staff in an organised fashion. This failed to engage 
many service-users: 
I don’t know if it was interesting for everybody on the ward… a lot of them then 
declined [to vote]” – (Site 1, Transcript 3, 2017, MHN) 
The didactic transmission of facts was the typical pedagogic approach observed 
in staff organised information sessions. The interaction was often dominated by 
technical requirements of social skills training rather than proceeding on a 
humanistic and person-centred basis. In addition, because staff participants were 




concerned that some service-users may not have taken in the information on voting 
rights and therefore staff ‘tested’ their retention with the associated negative 
connotations noted earlier. This potentially inhibited discussion and a free flow of 
ideas. In Butlerian terms the organised structure of the sessions was a repetition 
of the dominant ritual orders of psychiatric care and consequently gave fewer 
opportunities for interactants to develop novel and unsubscribed political 
identities. 
The sessions did not result in many of the service-users showing an interest in 
political discussions or registering to vote. Despite staff’s enthusiastic 
encouragement, registration and intention to vote remained low across the three 
sites. The delivery of information on voting in community meetings therefore 
appears on the face of it to have failed to engage many service-users. Very few 
volunteered for support. The practice may have even prompted some service-users 
to distance themselves from the political roles they were encouraged to occupy. 
On the other hand using a survey with neutral written questions during ward 
rounds (“Do you want to vote?; Any comment?” – Site 3, Transcript 1, 2018, WM) 
as they did at Site 3, appeared no more effective.  
This may be construed as a significant failure on the policies own terms. This 
misses the point to some extent however as the very act of setting up an 
environment in which political engagement is signalled as formally important, 
together with the increased opportunities in informal interactions, cumulatively 
represents a substantive change which might, over time, produce greater uptake 
of political roles for both staff and service-users. For example, it allowed the staff 
member previously quoted to volunteer political choices for public and professional 
scrutiny and this may have been a useful exercise in socialisation into civic and 
political life whether or not voting/registration rates increased as a result. 
The uptake of opportunities to register to vote or to cast a ballot should not be 
equated with engagement with public and political life more generally. Well-




rounded engagement also requires inclusion in the everyday decision-making 
processes of the institutions in which service-users reside. This might include the 
mental health service itself as well as workplaces, local councils and communities, 
political parties, charities, schools, universities and much more. There seemed to 
be little thought at any of the sites visited as to how the policy of political 
inclusion might be applied to a broad range of settings. As already noted, the 
overriding focus was on the uptake of voting rights. 
 
Formal One-to-One Discussions: 
Information about voting rights was delivered in some situations on an individual 
basis rather than in community meetings. Practitioners at Sites 1 and 2 used both 
community and one-to-one meetings to communicate information on voting rights. 
This potentially allowed a more in-depth discussion of individual intentions and 
provided greater opportunities for individuals to ask questions without risking the 
social judgement of the group. This could facilitate the individuals need to ‘save 
face’ and raise opinions they were more uncertain of without risking 
embarrassment in front of a group of peers. However, it also potentially 
individualised, and medicalised, the politicisation process reducing opportunities 
for cross cutting collaboration and conflict. 
The SALT at Site 1 stated that communication of rights could occur regularly 
and might be accompanied by a written reference document detailing political 
rights. Service-users could keep this document to remind them of the processes by 
which their political influence might be exerted thus formalising political 
processes. “yeh – it’s exactly the same as when he’s read his rights you know we 
could hand him a piece of paper with his rights every… month.. ” – (Site 1, 
Transcript 2, 2017, SALT) 




The practice of providing a written reference sheet of rights, with details on voting 
rights specifically included, was not a current practice. It was a practice that staff 
at both Sites 1 and 2 thought appropriate for implementation at the next electoral 
event. ‘I think it would be similar to what we do when people come and they are 
on section we read them their rights and we give them a copy” – (Site 2, Transcript 
6, 2018, MHN). Although this could standardise policy implementation and ensure 
that everyone is made aware of their voting rights as standard it still insufficient. 
The distribution of depersonalised written information replacing conversations 
between staff as service-users could also potentially depersonalise political support 
and create the impression on the part of staff members that this awareness raising 
is sufficient accommodation to fulfil their obligations in relation to ensuring equal 
opportunities resulting in less proactive support being provided.  
At Site 3 one-on-one discussion during ward rounds was utilised by some 
practitioners to collaboratively form ‘plans’ with service-users to help them 
organise political actions such as going to a polling station, to vote, or to ‘assess’ 
the level of support they needed to access equal opportunities to engage in politics. 
These assessments were often described as capacity assessments rather than a 
dialogue producing co-owned outcomes. “Well obviously you can do an 
assessment, if she clearly lacks capacity she’s still got the right to vote” – (Site 3, 
Transcript 1, 2018, WM).  
Often when capacity assessments are implied by the practice of testing political 
knowledge service-users appeared to engage in role distancing as a result of their 
capabilities being doubted. This is not an unreasonable reaction when a person 
with power over you questions your ability to form independent and rational 
political opinion.  
Whether a service-user was averse to being pushed to participate in the election 
depended on individual circumstances and personality. Being pushed was an 
effective strategy for at least one service-user who ended up voting and having a 




positive experience doing so. (it’s okay to push me… they all push me to do stuff 
so… I don’t mind the push.. its good – Site 2, Transcript 5, 2018, SU). Some 
practitioners, such as the social worker organising policy implementation at Site 
1 during the 2017 general election, sought to avoid any difficulties by 
communicating rights in formal written letters rather than in person. Again this 
depersonalises the provision of political support, gives the institution an 
opportunity to perform the role of progressive mental health service without much 
effort or resources, and can give the false impression to staff that sufficient 
accommodations have been made. 
Overall we can observe that the provision of organised sessions aiming to raise 
awareness and educate people with mental health difficulties and disabilities on 
political matters often fails to engage people, frequently patronises and infantilises 
adults who want to be recognised as having legitimate opinions and can also allow 
institutions to control and manage the way politics is defined and engaged in. 
Sometimes organised sessions function to narrow the scope of politics and its 
potential relevance to the lives of service-users detained in mental health 
institutions. Other strategies of formalised and managed political engagement 
came in the form of one to one interactions in which plans were made for 
registration and voting, the distribution of formal information letters and allowing 
service-users to request support to cast a vote, or in the course of ward rounds 
doing a survey of whether people want to vote and why. These strategies appeared 
to create restrictive stages upon which the performance of the role of political 
agent was restricted to managed behaviours. Individuals, in order to receive 
reasonable accommodations were required to accept and submit to benevolent 
support which was not always appropriate. For people concerned to increase and 
enhance their status and to be recognised as having legitimate opinions this 
created rational reasons for disengagement. 
 




7.4.2. Informal Play 
There were a number of informal interactions where political information was 
exchanged between staff and service-users and between service-users. At Site 1 I 
observed and participated in a number of informal conversations that performed 
forms of political expression and action and which modelled a practice of politics 
for service-users. In the spaces between wards, and outside the hospital building, 
both staff and service-users felt more able to engage in dialogue about political 
issues. Within the hospital service-users would regularly undergo assessments and 
attend meetings with their Responsible Clinician. Coming out of these spaces, 
heavy with meaning denoting roles and strict rules of interaction, changed political 
discourse significantly. The effect of the meetings was to reinforce rigid identities 
and modes of discourse which was heavily regulated.  
The space outside of the meetings was productive of a more free and liberated 
discourse. Political information was requested and shared more readily in these 
informal spaces observed at Site 1 and 2. Controversial opinions and topics were 
more easily expressed and raised when the pragmatics were more informal across 
the three sites. 
 “Service-user: ‘if I voted what changes will it have on where I live on the actual 
hospital?’ we tried to explain that Labour wanted to invest more into the benefits 
system and most parties wanted to spend money on the NHS but that voting 
Conservative entailed possible changes to the Mental Health Act” – (Site 1, 
Observation Notes General election, 2017) 
At Site 1 and 2 informal conversations were accorded a place in the practices of 
political inclusion. Staff in the open rehab ward saw the discussion of politics with 
service-users as replacing the processes of informal political socialisation usually 
provided by teachers, parents and/or siblings: 




“in some way you’re taking the place of those conversations that they had going 
through school or with parents or with siblings so it’s got to be that informal” – 
(Site 1, Transcript 2, 2017, SALT). 
Compared with the didactic and potentially infantilising pedagogy observed at 
Site 1, many of the organised sessions at Site 2 were more dialogical and accorded 
service-users legitimacy in directing discussion towards their own interests: 
“every morning we have…… discussion groups…… if someone wants to talk about 
political things we have things on the agenda…… but we also have…… clients who 
chair the meetings” – (Site 2, Transcript 1, 2018 SMHN) 
In this way authoritative roles were ‘given’ to service-users. Nevertheless, these 
environments remained monitored, managed and ultimately ‘owned’ by service-
providers. At Site 2, where the spaces in facility were constructed as co-owned, 
more varied political opportunities were made available. The communication of 
political information occurred in voluntary activity sessions at Site 2 which were 
described as service-user led and casual.  
“its more sort of casual it’s sort of current affairs but really it’s more let’s sit 
down and have a coffee and it’s a relaxed sort of chatting…… session” – (Site 2, 
Transcript 3, 2018, OT) 
At Site 1 persons and bodies independent of the medical institution were 
considered by one Ward manager as the only appropriate source of political 
information. Staff members were viewed as having a considerable amount of 
influence over those in their care which could be abused. At Site 2 a similar fear 
of undue influence meant that staff sought first to engage family members or third 
parties in the process of politicisation. 




 “we are going and looking for people who are providing information on [politics]…… 
we bring them in…… they can have a session with service-users” – (Site 2, 
Transcript 6, 2018, MHN). 
There was a wide range of different opinions and approaches observed about 
sharing personal political opinions across sites. At Site 2, in the context of 
communal lunches, opportunities to play at and become political persons appeared 
more widespread: ( “I can discuss [personal political opinions] and I want to give 
them the benefits if I’m if I am voting… it is good to share” – Site 2, Transcript 1, 
2018, MHN) 
The more informal and relaxed the discourse between the parties to a discussion 
the more engaging it appeared to be for both service-users and for staff. The stage 
was better set for more democratic discussion between staff and service-user teams 
in communal eating areas or spaces outside the medicalised spaces of the wards. 
As soon as there was a change of discourse back to the clinical, rehabilitation or 
social skills training, political discussion became more uncomfortable and 
constrained. This effect was explicitly acknowledged by some staff– “as soon as 
we get clinical about it.. people will turn off..” – (Site 1, Transcript 5, 2017, WM). 
Interactants appeared to sense that mixing the clinical with the political was 
deemed inappropriate. 
Service-users expressed interest in having political conversations with family, 
friends, other service-users, advocates and political representatives. These were 
viewed as potential sources of encouragement and recognition. This is in stark 
contrast to how the educational sessions conducted by the SALT at Site 1 
appeared to be viewed. Trusted family members appeared to be a stronger source 
of political motivation. 
I wanted to vote but I wasn’t interested in it (Disappointed softer tone) but my 
auntie has made me change my mind (Site 1, Transcript 1, 2017, SU) 




Family socialisation into politics is likely to be less pressurising and less 
patronising. In addition, the family members may be more empathetic and 
understanding of the individual’s worldview and even share aspects of their views. 
All this is likely to contribute to a sense of political collaboration. Of course in 
some cases family engagement may be counterproductive, inappropriate or not 
practically possible. At Site 2, the community based open facility, was the only 
facility where substantial effort had been made to liaise with families of residents 
to provide political support. 
if the family want to come we will discuss... if they want to give the service-user 
[support]... If not we arrange for staff to escort them” (Site 2, Transcript 1, 2018, 
SMHN) 
As we saw in Chapter 5, three service-users were accompanied to the polling 
stations by family members; one by a father, a second by a mother, and a third 
with her husband. One service-user was escorted to the polling station by staff, 
although efforts were made in this case to engage the family to accompany him 
before-hand. This was declined because: He said his family didn’t talk about 
politics. 
Enlisting family support was possible at Site 2 because service-users were treated 
in, or close to, their network of friends and family which is not typically the case. 
At Site 3 family support was not seen as a viable option. The relationships 
between family members can of course be fraught and could not always be relied 
on to provide the kind of support needed. For example, one ward manager said:  
 “we can take the abuse [inflicted by service-users] because we are trained… but 
relatives they tend to pull away” (Site 3, Transcript 1, 2018, WM) 
The organisation of family and peer support had mixed success in terms of 
politicisation as it depended on supporters being aware of and engaged in national 




politics enough to be confident political companions and guides and have enough 
free time to accompany them to the polling station. 
In the case of the man accompanied by his father, limited support was provided 
in terms of opportunities to discuss political opinions and choices. No help or 
support was offered in the polling station. 
Me: did [your father] help you to cast your vote when you were at the polling 
station?.......  
SU: I was trying to work it out separately” – (Site 2, Transcript 7, 2018, SU) 
In the event, the very limited support of his father was not sufficient to overcome 
his sense of lacking enough information to make a meaningful choice. The staff at 
Site 2 had not provided any information sessions instead relying on family support. 
In this case the service-user felt unable to make a confident political choice about 
who he wanted to represent him in parliament. He understood the way the 
democratic system worked (SU: well they may have represented my view if I er 
actually knew what view they represented – Site 2, Transcript 7, 2018, SU) but felt 
he did not have any information on the characters, views or platforms of any of 
the candidates. This resulted in a deep sense of frustration: 
“To be honest…. I voted Nobody…. because I didn’t know anybody…. I’ve got no 
information I’ve got no details… I’ve got nothing from the news I’ve got nothing 
through the politicians’ broadcasts… I had nothing to go upon to my vote” – (Site 
2, Transcript 7, 2018, SU) 
Many of the residents were keen to construct a positive political identity in 
informal conversations that would be translated and legitimised by the research 
process. For the purposes of this section I present the illustrative case of Polly 
(not her real name). Polly was discouraged from openly expressing a positive 
identity other than that prescribed by the institution which was limited to 




attributes associated with normality – one staff member commented that 
sometimes you couldn’t even tell Polly was ill. However, the novel context of the 
research process provided Polly with an opportunity to express an alternative 
positive identity. When describing her personal biography, she highlighted her 
credentials as a singer and an actress as well as her involvement in a youth council 
at her college. For Polly, creative and cultural activities such as art, music and 
theatre were important aspects of a positive identity that she wanted to convey. 
As I was asking her about her history of participating in politics, she clearly 
thought that these cultural activities were a relevant aspect of her political 
expression as an independent agent and citizen (Site 1, Transcript 1, 2017, SU).  
Providing such opportunities for positive identity creation and assertion are 
important aspects of political agency and ultimately political participation. Polly 
conveyed a positive identity to the researcher by discussing other residents in an 
objectivised medical discourse referring to ‘one of our patients’ being ‘very 
distressed’. This constructed a distinction between Polly and the other who was 
constructed as more vulnerable and more dependent than the participant. This 
appropriation of medical and psychiatric discourse seemed to be a way in which 
Polly could construct herself as a person with an important role in the institution. 
She also referred to herself and the management of the hospital as ‘we’ when 
discussing improvements in the policy. This collective reference was possible 
because she had been involved in the monthly governance meeting as a patient 
representative (although at the time of the interview her involvement had been 
suspended because she was ‘too ill’).  
‘No but we can make this happen in the future where we talk about elections a bit 
more in the morning meetings, we could make it happen’ (Site 1, Transcript 1, 
2017, SU) 




Polly rejected the implication that she needed staff to help her interpret political 
information and when asked about who she wanted to talk to, identified the local 
MP. 
I would like local MPs to visit the ward…… they could explain, to teach us…yes I 
would be happy to sit down with an MP” – (Site 1, Transcript 1, 2017, SU) 
The three service-users at Site 1 who voted were involved in external cultural and 
social activities and even work placements. The positive identities exhibited on 
the reception walls of the hospital included service-users playing a DJ set. Another 
picture showed the three who voted playing football. In discussion with the SALT 
and ward manager they stated that only these three male residents had been 
allowed privileged access to these sessions and it was in fact causing problems 
with other residents. In this way the selection of persons to be supported in 
political engagement was viewed as a privilege for well-behaved residents and 
created a social hierarchy which then became a source of conflict. 
When participants had had informal conversations with colleagues about my 
recommendations (i.e. that political communication between staff and residents 
become more relaxed and informal) the new social worker at Site 1 said some 
unqualified staff were eager and enthusiastic about a more relaxed attitude to 
political discourse. However, more established staff tended to be more reluctant 
(Site 1, Consultation, 2018, SW). 
Placing a focus on collaborative learning through doing, rather than teaching and 
assessment, could encourage a process or co-constructing and co-owning strategies 
of political engagement across staff and patient teams. This could have potential 
in breaking down barriers associated with professionalised and institutionalised 
roles. During lunch at Site 2 for example I observed: 
Two staff members… were in disagreement over Britain’s foreign policy…and a 
service-user agreed with the mental health nurse (Site 2, Observation Notes, 2018) 




In this situation a staff member and a service-user were united in their political 
opinion vis-à-vis another staff member creating opportunities for cross cutting 
collaboration in the conflict of ideas. Interactants were temporarily ignoring any 
artificial divides based on institutional roles in this particular performance and 
this created a stage on which service-users could feel more confident and 
empowered to advance their own political views. This exemplifies a more 
humanistic, person-centred and holistic practice of political inclusion. 
 
7.4.3. Pedagogical Approaches 
At all three sites efforts were made by staff to explain the nature of the political 
system as an introduction to the concrete actions of registration and voting. The 
approach was formalised at Site 1 in organised group sessions which were staged 
for the three individuals who were going to vote. At Site 2 one-to-one meetings 
were conducted and at Site 3 it was done briefly during ward rounds. 
Staff at Site 1 said that in addition to providing practical support to residents 
who wanted to vote they also attempted to encourage individuals who had not 
expressed an interest. 
“Trying to encourage everyone who can to vote and trying to make other staff 
aware of who can and who can’t vote” (Site 1, Transcript 3, 2017, MHN) 
Staff reported that this process of discussion and encouragement with those who 
were not planning on participating in the election was a positive experience (“she 
couldn’t [vote] because we hadn’t had a chance to register, I mean it was still 
positive to discuss everything with her and she’d like to get involved in the next 
election” - Ibid). 




At Site 2 efforts were made to encourage inpatients to vote by explaining the 
reasons why it would be beneficial: 
 “I make sure that [service-users are] informed and they exercise the rights…… 
everybody needs to exercise their rights” (Site 2, Transcript 3, 2018, SMHN) 
This approach was often implemented by staff who identified as politically 
engaged citizens themselves. Historical narratives were communicated which 
lionised class and identity groups who fought for the right to vote. They often 
constructed a lack of political engagement as a betrayal or a waste of the efforts 
of these previous generations: “women fought to get the vote and working people 
did…… so how can you not [vote]…” (Site 1, Transcript 9, 2018, SW). This strategy 
of using shame as a motivator for action appeared in some cases to be effective 
and can potentially be effective in helping people identify their conception of the 
good life (Snoek, 2014). 
Another strategy of persuasion was to argue that those who did not exercise their 
right to vote would be excluded from political influence in other spheres of political 
and civic life because once they renounce the vote, complaint and contributions 
in other areas become to some extent delegitimised. 
“[if I don’t vote] I can’t complain if things go wrong… half the countries in the 
world don’t have that right…… a hard fought right you know…” ” (Site 1, Transcript 
5, 2017) 
Persuasive and engaging arguments were used drawing on both personal interests 
(to have some say in procedures of governance) and group affiliations (loyalty to 
particular identity groups such as women or people with disabilities) to motivate 
service-users to exercise political rights. The justification for staff usage of such 
overtly political strategies was most often based on beliefs in the inherent value 
of political engagement. These strategies were also justified on the basis of 
advancing holistic, humanistic and person-centred recovery strategies. 




At Site 3 explanation and encouragement was applied in the course of ward rounds 
and was folded into the process of identification. This appeared to leave little time 
for the explanation of rights and the political system more generally. The ward 
manager indicated that encouragement was not appropriate for staff to engage in: 
I think, in places like hospitals staff… can only do certain things politically – (Site 
3, Transcript 1, 2018, WM). 
Across sites there were some differences in approach based on the diagnosis of a 
given individual. For example, those with learning disabilities appeared to be 
encouraged to engage in political issues directly relevant to a disabled political 
identity. For people with learning disabilities for example, mental health nurses 
and psychologists focused their educational strategies on particular disability 
issues such as health and social care and the welfare system. These individuals, 
all of whom were resident at site 1, were provided with educational sessions and 
discussion opportunities in which these issues were foregrounded. 
As a practitioner at Site 2 put it “We have to explain to them that [political 
discussion… should be… done in the appropriate manner” - (Site 2, Transcript 1, 
2018, SMHN). Modelling appropriate political engagement is primarily an 
educational process. When done well this practice appears to have characteristics 
of mutual learning (Freire, 1996). Across the three sites practitioners were teaching 
certain service-users the rules of political engagement and by extension how to be 
a good citizen. They did this through one to one meetings, community meetings 
and in the course of political activities such as going to vote. Where 
implementation was more substantial at Sites 2 and 3, service-users were being 
taught what ‘appropriate’ engagement in public and political life entailed. 
Inclusion in the formation and enforcement on the rules of appropriate political 
engagement was often restricted for people with mental disabilities. They were 
often constructed as rule takes rather than rule makers. 




An important experience of the ‘resident’ as well as the practitioner in a 
rehabilitation unit is being under surveillance for performative transgressions, or 
triumphs, worthy of being entered into the written record. This encourages self-
censorship and assessment fatigue as people are conditioned to avoid the pressure 
and social judgement associated with exercising political agency and challenging 
rituals and rules of performance. 
Me: …… have you ever been assessed to see whether you have the ability to 
understand? 
SU: I’m always assessed [Laughter] – (Site 1, Transcript 1, 2017, SU) 
At Site 1 (the closed rehab ward), staff conducted an exercise in which they 
identified prominent British politicians and told the service-users which party they 
belonged to. Service-users were then assessed in their ability to name which party 
a given politician was from. There was a clear right and wrong in such tasks and 
little room for dialogue on substantive political issues.  
 “SALT – can you remember any of the parties that you could have voted for? 
There were five…… (Silence)… any colours? For any of the parties? Purple….” - 
(Site 1, Observation Notes General Election, 2017) 
Great authority is attributed to staff members in a wide variety of areas including 
politics. This can create a political environment governed by technocratic 
definitions of right or wrong that are directly influenced by the medicalized ritual 
order of the institution. The technical skills required to achieve recognition for 
knowledge about matters relevant to political issues become based on mastery of 
psychiatric, psychological, social care, and nursing discourse and epistemology.  
“you’re used to working within a structure where, actually, things are right or 
wrong” - (Site 1, Transcript 2, 2017, SALT) 
 




In the political information session at site 1 there was a clear dichotomy between 
right and wrong. Service-users were assessed on this basis. This is clearly a practice 
that is not applied to people without mental health challenges and disabilities. It 
also did not appear all that supportive in allowing the participants to vote. 
On numerous occasions practitioners at all three sites refrained from 
distinguishing between right and wrong in relation to political views which caused 
frustration and confusion for some service-users who merely wanted a frank 
discussion with staff members who they trusted. Such arbitration was, in the view 
of some staff, not appropriately applied to political opinions. Service-users were 
had a responsibility to make up their own minds and were insulated from 
influential opinions of staff and other service-users. Here are two illustrative 
examples from both closed and open facilities: 
“it’s his opinion and again if he’s [capable].. I won’t be able to correct him” - (Site 
2, Transcript 1, 2018, SMHN) 
“SU asked if he had made the right voting decision. The MHN said – ‘You’re never 
wrong and you’re never right – it’s just an opinion’” - (Site 1, Observation Notes, 
2017) 
These examples show that staff were teaching service-users particular rules of 
political conduct, themselves based on a hierarchy between fact and opinion that 
reflects the technocratic governance of the mental health system. The assumption 
was also made that such basic starting points were appropriate for the three men. 
Although two participants had learning difficulties, this was not experienced as 
reasonable accommodation but as patronising differential treatment. In this case 
the MHN set up a dichotomy between the service-user’s voice as ‘just’ opinion 
and his pronouncements as neutral truths. This has wide implications for service-
users present and future political engagement should they internalise their 
political opinions and worldviews as inferior to that of trained professionals and 
experts. It teaches them to be passive and subservient political subjects. This is 




all the more restrictive when combined with the punishment of conflict through 
isolation. 
A different approach was observed at Site 2 in which substantive political issues 
were introduced as conversation topics during informal lunches. The dichotomy 
between staff neutrality and service-user opinion was in this context de-
emphasised by the introduction of staff opinions. Here I observed dynamics of 
conflict and cooperation being set up, cross cutting staff and patient teams, on 
the basis of substantive issues on both big-P Political issues and small-p politics 
of personal care. 
[Staff] responded to service-user points in thoughtful ways and kept on including 
people [staff and service-users] who weren’t in the conversation by asking them 
what they think – (Site 2, Observation notes, 2018) 
At Site 2 staff appeared to model for service-users, and include them in, an 
intellectual engagement with ethical dilemmas about right and wrong in the public 
sphere. During a communal lunch they were all permitted space to develop and 
apply their own ethical perspective on decisions. This was supported through 
informal discussions around rights and responsibilities: 
“for example… drinking… it’s a human right. I go out to drink. Don’t you… but 
how can we tell somebody you must not……… because it’s not safe for you and… 
then they will say.. it’s not safe for me either. Its not safe for you… so if we get 
into this discussion then this can take us everywhere and so where would you draw 
the line?” – (Site 2, Transcript 6, 2018, MHN) 
In this way service-users were trusted to engage in political dialogue without being 
unduly influenced by staff’s political opinions. This trust appears crucial in 
expanding opportunities for both staff and patients to become more involved in 
politicised discourse and action in the context of mental health institutions.  




This sort of interaction is important symbolically in breaking down the boundaries 
between staff and service-users and facilitates a more wholesome political and 
social milieu to develop. This humanistic approach was applied irrespective of 
diagnosis, mental health condition or legal status. 
“every individual, doesn’t matter [if he] is a detained patient or informal patient… 
or staff, you have to treat… equally” – (Site 2, Transcript 1, 2018, SMHN) 
This democratisation of political discourse across patient and staff boundaries and 
irrespective of legal or medical status was also discussed at Site 1, but was rarely 
observed spontaneously within the more risk conscious and security orientated 
milieu: 
“(earnest tone) yeh cos.. everybody has a right to.. vote and has an opinion… and… 
who am I to say (mock serious tone) actually your suffering from mental illness.. 
you might vote for the wrong people” (Site 1, Transcript 5, 2017, WM) 
Pedagogical practices relating to ethics and public engagement were not just about 
enhancing cognitive capabilities to decide between right and wrong in the political 
field or increasing political knowledge. It also involved having confidence to 
communicate opinions and feelings. A central ethical and political issue that was 
discussed between staff and service-users concerned paternalism versus agency in 
the context of treatment. This issue served as a launch pad to initiate political 
discourse: 
 “is it good that staff are helping you to vote or… are we being a bit interfering?” 
(Site 1, Transcript 4, 2017, SALT) 
However, such encouragement could also potentially function to reinforce the idea 
that staff, in managing people’s behaviour and restricting their choice and agency, 
were acting on the basis of a neutral and apolitical assessment of best interests. 




The practice of coercion and the practice of supporting agency were seen as 
overlapping and intermeshed: 
“I’m controlling them [but] I’m looking after them. That is what’s very tricky… I 
can be deemed as controlling them or I can be deemed someone who is really 
looking after their best interest” – (Site 2, Transcript 6, 2018, MHN) 
Mental health practitioners were given authority to distinguish between what is 
right and wrong for service-users whilst at the same time being charged with 
inculcating abilities for them to think ethically for themselves. This is a 
contradiction in terms. In a context in which coercion in justified on the basis of 
advancing best interest, and where staff worldviews are promoted to the status of 
neutral truth, there is a real risk that this could be experienced as indoctrinating 
(see chapter 1). In order for people to be provided opportunities participate in 
politics on an equal basis they must present as ‘free thinkers’ which paradoxically 
requires conformity with the norms of such performances. It is clear that this 
confusing set of contradictions can be daunting and demotivating for service-users 
and staff.  
Relations between teacher and student in adult education or anthrogogy (see 
chapter 4) are not usually premised on the need for socialisation into the 
performance of the student role. Teachers in adult education usually justify their 
role by their utility rather than demanding and policing student compliance. 
When such demands are made and enforced there is a real risk of infantilising 
adult service-users. The way that the educational interaction is set up in mental 
health institutions and the way in which it emerges in relations already latent 
with expectations and power can create real restrictions on the healthy progress 
of political socialisation. 
Service-users were tentatively involved in discussions around the ethics and 
politics of treatment, recovery and housing issues as an aspect of their political 
socialisation. If appropriate political behaviour is to be modelled and taught in 




these settings without undue influence, practitioners must continually co-
construct rules of appropriateness in dialogue with service-users. The dry 
application of banking pedagogies drawing on the practice of capacity assessment, 
and the reification of recovery as a key to political participation, was observed to 
work against the development of political agency. These educational approaches 
often had the effect of demotivating or even alienating service-users: ‘I would like 
to be part of it again but because of my mental illness I struggle with my thoughts’ 
(Site 1, Transcript 1, 2017, SU); ‘I’m not into politics… It can be a bit boring’ Site 
2, Transcript 5, 2018, SU). This alienation may have wider implications in that it 
may socialise people in ways that make it more likely that they will be apathetic 
and passive in the future.  
In contrast, where staff and service-users were permitted to ‘play politics’ in 
situations where roles were less restricted by the ritual order and hierarchy of the 
institution, opportunities were increased and enhanced. 
The role of teacher, in the process of educating people on how to engage in politics 
and influence decisions that affect them, when professionalised or subordinated to  
institutional priorities of efficiency, could become disengaging and undermine 
political opportunities by turning them into another assessment exercise. Political 
education, in order to be person-centred, must be premised on dialogical and 
mutual learning, rather than a didactic ‘banking’ approaches or behaviourist 
conditioning. Approaches based on humanistic and even cognitivist paradigms 
appeared much more effective than didactic banking models of education. 
 
7.5. Reasonable Accommodations 
As a result of receiving mental health treatment in residential facilities, the costs 
(in terms of both time and resources) of voting were typically increased. 




Consequently, many of the practices observed sought to reduce the cost of voting 
for inpatients. 
A number of logistical issues arise in supporting residents to participate in 
elections. In closed facilities and for those service-users on involuntary section, 
s.17 leave (MHA 1983) must be granted in order that they can leave the hospital 
to vote in person. In specialist facilities with lots of out of area patients the 
constituency in which a service-user is registered to vote may be far away. Thus, 
staff may be required to arrange transport. Service-users may be deemed to be a 
risk to themselves or others and therefore allocated escorts. Lastly, the capacity 
of service-users to understand the instructions given in polling stations to cast a 
ballot may be compromised by medications, mental impairments arising from their 
mental health condition, or the social environment experienced in the polling 
station due to the behaviour of staff, the public or electoral officials. Therefore, 
assistance by mental health nurses and therapists was also requested and received 
in polling booths in accordance with Article 29 (a)(iii) ‘Guaranteeing… at their 
request… assistance in voting by a person of their own choice’. 
 
7.5.1. Granting Leave 
For service-users to get temporary leave from the institution in which they are 
detained is an important decision for staff and users. The decision process and 
rationale in making s.17 leave determinations is a place where dilemmas of practice 
and perspective are brought into sharp relief.  
The granting of s.17 leave for the purposes of voting in person was required for 
inpatients detained under s.3 of the Mental Health Act 1983. The perceived 
benefits for inpatients participating in the electoral process was an important 
factor in the consideration of s.17 leave applications. When an inpatient took the 
line, and presented the face, of a politically engaged citizen such applications were 




viewed more favourably and the threshold of risk that is apparent to decision 
makers before they reject such an application is raised. (“normally we will discuss 
it…… at an MDT meeting level…… so that.. the leave is approved for them.” – Site 
2, Transcript 1, 2018, MHN). 
This is a view that was shared by service-users who thought that even if there 
were risks involved in allowing people leave to vote in person they should facilitate 
leave as much as possible: “they should always have the opportunity [to go and 
vote] even if there are risks” – (Site 1, Transcript 1, 2017, SU) 
This appeared to have been exploited by a service-user and accomplice staff 
member who wanted to get out of the hospital at Site 3 for reasons other than 
voting: 
“[The named nurse] was saying you know be calm, I’ve come to take you out… you 
need a good day…… she used the section seventeen leave to go to the…… Polling 
station… but it could have been just her way out… using the politician leave. … let’s 
just say the politician leave yeh…” – (Site 3, Transcript 2, 2018, SU) 
Decisions relating to the granting of s.17 often had certain conditions attached 
designed to reduce risk of harm to the resident and others: 
“MHN: he’s not been self-harming recently. And I don’t think there’s any reason 
[to decline s.17 leave]. I think we would put something in place like accompanied 
leave so… you… go with a person to a particular place and then you leave them for 
an hour… So it’s a compromise” – (Site 1, Transcript 3, 2017, MHN) 
Compliance with medication was also a condition of granting leave that was 
mentioned: 
“we’re always encouraging compliance with medication as well erm but hopefully 
if we can see this decline… we would act you know and get some sort of medical 




intervention. So that she was settled enough to go out.. So we would probably give 
some PRN… medication” (Site 1, Transcript 3, 2017, MHN) 
Requiring people to vote when under the influence of medication which settles you 
down could affect capacity to make judicious voting decisions. It could also 
significantly affect the decision as to whether to go to vote at all if such 
medications become conditions of participation. More research and guidance is 
urgently required to establish when or if, this is ever appropriate and to ensure 
that people are not forced to vote under the influence of mind altering 
medications. Such conditions are a rational basis for declining to vote at all and 
represent differential treatment on the basis of mental disability.. 
One ward manager stated that the participation in electoral events and the 
granting of s.17 leave to vote could in fact have negative consequences for patients’ 
mental health and suggested that the participation in politics ‘without purpose’ 
may be detrimental to recovery: 
“so we have to make sure that it’s not escalating the un-wellness while they’re 
actually doing it for a purpose and they believe that it’s going to help them in their 
recovery” (Site 3, Transcript 1, 2018, WM) 
In this way risk has replaced mental capacity as the test for whether political 
participation will be facilitated. As we will see, voting appeared to be beneficial 
for all those who participated and there was no evidence that it posed a risk of 
escalating mental illness. This therefore seems a problematic basis for denying a 
person the fundamental right to participation in political and public life even if it 
appears to be exploiting the rules to briefly escape hospital life.   
Some practitioners identified the conditionality of successful leave applications as 
a potential source of restriction of opportunities to vote: (“I wouldn’t particularly 
want someone coming with me when I was trying to vote” – (Site 1, Transcript 3, 
2018, MHN). 




Outright denial of leave to vote appears to require exceptional circumstances but 
the intensive surveillance that forms conditions of that leave could be a significant 
restriction in itself and demotivate many from participation. 
“we could do something like eyesight so the person could stand at the door and 
just see them at all times not actually even come in to the hall where the vote is 
as long as you can see them you got eyes on them” – (Site 1, Transcript 3, 2018, 
MHN) 
When asked about a hypothetical case in which a service-user felt that the 
provision of staff escort to the polling station was so inappropriate that he refused 
to vote (either in person or by post) under such circumstances staff invariably 
responded by saying they would still attempt to negotiate a compromise in which 
he was escorted and monitored in some way. 
In addition, factors such as perceived capacity to vote appeared to be considered 
relevant in the granting of s.17 leave. Staff retained power to determine whether 
to allow a person to vote on polling day on the basis of capacity. 
if she’s got capacity and she’s done your first initial assessment – (Site 2, 
Transcript 2, 2018, WM) 
In line with the UNCRPD principles political participation should not be a 
conditional right dependent on good behaviour, taking medication, accepting a 
particular ascribed identity, or any other factor that does not apply equally to 
other citizens without mental health difficulties. It appears these principles are 
not well understood or implemented in residential mental health institutions. 
The lack of guidance in relation to arbitrating s.17 applications for leave to vote 
(other than the apparent obligation to grant it if possible) has resulted in 
practitioners seeking to enable voting as far as they possibly can. A high threshold 
of risk is thus required to justify denial but many conditions are applied which 




could demotivate participation. In addition, the s.17 leave application appears to 
be a process in which capacity assessments for voting may creep in. 
Under the Guise of s.17 leave decisions, capacity assessments may still be used to 
deny people with mental disabilities their right to vote. This is a significant issue 
that may require legislative clarification. Further research is required to investigate 
the way in which Responsible Clinicians make s.17 determinations where leave is 
applied for to attend polling stations and other political events. No responsible 
clinicians were interviewed in the course of this research because they did not 
identify as being engaged in policy implementation and so were excluded on the 
basis of the participant eligibility criteria.  
 
7.5.2 Transport 
At Site 3, which provided specialist services to a high number of ‘out of area’ 
service-users, transport was provided to and from the hospital on the morning and 
in the afternoon of polling day during the local elections. This potentially allowed 
a greater number of service-users the opportunity to cast a vote in a nearby 
constituency to which they have a connection. (“those on the day who wanted to 
go we had a… minibus… so … we facilitated them” – Site 3, Transcript 1, 2018, 
WM) 
This approach differed from Site 1 in which it appears only service-users registered 
in the local constituency were facilitated to vote in person. This may have been 
due to practical difficulties in supporting service-users to vote in distant 
constituencies. The woman who wanted to vote, but ended up being excluded due 
to admin difficulties, could have been transported to cast a vote in a constituency 
60 miles away. This was deemed an unreasonable burden for a hospital with 
limited resources. 




At Site 2, which was based in or near to the service-users’ community, transport 
was provided by the families in their own vehicles, or service-users walked there 
with their family escorts. In the case of the man whom I observed at site 2, we 
took the bus. The payment for the bus journeys was arranged by the nurse escort 
and this was important because as I recorded in my notes: 
“The cost of voting seemed quite high in terms of the journey as it would take 3 
buses there and 2 buses back…… they said it was normal to get 2 buses to the 
polling station. This cost £12” (Site 2, Observation notes, 2018) 
Because service-users are treated in mental health hospitals that are often far from 
their place of residence this creates an additional cost in voting for inpatients 
directly caused by the imposition of mental health treatment. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect some provision to be made in terms of facilitating transport 
to and from polling stations.  
 
7.5.3. Escorts 
In two cases I accompanied service-users and their staff escorts to the polling 
station. This appeared the default approach in Site 1 and 3. At Site 2 three service-
users were escorted to polling stations by family – one by his mother, in one case 
a father and another by a spouse. The possibility of family support was explored 
prior to organising staff escorts. In all observed cases of service-users going to vote 
in person they were escorted, although one service-user reported that he went 
independently to vote in a local election shortly prior to data collection.  
At Site 1 the SALT and a mental health nurse escorted three service-users to the 
polling station and went into the polling booth with them to support them in 
casting a ballot: 




The SALT, MHN and I stayed by the door and the three men went and handed in 
their polling cards – there were two officials [who] handed them their ballot papers. 
The second official… directed them to the polling booths and gave them a quick 
explanation… B – very quickly to the polling booth but then hesitated and looked to 
the other two participants who were asking the electoral official for help 
The woman attempted to explain to [Service-users] B, C and D but then stopped… 
and looked over to the SALT. [She] asked ‘can you help him?’ SALT was surprised 
and went over – the electoral official said ‘it’s just that I don’t want to get involved 
if you don’t mind’ 
SALT said ‘we weren’t sure’ 
The electoral official said ‘no, if you’d like to come check them all I’m more than 
willing’ 
SALT asked if they were sure and the other electoral official agreed 
B asked why the electoral official couldn’t help and she said… ‘I would rather some 
else did if that’s okay because I don’t want you to be influenced by me’ (Site 1, 
Observation notes, 2017) 
In relation to providing support directly in polling stations The Handbook for 
Polling Station staff states that in all cases the Presiding officer should try to 
ensure that a person is given appropriate assistance in order to be able to cast 
their vote: For example, the elector may need the voting process explained to them 
by the Presiding Officer, or the elector may request the assistance of a companion.’ 
(Electoral Commission, 2017: 22) 
If the individual requests the assistance of a companion the handbook states that 
‘a disabled voter may be assisted… with the permission of the Presiding Officer, 
who must be satisfied that the voter’s disabilities would prevent them from voting 
unaided. The disabled voter’s companion can assist up to two [and] must be either 




a close relative (father, mother, brother, sister, spouse, civil partner, son or 
daughter) or a qualified elector. The voter should ask the permission of the 
Presiding Officer to be assisted by their companion.’ In my observation it was not 
the three men who requested assistance by the SALT and MHN but the electoral 
official, frustrated by their apparent lack of understanding. In addition it was not 
established whether either the SALT of MHN was a ‘qualified elector’. 
Another bureaucratic requirement that was ignored was that ‘the companion is 
required by law to complete a simple declaration, ‘Declaration to be made by the 
companion of a voter with disabilities’. In these cases ‘the Presiding Officer must 
ensure that they explain the process clearly to both the elector and their companion 
[and] record the voter’s name and elector number, as well as the companion’s name 
and address, on the form ‘List of voters with disabilities assisted by companions’. 
(Electoral Commission, 2017: 21) 
Service-user B had significant support needs being functionally illiterate and 
requested help directly in the polling booth. He reportedly received no support 
from electoral officers when he went on unescorted leave to vote in an earlier local 
election however. This indicates that support is inconsistent and dependent on 
the competence, patience, and knowledge of electoral officials: 
Me: did you ask any of the electoral officials there for help when you went and 
voted the first time? 
SU: nah I just went in and did it – (Site 1, Transcript 2, 2017, SU) 
Another issue is the way that rules vis-à-vis support provided by mental health 
staff were set up and then contradicted. At Site 1, prior to visiting the polling 
station, staff stated unequivocally that they would not provide support in the 
polling booths. The three service-users were told to ask electoral officials if they 
needed help. Once we arrived at the polling station it was clear that the electoral 
officials were uncomfortable with this because they might be perceived as 




influencing the vote. They said it was fine however for the SALT and mental 
health nurse to do so. This was a surprise for both the service-users and providers. 
The practical support provided in the polling booths involved reading out the 
ballot instructions, pointing out the candidate representing the party that the 
service-user wanted to vote for, and checking that the correct mark had been made 
before reassuring them it had been done correctly. 
“SALT and MHN went around the polling station booths and SALT explained in 
detail to CM what the sheet said. The [Mental Health Nurse] simply asked and 
pointed look what’s this? Read it and yeh you tick that box that’s all you do. When 
he saw what one had done the MHN burst out laughing and some of the others did 
as well. He then said ‘no no no that’s fine” – (Site 1, Observation notes, 2017) 
These simple steps facilitated the three service-users to express their political 
choice of candidate with a degree of confidence. They were all pleased with 
themselves for voting.  
“BB voted and with a huge grin and a bit of pomp and ceremony dunked his ballot 
paper into the box…… After they had voted all three were exited and were asking 
lots of questions and the excitable mood was infectious” – (Site 1, Observation 
notes, 2017) 
If persons with mental disabilities are to be reasonably accommodated to 
participate in elections, then some individuals will require support in the polling 
booth to identify the correct candidate and to complete the ballot correctly. So 
long as such support is requested by the person with disabilities, provided by an 
appropriate person, and documented by the electoral official in accordance with 
the above regulations then it is acceptable to enter a polling booth to read out 
instructions and indicate which candidates are which. 




However, one of the issues with this provision of support observed at Site 1 in the 
general election 2017 was that it compromised the secrecy of the ballot. For at 
least one service-user was particularly important. (“there was a big kerfuffle about 
B not wanting to tell C who he was voting for because the rule was that it was 
meant to be secret.” – Ibid). In the information sessions the secrecy of the ballot 
had been emphasised (“Your voting is secret no one can see you.” Ibid) 
Although the three men described the act of voting as a positive experience one 
stated that it was arduous: 
“well relatively the only thing that I really learned is that it’s really hard work and 
that you have to keep your vote a secret” - (Site 1, Transcript 6, 2017, SU) 
This practice raises issues in relation to the perception of undue influence and the 
safeguards in place to prevent the manipulation of vulnerable voters. In addition, 
the way expectations were set up and then contradicted could engender distrust 
in the voting system. There was no indication of undue influence in this case and 
the help provided appeared reasonable, but the practice of electoral officials and 
support staff may give rise to a situation in which problematic influence can be 
exerted. This is an area ripe for further investigation. 
Going to and from the polling station there was a markedly different type of 
interaction between service-users and staff in communicating political ideas as 
compared to discourse inside the mental institution. After the vote was cast staff 
felt a great deal more able to discuss their personal political views with service-
users. This was unsurprising as the vote had been cast and undue influence became 
less of an issue for staff, but even on the way there service-users and staff were 
much more open in asking questions and discussing how the vote will affect the 
local area, housing and mental health services. This implies that being in the 
institution has a profoundly restricting effect on the way in which political 
discourse can be conducted between staff and service-users. 




At Site 2 the observation involved of a man who had voted before. I observed him 
as he was accompanied by a MHN to the polling station. They talked convivially 
about how politicians were generally quite corrupt and seemed to make promises 
that were never delivered prior to the vote. They also discussed openly who he 
was going to vote for and why. He seemed more interested and knowledgeable 
about politics than the MHN and said he came from a tribal political family. The 
MHN said she didn’t vote. This demonstrates how service-users can adopt new 
roles vis-à-vis service-providers in discussing politics.  In this instance little 
practical support was required and the service-user perhaps even taught the MHN 
some things. He was relaxed and confident at the polling booth also. 
he approached the desk and they requested his house number and his name which 
he provided, the electoral official explained that he had two votes on one section, 
and one in the other. He went to the booth, marked his ballot and placed it in the 
box. 
This example shows how people in mental health rehab can be perfectly 
competent, without assistance, to casting a vote. Given that this individual had 
been diagnosed with psychosis it also shows how mental health professionals can 
be respectful and even learn from service-users’ worldviews without immediately 
jumping to the conclusion that they are exhibiting ‘disordered’ thoughts. Service-
users can clearly be more knowledgeable about, and involved in, politics than the 
mental health service-providers who are obliged to give them support in this area. 
 
7.6. Discussion 
From these various examples of practice, we can see that political socialisation as 
well as recovery orientated mental health treatment was applied by some 
practitioners with the aim of supporting the service-user’s autonomy in the 
political field with mixed success. Such practices sat uneasily with often coercive 




rehabilitative treatment based on behaviourist and/or didactic educational 
strategies. Treatment and recovery was often viewed as a pre-requisite of the 
ultimate aim of rehabilitation with each positioned on a linear trajectory. The aim 
of scaffolding autonomy and the forging of identities and relationships based on 
political citizenship, were sometimes constructed as secondary to the need for 
benevolent management of behaviour to enable maximum functionality. Coercive 
treatment through psychiatric treatment was therefore frequently assimilated into 
or confused with the aim of advancing agency in the long term.  
Individual staff members were sometimes able to find ways out of the hierarchal 
service-user/provide relationship in spaces outside the institution and in electoral 
cycles. This sometimes was natural and sometimes stimulated by the need to 
demonstrate fulfilment of duties to support political inclusion. More humanistic 
relationships allowed service-users opportunities to perform established political 
identities and be recognised as competent participants in the community and 
society at large. With those with less experience of the political process informal 
settings allowed them more freedom to exercise skills needed and play at political 
roles. 
The way that practices potentially alienated and demotivated many service-users 
raises serious issues and dilemmas, however. The problematic pedagogical 
approach to political participation in rehabilitation and recovery needs further 
elaboration. The first problem arises because practitioners applied two 
contradictory aims in teaching people to be political and supporting them in the 
polling booths: 
 to enhance the individual agency of service-users to engage politically and; 
 to fulfil their duties of care to protect and treat people considered pathologically 
compromised in their thoughts and behaviour. 
Political participation appeared best served by adopting an educational approach 
based on free-flowing discussion, person-centred interactions, and learning by 




doing which requires a recognition of the need to recognise and legitimate patients 
exercise of power over the conditions of their detention. This is about creating 
opportunities for residence to adopt a valid political faces vis-à-vis the institution 
and staff members. Motivating political participation and engagement in small-p 
politics was key to socialising people as political agents with their communities. 
A hard distinction between the personal, to be governed by technocratic expertise, 
and the public, to be governed by democratic processes, potentially served to 
undermine political inclusion in both the short and long term. 
Recovery based interventions, at least when the idea was first posited in 
psychiatric discourse (Hummelvoll, Karlsson & Borg, 2015; McCabe et al., 2018), 
are intended to facilitate the person in making their own choices and to live the 
life that they want to lead so long as this doesn’t pose a risk of harm. Thus, 
autonomy always has the caveat that it must be exercised in a way consistent 
with the autonomy of others. Rawls (1971) argues the ideal society is one in which 
the most extensive basic liberty is attained but such liberties must be compatible 
with a similar liberty for others. Put another way gaining autonomy in one social 
field requires ceding autonomy in another. To be included a person must first be 
identified as being includable according to psychiatric norms. 
The purpose of professionalised rehabilitation was to realign the values of the 
individual to societal values so that they can be ‘included’ in society as governable 
subjects and/or political citizens. Because society and the law places value on 
‘independent living’ and participation these can become evaluative indicators of 
success in the ritual order of mental health practice and work against the exercise 
of power in subverting norms by attempting to regulate the process of adapting 
and applying ethical norms. Services may therefore aim for patients to achieve 
independence in political thought and political inclusion whether these are the 
individual’s priority or not. Thus, influence on the service-users’ worldviews is 
inherent in the practice of politicisation. Implementation was often about 
persuading service-users that political inclusion is of inherent value rather than 




making accommodations. This has consequences for inclusion in, and self-
exclusion from, political and civic life as some choose to resist these externally 
imposed values. 
Political expression would potentially symbolise a move towards greater autonomy 
in choosing values and forming a version of the good life for oneself. Instead 
increased registration and voting rates, enforced by practitioners, was used to 
demonstrate the efficacy of the treatments applied and to enhance institutional 
status.  
These problems link in with broad philosophical debates on autonomy and 
benevolence. On one hand, extreme liberal environments might imply that an 
autonomous individual is one who chooses their own values based on their own 
interests and perspectives in complete independence from the social structures 
around them. Indeed, the MCA 2005 s.4(6) is based on a commitment to achieving 
patient-centred care that honours where possible the patient’s own, reflectively 
endorsed values, whether or not she has decision-making capacity (Coggan, 2016). 
As Butler shows us in her discussion of identity co-construction autonomy is never 
absolute in a social system that frames our actions however (Butler 1988). It is 
relational. The social structures around us provide pedagogies of citizenship and 
participation based on particular ethical frameworks. For example, if a service-
user chose to completely disregard the interests of others, a ‘social skills’ 
intervention might be applied to teach them the “correct” value as dictated by 
psychiatric practitioners to rehabilitate the individual to be able to function in 
‘normal’ social intercourse. This reifies ‘normal’ or established practices and thus 
delegitimates service-users’ power to adapt and subvert the fundamental norms 
but also potentially enables them to engage in mutually empowering relations 
with others in collaboration. 
The liberal justification for psychiatric practice appears incoherent when people 
under section are effectively being forced to do things that will purportedly 




enhance their agency. An informed choice of values, rather than deferring to higher 
authorities, requires awareness of competing sets of values and opportunities to 
interpret them flexibly. The value of choosing ethical principles for oneself, as and 
when choice situations arise, is part of a more fundamental set of ethical principles 
into which someone must already be inducted prior to the choice situation. They 
must be capable of identifying the good and of developing a sense of justice 
(Rawls, 1971: 19). These capacities, in policy implementation, were supported 
through educational support. Practitioners wanted to develop the capacities of 
service-users to think for themselves on questions of politics, right and wrong, 
good and bad, but this did not mean that any type of thinking was permissible.  
In the development of political roles in the social interaction on the ward, 
scaffolding by mental health staff can be analysed as constituting five phases. 
The first phase involves agreement on the idea of receiving support for exercising 
the right to vote and interactions in which a script is set that is consistent with 
the ritual order of the institution and the ascribed role of mentally ill person. 
The second phase involves staging by staff in which they locate appropriate 
political action and expression or designate an action area in education sessions, 
individual care planning meetings, community meetings, discussions over lunch 
or the polling booth. In constructing the action area they prepare resources such 
as information on parties and on political commitments in manifestos. In the 
third phase, which often overlaps with the second, actors are recruited to 
participate in the performance, if they are not already involved in the 
development of the actable idea, and the actors are trained for their roles. The 
fourth phase is the period of enactment when the political act is performed. In 
the final phase, after the performance, new meanings for selves, others, and the 
situation may be interpreted or assessed by the actors and audience. In the 
context of the research process, this often took place in interviews. 
This process can provide for greater opportunities for those in rehabilitation only 
if practitioners assume every person has capacity to participate in political and 




public life so long as the context and circumstance are designed in ways that 
reduce boundaries and increase opportunities for participation. All practicable 
steps should be taken to provide opportunities to develop political capabilities 
and identities and to interact with politically engaged others. We should not ‘give 
up’ on anyone.  
A person in the mental health system should not be treated as incapable just 
because their opinions, actions or omissions may seem delusional, unwise or 
against their own or other people’s interests. Even if someone appears to lack the 
skills or knowledge necessary to make political decisions, and even if someone is 
denied the right to vote, they still have the right to public and political life and 
to pursue their own interests and perspectives. 
Political participation should not be a conditional right dependent on good 
behaviour, taking medication, accepting a particular ascribed identity, or any 
other factor that does not apply equally to other citizens without mental health 
difficulties. 
Political education, in order to be person-centred must also be premised on 
dialogical and mutual learning, rather than a didactic ‘banking’ approach, 
behaviourist conditioning. Approaches based on humanistic and even cognitivist 
approaches appeared much more effective. 
 
7.7. Conclusions 
The whole process of mental health treatment incorporates aspects of civic 
education and therefore ‘treatment’, at least during elections is applied as a 
process of education or anthrogogy (adult education). Political participation is 
intended to be supported in ways that broadly motivate the pursuit of open-
mindedness, i.e. the pursuit of truth and understanding with due regard to 




available evidence and argument. However, politically inclusive practice only 
occurs periodically in and around elections rather than being embedded into 
everyday practices of treatment and rehabilitation. Thus, the normal medicalised 
practices and rituals inevitably reassert themselves even in these brief moments 
of politically inclusive practice during elections.  
 
The ability of service-users in residential rehabilitation facilities to play at political 
roles and become political citizens is shaped by rehabilitative practices. These 
practices form pedagogies of ethics and citizenship that impact on political 
opportunities for both service-users and staff. 
Using power to restrict contact with engaged peers and to restrict exposure to 
humanistic interaction and political discourse with staff members, can create 
political environments which are highly managed and stultifying. Staff members, 
because of these professional duties and responsibilities, were careful to avoid 
voicing personal views and political opinions with service-users and were cautious 
about permitting political engagement if there was a risk of conflict. However 
numerous informal spaces still emerged in observation of Site 1 and 2, in which 
professional oversight of political socialisation was much less pronounced and, in 
these circumstances, humanistic interaction and political discourse could emerge 
more organically. This formed a more dialogical style of educational support that 
could be applied by service-providers to service-users or, in the case where service-
providers were politically disengaged, the other way round.  
  










In this chapter I analyse the ethnographic interview and observation data using 
the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 3. This involves analysis of the 
roles, identities and physical arrangements which formed the social field in which 
performances of political agency occurred, all of which constituted the political 
environment. By examining roles, identities and environments as they were 
defended, subverted and/or transformed by policy implementation I analyse how 
narrative, expressive and agential powers were distributed according to the 
particular ritual orders of performative interaction and how these powers were 
directly affected by practices aiming to increase political opportunities. I also 
evaluate the appropriateness of implementation using the theoretical perspectives 
developed in previous chapters.  
 
 
8.2. Changing Roles 
Ian Hacking in his book Rewriting the Soul (1995), argues that mental health 
professionals, in their pastoral role exercise powers that establish new ways of 




being and can inscribe them with positive meaning (Foucault, 2000a; 2000b). 
Butler’s theory of co-constructive identities shows how novel positive identities 
can be forged through subversion of the norm (Butler, 1988). New categories of 
personhood can be empowering. However, they can also constitute a threat to a 
person’s current way of life. The data shows that in implementing policies of 
political inclusion, the subversion of the norm becomes normatively regulated 
through an ethics of appropriateness and thus norms attempt to regulate the 
process of their reconstruction. This can cause restrictions on becoming political 
agents. In this section I consider how the introduction of new ways of being (the 
political citizen with mental disabilities and the politically engaged mental health 
practitioner) affected social discourse and reconstructed the identities of 
participants in new and surprising ways. As the analysis in this thesis hopes to 
show regulating and adapting behaviour according to the norms developed in 
psychiatric rehabilitation can function to restrict political opportunities in the 
short term. This may arguably be justified by the uncertain promise that such 
practices might expand opportunities in the long term. Conversely subverting and 
resisting the role of mental health patient and acceptable incompetent can expand 
opportunities for political agency in the politics of the institution but also can 
restrict the opportunities to engage in the politics of the wider community as 
people are mis/mal-recognised as dangerous or problematic participants in such 
processes. This can mean people with mental health challenges are readily 
stigmatised or excluded from political and public life.  
 
8.2.1. Mis/Mal-Recognition 
Health practitioners ritually exercise power in relation to service-users. Power is 
vested in such roles because persons with psychiatric and psychological 
qualifications are constructed as experts in identifying and implementing the best 
interests and divining the perspectives of persons with mental disabilities. This 




relation is manifested in their day to day duties and, of specific relevance to this 
thesis, their responsibilities to teach service-users skills relevant to political 
participation and to provide opportunities for political participation. One 
participant put it in a way that captures both the social and political dimensions 
of this skill. 
social skills [mean] that you… disagree with somebody in an appropriate way and 
manage yourself as well as not upsetting everybody else. (Site 1, Transcript 2, 
2017, SALT) 
Professional identity may be characterised as a beneficent carer role in the 
Goffmanian ‘act’ between service-provider and user in the mental health setting. 
This forms an important ‘ritual performance’. The institution requires that 
beneficent carers reduce risk and induce behavioural and attitudinal changes in 
service-users for the purposes of inducing and evidencing recovery and 
rehabilitation. This process may be in conflict with, and therefore restrictive of, 
opportunities to develop identities and capabilities necessary to express political 
views, to take political action, and to be recognised as behaving as a political 
citizen. 
obviously people are acutely unwell… so those service-users you need to actually 
erm do a risk assessment and assess their mental health (Site 2, 2018, Transcript 
4, OT) 
If the patient takes their life the buck stops with the responsible clinician… the 
psychiatrist has the final say and … the bottom line is medication and containment 
(Site 1, Transcript 7, 2018, SW) 
Coercive treatment and institutionalisation of mental health patients was 
therefore constructed by staff members as a justifiable restriction on inpatients’ 
ability to cast a vote in elections so long as it is within the norms of the institution. 
These norms appear inflexible and unresponsive to service-user’s wants and needs 




for recognition. This logic appeared to be applied to service-users across the 
spectrum of diagnoses although the sample of service-users was so small and the 
information on diagnoses and symptoms so restricted that it is difficult to make 
a clear finding on this point.  
Despite the emphasis on medication and containment practitioners were keen to 
stress that it remained a human rights-based approach.  
my actions… are justifiable… within reason…. Within expectation, within policy.. 
you know (speaking quickly) within the human rights… (Site 1, Transcript 5, 2017, 
WM) 
This demonstrates how necessity can function to place people with mental 
disabilities into a state of exception that even excludes them from the 
application of laws specifically designed for people with mental disabilities such 
as UNCRPD Article 29. By creating an exception to the normal application of 
rights and formalising it as an aspect of law the force of non-law (necessity or 
law) can be described as ‘within’ the system of Law.  
Restrictions on political agency within the institution were seen by many 
professionals as a form of collateral damage justified by the more pressing aim of 
containment and treatment, also required by Law. An example the way in which 
the state of exception applied to restrict the implementation of policies of 
political inclusion was evident in the responses to vignettes used in semi-
structured interviews. A hypothetical situation was presented to staff in which a 
political dispute on the Israel/Palestine conflict occurs in a community meeting. 
Many practitioners argued that the correct response would be to end the 
conversation and split up the debaters to avoid the risk of causing distress to 
other patients and escalation of conflict. 




 [we would] take the two patients that [are arguing about the Israel/Palestine 
conflict] away from the community meeting to have that discussion… as conflict 
resolution (Site 1, Transcript 5, 2017, WM) 
Constructing political debate as a conflict resolution exercise places pressure on 
political interaction to be agreeable. This is a norm that is not necessarily applied 
to politics in other contexts. Staff decisions relating to service-users are often 
constructed in the discourse as choosing the lesser of two evils – i.e. between 
coercion or autonomy which carries an increased risk of harm. Staff recognised the 
potentially restrictive nature of their practices in relation to the political 
opportunities of service-users. They attempted to resolve the contradiction 
between agency and treatment by designating some behaviours as appropriate 
expressions of political agency and others as inappropriate (and outside the sphere 
of political action protected by the UNCRPD and other legal instruments). 
this isn’t the appropriate time to be discussing that sort of issue… it’s not fair on 
the other people… if you want to discuss this we should wait till you’ve calmed 
down a bit and… meet together with staff to support the discussion… (Site 2, 
Transcript 3, 2018, OT) 
Staff had the power to shut down political discussion and readily used it if they 
judged that participants were getting too emotive. 
if it starts to get aggressive its best to remove people from that situation rather 
than it (Laughs) escalating (Site 2, Transcript 3, 2018, OT) 
the first decision staff make is… whether [the heated political debate in a community 
meeting is] likely to escalate … a risk assessment of patient safety and patient 
distress” - (Site 1, Transcript 2, 2017, SALT) 
On some occasions this appeared to demotivate participation. This has wider 
implications too. If a person is socialised to see themselves as a disruptive and 




incompetent participant in political debate, and has experienced the shame and 
embarrassment of being removed from a public discussion then they will likely 
think twice about participating. It is an example of the conflict between the need 
for safety and order and the need to enhance participation. It is a difficult balance 
for practitioners to strike. But the threat of removal from the debate creates a 
situation which potentially mis/mal-recognises individuals with mental health 
challenges as risky and unstable participants in political processes. 
Staff did not relish their role as arbiters of political expression. In describing their 
experience of implementation, staff expressed confusion and annoyance at a 
situation in which important decisions regarding a person’s effective exclusion 
from political and civic life were delegated to front line psychiatric staff without 
appropriate guidance or protocols to help them resolve these conflicting duties.  
I mean staff are not unwilling… it’s a newish sort of phenomenon and we’re all a 
bit clueless as to what we do – (Site 1, Transcript 2, 2017, SALT) 
Because staff were responsible for decisions to restrict a person’s choices on the 
basis of risk, the admission that such choices had a political dimension became 
difficult to articulate. Policy implementation was experienced as an attribution of 
personal responsibility for policy outcomes that were difficult to explain under 
scrutiny. Staff were forced to choose between the lesser of two evils and therefore 
describing practice as a positive pursuit of person-centred recovery was often 
implausible. As a result, engaging with implementation was a potential threat to 
reputation or what Goffman describes as ‘face’ (i.e. a positive social identity 
projected in interpersonal interaction). It also had the potential to collapse the 
doctor patient ‘act’ by undermining the relevance of psy-epistemology in dividing 
a person’s ‘real’ interests and recovering their ‘real’ self from the jaws of mental 
illness. 
Some staff members, in order to reduce reputational threat, avoided responsibility 
to provide political support. Others assimilated the narrative of human rights-




based approaches to treatment thereby creating an apparently neutral 
technocratic role for themselves ‘outside’ politics. Support to exercise political 
rights became part of the service-users ‘social care pathway’ for upper 
management at Site 1 and an aspect of service-users ‘right to health’. This meant 
practice could be justified by rehabilitation and normalisation with a view to 
progressing the individual to step down services. Political inclusion was 
categorised as treatment and containment which allowed practitioners to justify 
restriction of political rights on the grounds of risk. It also meant that service-
user acceptance of a political role could be used as a measure of rehabilitative 
progress or decline. From this perspective political socialisation was seen as a 
conditioning process whereby experts teach their clients how to engage in the 
proper manner. This form of pedagogy excludes more subversive, bottom up and 
self-directed learning and engagement. Containment and restriction is reflexive as 
part of the ritualised norms of the institution. 
By supporting political rights (for example by granting s.17 leave or facilitating 
political debate) staff often anticipated an increased risk of harm based on mental 
disability. Risk assessment practices often breach the principle of equal treatment 
with other citizens and can stigmatise people with mental illness as lacking the 
social and intellectual skills to engage in political processes (Szmukler & Rose, 
2013). This has implications for how service-users will understand their role as 
citizens in the wider community as well as potentially undermining more 
egalitarian service-user-staff relationships.  
Staff who took on the challenge of implementation found that they opened 
themselves up to criticism from colleagues (“I think that… [disappointed and 
disapproving tone] personally I think that should have been handled a lot better 
than it was – Site 1, Transcript 5, 2017, WM). Whether practitioners opt for 
positive support or risk reduction they are open to criticism, negative social 
judgement and even the potential for legal challenge. This is related to the way in 
which the adoption of the professional role objectivises political contributions on 




the basis of expertise and creates a tendency towards technocratic rather than 
democratic governance. This socialises those in psychiatric rehabilitation into 
particular types of political role that are not necessarily consistent with ideas of 
democratic political citizenship. 
A common experience of service-users was to be under constant assessment by the 
staff team, and even other service-users, for performative transgressions. This 
created a dynamic in which the residents often became increasingly anxious and 
uncertain as to how his or her views and opinions might be judged and what the 
social and medical consequences might be. The fact that practitioners were also 
subject to surveillance by services users and colleagues made them cautious about 
performing the role of political educator. This motivated role distancing 
behaviours which in turn communicated that political participation is generally 
inappropriate. Over many years this is likely to socialise service-users in ways that 
restrict opportunities for the development of political identities and capabilities 
conducive to participation in the community. Instead there is the danger that the 
primary method of influencing the decisions that affect their lives becomes the 
performance of need through disruptive or disordered behaviours which trigger 
responses from practitioners. In subverting the norms of psychiatrically defined 
‘healthy’ behaviour attention and resources are dedicated to dealing with such 
behaviours. Alternatively, the adoption of behaviours regarded as ‘healthy’ from 
the practitioner point of view can create situations in which they are afforded 
greater and greater influence through step-down procedures.  
It was difficult for service-users to understand and assess the effects of these 
political strategies because communicating information about particular service-
users or staff was often done covertly, backstage. The potential for surveillance to 
be perceived by the service-user team as arbitrary, or even malicious, was greatly 
increased due to this secrecy. Uncertainty and anxiety about behavioural outcomes 
became all the more apparent in the context of conversations with new 
acquaintances (such as the researcher) for whom he or she had even less ability to 




predict the criteria for successful or appropriate role performance. These processes 
could be a source of shame and even alienation for service-users. 
Me: would you describe yourself as someone who’s politically engaged? 
 (quietly and perhaps a little ashamed or disappointed with this answer) not really 
no… I don’t take a lot of interest. (Site 3, Transcript 1, 2018, WM) 
This role distancing could be interpreted as an artefact of the interview methods. 
Closed, and high pressure questions such as this should not be asked at the start 
of the interview, however such role distancing was evident also in observations and 
in following interviews where this question was asked at the end rather than the 
beginning. Social anxiety about role performance, and thus role distancing, was 
compounded when roles with unstable and controversial rules and pragmatics, 
such as the ‘political role’, were adopted. Expressing a political identity was 
interpreted by both staff and residents as ‘inappropriate’ in many situations and 
for a variety of reasons notwithstanding mental health status. Therefore, they 
often approached the performance of political roles cautiously and defensively. 
Many simply avoided the role, at least within the walls of the institution when 
significant consequences could follow erroneous performance. 
Mental Health Nurse – (to [a service-user] after some throw away comment about 
how boring the political information session was) you’re on the ward now so you’ll 
get into big trouble – (Site 1, Observation notes, 2017) 
The way in which participants affected distance from the political role indicated 
that it posed a threat to ‘face’ in relation to either the staff member audience, the 
service-user audience, the internal audience  (i.e. the performance conflicted with 
internal worldviews and identity narratives) or the researcher. 
I’ve… asked… who to vote for. Sooo boring (Site 2, Transcript 5, 2018, SU) 




Different political performances and lines were taken with different audiences. For 
example, staff would avoid revealing to service-users who they were voting for 
whilst service-users were often much more open. This created some discomfort on 
both sides. Service-providers often sought to allay service-users’ concerns about 
self-perceived inadequacies affecting the performance of political identity by 
hiding their immediate social judgements (articulated verbally or through body 
language). By contrast staff were comfortable conveying their misgivings about 
service-user choices when I interviewed them. These created the sense that the 
political interactions with service-users were somewhat artificial rather than 
genuine conversations between two equal members of the polity. 
There was uncertainty about the criteria on which political performances were to 
be judged for residents and how staff practices seeking to support political 
participation should be evaluated and assessed. Although the rules were uncertain 
it was clear that conduct was to be policed by staff even in the context of political 
socialisation within family and peer groups (an explicit feature of the written 
policy at Site 1). This was supported by the institutionalisation of the individual. 
A typical feature of the organisational structures observed was the application of 
rigid rules of appropriate behaviour (relative to ‘outside’ social and political 
environments). For example, professionals would refrain from discussing with 
residents ways of managing behaviour in groups, preferring to discuss these 
backstage in closed management meetings or between staff members behind closed 
doors. This systematic exclusion of service-users from these important discussions 
is em-bedded in the ritual order of the institutions. 
In distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate political participation 
practitioners carefully took into account the context in which the expressions, 
actions or omissions occurred. An important consideration was the relationship 
between the people involved. For example, whether it was between family 
members and the individual, or the individual and other service-users, or be-tween 
the individual and staff members. Another was the potential risks and benefits of 




political participation for those involved. The risk of abusive and unduly 
influencing relationships was a particular concern in family and peer interactions 
where the service-user was seen as the potential influencer and abuser. In 
staff/service-user interactions, there was the additional risk of un-due influence 
being exerted upon the service-user. 
When a service-user engaged and performed the political role, either by 
contributing a political view or engaging in a political conflict, it was sometimes 
a negative experience where it resulted in their views being challenged, ridiculed 
or interpreted as a manifestation of mental illness rather than being recognised as 
a legitimate contribution. If expression resulted in conflict, it was likely to be 
viewed as problematic by staff and residents and a risk to mental health. This 
could be humiliating and induce defensive role distancing behaviours. These 
factors reduced opportunities to play at, and become, participants in public and 
political life. Service-users were not recognised as adopting valid or legitimate 
faces in political discussion and were readily regarded as using it for manipulative 
purposes. In this way 
, the requirement to ‘be’ a mental health patient in performance ‘produces 
necessary failure’ in the performance of political identity (Butler 1990: 145). 
Rituals of social intercourse, developed and policed in the context of mental health 
rehabilitation services, created conditions in which knowledge and capability for 
performing an explicitly political role became a daunting task for residents and 
staff alike. The prospect of social judgement and sanction for voicing the wrong 
view, or having that view naturalised as an inherent aspect of your character (for 
example voicing opinions on immigration and being labelled a racist), induced a 
great deal of anxiety for some service-user participants as illustrated in one 
memorable exchange: 
Me: so what do you think about politics?.. 




SU: well I think (voice shaking and goes very quiet) it’s okay? – (Site 1, Transcript 
6, 2017, SU) 
In accordance with the perspective adopted (see Ch.3-4) the performance of a 
political role requires a player to make assessments of the world around them, 
identify changes that accord with their interests and perspectives, and then seek 
to change the world accordingly. There is no single ‘correct’ way in which this 
process should be facilitated but  there are some prominent epistemologies of 
governance and/or practices of influence - what Lears (1985) calls cultural 
hegemonies (Lears 1985) and Bourdieu (1977) doxa - evident in our national 
political environment.  
By an epistemology of governance, I mean a theory of knowledge underpinning 
governing practices. One prominent example is the ‘democratic epistemology of 
governance’ i.e. that opinions and individual experiences measured in national 
elections are a good way to assimilate diverse interests into a national worldview 
and thus legitimate governing knowledges informing executive actions or 
omissions. Another example is that ‘scientific’ knowledge is the best foundation 
for good governance and therefore evidence-based knowledge is justifiably 
dominant in political discourse over and above so called ‘subjective’ interests. The 
first might broadly be called democratic the second technocratic.  
In the political environment of the mental health rehab unit, a technocratic 
epistemology of governance was typically adhered to by staff and service-users. 
Political issues, rather than being decided through processes of conflict and 
cooperation between people with different perspectives and interests, were often 
constructed as having correct or ‘scientific’ answers to be determined by experts. 
Mere opinion was accorded little value in decision making processes. To seamlessly 
switch to an approach where the opinions and perspectives of the service-users are 
relevant to the governance of the relations between staff and users therefore runs 
counter to the prevailing governing epistemology based on psychiatric knowledge. 




This knowledge reified the identity of service-users in ways that compromised their 
face validity when pursuing political lines and was a significant restriction, over 
time, of their political inclusion. In Butlerian terms it was a restriction on the 
possibility of variation on the repetition of the ritual order. 
This process of mis-recognition has wide implications. It can discourage people 
from analysing and articulating their own wants and interests in relation to 
broader political perspectives. The political and social education inherent in 
psychiatric rehabilitation can construct aspects of the political in a person’s 
behaviour as individualised problems. Through this process people come to 
identify their goals as achievable exclusively through self-actualisation rather than 
through systemic and political change. Rather than disputing the rules of the 
system in place, residents may directed to increase their capacity to succeed in 
the system as it is, or simply be encouraged to seek exclusion from the 
responsibilities imposed by our current economic model. 
 
8.2.2. Professional Roles 
The duties under the policy of political inclusion appeared to be viewed by many 
staff members as an optional extra which only high-flying staff members would 
engage in. Many adopted a form of verfremdungseffekt in the performance of the 
role attempting to preserve their previous character as authoritative staff member. 
It provided staff an opportunity to demonstrate their personal and professional 
commitment to patient rights and for some an opportunity to achieve enhanced 
status. Rather than institutionalising direct patient involvement the role of 
political supporter was associated with representing patient views and interests 
and thus became a source of political capital in institutional decision making. 
The ritual order represents a clear, and in some cases legitimate, restriction on 
opportunities for political expression and action just as it is in many situations 




outside the mental health service. Specific categories or modes of political 
participation may be considered socially inappropriate for anyone notwithstanding 
mental disability in some contexts. The ritual order of the mental health 
institution, discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, is well established and exerts a powerful 
influence on behaviour of both staff and residents in the mental health setting. 
Staff roles were thus moulded in implementation as arbiters of appropriate and 
inappropriate political action. 
The problem of judging service-user’s political participation on the basis of 
appropriateness is that there are a variety of consequences that mental health 
practitioners can apply which would not be options in the case of someone without 
mental disabilities. In addition, the threshold at which an act becomes 
inappropriate appears, for practical reasons already discussed, to be lower for 
people with mental disabilities compared to the general population and to vary 
according to the role of the individual within the institution as well as their 
diagnosis. For example, it appeared from the data that those who were diagnosed 
with delusional, paranoid or psychotic conditions were subject to more intensive 
scrutiny in terms of the appropriateness of their political contributions because 
these conditions were viewed as corrupting and distorting their worldviews which 
form the basis of political action. 
In the political environment of the mental health ward, even appropriate political 
actions (according to criteria on which people without disabilities would be 
judged) can be deemed a risk to staff and residents and therefore restricted. Where  
political action was used to challenge the political system of governance in the 
hospital itself the efficient running of services was routinely prioritised over the 
political inclusion of the individual. Political action that would be appropriate for 
someone without the label of mental disability, was designated inappropriate so 
as to maintain institutional order or to ensure that progress in medical terms was 
preserved. One horn of the difficult practical dilemma was routinely chosen. 




Consequently, political inclusion - a fundamental aim of person-centred recovery 
– was routinely de-prioritised. 
This is concerning and ways of avoiding this invidious choice need urgently to be 
sought. A person in mental rehabilitation should, according to the principles of 
person-centred recovery, have the right to play at, and adopt, different political 
identities and worldviews and pursue goals to change things in any area of their 
life without fear that their opinions and actions will be mis-recognised as 
symptoms of mental illness. 
In addition, as we have seen in previous chapters, the nature of politics, mental 
health treatment and the definition of disability itself are political issues. Political 
inclusion seeks to ensure opportunities for being involved in big-P Politics (in 
political institutions and elections) and small-p politics (in the politics of care and 
containment in the mental health institution) and designating aspects of political 
action as inappropriate in the spaces where a person undergoing mental health 
treatment spends a great deal of their time can create substantial restrictions on 
inclusion in public and political life.  
Adjusting our concepts of ‘Politics’ and ‘power’ and reconsidering who should get 
to define them in practice can help. Can we treat them as essentially contested 
concepts that should not be defined exclusively by professionals. Instead  can 
politics be non-exhaustively defined as engaging in processes of conflict and 
cooperation on matters relevant to the community as a whole?  
How would this work with the thorny problem of what should count as political 
and what should be counted as a disordered worldview? As already noted staff 
often experienced political action and expression from service-users as a threat to 
the ritual order of the institution and more directly a threat to their ability to 
resolve conflict in service-user/provider performances.  




One possible response is to see policies of political inclusion as indicating a 
requirement to set the threshold between appropriate and inappropriate at the 
same level as applied to persons without mental disabilities by asking the question, 
how would I deal with this person’s political demands if they were coming from a 
person not being treated for mental health problems. 
But the difficulty in doing this lies deep in the relationship between doctor and 
mental health patient. Health care professionals treating physical conditions must 
rely on persuasion, using the authority granted by educational qualifications, to 
gain permission to implement diagnostic and treatment decisions. This is a 
foundation on which to build mutual trust - a precondition for a relationship in 
which ‘patients’ are respected as equal citizens and agents in their own right.  
In contrast, the rehabilitation of a person with mental disabilities appears to 
require a person’s attitude and worldview to change and consent is unnecessary 
to impose treatments. In addition it is the case that a patient’s actions based on 
erroneous worldviews can  be extremely harmful to themselves and others. The 
ascription of disordered identity allows doctors to de-legitimate the patient’s 
current worldviews and apply treatment decisions without recourse to persuasion 
drawing legitimacy for this from professional duty and law. This decision is 
legitimated further by the evidence of medicalised assessment and recording 
practices. But, there is a significant lack of accountability in this process which 
symbolically places a person in a state of exception. 
Adapting mental health treatment practices to recognise, support and enhance 
political agency problematises the foundations of the mental health practitioner’s 
claim to knowledge about the individual’s condition. When the discourse moves 
into the neutral and egalitarian space of political discussion where everyone is 
entitled to an opinion and no one is wrong or right then the ‘patient’ doctor 
relationship is shifted to a citizen to citizen relationship. This enables the patient 
to be recognised as a person with something to contribute and to negotiate but 




who may need some teaching and guidance, rather than someone to monitor, 
manage and tell what to do. 
A recognition of the political agency of persons diagnosed with mental illnesses 
necessitates a shift away from the objectivised knowledge about an individual 
indicated by psychiatric and psychological epistemologies and technocratic 
observance of law and policy. To facilitate the co-construction of political 
participation as an aspect of the good life, spaces must be available where 
pragmatics of law, policy and professionalism are made more malleable to service-
users. The significance of the law is reduced in order that it may regain its 
significance in people’s everyday lives. 
The organisational hierarchy in hospitals is structured and justified by the claim 
to psychiatric knowledge and so the greater recognition of personal experience has 
potential to destabilise the political environment in ways that undermine the 
authority of the psy-disciplines. This was perceived by staff research participants 
as a risk and a threat to the good order of the institution and therefore also to 
patients’ functional rehabilitation. 
This suggests that practices of politicisation might be more effectively   conducted 
in physical spaces that are not pregnant with medical symbolism and outside of 
the roles and identities people are required to play within the ritual order of the 
institution. It also suggests that psy-epistemologies are inadequate to the task of 
supporting political participation and rather that pedagogy, or in the case of 
adults, anthrogogy, might provide a better basis for such practices. 
 
8.2.3. Shared Learning Experiences 
Many staff described their implementation of the policy as holistic and person-
centred.  




we are promoting this holistic approach in… voting to… exercising their rights 
financially… er… emotionally… erm.. socially so it’s the whole approach that we 
have to promote (Site 2, Transcript 6, 2018, MHN) 
This positive narrative foregrounded commitment to supporting patient rights but 
practitioners were aware that it sat uneasily alongside the practices of coercion 
and containment premised on rehabilitative interventions.  
Many of the practitioners had to engage in practices of coercion and containment 
and manage the mutually coercive relations that are a feature of the ward 
environment. To counter the perception that mental health professionals were 
engaging in restrictive practices that undermined human rights and freedoms they 
presented positive narratives to the researcher and the policy implementation 
provided experiences from which such narratives could be readily developed. 
that’s the way forward to try and encourage him to exercise that right and then 
also feel, again that he’s getting well and he’s able to make that contribution to 
society (Site 2, Transcript 4, 2018, WM) 
They described implementation as a fulfilling experience because it provided 
opportunities for them to listen to, and support patients to engage in meaningful 
political expression and action. This allowed practitioners to construct useful and 
valuable professional identities based on human rights-based principles and 
enhance their standing and face.  
The staff members who described the role of political supporter as analogous to a 
parent or teacher found that political interactions with residents became more 
personable and less reliant on the way doctor patient ascriptions structured social 
performance. This approach also gave them insight into the way in which 
institutions restricted politicisation: 




your first opinions [are formed by listening to] parents talking about it and then 
you might talk to your friends… You listen to the news. You actually formulate 
not only your opinions but your understanding of the whole system… I think for a 
lot of our patients because they’ve been in and out of institutions, they’ve not 
necessarily had that opportunity to grow in that way (Site 1, Transcript 2, 2017, 
SALT) 
One staff member, citing Paulo Freire, stated that all education is political and 
described the process of providing political discussion as a joint learning 
experience in which she and service-users would learn from each other’s views and 
experiences. Although such mutual learning was identified as a model on which 
to base implementation, in practice staff often felt restricted to a management 
role rather than seeing themselves as equal participants: 
why they want to vote is not my problem… but how I’m going to manage them that 
is how I would think because my job is basically… managing the situation not 
touching their choice (Site 2, Transcript 6, 2017, MHN) 
As described earlier an MP visited Site 1 prior to data collection in 2017 and 
reportedly had not talked to residents, interacting only with staff, managers and 
the owners. In contrast, a social worker organised a later visit by an MP explicitly 
for the purpose of interacting with and listening to residents following consultation 
based on my initial findings. The MP, on the second visit, reportedly learned a 
great deal about what it is like for service-users  in the hospital and to live with 
mental disabilities. This resulted in him inviting a group of residents to 
parliament. Thus, hearing and recognising voices of people with disabilities as 
contributions from legitimate members of the community is potentially 
transformative (Site 1, Consultation, 2018). I have already discussed the 
importance of narrative for practice in s.4.4. 
Influence is the currency of politics and is not something that should be avoided 
in interactions between health care professionals and service-users. But political 




discourse is best conducted between equal citizens political support is most 
effective when offered in the context of egalitarian relationships and in the context 
of the institutions under study requires ‘stepping out’ of the doctor patient roles. 
The capacities to engage with others on this basis need to therefore to be 
supported and environments optimised so that these roles and relationships are 
encouraged and accessible for both staff and service-users. 
 
8.3. The Political Identity 
A helpful aspect of a Goffmanian perspective is that it provides a set of concepts 
useful in analysing the performance of political roles in the drama of individual 
interactions. Mental health professionals supporting service-users to engage in 
political and civic life may, due to institutional pragmatics, briefly separate 
themselves from their professional identity and role in order to present a personal 
political identity. This carries the risk of collapsing the doctor patient act and 
undermining professional authority. Alternatively, the practitioner may engage in 
political inclusive practice but do so whilst distancing themselves from the 
political role to preserve a sense of their objective professional identity (performing 
a verfremdungseffekt - Brecht, 2005). Unfortunately, in observation performance 
often came across as disingenuous to the service-user audience meaning that they 
distanced themselves. Service-users may also distance themselves from the 
political identity to avoid criticism for the perspectives and opinions they express.  
Some residents sought to deny a disabled identity thereby resisting their status as 
mental health ‘patients’ or ‘service-users’.  
“I don’t class myself as disabled no... I’m still independent” – (Site 1, Transcript 
1, 2017, SU) 




In contrast, some residents fully accepted and embraced the identity of ‘disabled 
person’: 
SU: I do have a disability yeh I have learning disability” – (Site 1, Transcript 2, 
2017, SU) 
If we take the example of a person detained in a mental health hospital for the 
purposes of treatment and for the safety of themselves and others, and assume 
that they have a capacity to develop a sense of their goals and interests, then it 
is useful to ask what are the strategies available to them to pursue these goals 
and interests? 
If you want to gain political capital in this sort of environment two strategies seem 
pertinent: 
1) Compliance with mental health professional’s decisions in order to increase the 
chances that the professional’s discretion will be in your favour. In the short term 
this is potentially an undesirable option as it means deferring gratification and 
submitting to the will of others. In the long term it can be very positive however 
as residents progress to the point where they can legitimately exercise their 
freedom and agency. 
2) Challenge and undermine the system by means of protest and conflict. Conflictual 
behaviour is often immediately supressed and is implicitly discouraged by the 
threat of prolonged treatment. It is a risky strategy in both the short and the long 
term. However, in the short term it can be effective to meet certain demands and 
interests, for example coercing staff into providing some social and material 
resources by forcefully demonstrating psychiatric need. 
 
The way politics is defined on the ward reduces the salience of systems of 
accountability in the immediate context. The political environment on the ward 
may, because of the uneven power relations developed, form an experience that 
encourages apathy or futile demonstrations of anger (or even attempts to initiate 




revolutionary conflict). This constitutes a pedagogy of ethics, in the course of 
political socialisation forming a habitus, that may be transferred to the wider 
political field. It encourages people to repeat discourses and not to subvert them. 
This means that political identity is in some ways restricted in the medicalised 
environment. 
 
8.3.1. Political Identity in Medicalized Environments  
In all three facilities a small minority of service-users participated in the general 
election and the local election so even the exercise of rights to electoral 
participation appeared rather constipated. This was perhaps due to a lack of 
awareness, motivation and peer support. However, the social restrictions that 
influence these factors were little discussed and were rejected by many staff 
members as a causative factor. To take one example as illustrative - the Speech 
and Language Therapist at the closed rehab facility identified the restriction as 
arising directly from psycho-social impairment. This demonstrates the way in 
which responsibility for exclusion is placed upon the excluded. 
because of the mental health problem, you’ve got that level of you know…… there 
are some who are really really good and…… But I suppose also by the nature of 
things cos they’re you know… they’re not always the most attractive group of 
people… they’re a bit frightening (Site 1, Transcript 2, 2017, SALT) 
Here, mental illness and impairment are constructed as naturally causative of 
political disengagement and exclusion. This effectively displaces responsibility for 
supporting equal opportunities from staff to patients. Individual characteristics 
are identified as the main cause of exclusion. The right to participate is, according 
to many staff members, not undermined by the practice of treatment and 
detention under the mental health act, (and all the attendant disadvantages this 
causes) but rather by the way the individual behaves and presents in social 




situations. This was not discussed as a problem of stigma or mis-recognition in 
any of the interviews but rather was constructed as a character flaw. Persons with 
mental health problems who are competent in engaging in political debate are 
consequently regarded as exceptional and held up as examples of inclusive 
treatment practice. 
Although most staff members placed responsibility for exclusion on the character 
of service-users, a minority of staff participants did identify systemic restrictions 
on the exercise of political rights. As noted earlier one staff member at site 2 (the 
open facility) said that institutional constraints placed upon inpatients’ freedom 
of expression, movement and association was a main cause of lack of engagement 
with elections. 
Defence of patient rights allows staff to perform the role of progressive practitioner 
and to demonstrate the holistic and virtuous nature of their approach to mental 
health treatment. This remained an imposed rather than something originating 
from the discipline and practice of psychiatry.  
MHN: it is because of legal rights for certain things so that’s what we have to 
facilitate” – (Site 2, Transcript 1, 2018, MHN) 
In common with other participants this interviewee appears to be making a sharp 
distinction between ‘rights-based’ practice and medicalised treatment. However, 
in the facilitation of political rights, a beneficent treatment approach remained 
hegemonic and dominant in the discourse and in the reification and objectification 
of identity of service-users. Butlerian strategies of protests against this reification 
appeared to be ineffective due to the ability of staff to mis-recognise such action 
and expression as confirmations rather than subversions. This is inherent in the 
ritual order of interaction which governs staff and service-user performances. 




The ward manager in the open facility described practices in which the support 
for exercising political rights could interact with the professionalised recovery and 
rehabilitation processes.  
“well there is a combination of different things there it… social skills because you’re 
trying to get them back into the community. They’re going to get to have to mix 
with the public…… sooo that’s normalisation er therapeutic is about trying to ensure 
that they are going to exercise their rights make them feel good about themselves…… 
make them feel valued and make them feel like they have an opportunity to 
contribute to society and… make them feel like there is a purpose to live.” (Site 2, 
Transcript 2, 2018, WM) 
Despite the emphasis on connectedness and co-construction I found that even in 
the open facility (Site 2) the practice of politicisation was viewed as a 
professionalised exercise in which service-users were objects rather than active 
agents in their development. This meant that numerical measures of progress 
could be produced to evaluate policy implementation as well as restricting the 
scope of the practice to increasing voting and registration rates. This potentially 
avoided substantive application of the principles of connectedness and co-
construction in the practices of political inclusion.  
There was a clear narrative that mental illness inhibited mental capacity to make 
political choices. This was repeated and internalised by service-users which in turn 
influenced their perceptions of the pointlessness of participation. One service-user 
argued acute mental problems made going outside, let alone a trip to the polling 
station, difficult as a result of anxiety and apprehension. In my observations and 
interviews, even those professing their incapability were very good at expressing 
themselves and defending their interests using skills identified by Cees van der 
Eijk as aspects of political behaviour (2018). For example, the person citing 
anxiety and apprehension was patient representative in governance meetings and 
argued forcefully that the private mental health service-provider was exploitative 




(“I don’t think they should privatise hospitals… So staff don’t take advantage of 
patients’ money and its safer” - Site 1, Transcript 1, 2017, SU). She also recorded 
what could be interpreted as a protest song about the experience of the mental 
health hospital inspired by the film Frozen: 
“a kingdom of isolation, and it looks like I’m the queen, the wind is howling like 
this swirling storm inside, couldn’t keep it in, heaven knows I tried. Don’t let them 
in don’t let them be, be the good girl you always used to be, conceal don’t feel, don’t 
let them know!” (Ibid) 
Despite the problems of developing political identities in medicalised and 
institutionalised environments, the policy meant that a new type of personhood 
(Hacking 1995) was available to service-users. The policy documents constructed 
a role of ‘politically engaged patient’ that previously was not available or a valid 
or legitimate identity for residents. Therefore, a choice is made available to service-
users to adopt, or to play, the novel institutional role of politically engaged patient. 
Many service-users, and particularly those who were younger and who had been 
institutionalised early on in their lives, had never performed a political role before 
and were therefore unsure what the rules of performance were. 
The role of politically engaged patient was experienced by some service-users as 
an imposition. This depended heavily on the sensibilities of the individual people 
involved, their relationship, their previous experience of political discourse, the 
staff member’s approach to political support and the service-user’s status in 
relation to the recovery process. Service-user engagement in any sort of conflict 
can be mis/mal recognised as mental illness. This appeared to be particularly 
acute for those with personality disorders, psychosis and/or schizophrenia. Those 
with learning difficulties were treated more patiently and sympathetically. 
The ascription of a political role caused staff and service-users to engage in role 
distancing from the ascribed political identity in cases where: 




 they had no previous experience of political interaction. 
 the institution and staff were viewed by the service-user as not acting in 
their best interests; 
 the individual had a worldview in which the democratic institutions of 
state are illegitimate and; 
 the resident is viewed as acutely ill or dangerous.  
Where the resident was resisting staff ascriptions of identity and personhood they 
engaged in role distancing behaviours. Role distance, as we saw in Chapter 3, is a 
strategy whereby expectations of a competent performance of role are reduced 
through bodily and linguistic communications. This allowed residents who did not 
fully embrace the political role to avoid social judgement and their own internal 
critique for poor performance or mis/mal-recognition as illustrated by the 
following comment from service-users: ‘Cos of my schizophrenia I wouldn’t be able 
to have a good conversation’ (Site 2, Transcript 7, 2018, SU). Sometimes this 
created a sense of alienation from and hostility to politics in general, and towards 
the support offered by staff. 
The ascription of the political role was experienced positively as a recognition of 
political agency in cases:  
 where the service-user had embraced previous identity ascriptions (for 
example identifying as disabled or mentally ill); 
 where the service-user/provider relationship was based on greater levels of 
trust and respect; 
 where the service-user had previous experience of political role 
performance and; 
 where they were viewed as nearing recovery.  
The availability, and ascription of the political role may be experienced both 
positively and negatively by service-users depending on their individual 
circumstances but also depends heavily on the context in which the practice 




occurs. This means that professionals exercised their discretion carefully in 
identifying and selecting service-users who they thought would embrace and 
potentially benefit from the ascription of political identity.  
In cases where institutional ascriptions of the political role failed to engage 
residents in politics, more basic processes of politicisation were required to precede 
education and encouragement. Organising MP visits, ensuring access to politically 
engaged others such as family, friends and colleagues, or simply creating 
environments in which political discussion and information are regularly engaged 
in and normalised may provide a basis upon which political roles and identities 
can be constructed by the resident themselves, rather than being ascribed. This 
was the basis of the reform agenda implemented after data collection at Site 1. 
 
8.3.2. An Extension of Staff’s Sphere of Control 
Because of the technocratic governance strategy of mental health institutions and 
the inconsistency between technocratic and democratic governance structures 
already discussed, the imposition of the novel political role was experienced by 
some residents as an extension of the sphere of control of staff to the political 
sphere. Participation being made conditional on good behaviour, capacity 
assessment procedures, formal and didactic educational practices, social skills 
interventions and bureaucratic processes indicated that the political sphere was a 
space primarily owned and managed by staff members. 
Consequently, there was potential for implementation to feel oppressive, 
indoctrinating and to create conflicts of interest. Further, because of the way that 
media and information was restricted in the institution, staff were privileged with 
more information which placed them in a clear position of influence when 
providing political information and answering political questions. 




The policy was interpreted by staff as providing a mandate to manage patient 
political expression and action. It gave discretion to provide supported access or 
to decline to make reasonable accommodations. Implementers become arbiters of 
appropriate political expression justifying the management of a wide range of 
political expression and action. As one staff member put it: everything’s political 
to some extent but some things are obviously more (Site 2, Transcript 3, 2018, 
OT). In this way casting an abstract vote in a general election was seen as more 
political than railing against a situation in which no suitable housing was available 
in the local area. One was supported and the other restricted as inappropriate. 
Staff, sometimes erroneously, assumed people with mental health challenges 
needed help. When support is offered on the basis that you must adopt a passively 
incompetent role it can be experienced as a reduction in status.  
Me: would you want one of the staff members to kind of help you read through 
[party manifestos]…? 
SU: No… Other patients might like that though… I don’t class myself as disabled…  
There is then a need for practitioners to be aware of unexamined assumptions 
especially given the possible impact of their more powerful position. Engagement 
with the educational literature and alternative narratives would enable them to 
be more creative, informal and humanistic in implementation, and to be less 
defined by the medicalised environment. 
More generally, rather than presuming incapacity, practitioners should assume 
every person has capacity to participate in political and public life so long as the 
context and circumstance are designed in ways that reduce boundaries and 
increase opportunities for participation. Taking steps to provide opportunities for 
service-users and staff to develop political capabilities and identities and to 
interact with politically engaged others is likely to contribute to achieving recovery 
as well as fulfilling the obligation to support participation in political and public 




life. Practitioners should also be aware of the danger of ‘giving up’ on some service-
users because of their disabilities and of rationing support to those who are 
compliant with medication and performing the role of ‘good mental health 
patient’.  
An even more difficult habit to develop (difficult for us all in our everyday lives 
let alone practitioners in the institutional context) is to abnegate any right to 
restrict other people’s choices even though we consider them to be wrong. In the 
context of this study this implies that practitioners should not seek to restrict 
service-users’ political choices on the grounds of them being incapable just because 
their opinions, actions or omissions seem to them unwise or against their own or 
other people’s interests. Further, even if someone appears to lack the skills or 
knowledge necessary to make political decisions, and even if someone is denied the 
right to vote, they still have the right to public and political life and to pursue 
their own interests and perspectives. 
 
8.3.3. A Therapeutic Experience  
Despite implementation sometimes being experienced in negative ways there were 
many cases in which it was experienced much more positively by service-users. 
Many benefits were identified. 
The practice of escorting service-users as a group to the polling stations was 
experienced as an occasion for positive social bonding both between service-users 
and between service-users and staff. Because forums where political expression 
was encouraged allowed people to play at new roles and engage in conflictual and 
cooperative relations it was experienced as a process of social development where 
social skills could be practiced and enhanced. In addition, it was an opportunity 




to eschew socially-desirable role distancing, in order to fully embrace, in the 
Stanislavskian sense of becoming, the role of political citizen. 
Of course, there are also issues with this approach. The secrecy of the ballot was 
compromised when the staff members escorting the group went into polling booths 
to support service-users to cast their ballot. In addition, service-users' rights to 
refuse escorts was undermined by the fact that many would not have been granted 
section 17 leave without the presence of staff members. This can again provide 
rational reasons for disengagement and represents differential treatment. 
The symbolic recognition of political agency was therapeutic in the sense that it 
provided a social and political environment in which service-users could take pride 
in their experiences and perspectives. This reportedly resulted in increased levels 
of confidence and self-esteem following the election (Site 1, Consultation, 2018). 
In addition, the transition between playing at the role and becoming a political 
agent effected by the act of casting a ballot was a source of pride and social 
esteem.  
Me: was it a positive experience coming out and voting or? 
SU: yeh… you feel more wanted don’t you… cos everyone knows who you are… she 
underlined it… [my name] was on the piece of paper (Site 2, Transcript 5, 2018, 
SU) 
The process of political participation provided behavioural confirmation of 
‘progress’ which staff could record as contributing to the recovery process. The 
service-users were aware that their participation was recorded. This record 
effectively recognised and confirmed the political identity of service-users 
providing a springboard for further engagement. Staff saw it as a sign of progress 
in recovery also. This was therapeutic in itself as a symbolic expression of 
increased social standing within the community of service-users at the facility and 
a practical step towards more independent living. 




These subtle processes of recognition had the effect of changing how the political 
environment was experienced for certain service-users giving them a greater sense 
of self-efficacy. The ritual order was, at times, rendered more flexible to subversion 
and resistance by both staff and residents providing opportunities for self-
definition and free expression of perspectives. In other cases, adoption of the 
ascribed disabled identity (rather than resistance and subversion) provided a basis 
for building political identities and capabilities also. The Butlerian conception of 
the development of political agency, primarily through resisting and subverting 
hegemonic identity norms, might usefully be adapted to allow for ‘playing by the 
rules of the game’ as an alternative route to forms of political identity and 
capability.  
Although these positive aspects of adapting to the ascribed identity of the disabled 
person were evident other service-users did not wish to adopt that identity. One 
possible response by practitioners to resistance to being placed in this category is 
that it is deluded. But the evidence and arguments presented here and in later 
chapters suggests that a more appropriate and ultimately more successful response 
is to recognise that adults want to acquire a sense of status in social groups and 
that some people feel that the ascription of disability can negatively affect their 
status and sense of self. 
Political participation is also often constructed as conditional on good behaviour, 
taking medication, accepting a particular ascribed identity, which are associated 
with therapeutic success. These are conditions that do not apply equally to other 
citizens without mental health difficulties. 
Although some service-users engaged in the political role for reasons other than 
exercising influence in political decisions, playing at the role transitioned to 
‘becoming’ and ‘being’ when the vote was cast. After the vote one service-user for 
example portrayed himself as being more aware of the world around him and as 
a responsible political citizen - (high pitched) everybody has the responsibility to 




vote else you don’t know what’s happening in the world do you (in a wise tone) – 
(Site 1, Transcript 4, 2017, SU). In this way engaging in creative role play was a 
basis for becoming a political citizen through the symbolic act of casting a ballot. 
 
8.4. Discussion 
In mental health settings there is a danger that the concern of staff regarding 
political rights is experienced and interpreted by service-users as an extension of 
staff’s powers of assessment and behavioural management. Performance of the 
political role exposed service-users to heightened and inconsistent social 
judgement as compared to people without mental disabilities. For example, the 
question of whether a person wanted to vote or not was experienced by some 
service-users as a threat to face in the Goffmanian sense because they worried 
that either accepting or rejecting the opportunity risked negative comments in 
their notes. In this way the politics of care inevitably impacted on political 
participation more generally. 
From the staff perspective, the policy was often interpreted as an inconvenience, 
perceiving it as a performance required for the maintenance of good public 
relations - a window dressing exercise rather than a practice relevant to their 
professional identity - where implementation functioned as an additional 
demonstration of institutional commitment to patient rights rather than a 
fundamental aspect of everyday practice. The implementation process was at 
times stressful and fundamentally disruptive from the institutional perspective as 
it increase the risk of conflict and inefficiency.  
Inclusion in institutional political processes (small p politics) was seen as a greater 
risk to patients than supporting inclusion in elections. Staff found that the 
political supporter role provided them with a mandate to manage the service-
user’s engagement in beneficent ways that undermined agency in the short term. 




The role sometimes functioned to allow staff to direct service-users towards 
‘appropriate’ political processes and away from others.  
Although the health benefits of participation were rarely constructed as extensive 
enough to justify coercive practices many staff attempted to resolve the tension 
between benevolence and agency by attempting to assimilate the roles of political 
support worker and beneficent carer. Assimilation of the roles was possible by 
attributing a therapeutic or medical benefit to political inclusion and in this way 
implementation became a matter of social skills interventions that function to 
rehabilitate service-users and reintegrate them into the community.  
“[political inclusion] is a part of rehabilitating them back into the community …… 
and I think just making them feel like they have a voice is really important as well 
– Site 1, Transcript 3, 2017, MHN) 
The confluence of medical and political roles was often seen as inappropriate from 
the service-user perspective. One way of asserting their power to resist was to 
refuse to exercise their right to vote. Although the assimilation of the political 
supporter role and the beneficent carer role often facilitated the maintenance of 
power, it still required staff to recognise the political agency of residents in new 
and interesting ways. The policy symbolised a shift in practice towards recovery 
orientated and patient-centred practice, and away from strict application of 
coercive authority. 
Most staff experienced implementation as an opportunity to problematise some of 
their own assumptions about service-users’ capacity for political expression and 
action and to incorporate the principle of supporting political inclusion into their 
professional identity. Many staff discovered supporting politicisation in the mental 
health setting was an intellectual challenge (“I haven’t really thought about [how 
to distinguish between mental illness and political expression and action], I don’t 
know…. “– Site 2, Transcript 3, 2018, OT). The thrust of the argument in this 
thesis implies that the fruitful task of de-fining appropriate and inappropriate or 




dysfunctional political engagement is one that should not only be confronted by 
staff. The ‘community as a whole’ and in particular service-users should also have 
opportunities to contribute to these judgements. In inpatient rehabilitation 
settings this could helpfully  include people with lived experience of mental 
disability family, peers and NGOs, mental health nurses, social workers, advocates, 
psychologists and psychiatrists. 
Even where the scope of political inclusion was restricted to electoral politics and 
the political supporter role was assimilated with the beneficent carer role, it still 
appeared to have transformative potential to reconfigure the professional identities 
of staff and the passive roles of patients.  
Staff members who embraced the role of political supporter found policy 
implementation allowed them to become more self-reflective and construct a new 
professional role. They began to view their task as creating supportive political 
environments for patients and checked the instinct to closely monitor and manage 
expression and action more often. Rather than policing and assessing 
inappropriate behaviour, capacities to participate were to be nurtured and 
encouraged through explorative exercises and discussions. The discourse of 
political inclusion allowed some staff to enhance their influence in institutional 
political processes by representing service-user’s political interests (for example 
winning resources for day trips or persuading responsible clinicians to grant s.17 
leave). Therefore, the practice provided positive experiences for these staff 
members which could form the basis of an explicitly political professional identity. 
In these cases, the new role was experienced as analogous to an advocate, parent 
or teacher. Implementation became an educational process in which both 
practitioners and service-users learned together about each other’s subjective 
experiences, how they would like to change things for the better, and how to make 
such changes happen in the current political environment of the institution and 




wider society. Thus, the distinction between staff and patient’s as different kinds 
of political agent was in some cases significantly weakened. 
The context of mental rehabilitation in totalising institutions means that 
practices of politicisation can be have positive and negative in relation to 
opening opportunities for political engagement. Often, the possibility of 
engagement in the small-p politics of the institution remained out of bounds, 
being ringfenced as an arena of professional knowledge. This in turn has wider 
implications for engagement in big-P politics in the wider community as service-
users are socialised to defer to expert knowledge and opinion in preference to 
their own experiences and worldviews.  
Butler’s theory of co-constructive identities shows how novel positive identities 
can be forged through subversion of the norm (Butler, 1988). New categories of 
personhood can be empowering but can also pose a threat to a person’s current 
way of life and a sense of self. The data shows that in implementing policies of 
political inclusion, the subversion of the norm becomes normatively regulated 
through an ethics of appropriateness. These norms are informed by a psychiatric 
conceptualisation of the good life as one with minimal conflict with others and 
in which people behaviour according to existing social pragmatics rather than 
challenge and subvert them. This can create significant restrictions on becoming 
political agents.  
Understanding the real-life aspects of Goffman’s concepts can both clarify and 
demystify several important issues encountered in the empirical work presented 
in. In playing political roles, for example, role-distanced performance might be 
interpreted by practitioners as a poor performance and evidence of inadequate 
social functioning. The behaviour in question may well constitute a subversive or 
problematic performance given the expectations of role embracement but if role 
embracement is defined as healthy and role distancing as unhealthy then the scope 
for autonomy and choice in political identity play may be reduced.  




The analysis reveals that regulating and adapting behaviour according to the 
norms developed in psychiatric rehabilitation can function to restrict political 
opportunities in the short term. Such restriction is justified by the uncertain 
promise that such practices might expand agency in the long term. This 
assumption has been challenged by the finding that the socialisation into 
technocratic governance structures create alienation and disconnection from the 
political processes that govern people’s lives.  
Subverting and resisting the role of mental health patient and acceptable 
incompetent can expand opportunities for agency in the politics of the 
institution but also can restrict the opportunities to engage in the politics of the 
wider community as people are mis/mal-recognised as dangerous or problematic 
participants in such processes. This can mean people with mental health 
challenges are readily stigmatised or excluded from political and public life. 
 
8.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter I demonstrated, by reference to the interview and observation data 
at three sites, that the implementation of policies of political inclusion presented 
a number of issues and dilemmas to staff as well as service-users. It was at times 
stressful and discussion of politics appeared to be experienced by some as a threat 
to staff authority and expertise. This was because it can collapse the distinction 
between political opinions and actions on the one hand, and symptoms of mental 
disorder on the other. More fundamentally the practice of political inclusion in 
the ‘small’ politics of care and recovery presented a challenge to the 
epistemological foundations of mental health service provision (i.e. superior 
professional knowledge regarding the individual’s lifeworld) and the authority of 
staff vis-à-vis patients.  




As a result, some managers restricted implementation to administrative and 
logistical support or to neutral or ‘non-influential’ political interaction. This was 
a form of cognitive dissonance as the whole raison d'être of rehabilitation is to 
influence people to live better lives which necessarily involves political influence. 
In addition, supporting greater political agency in decisions that affects one’s life 
must include medical and institutional decision making most proximate to service-
users. Politics should not be constructed as remote, elitists and distant but made 
as relevant as possible. 
These factors mean that during implementation of politically inclusive practice 
there is a slippage back into the normal medicalised practices and rituals of mental 
health care. The roles of passive patient and managerial psychiatric professional 
are normalised and reinforced by the institutional environment and performance 
of this in interaction becomes a comforting ritual. It is in this way that the good 
intentions of practitioners are often frustrated and policy outcomes, if measured 
on the basis of registration and voting rates, remain disappointing. 
Some staff experienced the role of political supporter as a continuation of previous 
carer roles whilst others saw it as a challenge to, or contradiction of, ‘normal’ 
practice. Some service-users used the introduction of policies of political inclusion 
as an opportunity to reflect on the way that power and authority operated in the 
institutional setting and in the wider polity and thus provided resources and 
opportunities to disrupt institutional rituals and roles. This disruption in turn 
had potential to stimulate changes in the political environment of the mental 
health service for participating service-users and staff. This potential was often 
then shut down on account of risk and disruption to rehabilitation and recovery. 
These findings indicate that a humanistic, person-centred and holistic practice of 
mental health treatment, that also feature aspects of anthrogogical education 
and the ‘praxis of philosophy’ need to be deeply embedded into institution 
rituals. This would perhaps be more conducive to the types of political 




opportunities envisioned by both domestic and institutional policy and under 
the UNCRPD.  
The application of principles of political inclusion in mental health services that 
are more focused on a medicalised and technocratic application of psychiatric 
and psychological principles, and which construct service-users in the role of 
passive learners, can end up creating more restrictions on the development of 
political agency than they open up. This is a complicated and contextual 
analysis of the phenomenon of political socialisation but such nuance is 
necessary to more fully substantiate the right to equal opportunities to engage 
in political and public life for people with mental disabilities.  
In the next chapter I analyse in more detail the educational processes intended 
to enhance and increase service-user capabilities for political participation. 
  












In this chapter I will present data and apply dramaturgical and political analysis 
to analyse the phenomena observed. I use theory to inform this analysis but also 
use the empirical data to modify and adapt the theoretical approaches described 
in previous chapters. In some ways the data supports Goffmanian theories on the 
performance of political roles as well as Butlerian theory on the co-construction 
of political identities and ‘performative agency’. In other ways the data presented 
contradicts aspects of the literature and theory.  
The central argument made in previous chapters is that medicalised practices and 
rituals of mental health treatment and rehabilitation, which are applied in 
everyday interactions on the wards, are intended to be suspended during moments 
of implementation of policies of political inclusion (Ch.6). These moments are 
constructed as an aspect of person-centred, humanistic and recovery orientated 
practice and occur periodically in and around elections (Ch.7). However, the 
normal medicalised practices and rituals are difficult to escape for both 
practitioners and service-users and inevitably reassert themselves even in these 
brief moments of politically inclusive practice (Ch.8). It is in this way that the 
good intentions of practitioners are often frustrated and policy outcomes measured 




on the basis of registration and voting rates, remain disappointing. In this chapter 
I analyse these moments of slippage (reverting from recovery orientated practice 
back to medicalised rehabilitative treatment) and seek to use the data and theory 
to explain and analyse some possible reasons why this occurs, as well as possible 
ways out. In doing this I suggest some minor adjustments to Butlerian theory of 
political identity development arguing that although subversion of norms is 
important in political conflict, adherence and embracing of norms can function to 
expand political opportunities also. Both embracement and subversion of social 
roles can be productive in the process of political anthrogogy. 
 
9.2. The Politics of Recovery and Rehabilitation 
The concepts of recovery and rehabilitation discussed in previous chapters (s.6.3.2) 
is fundamental in justifying current mental health law and policy and underpins 
modern nursing theory and practice in the UK. Diverse, and often conflicting, 
definitions of recovery have led to multifarious theoretical and practical approach’s 
to implementation. The policy of political inclusion was interpreted by ward 
managers as both a therapeutic intervention in rehabilitative practice and an 
aspect of recovery, but this translated into very different practices in different 
institutions. 
There is a tension between rehabilitative treatment which is associated with 
normalisation, containment and risk reduction and person-centred recovery which 
should imply greater responsibility to take decisions and therefore greater risks. 
In the context of mental health rehabilitation at Site 2, the care pathway was 
managed closely in order to ensure that service-users didn’t present any risks of 
harm through their ‘recovery journey’.  
“[It is] very important to take them through their recovery journey in a very safe 
environment actually” (Site 2, Transcript 6, 2018, WM). 




In observation at all three sites, attempts at politization very often failed with 
numerous service-users resisting attempts made to motivate them to exercise their 
right to participation. This was perhaps in part because of the assumption that 
such participation would be closely managed to reduce risk. However, it was more 
often simply attributed to mental illness and lack of progress in treatment and 
rehabilitation (see s.8.2.1). 
Both formal and informal sessions seeking to facilitate political inclusion presented 
opportunities to inform people of their rights, to encourage them to register and 
cast a ballot. However, they also functioned as a way of assessing people’s 
capabilities to engage. They did not appear patient directed nor spontaneous and 
humanistic interactions. They were rather presented as professional interventions. 
“we put a plan in place… and actually find out.. what level of support [they] need” 
– (Site 2, Transcript 1, 2018, MHN) 
When service-users did not want to register to vote or participate in elections the 
Clinical Team Leader at Site 2 sought to push service-users to get involved as an 
aspect of holistic treatment (see s.8.2.3).  
“Some of them they just – ‘No!’ – so I have to tell them…… So I told them [the 
reasons why they should vote] and they said actually ‘Yes’” – (Site 2, Transcript 
1, 2018, SMHN) 
This intervention was justified by the fact that within a holistic treatment 
approach the social role of political citizen should be encouraged. Capacity 
assessments were applied to those who wanted to vote and although this was to 
determine what support was necessary it had the effect of embedding political 
inclusion in a medicalised understanding of treatment: 
“to ensure erm she is aware in terms of you need to assess capacity” – (Site 2, 
Transcript 4, 2018, WM); 




“staff shouldn’t be making the decisions as to whether she shouldn’t vote unless 
there’s a real capacity issue” – (Site 1, Transcript 2, 2017, SALT)  
No capacity assessment was applied to decisions not to vote other than at Site 3. 
This is in line with an individualistic view of political motivations. It is perhaps 
deemed rational not to waste time on voting when both staff and patients 
frequently argued that ‘it won’t make any difference anyway’ or ‘there is no one 
worth voting for’. By contrast, the ward manager at Site 3 did question service-
users who said they did not want to vote. This was an aspect of a checklist criteria 
developed.  
“if they said no you [ask] why? Do you want support?” (Site 3, Transcript 1, 2018, 
WM) 
For many practitioners across all three sites, political participation was 
constructed as an aspect of rehabilitation in which professional intervention is 
used to socialise service-users to engage in voting. Such encouragement would not 
necessarily be a welcome prospect for all service-users. Some practitioners stated 
that they needed to exercise careful judgement in deciding who to push and when: 
“some people… will not give you a lot of room to manoeuvre…… Some people will 
be very open” – (Site 2, Transcript 6, 2018, MHN) 
This judgement may be based on diagnostic criteria. The aims of these practices 
were often to encourage a holistically conceptualised form of rehabilitation. 
However such holistic rehabilitation was often seen as an outcome of a process of 
treatment rather than something to be embedded in everyday life of the 
institution. In this practice political inclusion is something that may come after 
successful treatment of mental illness (see appendix 5) rather than something that 
people with mental disabilities are continuously entitled to and that is therefore 
embedded in other spheres of life (see appendix 6).  




In addition to encouraging people to engage in politics through encouragement, 
practitioners also sought to develop individual political capabilities. A central aim 
of political inclusion as rehabilitation was the development of self-efficacy: 
“it’s the level of confidence…so we…always implore them [and] encourage them” 
(Site 2, Transcript 1, 2018, SMHN) 
Although the development of self-efficacy may be an important aspect of 
anthrogogical practice and potentially divorced from the medicalised system of 
treatment, it was often the case that service users were encouraged to embrace 
their identity as a mentally ill person and be confident in that identity.  
Further examples of slippage from politically empowering practice to containment 
and treatment was found in the way measurement and scaffolding of political 
capabilities was discussed in governance meetings at Site 1. Policy implementation 
was subsumed into the program of social skills training required of certain service-
user. This allowed rights-based approaches to politicisation to be interpreted as 
an aspect of, rather than contradictory to, broader objectives of assessment, 
containment and treatment. Designating politicisation as a social skills 
intervention made it more amenable to centralised management, measurement and 
control. Rather than politicisation being an opportunity for all service-users and 
staff alike to explore political views, roles and actions, individuals were supported 
in a top down way and often on an individual basis in accordance with 
institutional goals.  
The three individuals at Site 1 who accepted staff support were directed to attend 
information sessions on this interventionist, top down basis (see 7.4.1). In this way 
purportedly ‘rights-based approaches’ tended to slip back into assessment and 
categorisation practices typical of medicalised approaches. This could have been 
one reason for many service-users decision not to participate. It was participation 
on the terms of gatekeepers without much opportunity for individuals or groups 




to own the terms of their involvement. Staff were thus focused on identifying 
mistakes in political performances of service-users: 
so quite a lot of what I do is… assessing people’s… ability to manage… and 
providing… descriptions for the staff of where their areas of difficulty lay”– (Site 
1, Transcript 2, 2017, SALT) 
A process of identity reification ascribes a myth of irreconcilable difference and 
can create conditions in which political identity, expression and action may be 
discouraged and restricted (Barker & Buchanan-Barker, 2011). Peplau argues that 
this practice, means people’s political opinions and actions may be mal-recognised 
as aspects of illness rather than the expressed will of an agent and citizen (Peplau, 
1995: 2) (see s.8.2.1). 
The ritual order of the institution and its reinforcement in day-to-day interaction 
was identified as a central reason for this difficulty in adopting humanistic, 
informal and person-centred practices of political inclusion. Processes of 
institutionalisation both undermined the development of political capabilities and 
identities in the first instance and meant that service-user's political engagement 
was monitored and mis/mal-recognised when political action and expression was 
attempted.  
“those three have been in and out of institutions all their life. So they've had very 
little…. time…. outside living independently…” – (Site 1, Transcript 2, 2017, SALT) 
By socialising service-users to internalise an automatic deference to expertise and 
institutional authority, opportunities to learn how better to think critically, and 
to develop capabilities for political expression and action, were potentially 
reduced. In this way the potential for more open anthrogogies of citizenship and 
ethics was reduced. 




 “[the] institution makes a big impact… if we are creating routines, we are creating 
certain things, then we are controlling certain things” – (Site 2, Transcript 6, 2018, 
OT) 
A note in my research diary during my observations of the closed rehabilitation 
ward during the General Election described how the ritual order of the institution 
categorised and constructed the patients. 
“The language heard… reflected knowledge about the personality and present 
behaviours of the patients in psychiatric or psychological terms. This… turned 
patients into objects of knowledge about which expert opinions could be formed. 
But these ‘knowledges’ were only snapshots and were contingent on the context 
and relationship with the expert. They were also based on subjective notions about 
what is a good life and what is good behaviour over which residents had little say.” 
(Site 1, Observation Notes, 2017) 
Butlerian theory would indicate that subversion of and conflict with such 
institutional ritual orders, are the main ways in which political identities may be 
developed and co-constructed. However, cooperation with institutional actors and 
internalisation of the ritual order may also be conducive, for service-users, in this 
process. Encouraging service-users to engage in perpetual conflicts, challenging 
norms and ascribed identities, could undermine political inclusion in the long 
term. Political cooperation with service-providers may be necessary for some 
members of the community in the short term. For example, performance of their 
reified institutionalised identities may facilitate cooperative relations and help 
develop less combative political practices. This could facilitate participation in 
certain contexts. 
The developing practice of politicisation in mental health services constructs care 
as a social activity focused on growth and development which involves the 
recognition of both rights and responsibilities. Butlerian forms of subversion places 
the focus on the rights of individuals and thus encourages combative and 




conflictual political relations. Cooperative political identities on the other hand, 
whereby people play their ascribed roles (with potential role distancing) as a way 
of enhancing their opportunities for recognition, develops political capital on a 
collaborative basis. This enables them to move from a place of mis-recognition to 
a situation where they may be recognised as equal members of the polity.  
In this section I have described the politics of rehabilitation and recovery as an 
emerging theme in the implementation of the policies of political inclusion and 
have discussed the implications of these findings in relation to Butlarian theories 
of political identity formation and suggested some minor adjustments. In the next 
section I will analyse the way in which the politicisation of service-users was 
subject certain responsibilities, placed both on service-users and providers. This 
was often based on medicalised notions of treatment progress and compliance.  
 
9.3. Rights and Responsibilities for Inpatients 
People with mental disabilities have the right to participate in political and public 
life on equal terms with other citizens. However, the containment and coercion 
associated with recovery and rehabilitation in the mental health system clearly 
curtails these rights directly and indirectly in many ways. There are restrictions 
on access to information and of rights to protest and public assembly for example. 
These restrictions are based on perceptions of risk but are justified by a human-
rights discourse.  
Mental health providers, in applying practices that potentially restrict political 
expression and action, have a duty to make reasonable accommodations to ensure 
rights to political inclusion are supported in alternative ways. Such 
accommodations should support rights to health and wellbeing of service-users, as 
well as the rights to political and civic life. Some practitioners interpreted this as 
a mandate to push service-users to exercise their rights even if they expressed a 




contrary wish on the basis that it would help with rehabilitation. The right to 
participate was thus described as a duty. 
“from my point of view, everybody needs to exercise their rights” – (Site 3, 
Transcript 1, 2018, WM) 
Despite requirements to reduce impairments and restrictions on the ability of 
people with mental disabilities to the exercise of political rights, participation was 
described in the closed facility as contingent on individuals taking responsibility 
for themselves: ”you’ve got to take responsibility for yourself because that’s what 
we aim for” – (Site 1, Transcript 2, 2017, SALT) 
The facilitation of political rights was also frequently considered to be detrimental 
to rehabilitation (see for example the response to Vignette 2 in Appendix 4 in 
section 6.2.1). In this way service-providers saw themselves as having a duty to 
protect certain service-users from the dangers of participation. This logic was used 
to justify the restriction of political expression and action even in elections. It 
represents a generalised exclusion from public and political life applied almost 
exclusively to service users in the mental health system. People with significant 
and serious mental disabilities or who were deemed acutely ill were assumed to 
fall into this category as evidenced by the social worker at Site 1 excluding whole 
wards from inclusive initiatives. Restrictions were contemplated where service-
users’ behaviour in political engagement was deemed inappropriate so had a low 
threshold: 
“[the] safety of patients…… whether it’s likely to escalate…… other patients being 
upset and uncomfortable with it …… that would be the first the first thought I think 
that would come into staff’s mind” – (Site 1, Transcript 2, 2017, SALT) 
Here we see that staff often assume a role in which they impose and police norms 
of citizenship. They teach individuals to distinguish between appropriate and 
inappropriate political behaviour and to avoid the latter. An opinion or action 




being considered beyond the pale because it makes others uncomfortable is an 
incredibly low threshold for restriction and one that is not typical of other 
institutional environments. This creates a situation in which conflictual political 
relations are routinely restricted and supressed as a matter of professional duty. 
Both staff and service-users are seen as bearing a responsibility to maintain the 
therapeutic environment. Conflict is thus channelled into complaint procedures 
and legal challenge. Subversive protest action is discouraged and cooperation with 
dominant actors becomes a central strategy in gaining influence and political 
capital. In this way individuals are ‘normalised’ and assimilated into 
institutionalised worldviews and particular ethical rules are conveyed and 
internalised. 
In this context role distancing behaviours are characterised by political 
behaviours. For example, disrupting doctor/patient performances become a form 
of covert protest. Ingratiating oneself with powerful actors, based on performances 
of obedience, becomes a strategy whereby people can exert greater influence on 
the co-construction of their identity and in the institutional politics of the hospital. 
This seems to confirm Butlerian theory in that it reveals empirically mechanisms 
by which the subject’s development of political identity and ethical perspective is 
entangled with subversive repetition of prevailing social and political norms. 
However, Butlerian emphasis on the development of political identity through 
scepticism, critique, subversion and even rejection of prevailing norms (Butler, 
2010) becomes problematic in that these strategies invite greater coercion, 
isolation and exclusion for people with mental disabilities. Thus, subversion may 
ultimately hamper the development of political identities in these restrictive 
medicalised environments. 
By narrowing the scope of the policy to voting rights, and emphasising the duty 
to protect service-users from risky political engagement, many service-users were 
not supported or encouraged to engage in broader opportunities to play at 
political roles and become recognised as agents acting in political processes. In 




the closed facility those who were categorised as ineligible to vote, as ‘too 
disruptive’ or ‘unsettled’ were excluded altogether from political information 
sessions (Site 1, Observation Notes, 2017).  
If political identity is performatively constituted as Butlerian theory indicates 
then it does exist outside of the social performance. This also indicates that 
political agency is relational. Recognition and effect (i.e. whether we listen to, 
take account of, and act on people’s political action or expression) is a 
fundamental aspect of political capability and is not inherent in the individual. 
However, in the case of persons with mental disabilities the performative 
constitution is undermined by the reification and objectification of (in)capability 
prior to performance. It is also directly restricted due to assumed risk. There are 
some aspects of political capability that are inherent in the individual and which 
can be nurtured. Some contributions appear more recognisable and effective than 
others independent of the recognition of that performance as they have obviously 
political aspects. Voting falls into this category. However most of the aspects of a 
public and political identity appear to be relational. 
The psychiatrist, for example, learns what to say, and must speak in codified ways, 
which means that the codification and ritualization of that discourse precedes and 
makes possible the subject who speaks (Butler, 2010). The same applies to service-
users who can learn what to say to be recognised as ‘recovered’ and this can 
constitute recovery. The issue is that even if a service-user learns to competently 
perform political roles they may still be dismissed as lacking genuine worldviews 
(schizophrenia or psychosis), being manipulative (personality disorder) or simply 
as posing a risk of harm or compromising their rehabilitation. They ‘play’ politics 
but are not seen as genuinely inhabiting the role in the Stanislavskian sense of 
becoming (see Ch.4) or through adopting appropriate verfremdungseffekt. Of 
course none of us ‘genuinely’ inhabit these roles as we all play varous roles in 
different contexts and with different audiences depending on the face we seek to 
portray. In the playing, we can only ‘become’ through recognition but there is no 




authentic identity underneath. Political participation is in this way a 
perlocutionary act and not something that springs from the individual in isolation 
(Austin, 1962). 
A series of discursive and non-discursive practices and institutions re-constitute 
the idea of the political agency as an existing and autonomous reality. But errancy 
and failure can, and do, undermine these performances. As a result, we recognise 
that it is these repeated and sometimes errant processes that constitute political 
agents as ‘being’ autonomous. Unfortunately, if those processes become too errant 
under the watchful eye of mental health professionals, the very existence of 
political agency can be called into question. This potentially has far reaching 
consequences for political mobilisation of persons with mental disabilities by 
closing them in to restrictively narrow political domains based on the concept of 
appropriateness. 
To say that there is no singular domain of politics, is not to say that the policy of 
political inclusion, being viewed as encompassing much more than electoral 
politics, no longer has an object. It only re-describes that field and affirms that 
how we describe the field has something to do with how the field finally looks and 
what we take it to be.  
As Callon (1998: 17) has pointed out, theory contributes to the making of the 
sphere of its application. On this basis the formation of theories of democracy and 
politics in the implementation of Article 29 can be understood as a political 
process that circulates, connects, links and (re)constitutes political roles and the 
dimensions of appropriate participation. Political theory creates a set of 
methodological assumptions of what the political sphere is and generate a set of 
processes that fortify those very assumptions in implementing policies of political 
inclusion. Using this insight, practitioners and service-users may approach the 
questions of what politics is, what rights and responsibilities are involved in 
supporting equal political participation and when and where it is appropriate to 




‘play politics’, through an open-minded and dialogical process. These questions 
should not be unilaterally determined by the staff team. Rights and 
responsibilities in this field should be a matter of negotiation and determined 
through a political process. 
 
9.4. Anthrogogy and Indoctrination 
Following on from the discussion of political inclusion as an aspect of holistic 
recovery, and the rights and responsibilities of various actors in securing this 
outcome, I now want to talk about the related idea of person-centred practice as 
it applies to anthrogogies of politics. 
Person-centred practice draws on a constellation of ideas introduced in disability 
studies and through the assertion of disability rights in legal and political 
institutions. Advocates of holistic and person-centred approaches, although they 
are diverse, generally assume that a person’s ‘need for nursing’ cannot lie in some 
‘either/or’ world of community or hospital, general or specialist service, acute or 
continuing care, but rather flows across these artificial boundaries, as the person’s 
needs change.  
Person-centred practice is an important aspect of recovery in the sense that it 
promotes the persons capability and opportunity to exercise agency. This is 
reflected in the frustration that some service-user participants had at the refusal 
of service-providers to recommend rehousing them in the community. Although 
housing was the foremost political issue raised by service-users, (“SU asked 
researcher ‘if I voted what changes will it have on where I live…?” – Site 1, 
Observation Notes, 2017), their political interests were often described by 
practitioners in terms of increased funding for services (Site 2, Transcript 4, 2018, 
WM). This highlights the potential conflict of interests that arise where service 
providers adopt the role of political advocates. 




Within a person-centred practice care “needs to flow with the person” (Barker 
2001), adapting itself to the person’s changing needs. The practices of 
politicisation suffered from artificial distinctions between staff and patients’ 
political agency, between eligibility to vote and disenfranchisement and between 
fact and opinion. If we maintain a focus on the needs of the person – for critical, 
transitional or developmental care – the interdependence of different services, and 
the person’s dependence on peers and family members to meet different needs, 
becomes apparent.  
In the course of describing practices of political socialisation, staff in all the 
rehabilitation facilities found it necessary to rely on the concept of appropriateness 
to distinguish between the types of expression and action a staff member should 
encourage, and those which posed a ‘risk’ and may be described as symptoms. By 
doing this they could impose ideas about how people should behave in political 
interactions. Therefore, an aspect of the role of political supporter was to decide 
between appropriate and inappropriate political action. This notion was explored 
and scrutinised rigorously in interviews and many practitioners had difficulty in 
distinguishing between symptoms of mental ill-health and legitimate political 
expression. Although the sarcasm at the end of this extract shows the staff 
member didn’t think it was always possible. 
3: [to distinguish between political opinions and delusion is] very difficult… we 
don’t know whether or not they’re in contact with the secret service do we really 
(sarcastic tone)– (Site 1, Transcript 3, 2017, MHN)  
Staff generally relied on the notion that disciplinary knowledge relating to mental 
illness (i.e. the definition of ‘delusion’) allows you to categorise particular 
expressions and actions as ‘outside of the norm’ and thus evidence of pathology. 
This means that different types of mental illness and disability may be seen as a 
relevant factor for practitioners in identifying suitable service users for political 
support. 




there are extremes as I said – [there are] people with very extreme political views 
who are absolutely not mentally ill…… but then there are some very strange and 
extreme political views that come out… of… mental illness…… (Site 1, Transcript 2, 
2017, SALT) 
This indicates that only ‘normal’ or common political opinions will be tolerated. 
Whilst those at either end of the bell curve will be in danger of being classed as 
mental illness. This is particularly the case for people diagnosed with paranoia, 
psychosis and personality disorder which influence the process of forming and 
communicating worldviews. Across the three sites it appeared that practices of 
political inclusion seemed more difficult where the patient had been diagnosed as 
having delusional, psychotic or paranoid symptoms.  
Another experienced staff member at the open facility went further explaining 
that disciplinary expertise is not enough: to make a confident distinction. You 
must have a broad range of direct experiences in dealing with persons with mental 
illnesses and disorders and crucially you must have spent enough time with the 
relevant individual to have acquired knowledge about his or her particular 
opinions and worldviews.  Rather than relying on diagnosis or medical records, 
you must get to ‘know the real person’ in order to distinguish between legitimate 
opinion and symptoms of mental illness. Even with the significant time and 
commitment spent getting to know the person over a protracted period such 
judgments are still uncertain. Because this point has significant implications I 
have reproduced the passage at length: 
when I wasn’t experienced… I put most of the things as part of their illness…… and 
also not having to have lots of… direct contact with people… Once this is happening 
then you will know the person…… and you will know [their opinions]… there are 
times when… you spend time with people you get to know them… Then you can 
differentiate…… which one is actually their opinion and which one is part of their 




il lness but again having said that it’s not a black and white thing. I could be 
completely wrong! – (Site 2, Transcript 5, 2018, MHN) 
The ability to support political expression and action potentially depends on the 
supporter’s ability to distinguish between aspects of the individual’s political 
worldviews and identity that should be cultivated, and those which are disordered 
and legitimately stigmatised. If we accept the opinion of the experienced member 
of staff above then, only supporters in long standing, respectful and trusting 
relationships (where they ‘know the person’) can make such determinations. This 
is one reason why the open rehabilitation ward visited relied on family members 
and spouses to provide political support and socialisation. It may also be one of 
the reasons that the ward manager at the third facility avoided making such 
determinations explicit and concentrated on logistical and bureaucratic support. 
A range of holistic and person-centred approaches to politicisation and education 
were observed and discussed in the context of the open rehabilitation ward. 
Nurses, ward managers and therapists across the three sites described practices of 
politicisation as generating social pragmatics that emphasize the person’s extant 
resources and capacities for decision making. The various methods observed gave 
practitioners and service-users a better view of the other person in context as well 
as the care system. These topics were directly relevant to their experiences. The 
need for creative and informal spaces to allow opportunities for both staff and 
service-users to play at, and become, more political was clear. By acknowledging 
the need for a continuously flexible and reflexive response, the chaotic nature of 
human behaviour and experience may be recognised and dealt with using social 
and political practices, as opposed to technocratic but benevolent management 
(Barker & Ritter, 1996). It must be a dialogue rather than a medical intervention. 
Practitioners were engaged in anthrogogies of ethics and citizenship in positively 
supporting political participation as well as in their medicalised practices. Because 
this education occurs in a medicalised and technocratically governed institution, 




the possibility of person-centred anthrogogy is often more difficult. As we saw in 
Chapter 1 the process of providing positive support to people with mental 
disabilities to participate fully in public and political life poses the risk of creating 
indoctrinating systems of education. This was tacitly acknowledged by 
practitioners keen to avoid ‘undue influence’. Indeed, the process of mental health 
rehabilitation and treatment generally may by subject to the same criticism if we 
consider that mental health practice is about teaching people to lead ‘good’ lives 
through coercion and containment.   
Macmillan (1983) has argued that indoctrination in education is inevitable. 
Because practitioners apply anthrogogies of politics in ways that potentially 
indoctrinate people into hegemonic political doctrines such as ‘democracy’ and 
‘human rights’ this process appears benign and legitimate to many. However, the 
fact that providing positive support for political participation can be viewed as 
indoctrination has deep implications on whether it can be viewed as advancing 
agency. Practically it also creates a situation in which practitioners are extremely 
cautious to engage in politically inclusive education and when they do often affect 
role distance that reduces the benefits of such initiatives. The issue of 
indoctrinating tendencies was perhaps one reason that slippage back to more 
comfortable medicalised acts and rituals was so prevalent during implementation. 
This allows the political basis of psy-epistemology, that it is based on a very 
specific and debatable version of the good life, to be effectively hidden. 
Macmillan’s argument is derived from a reading of Wittgenstein’s theory of the 
world picture or worldview. Wittgenstein likens the worldview to a myth:  
The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. 
And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely 
practically, without learning any explicit rules. (Wittgenstein: 1972: 15e) 
The world-picture, as the basis for a rational debate, must be held with certainty. 
It provides the basis for effective action in the world and thus forms a foundation 




for political analysis and action. Garrison (1986) argues that it is possible to 
radically doubt a world that one continues to occupy, but to do so is to abandon 
rationality as well as effective action. He argues that to dispute the agreed 
worldview is to ‘court the appearance, at least, of madness’ (Ibid: 263). 
The teacher/student relationship in being socialised into a doctrine or worldview 
requires relations of authority (Taylor, 2017; Momanu, 2012). Burdeau (1989) 
emphasizes the universality of authority and identifies three distinct types of 
authority: 
1. Anonymous authority generated by social, institutional and cultural determinants 
of behaviour;  
2. Personal authority generated within social groups as a recognition of capabilities 
to influence others and; 
3. Functional authority generated by ritual orders and rules of law that invests power 
in specific roles in an institutional framework.  
Indoctrination by those in positions of authority is one of the most efficient 
methods of constructing governable citizens and is seen as particularly effective 
when applied to vulnerable populations such as people with mental disabilities 
and children (Cathala, 1986). This process is potentially very effective in 
increasing political participation in a superficial sense, but does not necessarily 
enhance the quality of participation. 
Taylor (2017) and Momanu (2012) argue that identification of indoctrination may 
be based on analysing educational practice in relation to four criteria: 
1. Indoctrination as intention: Withe (1972) and Snook (1972) argue that an 
authority must intend to indoctrinate and the indoctrination must also be 
functionally successful  




2. Indoctrination through contents: Teaching turns into indoctrination when it 
encourages the transfer of knowledge which has been distorted by and 
subordinated to a political ideology (Reboul 1977, 55). 
3. Indoctrination as method: Teaching may become an indoctrination act when it 
uses authoritarian methods, regardless of the knowledge transferred and the 
intentions of the teacher. (Momanu, 2012) 
4. Indoctrination as outcome: Teaching that results in the output of closed-
mindedness and an imbalance of authority (Taylor, 2017) 
I argue that the last two point are most relevant to the current discussion as the 
ward environment, including education sessions intended to support political 
inclusion, are based in authoritarian rituals of treatment and containment. In 
addition, the dominant positivistic epistemologies of psychiatry and psychology 
can be viewed as encouraging closed-minded ‘students’ who see their problems 
exclusively through that lens. Momanu (2012) argues that constructivist 
approaches to education are a way of supporting more open-mindedness in 
teaching and thus avoiding the problem of indoctrination. She further argues that 
cognitive conflict (as proposed by Inhelder & Piaget, 1958), allows emphasis to be 
placed on the non-linear and cumulative process of knowledge co-construction.  
In order to avoid any of these optics of indoctrination and to apply more person-
centred anthrogogies of politics, a critical approach must be adopted, and lessons 
learned from debates in education literature.  
Momanu (2012) argues, from a constructivist perspective, that productive conflict 
between teacher and student, in which authority becomes decentralised, enhances 
the quality of knowledge produced by permitting a wider range of evidence to be 
considered. Knowledge is co-constructed during the process of conflict which also 
creates opportunities for collaboration.  
Anthrogogies that empower seek to enhance students’ capabilities to engage in 
knowledge co-production rather than merely communicating readymade truths. 




Knowledge construction is not a simple and linear process. Some educationalists 
advocate a preliminary “deconstruction” (not in the technical Butlerian sense) of 
the biases and false ideas that act as obstacles to knowledge co-production such 
as a service-user’s lack of confidence in forming and defending worldviews 
(Bachelard, 2002). Others argue that base conceptions brought to the educational 
interaction play an active or even positive role in structuring the conflict upon 
which co-produced knowledge is built. Knowledge is conceived both as an 
extension, and as a subversion (Giordan and Vecchi 1987; Giordan 1993; Giordan 
1998; Larochelle & Desautels 1992 quoted in Momanu, 2012). This approach 
complements Butlers ideas on the repetition and subversion processes of identity 
construction. Under-theorised, but evident in my data, is the process of extension 
of existing norms and knowledges which can involve embracing and adopting 
exiting norms rather than subverting them. 
The conflict of ideas in knowledge production does not exclude cooperation. 
Perret-Clermont argues (2000, as quoted in Momanu 2012) that the change of 
roles between student and teacher to students in dialogue not only leads to the 
improvement of social relations, but it also makes learning more effective 
(Momanu, 2012). 
The practitioner’s role, in applying anthrogogies of politics, is therefore to mediate 
the interaction of the service-user with their environment, but not by reducing or 
managing the problems faced by the service-user in forming a coherent worldview. 
Managing and reducing the difficulties of forming a coherent worldview by telling 
service-users how the world is can increase the risk of closed-mindedness and 
indoctrination. 
By involving the service-user in activities that create cognitive conflicts, they can 
learn capabilities for active knowledge co-production and thus develop a range of 
political capabilities. If practice is to be person-centred, it cannot take the form 
of a top down distribution of knowledge not least because psychiatric practitioners 




are ill-equipped to teach the theory and practice of politics. Agential political 
capabilities are based in the relational capacity to build and continuously rebuild 
knowledge and worldviews in collaboration and conflict with others. It is not about 
rote learning ‘facts’.  
Co-constructing knowledge about the world is a political process where each 
person expresses his/her opinions and develops them in dialogue with the others. 
Both staff and service-users are thus students who come to the interaction with 
an appreciation of the importance of engaging with a variety of ideas and 
perspectives and the will to learn from each other how to articulate opinions. 
Distance must be engineered between the medical and authoritarian roles and 
rituals of mental health treatment, and the anthrogogies of ethics, citizenship and 
politics to prevent slippage back to medicalised and indoctrinating applications. 
In the next section I will evaluate the ways in which service-users and staff 
negotiate conflict within the pragmatics of the psychiatric ward. The way conflict 
is maligned as disruptive and anti-therapeutic is emblematic of the way in which 
the norms of rehabilitation overshadow the practices of politicisation and person-
centred recovery. 
 
9.5. Redefining Productive Conflict as Political Action 
Often slippage back into medicalised rehabilitation practices was triggered by, or 
justified by the threat of, conflict. Conflict was seen as problematic as it 
represented a risk of psychological and physical harm as well as evidence of 
psychiatric deterioration.  
Intellectual conflict (if defined politically rather than as a psychiatric matter to 
be resolved by treatment or a disciplinary matter resolved by containment) is an 
unavoidable aspect of political action and is therefore something that cannot be 




resolved and eliminated in the way premised by some psychiatric or psychological 
paradigms (Van der Eijk, 2017). If political behaviour, and thus conflict, is 
unavoidable, it makes little sense to try to create apolitical safe spaces for those 
who are deemed to lack the capacity to competently deal with political conflict 
and cooperation.  
The data indicates that if a wide range of conflicts are deemed inappropriate 
within the ‘therapeutic environment’ of mental health institutions political 
opportunities are dramatically reduced for residents. Enhancing the quality and 
prevalence of political participation for residents in institutions may demand time 
and resources and the co-constructing spaces in which residents can engage in 
diverse forms of productive, political conflict. The risk that such behaviours will 
be interpreted as symptomatic of mental illness, is a significant pragmatic of the 
political environment on the ward. It is also the case that some conflicts can do 
more harm than good. More research is needed to determine whether this is the 
case, if it is condition specific or influenced by other factors, and what strategies 
may be useful in ensuring both participation and harm reduction. 
Of course, conflict is not always productive or desirable. There are many instances 
in which conflict (and cooperation) are not political in character because it lacks 
a social or communal purpose. However one reason to highlight the potentially 
productive qualities of disruption and conflict is that the demarcation of 
behaviours, goals and interests as political (rather than dismissed as unreasonable, 
selfish or pathological) can interrupt and challenge the ritual orders in which the 
character of someone’s behaviour can be deprived of its social and communitarian 
purpose through a process of separation, individualisation and mis(/mal)-
recognition.  
When socio-spatial cues organise interactions on the ward in ways that encourage 
a medicalisation of conflict, support for political inclusion becomes more difficult. 
This is because it suggests a lack of conflict is the foundation of therapeutic 




relationships and environments, so opportunities for residents to engage conflicts 
conducive to political change are consequently discouraged (Gerace et al, 2018). 
Support for political inclusion that is underpinned by a paradigm that denies the 
possibility of productive conflict only give the appearance of supporting capacities 
for meaningful participation (Bovenkamp & Trappenburg 2010). A more engaging 
form of support thus only becomes possible outside the institutional rituals of 
conflict resolution. 
The arbitration of appropriate political behaviour conveys an anthrogogy of 
politics which discourages productive conflict. It is based on the categorisation 
and reification of service-user’s worldviews as ‘disordered’. Conflict then becomes 
defined as a manifestation of this disorder. This can imply that good mental health 
is a state free of conflict and political struggle. 
The data gathered indicates that where powers of definition are democratised and 
continually reconstructed in relationships of both conflict and cooperation, there 
may be greater opportunities for political inclusion for people with mental 
disabilities. However, such practices also present challenges in terms of undue 
influence and indoctrination in contexts of strict hierarchy. The solution is perhaps 
not to exclude political conflict as inappropriate but to disrupt the hierarchy. 
Both staff and service-users should thus be involved in making the distinction 
between appropriate and inappropriate political conflict. A fully rounded 
assessment might involve the following considerations: 
 The context in which the expressions, actions or omissions occur  
 The social relationships between the people involved 
 The potential risks and benefits of participation for those involved  
The aim of policy implementation through anthrogogies of politics is to encourage 
people with mental disabilities to think for themselves with a view to becoming 
reasonable and democratic members of the community. The automatic assumption 




that people with mental disabilities are incapable at the outset seems to 
undermine this goal and to reinforce practices of risk aversion and coercive 
treatment.  
The data indicates that people are generally capable of political action whatever 
their mental health status. Often people in mental rehabilitation are thoughtful 
and powerful individuals who should have opportunities to engage in productive 
political conflict without fear of reprisal. The aims of the anthrogogical approach 
should therefore not be targeted exclusively towards people with mental 
disabilities but also to the individual, family, friends and the mental health 
professionals themselves. This elides with the concept of relational rather than 
individual autonomy discussed in previous chapters. 
Anthrogogies of politics involve ethical thinking and therefore require skills that 
can be attained through engagement with philosophy. Supporters of more 
universal philosophy education believed that philosophy need not be confined to 
the domain of the academy, but rather that whatever their circumstances, age or 
level of impairment, people are capable of critical, creative and caring thinking 
(Lipman 1976).  
 
9.6. Conclusions 
In this chapter I have analysed moments where practices intending to be 
supportive of political opportunities reverted to medicalised practices of 
containment and treatment. In doing so I have identified that both subversion and 
embracement are useful in forming and sustaining political identities. This is based 
on a minor adjustment to Butlerian theory. I have also shown that the principle 
of person-centred recovery, when applied to political education in psychiatric 
rehabilitation, is often not deeply embedded into the ritual order of the mental 
health institution and can thus be productive of closed-minded thinking.  




The application of political education in psychiatric settings by those in positions 
of authority poses a risk of undue influence and even indoctrination. On the basis 
of the data gathered I have proposed that introducing a concept of productive 
political conflict into the ‘therapeutic environment’ of the ward might expand the 
possibilities of policy implementation to produce enhanced and increased 
opportunities for more informal and flexible educational relationships. A range of 
anthrogogical strategies have been posited as possible ways out of the medicalised 
ritual order of the institution. 
  












In this thesis I have sought to answer the following questions:  
How are policies aiming to enhance and increase opportunities for political 
participation of people with mental disabilities being implemented in residential 
psychiatric rehabilitation; what barriers or difficulties are encountered in achieving 
that aim;  and how might a policy to enhance political participation be more 
successfully implemented? 
In exploring this broad area of inquiry, I found it useful to identify three subsidiary 
questions which go beyond description towards more comprehensive 
understanding and evaluation: 
1. On what basis are such policies being implemented? 
2. What are the principles that underpin the distinction between 
appropriate and inappropriate political action and expression for people 
undergoing psychiatric treatment? 




3. What are the wider implications of practices of political inclusion being 
implemented in this way? 
Chapters 6 to 9 provided rich and detailed analysis of how policies were 
implemented across the three sites. Within these chapters I teased out tentative 
answers to my main and subsidiary research questions. The following chapter 
summarises some of the main outcomes of this work and seeks to draw out 
theoretical and practical insights.  
 
10.2. Main Findings 
Mental Health professionals have a duty to reasonably accommodate participation 
in public and political life throughout mental health treatment (Ch.2). 
Participation in public and political life, for adult citizens, may minimally be 
understood as casting a ballot in an election every four or five years but 
encompasses much broader array of activities in local communities and mental 
health institutions. Politicisation involves forming and performing political 
identities through both praxis (actions that aim at changing the world in 
accordance with worldviews) and poeisis (gestures symbolically performing 
political agency and inclusion) (s.3.4). Embracing a political identity requires 
social recognition (s.3.3.3). Mental health treatment incorporates anthrogogies of 
citizenship and ethics that deeply influence this process (s.4.5). Normal practice, 
generally restrictive of political identities, was suspended during the run up to 
elections in brief moments of policy implementation. However, politically inclusive 
practice within the pragmatics of mental health ward was overwhelmed by the 
rituals of treatment and containment. This meant many participants experienced 
discomfort, alienation and engaged in role distancing. Educative practice also 
presented risks of undue influence and indoctrination within an authoritarian and 
technocratic system of governance. Given the small number of policy documents 




received, and problematic survey data, I sought to use ethnographic research 
methods to elucidate these processes (Ch.5). This was an exploration of 
complexity rather than an endeavour to test hypothesis derived from theory.  
I found that non-electoral, and other transgressive forms of political action and 
expression are frequently considered inappropriate for persons with mental 
disabilities (s.6.2.2). Some forms of political action, when performed by particular 
actors, may be cast as symptomatic of mental illness and trigger rituals of capacity 
assessment and containment (Ch.8). This was the case even during moments of 
direct policy implementation. This represented a slippage from politically inclusive 
practice back into medicalised treatment rituals. 
Being a resident of a mental health institution can mean the threshold for what 
counts as legitimate political action is significantly higher when compared to the 
general population. This is a prime example of the restricted opportunities for 
people with disabilities. They are less likely to be recognised as legitimately 
participating on an equal basis with others (s.7.3). The voices of people with 
mental disabilities are rarely heard directly and when they are, can be 
delegitimised on the basis that they do not convey ‘real’ experiences’ (s.7.4). Their 
worldviews, to be recognised as legitimate, must be corroborated by mental health 
experts and this can create conflicts of interest when people with mental health 
difficulties seek to hold mental health institutions to account (s.7.4.2).  
In medicalised contexts “inappropriate” political action and expression may be 
restricted and discouraged for reasons relating to risk and capacity (s.7.4.1). By 
extension, more mundane forms of political participation may also become less 
appealing as action and expression is put under intense scrutiny (s.8.3) 
The substantive implementation of Article 29 of the UNCRPD should expand 
opportunities for political action for both service-users and mental health 
practitioners (Ch.2). The data shows however that mental health settings are 
replete with rules and rituals of interaction which encourage some and discourage 




other types of political performances (s.9.6). This renders implementation 
complex. In fact, practices mandated by implementation, when they slip back into 
medicalised rituals, can have the unintended effect of reducing political agency by 
expanding psychiatric management of behaviour into the political field (s.9.4). 
This can understandably cause alienation. 
If we see politics as being a process of conflict and cooperation (s.3.2.3), treatment 
for prolonged periods of time in residential mental health services can create 
enduring restrictions on the ability and opportunity to construct political 
identities and worldviews by framing even productive conflict as problematic 
individual behaviours (Ch.9). Furthermore, the very imposition of psychological 
interpretations of the personal can reduce opportunities for developing subversive 
worldviews, political identities, and capabilities (s.7.3.1. See also Rose, 1990; 
Kitzinger, 1993).  
Boundaries of role and place in the normal drama of the wards create pragmatics 
that impact on political identity construction and capability for service-users as 
well as staff. In particular, categorising political action or expression as mental 
health symptomology can be restrictive of opportunities to play at, and become 
through recognition, political citizens (s.7.4.). Behaviours can on this basis be 
forcibly restricted through internalised understandings of ‘appropriate’ political 
action, separation, escalated treatment interventions and increased coercion (s.9.2-
9.3).  
Alternatively, power in the institution can be used to expand political 
opportunities for a select group of service-users who have satisfied psychiatric 
definitions of progress towards rehabilitation (s.8.2.1). The separation of political 
conduct into appropriate and inappropriate, was often premised on a view of the 
political sphere as one full of dangers, particularly for ‘the vulnerable’ (s.9.5). In 
this way risk has replaced mental capacity as the test for whether political 
participation will be facilitated (s.7.5.1)  




Categorising political behaviour as an aspect of mental health treatment can result 
in greater control and influence being exerted by professionals over the political 
development of service-users (s.8.3.2). This can cause both staff and service-users 
to engage in role distancing behaviours to avoid problems associated with the 
doctor patient act collapsing (Ch.8). By contrast, in cases where political 
participation is recognised as an aspect of a person-centred recovery process 
(rather than a threat) opportunities to play at and become political citizens, and 
perform as such, were expanded for both staff and service-users alike (Ch.7).  
The data presented shows that the attribution of political roles can become (or 
be experienced as) ‘real’ through processes of embracement and recognition (s.8.3) 
but political identity is not necessarily a fixed or enduring object (s.4.3). In 
addition, the ascription of political identity in mental health treatment can carry 
a mix of benefits and risks for people in residential care (s.9.3). The supportive 
role can also present a threat to face for staff and the institution more generally 
(s.8.2.2.).  
The insights that dramaturgy can provide in analysing processes of politicisation 
are extremely useful in teasing apart the distinctions between political behaviour 
and behaviour that is inappropriate and seen as beyond the pale in the context of 
mental health rehabilitation. Dramaturgy also allows practitioners to develop 
practices to encourage positive development on ethical and political rather than 
psychiatric grounds thus avoiding ideas of technocratic and authoritarian 
governance from being internalised as part of the normal practice of politics 
(s.7.5.). 
 




10.2.1. The Power to Include  
In this section I want to outline a central conclusion drawn from this research 
project. After analysing the law and policy and then observing and discussing it 
with implementors and subjects, it became clear that the way power is 
conceptualised as a resource to be distributed from the top down in the 
substantiation of political rights, makes a problematic foundation for 
politicisation. 
Law and policy, both domestic and international, constructs the enhancement of 
political opportunities in mental health services as within the power of service-
providers (Ch.4 & 6). In studying political participation in mental institutions, I 
have found that the exercise of power is much more diffuse than the law suggests 
(s.7.6-7 & 8.4). However, narratives of change, and political power in general, are 
placed within service-providers remit of control by the very policies that seek to 
increase political inclusion for service-users (Ch.7-9). This bakes into the policy of 
political inclusion a form of political exclusion (s.6.2.6). 
Politics is power in action, being the main technology used to achieve concrete 
ends. Power is certainly not unique to the doctor patient relationship, does not 
flow unidirectionally and is not something to be necessarily avoided within 
institutions. However, mental health services are built around power being 
attributed to certain institutional roles and this creates systematic restrictions on 
the political agency of service-users. Residents of psychiatric institutions are 
conditioned through mental health treatment and socialised in ways that 
encourage them to passively comply with decisions of practitioners, experts, family 
and friends who, they are told, know better. This belief that they cannot ‘know’ 
the world like people who don’t have their mental illness can demotivate and 
alienate people with mental disabilities from engaging in both small-p and big-P 
political processes (s.8.2.1).  




Forming and communicating worldviews, and action in changing the world 
according to what it should be, are often mis/mal-recognised as illegitimate actions 
for someone undergoing treatment. It is often not a valid face for service-users to 
adopt (s.8.2.1) unless they cross the divide and become a psychiatric practitioner. 
The narrative of change, through rehabilitation or recovery resolving internal 
disorder, is positioned as one driven by staff action (s.6.3). These roles are 
internalised, repeated and resisted in the interplay of actions in the service-
user/provider act. The inflexibility of institutional orders and roles, if strictly 
maintained, stunts the ability of staff and service-users to engage in playful, 
destabilising, and novel ways of being (Ch.8). In turn this restricts opportunities 
for politicisation and participation. Playful human interaction in a whole rang of 
activities such as sport, horticulture, art, music and literature all appear to be 
important wellsprings for political ideas, identities, and actions (Ch.3). The are 
also an important source of self-efficacy which is an motivator for political 
engagement (s.9.2). 
A distinction was identified between the formalised pedagogical practice delivered 
on the wards of the hospital and the informal way in which political information 
was communicated in more liminal spaces. These arguments led me to conclude 
that the educational dimension of mental health practice is crucial but that the 
style of education adopted in supporting political participation was often 
antithetical to open-minded politicisation (s.8.3). Often the implementation of 
policies of political inclusion was itself alienating and exclusionary achieving the 
opposite of what the drafters of the UNCRPD might have envisioned.  
The application of radically dialogical anthrogogies of citizenship and ethics better 
support politicisation than implementation as a policy ‘intervention’ applied as 
treatment from the top down (s.9.4). Rather than being taught in fixed sessions 
on the specific topic of ‘politics’, issues and opinions might be discussed in the 
context of group activities and embedded into everyday practice. A collaborative 
educative experience might be fostered rather than a hierarchical banking model 




of political education (s.4.5). If the mutual learning aspects of implementation are 
emphasised, then this provides a way out of the assumption of staff knowing more 
about politics than residents. More fundamentally, the aim should not be to 
deliver a political curriculum, but rather to engage on a regular basis in open and 
free dialogue on substantive political issues that are relevant to staff and residents 
(s.8.3.3).  
Policies of political participation may instead be viewed as a bottom up activity 
shaped by humanistic relations. The significance of the law, and the ritual order, 
may thus be rejuvenated through their de-naturalisation. As in Kafka’s parable, 
to shut the door of the law is to allow space for Law to regain its significance as 
a political construct (Snoek, 2014). 
Successful implementation occurs where practitioners are unafraid to step in and 
out of the supervisory or care giver role (s.7.3.2) and where service-users are 
willing to recognise and accept service-providers as individual human beings 
rather than institutional agents (s.8.2.2). To do this, there needs to be 
opportunities to develop humanistic relations. Those implementing the policy need 
to be informed and politically engaged themselves or be willing to learn political 
skills from service-users and politically engaged others. Both teams need spaces 
available in which law and policy governing mental health service provision are 
destabilised in ways that recognise the diffuse nature of power and recognise it as 
legitimately exercised by all on all (s.8.3.1). Strategies of embedding this type of 
flexibility in role is something that might be examined in further research as a 
focus of training for staff and service-users who want to promote similar policies 
in other hospitals. Policies of political inclusion also need to be co-owned by staff 
and service-users from the outset rather than be imposed from the top down. 
This flexibility does not necessarily exclude the benevolent management of 
behaviour. Some issues may best be dealt with through a more authoritarian or 




technocratic practice although this does risk the slippage towards medicalisation 
of political problems discussed in the previous section.  
I merely suggest that by supporting capacities and opportunities for residents to 
talk about small-p politics such as treatment or care plans through a political 
discourse, and by weakening the psychiatric claims to exclusive knowledge about 
service-user identity, we might better realise the right to participation in both 
electoral and non-electoral politics. By recognising greater agency on the part of 
service-users in interpreting and dealing with their own social and personal issues 
people treated in psychiatric rehabilitation may be enabled to develop political 
capabilities according to their own needs and aspirations in a range of political 
fields.  
Because of the complexity in deciding whether a dispute or issue comes under 
‘psychiatric’ or ‘political’ jurisdiction, and because of the monopoly of legitimate 
force claimed by one side in such conflict, institutions are able to adopt narrow 
definitions of political action that reduce their obligations and accountability. A 
potential barrier to the exposure of political conflict is the tendency towards 
containment of unseemly conflict within the mental health institution (Ch.9). The 
optics of political conflict undermines the therapeutic and professional image that 
is required to attract funding as well as presenting a unified institutional ‘face’ to 
outsiders (s.2.9; Ch.8). This is something that regulators such as the CQC as well 
as NHS commissioners could consider in evaluation and funding decisions. By 
raising the acceptable threshold of risk, they might permit more humanistic and 
person centred care which in turn increases opportunities to engage in public and 
political life. 
The reification of the mentally disabled identity as fundamental to the political 
affiliations of service-users is embedded in the structure of law and policy on 
supporting political participation for disabled people. Diagnosis and/or progress 
towards rehabilitation and recovery become ways of categorising service-users and 




justifications for exclusion (s.8.2). This is not to say that changing professional 
practice through top down law and policy in mental health hospitals is always 
counterproductive. The argument supported by this thesis is rather that more 
opportunities for residents to disrupt the ascription of the ‘patient’ role (which is 
passive and objectified), and the reification of identity as diagnosis, the more the 
institution might enhance and increase opportunities for political engagement 
across the full range of political domains. In addition, the more opportunities for 
staff to disrupt the ascription of a bland role of institutional agent the greater 
their opportunities to engage in humanistic and recovery orientated practice. 
These actors both require spaces in which law and policy, and by extension the 
ritual order of the institution, become more fluid and destabilised.  
There was genuine concern that practices of politicisation could be construed as 
malpractice. The perception that political power is something that can be granted 
to people with disabilities by service-providers, by transmission of knowledge, 
generated fears of undue influence that inhibit the enhancement of participation 
(Ch. 2; s.8.3). There is a potential problem in embedding a policy of political 
inclusion in the general practice of staff where they are resistant to engage for fear 
of criticism and reprisal other than at election time. As I have reported, staff 
feared making ‘mistakes’ in providing political information, and unduly 
influencing service-users even during these periods (Ch.7-8).  
In addition, staff often felt ignorant about political issues, had never voted 
themselves, or were disinclined to vote or engage in politics. Many staff had not 
had opportunities to develop political capacities and identities themselves 
(s.6.3.3). All of this becomes a problem only if staff are constructed as experts 
delivering political knowledge to service-users rather than equal participants in 
political discourse co-constructing political communities in dialogue.  
The answer is not to abandon politically inclusive anthrogogies but to conduct 
them in spaces where hierarchical relations are sufficiently disrupted that 




knowledge transfer can legitimately occur in both directions. Confidence and 
competence in participating in political discourse is just as important for the staff 
implementing policies of political inclusion as it is for residents. Indeed, in some 
circumstance’s residents will be better positioned to support staff political 
participation than the other way around.  
In mental health rehab the threat of soft power and surveillance in the doctor 
patient nexus, means that indoctrination and undue influence is a real risk. This 
threat must be explicitly dealt with to allow people to interact in spontaneous 
political dialogue. Such dialogue was observed between staff and service-users only 
in places where the rules of interaction could be challenged or subverted without 
fear. This insight is helpful in designing spaces in which people can experiment 
with a variety of political identities and strategies.  
As rehabilitation is a educational process of socialisation into ethical ways of 
being, every aspect of mental health treatment is both political and educational 
(Ch. 4). The aim of person-centred recovery is to allow people to discover and 
implement their own conceptions of the good life. This requires opportunities for 
free and open discussion between political equals. 
In thinking about how the political environment (as co-constructed between staff 
and residents on the pathway through the mental health service) might be 
designed to increase political opportunities it may be useful to identify aspects 
that more accurately reflect the treatment of citizens in the wider political 
community. For this to work residents need to have opportunities to subvert roles 
and challenge social pragmatics and for staff to step out of their institutional roles 
to form collaborations across the staff patient divide (Ch. 8-9). Productive 
conflicts must be allowed to play out rather than being resolved by rejection, 
control or containment (s.9.5). Going outside the physical environment of the 
hospital appears to be an effective strategy in facilitating the co-construction of 
political environments where productive conflict can play out. Political debate can 




be staged in ways that encourage creative engagement on a co-constructed basis 
(Ch.4). 
Although the rhetoric for the NHS and independent hospitals for low secure rehab 
revolves around recovery and treatment through person-centred practice, the way 
in which these principles are actually benefiting service-users in the expression of 
political agency remains difficult to measure and evaluate. In addition, applying 
policies of political inclusion in high security facilities with patients who have very 
serious cognitive impairments may present a variety of different challenges not 
covered in my data. This means drawing wider implementation is a complex 
undertaking. My findings will not necessarily transfer to radically different 
contexts and more research is needed on these topics. 
In the data, reference is often made to residents who ‘will never be able to fully 
function’ (Site 1, Consultation, 2018, SW). Following consultation on the basis of 
my findings, practitioners however began to argue more confidently that partial 
capacities (e.g. articulating wants and needs as well as worldviews) could be 
supported through a more universal application of the policies of political 
inclusion. Rather than the practices of support being targeted to specific 
individuals thought to be receptive, well behaved and who had explicitly signed a 
form requesting support, the policy of political inclusion began to be applied to a 
wider set of decisions and situations in the everyday life of service-users following 
data collection. For example, cultural activities involving a performer and an 
audience are inevitably highly social. They are events in which certain ritualistic 
roles are performed by the participants in a temporarily co-constructed power 
dynamic and thus can be more conducive to political inclusion than formal 
educational sessions (s.9.4)  
In addition, many potent political messages can be conveyed through role play. 
Much like the construction of a political society in miniature the classroom, or a 
corporation or the larger imagined community of a nation, the dramatic 




performance mediates and disrupts the roles of the participants in ways that can 
be productive of opportunities for new modes of expressing oneself and one’s 
political ideas. Political autonomy can be expressed as the accumulation of 
cultural and social capital in which the performance of a personally meaningful 
identity (and the recognition of that identity by an audience) is vitally important. 
Capabilities for participation should therefore be based on the concept of 
relational, rather than individual autonomy (Ch. 1). 
When you have the epistemological authority to designate what is and is not 
political then you can exercise the power to delegitimise challenges to your 
authority and legitimacy. When an institution can prescribe knowledge about your 
internal experience, legitimate political protest can be portrayed as unreasonable 
(s.8.2.1). For example, certain political strategies can be readily interpreted as 
pathological, unhealthy and dangerous. This includes adopting the sick role to 
coerce others to care for you; making vexatious complaints as a form of protest; 
aggressive and violent assertions of political ideas; or simply adopting the 
mannerisms and language of powerful peers. 
It can be claimed that the protest action and complaint are based on a 
misinterpretation of reality and this may be readily generalised by staff and 
service-users into the political sphere. This delegitimises a person’s political 
identity because they are not recognised as basing arguments on legitimate 
constructions of the world. 
Townsend illustrates how attempts to empower service-users in everyday mental 
health practice are frustrated by the institutional processes of admission, 
accountability, decision making, budgeting, risk management, and discharge 
(Townsend, 1998). Similar processes frustrate the implementation of policies of 
political participation despite good intentions (Ch. 9).  
There is a potential conflict of interest here between the staff’s professional duty 
to the residents and their responsibilities and requirements towards the 




institution. Greater capability for political agency may mean confronting residents 
with difficult realities that are easier hidden, an increasing volume of complaints 
and increasingly demanding patients. Organisationally this requires increasing 
workloads and staff pay budgets to accommodate and compromise with residents’ 
demands. In addition, it may require less restricted access to electronic devices to 
open up opportunities for accessing political information and social networks. It 
may require giving staff more agency and discretion to modify their practices in 
inclusive ways which can erode hierarchical relations in management. None of 
these policies would advance institutional efficiency in the sense of risk reduction 
and containment. They may do precisely the opposite forcing mental health 
services to become looser and less organised communities rather than tightly 
bound and totalising institutions.  
This medicalisation of complaint, and the restriction of resident’s ability to 
produce and consume cultural and social content outside of the parameters that 
a mental health hospital deems safe, are potentially significant restrictions on the 
ability of residents to develop political agency (s.9.3).  
This speaks to issues at the heart of implementation of the ‘paradigm shift’ in 
mental health practice envisioned by advocates of the UNCRPD (Bartlett, 2014). 
The difficulty of implementing top down policies of political inclusion in ways that 
allow law and policies to be challenged, subverted and reconstructed from the 
bottom up. The approach to participation is premised on a conceptualisation of 
power as owned by mental health practitioners who are then required by law to 
concede some of their powers to persons under their care (Sandland, 2017). This 
thesis has provided empirical evidence that in mental institutions, ‘giving’ service-
users political power is no straightforward task. This is because the premise that 
power can be owned and distributed is problematic. As Foucault, Goffman and 
Butler argue, and as I have shown empirically, power simply does not work this 
way.  





10.2.2. Towards a Dialogical Anthrogogy of Politics 
One of the most important discoveries in this thesis is that the imperative to 
enhance the political participation of service-users is often antithetical to, and 
disrupts, the deep mechanisms of mental health institutions (psy-epistemology; 
physical environment; manifestations of power; identity performances etc). 
Disruption was a generative collision of imperatives that created political 
opportunities for service-users and staff. One understandable response to this 
otherwise radical challenge to the status quo is to narrowly define the nature of 
politics to electoral participation, thus excluding the politics of the institution, 
and to practise a restricted notion of (political) education – didactic and 
transmissive which replicated and reinforced the institutional hierarchy.  
There is a clear alternative path – to define the political much more widely to 
include an essential aspect of all interactions and to identify a person-centred and 
respectful system of support. I acknowledge the great difficulty of institutions and 
professionals moving to adopt educational, rather than psychiatric practice but 
the need for radical change is already implied by the UNCRPD. In these final 
sections I will try to outline some theoretical possibilities for best practice building 
on data gathered. 
In consultation with social workers and psychiatrists following data collection 
Paulo Freire was cited directly as an inspiration for improved practice (s.4.5). The 
new social worker at Site 1 argued that Freire’s ideas could be used to develop a 
pedagogy of citizenship that could help to empower service-users and increase 
opportunities for political inclusion.  
Freirian practices and theory have significant parallels in the practice of 
Community based Rehabilitation advocated by the WHO. Freire’s ‘pedagogy of 
the oppressed’ may be placed into a broader framework of social transformation 




underpinning the inclusion of institutionalised psychiatric communities in political 
and civic life. The term “social transformation” here is used in the sense of 
transforming the identities roles and ritual order of the community of actors within 
a particular setting rather than on a nationwide scale. 
On my reading of Freire, for a pedagogy of citizenship to operate in line with a 
holistic theory of inclusion or person-centred recovery, rather than a narrow 
narrative of rehabilitation, a pastiche of approaches is required to identify 
individual and collective needs for political recognition and to accommodate 
health struggles in different times and places.  
In The Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1996) Freire sets up his argument by 
distinguishing between ‘oppressors’ and ‘oppressed’ but then presents the solution 
as a mutual educational process by which people who identify as being oppressed 
are given a voice and are listened to. Through such a process liberation is not a 
gift, and not a self-achievement but a mutual process of discovery. It also appears 
to require the identification of an ‘enemy’ in the ‘oppressor’ and so embraces a 
form of productive conflict. 
Freire also has some interesting things to say on the nature of the 
oppressor/oppressed distinction: 
“The oppressed suffer from a duality which has established itself in their innermost 
being. They discover that without freedom they cannot exist authentically. Yet 
although they desire to authentically exist they fear it. They are at one and the 
same time themselves and the oppressor whose consciousness they have 
internalized. The conflict lies in the choice between being wholly themselves or 
divided…… between following prescriptions or having choices; between being 
spectators or actors; between acting or having the illusion of acting through the 
action of the oppressors; between speaking out or being silent; castrated in their 
power to create and re-create, in their power to transform the world. This is the 




tragic dilemma of the oppressed which their education must take into account.” 
(Freire, 1996: 31) 
To reconcile this with my understanding of Foucauldian power and Butlerian 
identity construction through performativity the essentialised idea of the authentic 
self and the divided self requires critique. The conflict, cast by Freire as between 
a whole self and a divided self, is irreconcilable with the idea of the subject as 
performed in interaction. However, recognition depends on performance being 
conducted as if the self is wholly inhabiting a particular role in the Stanislavskian 
sense of becoming (Crowley & Benedetti, 1998) or with competent 
verfremdungseffekt. In preparing oneself for such performances I have argued 
previously that individuals become reified as lacking capabilities to define their 
worldviews and interests in ways that are compatible with their perceived and 
actual roles. To find a way out of this process of reification people must become 
researchers and students of themselves and of the art of social construction in 
which they constitute themselves and others. This requires the construction of 
oneself as an important audience in the performance of identity so that self-
reflection can occur. The ‘real’ identity that one is attempting to be true to in 
role distancing is thus the identity that is performed for oneself as an internal 
audience. It is no more or less substantive than the identity performed for external 
audiences. This provides a potential foundation for the performance and 
recognition of persons as having power to transform the world – i.e. becoming 
open-minded independent political agents.  
Going back to Freire, he compares the condition of oppressors to that of the 
oppressed. He argues that similar processes of identity reification apply, and these 
create restriction on political transformation in very similar ways: 
The same is true with respect to the individual oppressor as a person. Discovering 
himself to be an oppressor may cause considerable anguish, but does not necessarily 
lead to solidarity with the oppressed. Rationalising his guilt through paternalistic 




treatment of the oppressed, all the while holding them fast in a position of 
dependence will not do. Solidarity requires that one enter into the situation of 
those with whom one is solidary; it is a radical posture. If what characterises the 
oppressed is their subordination to the consciousness of the master, as Hegel 
affirms, true solidarity with the oppressed means fighting at their side to transform 
the objective reality which has made them these ‘beings for another’. (Freire, 1996: 
31-32) 
In this way the oppressor is subject to the same reifications of identity as the 
oppressed and the role of oppressor and oppressed is interchangeable. Therefore, 
to support political capabilities in situations in which the majority of power is 
held by one team (the ‘oppressors’) those with power must deconstruct their own 
roles and identities and enter into the divided state of identity reconstruction 
themselves. In mental health rehab this implies that staff must enter spaces in 
which their legal duties and policy obligations are suspended so they might engage 
with service-users as equals to engage in politics side by side.  
The new social worker at Site 1 made the comparison between staff and residents 
and Freire’s oppressors and oppressed because that provided a basis on which to 
recast ‘patients’ as political citizens and staff like herself as attempting to 
collaborate with them to transform the community for the better. Through a 
dissolution of previous identities and roles new areas of conflict and cooperation 
were potentially opened up. A new type of professional personhood - an active 
participant in a mutual process of learning and political empowerment – became 
possible so long as staff and residents suspended law and policy and acted on the 
basis of mutual solidarity. 
The oppressor is solidary with the oppressed only when he stops regarding the 
oppressed as an abstract category and sees them as persons who have been unjustly 
dealt with, deprived of their voice, cheated in the sale of their labour – when he 




stops making pious, sentimental and individualistic gestures and risks the act of 
love. (Freire, 1996: 32) 
The process of developing solidarity across team boundaries was described by one 
staff participant as essential in removing barriers to political opportunities for 
service-users. One staff member at site 2 described the process of building lasting 
friendships with individuals and knowing the ‘person’.  
Freirean theory indicates that the challenge for service-providers attempting to 
open up political opportunities for service-users is to participate equally in 
activities seeking to ‘empower’ each other and help build each other’s capacity’ to 
exercise greater agency. Rather, through increasing opportunities for meaningful 
social participation, partnerships can be co-constructed (Rifkin and Pridmore, 
2001).  
Practices inspired by Freire take various forms. Instrumental approaches view 
communities as handmaidens of biomedical and behavioural expertise, helping to 
implement programmes made and owned by managers, doctors or psychologists. 
Dialogical approaches promote interactions between health professionals and 
communities as people, facilitating interaction between lay and expert 
understandings of recovery to create services that resonate with users’ 
understandings of their needs and interests.  
Campbell (2014) argues for a critical approach that embeds these efforts within a 
wider critical or political counter-discourse. Disability rights activists view 
community mobilisation as a route to collective action to challenge (or ‘resist’) 
the social inequalities that place peoples’ well-being at risk (Campbell 1997; 
Campbell & Oliver, 1996). But the requirement to adopt a political identity 
centred around an acceptance of a radical ‘disabled’ identity should not become a 
requirement.  




The anthrogogy of politics has become bogged down in essentialist assumptions 
about community and identity. For practical reasons, educational programmes 
generally target communities defined by geography, identity, or common 
institutions assuming that residents share a common motivation to tackle political 
problems. Yet communities in mental health rehabilitation represent a wide 
spectrum of age, gender, educational levels and politics, living in varying degrees 
of cooperation and conflict. Particular groups within the institution have a lot to 
lose from the empowerment of others. Such groups may actively work to 
undermine policies of inclusion when they threaten established hierarchies 
(Gruber & Caffrey, 2006). 
The second problem facing the application of anthrogogies of politics in the mental 
health settings relates to confused assumptions about the potential for political 
struggle to address the economic and social causes of mental disabilities. Despite 
evidence that poverty is a key driver of poor health, health projects are often 
framed by de-contextualised concepts like ‘gender’ or ‘human rights’ 
conceptualised independently of their intersections with other corrosive 
disadvantages. An exclusive focus on empowerment through building skills to 
leverage concession from those in authority or increasing access to the ballot box 
ignores the consistent finding that ‘across very different contexts, people’s ability 
to exercise strategic forms of control over their lives is linked to being able to 
generate regular and independent sources of income’ (Department for International 
Development, 2011: 2). 
Despite Freire’s emphasis on the necessity of equal dialogue between community 
insiders and supportive outsiders in formulating the goals of joint projects, 
implementers often impose their own values on communities they seek to mobilise. 
The same is inevitably the case when service-providers in mental health wards 
seek to encourage service-users to vote.  




Freirean citizenship education in practice may be criticised for the overly linear 
conceptualisation of social change implicit in ‘planned social change’ approaches. 
These assume that citizenship education will trigger mobilisation that can lead to 
health enabling social changes. Eyben (2005) argues that linear planning, 
supported by instruments of performance management, is poorly equipped to deal 
with complex social problems, and that it is impossible to predetermine 
trajectories of change in social systems in constant flux.  
Participation, recovery and rehabilitation in mental health services may be 
improved by aiming to support the independent development of plans to manage 
individual and collective problems through political action. Anthrogogy is 
instructive in theorising and articulating some innovative approaches. Educational 
materials could provide suggestions for immediate application of strategies of 
social, individual and institutional change as opposed to learning the ‘facts’ about 
politics. Educational initiatives may in this way become orientated towards 
dialogical and self-directed learning. The focus, according to these principles, must 
be primarily 'problem centred' rather than 'topic centred'. 
Service-users may in addition require support in developing a sense of self-efficacy. 
Self-efficacy refers to how confident the patient is about his or her abilities based 
on feelings of self-confidence and control (Bandura, 1977) Tendencies to perform 
a given behaviour are influenced by:  
 Expectation of outcome (Is it worth it?)  
 Expectation of self-efficacy (Can I do it?)  
Motivation is highest when service-users are dissatisfied with the current 
conditions, but it is also vital that service-users believe that they can influence 
political change, and thus the effort put in will be worth it. Clinicians can 
potentially enhance self-efficacy by using teaching techniques such as skills 
mastery and modelling (Habel, 2006). 




According to Bandura (1977) a sense of self-efficacy is inculcated most effectively 
through the mastering of skills. The experience of success increases self-efficacy 
while experiencing failure reduces self-efficacy. Skills can be anything that the 
service-user wants to achieve ranging from athletic, culinary, technical or cultural 
skills and could be organised to bring people together to share political strategies 
indirectly in the course of doing other activities.  
Self-efficacy can be achieved through social prescription and funding for the 
development of these soft skills. Repeatedly experiencing failure during an initial 
course of events can be particularly detrimental to the development of self-efficacy. 
Repeated successes, on the other hand, result in a strong sense of self-efficacy, and 
subsequent failures are unlikely to diminish the ensuing self-confidence.  
Skills mastery may theoretically be scaffolded for service-users by prescribing 
group activities in which they can develop skills that are useful and relevant to 
their lives. One of the best ways to foster mastery is to have service-users set goals 
for themselves in a particular area or for a specific behaviour; this can be written 
in the form of a contract with oneself and resources and financial or social support 
provided. Small achievable goals provide direction and incentive for action or 
change. Goal setting could be personal and self-directed or could be communal 
and co-constructed but should not be imposed by clinicians. 
According to Henry et al. (2009), service-users who believe they have a measure 
of control over their health are more likely to successfully self-manage their 
condition than people who believe their health is the service-provider's 
responsibility or simply down to luck, or fate.  Thus, when, service-providers and 
service-users work collaboratively, service-users and practitioners may experience 
both a greater sense of control over health outcomes and an increased sense of 
political agency.  
 




10.2.3. The Principles of Political Participation  
At present policy implementation is based on a commitment to human rights (Ch. 
6). Those who are not excluded from the right to vote in law are identified as 
attracting obligations under human rights treaties and are facilitated to 
participate in elections (s.7.3.1). This reflects a prioritisation of efficiency in the 
use of institutional resources that means good implementation becomes that which 
meets obligations with the minimum amount of resources possible. Adherence to 
this principle means that politics is interpreted narrowly (s.6.2.2), and many 
service-users are excluded from the benefits of politically inclusive practice (s.7.3). 
Even when people are identified as eligible and willing to participate, mental 
health diagnosis can become a way to justify exclusionary practices such as 
withholding information about elections. For example, a service-user with a 
diagnosis of personality disorder was left under the impression that the election 
was cancelled so as to avoid her anger that her registration had not been 
administered in time by hospital staff. Conflict, even if productive and justified, 
is seen as anti-therapeutic for people with certain types of diagnosis.  
A second principle evident in implementation is a commitment to political 
autonomy. This is reflected in the obligation to ensure that practice does not 
unduly influence or indoctrinate service-users into particular worldviews. As I 
have shown mental health practice already influences service-users to adopt 
certain worldviews based around ideas of mentally healthy ways of being so this 
principle appears to be applied inconsistently. In addition, it is based upon an 
overly individualistic view of political autonomy. A relational concept of autonomy 
that sees freedom of choice as embedded in social context appears to be a more 
useful basis for inclusive practice.  
A third principle is that of appropriateness. In practice this means that behaviour 
must be appropriate for the audience and context. When practice slips back into 




medicalised rituals of assessment political expression and action are often deemed 
inappropriate and even disorderly to the extent of being classified as aspects of 
mental illness. Coercive intervention therefore remained a lurking threat in the 
background of every interaction. 
A fourth basis for implementation revolved around the idea of person-centred 
recovery. This is related to the concept of humanistic and holistic practice and 
were exemplified by educational approaches and informal socialisation. This 
appeared conducive to the types of political opportunities envisioned by both 
domestic and institutional policy and under the UNCRPD. By contrast, 
application of principles of political inclusion in mental health services that are 
more focused on a top down, technocratic application of political education, and 
which construct service-users in the role of passive learners of facts, can end up 
creating more restrictions on the development of political agency than they 
opened up.  
As noted in previous sections, participation rights should not only be a 
momentary act, but the starting point for an intense exchange of ideas and 
worldviews in all relevant contexts of people’s lives. It should be dialogical 
rather than didactic.  
The contradictory aims of participatory rights (to both socialise people into a 
political community and also empower the individual to pursue their 
independent version of the good life), creates difficulties in policy 
implementation. Positive support from those in authority can superficially 
increase political participation but may reduce agency by inculcating closed-
minded views. In addition, responsibility for substantive realisation is placed on 
those in functional authority, in authoritarian institutions, creating a risk of 
indoctrinating education being applied in spite of good intentions (s.9.4). 
Mental health treatment is an application of ideas about what it is to be a good 
human being, a good citizen and what a good life constitutes. In practice staff 




socialize service-users into these ideas and into systems and epistemologies of 
governance (s.7.4 & 8.2). Therefore, practitioners need to be clear in their own 
minds on what they think about these existential issues and explicit that they 
apply this in treatment. More democratic and less technocratic approaches to 
the organisation of services potentially need to be implemented to fully realise 
the ambitions of the UNCRPD. 
People should and can be involved in the decisions that affect their lives and 
there are innumerable creative and exiting ways this could be enacted. Political 
engagement, at any level, helps people to engage in their own struggles and 
claim their own victories but also recognizes their inherent humanity and dignity 
as equal members of the community. Involving people in the governance of the 
services they engage in, involving them in the local community and encouraging 
them to engage in questions about how to improve things for both themselves 
and for everyone else is an essential aspect of public and political life. Reducing 
politics to casting a vote in elections every five years is therefore insufficient. 
Politics must be understood much more broadly if we are to recognise people’s 
dignity, agency and humanity throughout their mental health treatment. 
Appropriate political participation and action for people with disabilities in the 
context of mental health rehabilitation should not be restricted by the requirement 
for them to accept and embrace a disabled identity on the terms of people in 
authority. As we saw in the previous section, productive political conflict should 
not be automatically cast as inappropriate. The question of how to make the 
distinction between appropriate and inappropriate political engagement, on the 
basis of which principles, and who should decide remains at the heart of the 
problem of implementation. 
I now want to lay out some of the principles on which such decisions should be 
based, some ideas for how the process of decision making should be designed and 
who should be involved in the decision. This provides a basis for mental health 




service-providers and users to begin to design their own political constitutions for 
the mini-society that is constructed in each mental health ward. These ideas are 
based on the theoretical perspectives of constructivist anthrogogical literature, 
WHO CBR guidelines, the principles underlying the UNCRPD and the MCA 
2005, participatory design theory, and the empirical findings from this research 
project. 
How to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate political participation 
involves consideration of: 
 The context in which the expressions, actions or omissions occur  
 The social relationships between the people involved 
 The potential risks and benefits of participation for those involved  
The following principles should be applied to these questions: 
1) Assume every person has capacity to participate in political and public 
life so long as the context and circumstance are designed in ways that 
reduce boundaries and increase opportunities for participation. All 
practicable steps should be taken to provide opportunities to develop 
political capabilities and identities and interact with politically engaged 
others in and out of election cycles. We should not ‘give up’ on anyone.  
2) A person should not be treated as incapable just because their opinions, 
actions or omissions may seem unwise or against their own or other 
people’s interests. Even if someone appears to lack the skills or knowledge 
necessary to make political decisions, and even if someone is denied the 
right to vote, they still have the right to public and political life on an 
equal basis with others and to pursue their own interests and perspectives. 
3) A person has the right to play at, and adopt, different political identities 
and worldviews and pursue goals to change things in any area of their life 
without fear that their opinions and actions will be mis-recognised as 
symptoms of mental illness. 




4) The threshold at which political action and expression will be deemed 
inappropriate for people with mental disabilities should be set at exactly 
the same level as applied to persons without mental disabilities. 
5) Disability is political: Political inclusion seeks to ensure opportunities for 
being involved in big-P Politics (in political institutions and elections) and 
small-p politics (in the politics of care and containment in the mental 
health institution) 
6) ‘Politics’ should not be defined exclusively by professionals but be treated 
as essentially contested concepts. Politics can be non-exhaustively defined 
as engaging in processes of conflict and cooperation on matters that should 
be decided by the community as a whole. One such matter is ‘what should 
count as political and what should be counted as a ‘disordered worldview’’ 
and people with disabilities should be involved in such a decision from the 
outset. 
7) Political inclusion, as a fundamental aim of person-centred recovery, 
should be prioritised over and above the efficient running of the mental 
health institution. 
8) Political influence is the currency of politics and is not something that 
should be avoided in interactions between health care professionals and 
service-users. Political support must be offered in the context of egalitarian 
relationships so requires ‘stepping out’ of the doctor patient roles or the 
facilitation of contact with politically engaged peers and politicians. 
9) Political participation should not be a conditional right dependent on good 
behaviour, taking medication or any other factor that does not apply 
equally to others without mental disabilities.  
10) The whole process of mental health treatment incorporates aspects of civic 
education (i.e. how to be a ‘good’ citizen) and therefore ‘treatment’ should 
be applied as a process of dialogical and empowering anthrogogy where 
the roles of teacher and student are interchangeable. Political education 
should not proceed as a form of didactic and indoctrinating pedagogy 




inculcating closed-minded pupils. Political participation should be 
supported in ways that broadly motivate the pursuit of open-mindedness, 
i.e. the pursuit of truth and understanding, and to due regard to available 
evidence and argument when forming new beliefs and understandings and 
when maintaining or revising already established beliefs and 
understandings. 
Who should be involved in the decision: 
 The ‘community as a whole’. In inpatient rehabilitation settings this will, 
as a minimum, include: 
o Service-users, People with lived experience of mental disability, 
family, peers and NGOs 
o Mental health nurses, social workers, advocates, psychologists and 
psychiatrists 
o People from the local community, local councillors, local MPs, and 
community leaders 
Embedding political inclusion into the design of both policy and practice is vitally 
important as top down approaches to the implementation of rights participation 
in political and public life further reinforce the power relations that restrict such 
rights in the first place. Participation should not be viewed as something to be 
achieved following recovery and rehabilitation (appendix 5) but as a principle that 
should be applied throughout mental health treatment (appendix 6). Participatory 
design should prioritise ‘people’s rights to [participate] in… shaping of the worlds 
in which they act’. Here participation refers to ‘the fundamental transcendence of 
the users’ role from being merely informants to being legitimate and acknowledged 
participants’ (Robertson and Simonsen, 2013: 4–5). For this reason service-users 
should be involved in policy formation and implementation as equal partners from 
the outset and not be seen merely as subjects or beneficiaries. 
 




10.2.4 Practical Insights 
In this section I want to discuss the practices observed in mental health services, 
draw out some of the implications of these approaches and use them as a 
starting point for a frank discussion about what constitutes good practice in this 
area.  
Human rights are a matter of technical law as we saw in Chapter 2. However, 
the interpretation and substantive implementation, of human rights is a matter 
of sensitive, empathetic and contextualised practice. Practitioners sometimes 
engage with the UNCRPD simply because there is a legal obligation to do so. In 
addition, they risk being subject to legal sanction if they fail to fulfil the 
obligations. Institutions may therefore adopt policies of political inclusion to 
attract status and present an acceptably compassionate face to regulators and 
the public. This is not a good starting point for politically inclusive practice as 
it positions implementation as a way to advance institutional aims. Rather, such 
policies should present opportunities for service users to pursue their own 
objectives even if they contradict institutional goals. 
Practitioners should apply the principles of the UNCRPD, and in particular 
Articles 24 (the right to education) and 29 (the right to participate in political 
and public life) because they represent an effective way of promoting recovery 
and rehabilitation as well as preserving people’s inherent dignity and agency 
throughout their mental health treatment. 
Political inclusive practice at its best involves providing conditions in psychiatric 
rehabilitation where people can develop a sense of self-worth, capacities, and 
confidence. Increased opportunities for political participation, in theory if not 
always in practice, enhances the accountability of institutions, and democracy 
itself, by creating the conditions in which active members of the community can 
exercise power in ways that hold those in authority to account. 




Unfortunately, participation in mental health settings is often premised on 
performing the identity of a ‘good patient’ and even when autonomous 
participation is achieved subversive contributions may be readily dismissed as 
symptoms if deemed inappropriate. Participation is thus dependent on the 
participant being a governable subject and often fails to engender greater 
accountability. These tendencies should be dealt with at the outset by ensuring 
that policies are universal, apply to small-p and big-p politics, and that 
inclusion in both politics and public life is not dependent on the right to vote. 
Achieving recovery or ‘good mental health’ is often seen as a prior condition to 
achieving equal opportunities for inclusion. This could be visualised as a 
pyramid structure with good mental health as a foundation and political 
participation as the pinnacle (see Appendix 5). Best practices observed indicate 
that participation and good mental health should be seen as simultaneous or 
overlapping goals (see Appendix 6) as they are co-dependent.  
A standard response to the question of how to improve implementation of rights 
is to propose adaptations of law and policy and the adoption of clear protocols 
and checklists. We might for example consider introducing new regulatory 
standards of mental health care. If the CQC were to assess mental health services 
on how they apply the duty to support political capacities and identities then this 
might mean more efforts and resources are spent in supporting people’s right to 
vote and to participate outside of elections. This might empower service-providers 
to allow service-users greater autonomy and to take responsibility for the risks 
that they might take in exercising these new freedoms. 
But, in addition to costs in terms of financial efficiency and reallocation of limited 
time and resources, there is the danger that allowing residence to take more risks 
on the basis of individual choice would result in real harm to residents in the 
hospital’s care. This in turn might provide fuel for scandalising media reports of 




neglect where things go wrong, even if they are isolated incidents that might be 
argued a reasonable price to pay for greater autonomy across the board.  
Residents may be viewed by various audiences as posing risks to the social order 
of the institution or even to the fabric of civic society if they are permitted to 
participate in politics on a more equal basis with others. This is, however, 
speculation based on the assumption that people with mental disabilities don’t 
have the necessary sensibilities to engage in civil conflict. My data indicates that 
this is an erroneous assumption. In addition, equal inclusion is what we have 
committed to in signing up to the UNCRPD. We allow adult members of our 
community to take the risk of voicing an opinion and acting to advance political 
causes, whether or not they are deemed to be sufficiently sensible, informed or 
educated. The same should go for people with mental illnesses and disabilities.  
Equal political inclusion, in practice, might require spending a great deal of time 
listening to, facilitating and accommodating both reasonable and ‘bizarre’ 
requests and negotiating satisfactory outcomes with interested parties. This 
requires taking people with mental disabilities seriously as political agents. This 
involves looking beyond the bare request (which may be unreasonable or 
impossible) to the issue, or want, that the request is intended to deal with and 
supporting opportunities to exercise collective agency with like-minded people. It 
also requires developing the confidence and opportunity for people in mental 
health rehabilitation to form worldviews and to seek to argue the case for change 
in accordance with these views. This a good basis from which political inclusion 
could flourish. Currently our model of mental health treatment appears to socialise 
people to be the opposite: passive and compliant subjects. Although this, counter-
intuitively also provides opportunities to define oneself by resistance to such 
socialisation. 
A general point to consider is that residents and staff are caught in what might 
be termed a mutually coercive relationship. By this terminology I do not want to 




imply malicious or manipulative intention but simply to capture the effects of 
some of the discursive practices of residents and staff. Through the adoption and 
maintenance of the sick role residents in effect coerce staff into dedicating time 
and effort to their wants and needs, and through the adoption of the psychiatric-
professional role staff acquire legal duties to act in a paternalistic way toward 
residents. Finding opportunities to disrupt these mutually coercive roles, by 
creating contexts in which opinionated discussion between staff and patients can 
occur without fear of sanction seems to be the right direction of travel towards a 
more facilitative environment for the development of political capabilities.  
There are a number of practical changes that might be made in the system as it 
is. In the discussion with the SALT regarding the support provided at the polling 
station it was argued that because the SALT had no explicit protocols in this area 
she was forced to decide in the agony of the moment whether to support them to 
vote in the way that they wanted by entering the booth. The alternative was to 
let the three, who were expecting support, attempt to mark the ballot without 
guidance and potentially waste their opportunity to meaningfully engage. In this 
case the SALT decided to provide the support but only after the electoral official 
had sanctioned it. Appropriate support very much depends on the expectations 
of the participants.  
Both therapist and electoral official have a duty to support persons with 
disabilities’ opportunity to vote, electoral officials even have a duty to encourage 
this. However, a large degree of discretion is given to the professional in deciding 
how to implement the rather woolly aims of each policy, and the people who are 
subject to it have their expectations largely dictated by the people implementing 
them. This means that there is potentially a reduced chance of holding 
professionals who abuse this power to account. Although this wide discretion 
provides an opportunity for a more informal and flexible political socialisation for 
the residents, it may also provide opportunities for professionals to unduly 
influence political decisions of others. The relevant regulations already safeguard 




against this however. A professional providing such a service in the polling booth 
is restricted to helping two clients (who have requested and need help) and the 
presiding officer should make a written record of each incident. Fulfilment of these 
procedures may provide adequate protection. 
In addition to the embedding of democratic egalitarian practices, opportunities 
for the disruption of roles and the development of positive identity narratives, the 
cultivation of political agency may also be enhanced by providing residents with 
opportunities to engage in stimulating cultural and social activities outside the 
hospital. Such opportunities should not be distributed on the basis of good 
behaviour and privilege but be available to all residents as a matter of course.  
One of the main recommendations suggested in consultation following the field 
work was around awareness raising. Two posters were developed during the 
research processes in collaboration with participants from Sites 1, 2 and 3. The 
first poster/leaflet (see Appendix 2) deals with patients’ right to inclusion in civic 
and political life and what that means in terms of mental health staff 
commitments to service-users. It also provides staff with a space in which to write 
to important local contacts such as the MP, councillors and a 'hospital champion' 
of political inclusion. 
The second poster/leaflet (see Appendix 2) deals with equal rights to participate 
in free and fair elections. This deals with practical support in registering and 
voting as well as facilitating contact with politically engaged peers and access to 
information and debate. Again, it features spaces for staff to enter local contact 
details. Both posters feature a staff commitment that reasonable political action 
and expression will not be assessed for possible symptoms of mental illness and 
that capacity assessments will not be used as a reason for exclusion. 
These resources provide an accessible starting point for staff and service-users to 
introduce and discuss the practice of politicising psychiatric patients in 
professional practice with reference to theories of citizenship education and social 




identity. The posters intend to help raise awareness for mental health service-
providers and users to begin implementing the duty to positively support people 
with mental disabilities to participate in political and civic life on an equal basis 
with others (Art.29 UNCRPD). 
A second suggestion was that site-specific protocols be developed for any 
institution seeking to implement these policies. These would form a set of rules 
for political interaction developed in forums using participatory design principles. 
In this way service-users and staff may co-produce and co-own the outcomes. 
These ‘constitutions’ could set out a clear set of principles upon which support 
for political inclusion may be based. They would need to be reviewed regularly so 
that new entrants to the institution have opportunities to participate.  
To embed the policy of political inclusion more deeply into the discursive practice 
of staff and residents, as well as for practical reasons (e.g. timely registration on 
the electoral roll), it was also suggested that discussions on political inclusion 
could occur at the induction to the hospital or at the care planning stage. At this 
stage practitioners should considers asking: 
1. How the resident might want to be involved in decisions that affect 
institutional policy and practice, 
2. How they might want to be supported to vote in elections and 
referenda 
3. How they might contribute to decisions that affect their lives – e.g. 
where to live or whether to take a particular medication  
4. The care planning should also include: 
5. A discussion about how mental health diagnosis does not have to be 
seen as the defining aspect of any person’s identity and an explanation 
of the various opportunities to explore different roles if they wish to 
through social and cultural activities 




6. A commitment that reasonable political opinions will not be used as 
evidence of mental disorder and will be heard  
7. This care planning guidance developed with participants across Sites 
1, 2 and 3 is available in full at appendix 3.  
The recommendations proposed here are not solutions to the problem of 
supporting political participation but merely antecedents to co-constructive 
processes being born out of such debates and discussions. They should not be 
viewed as sufficient actions by institutions to fulfil duties of supporting political 
inclusion. 
It is difficult not to be pessimistic about the pusillanimous and even cynical 
approaches to political inclusion observed in some institutions. It is hard to 
escape the conclusion that because of the inherent contradiction between 
coercive treatment and empowerment, only a wholesale de-naturalisation of the 
system of mental health law and practice will increase the possibility of bottom 
up political mobilisation. It also perhaps requires a reimagining of our social and 
mental health support systems.  
My findings indicate that involvement of people with disabilities in the design, 
implementation and monitoring of policies of political inclusion at every stage is 
necessary so that engagement in public and political life may be on their own 
terms. Such opportunities are not in the gift of the institutions and services 
charged with their care. Educational approaches should be dialogical and 
inculcate open-mindedness rather than didactic and based on a condescending 
distinction between fact and opinion. This will likely require resources for 
implementation being provided directly to people with mental disabilities and of 
course in the experimentation and creative chaos that might ensue, new issues 
and dilemmas will surely arise. Scandals will occur and new harms will be done. 
This is, I believe a necessary step to take to fully substantiate the principles of 
UNCRPD which the UK is committed to implementing. 





10.3. Contribution to knowledge  
This is the first study to have produced detailed research on the everyday 
implications of implementation of policies of political participation in the UK 
mental health system. I have used ethnographic field work to produce rich and 
detailed data on what occurred during implementation of policies of political 
inclusion in mental institutions and in analysing and discussing this data moved 
beyond abstract theories of political agency and towards an understanding of its 
co-production in everyday interactions.  
The thesis has contributed to the conceptual understanding of political 
participation for people being treated for mental health conditions and also adds 
to the discussion around how the UNCRPD principles should be implemented 
more generally. A bottom up approach is likely to model better the co-constructive 
principles underlying the right to participation. The UNCRPD applies 
internationally. Given that, this contribution is not restricted to the English 
context but has international implications. 
I have brought to light previously unacknowledged, but key, tensions and 
dilemmas facing service-users and practitioners wishing to facilitate the 
participation of residents in secure secondary mental health facilities. The 
participation dilemmas include cultural dilemmas (conflicting cultural values 
regarding different types of politics), moral or legal dilemmas (conflicting 
understandings of residents’ rights as they arise in context) and organisational 
dilemmas (conflicting agendas between the professional ethics, the institutional 
management and the residents’ need for agential recognition). I have shown that, 
far from residents’ participation being a matter of technical practice and 
implementation of law, the political participation can be complex, messy and risky 
and therefore its enhancement and constraint is a matter of ethico-political 




practice that has not previously received adequate attention. There is always a 
danger, in the context of mental health institutions, of slippage back into 
medicalised rituals of assessment and coercion in the application of principles of 
political inclusion. This can present real problems of indoctrination and exclusion  
The application of Goffmanian and Foucauldian theorisation of relations in mental 
institutions is far from a novel approach. I have however added to these modes of 
theorisation by applying Butlerian concepts. This combination of analytical tools 
has enabled me to identify deep contradictions in the implementation of this policy 
that have not previously been recognised sufficiently. This close, theoretically 
grounded understanding is a considerable contribution to the debate about the 
implementation of this policy enabling a proper analysis of successes and failures 
of practice. 
I have identified alternative modes of practice that would better enable successful 
implementation of the policy - not only in the narrow sense of increased voting 
rates but in the more important sense of becoming a member of the community. 
I have thereby enabled a clearer understanding of the nature of the radical 
challenge that this poses for practitioners in implementing these principles in the 
current system. This has supported the actual development of practice and has 
already had some impact.  
The PhD findings were applied to reforming policy across research sites and in 
developing protocols for mental health practitioners in supporting service-users to 
engage in politics. This resulted in a variety of events being organised for the 
service-users at Site 1 including a trip to Westminster, a meeting with the local 
MP and a meeting with the local Mayor. I also developed, in collaboration with 
practitioners and experts by experience, a pair of posters to be used to raise 
awareness of policies of political inclusion in mental health rehabilitation as well 
as a care planning guidance so that practitioners consider registration on the 
electoral register when patients are transferred to residential services. This has 




been submitted to the Royal College of Psychiatrists so they can potentially 
implement it as an official nationwide guidance document. 
On the basis of the legal research contained in the thesis I have produced a paper 
for the Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing on applying politically 
inclusive practice in medicalising environments (Clubbs Coldron, 2020). In 
addition, I have prepared reports for the All Party Parliamentary Group on 
gambling related harms. This report details the arguments for including experts 
by experience (those with gambling addiction and their families) directly in policy 
development and implementation as well as directly in the regulation of the 
gambling industry through the Gambling Commission. This has resulted in the 
Gambling Commission making plans to create an in-house committee composed 
of people with lived experience. 
Finally, I have highlighted the educational dimension of implementation, and of 
psychiatric practice in general. The anthrogogies of politics outlined are heavily 
influenced by, and sometimes slip back into, the ritual order of the mental 
institution and this can undermine the good intentions of practitioners. This 
theoretically grounded link offers powerful new ways of thinking that can aid 
further research and the development of successful practice. 
 
10.4. Conclusions 
Across the UK and Europe policies are being implemented aiming to positively 
support inclusion in political and public life for persons with disabilities. 
Approaches widely refer to the inclusion of disabled peoples as ‘voices’ and 
emphasise participation in the politics of public health institutions and in health 
and welfare policies (WHO 2006: 7). 




Although a range of forums in the health care sector are being opened up to 
participation of their ‘clients’ and ‘consumers’ the benefits of implementation for 
people with disabilities remain insubstantial and abstract. In mental health there 
is a widespread assumption that people with mental disabilities by definition lack 
certain capacities for appropriate political engagement. Policies are made by HCPs 
intending to facilitate and support political engagement during mental health 
treatment by facilitating registration and granting leave to vote. Education 
sessions are organised to teach people the facts and rules of political life. This top 
down, technocratic and ‘consumerist approach’ (Lewis 2014: 8.5) can undermine 
the good intentions of practitioners seeking to implement the principle of political 
inclusion codified in the UNCRPD. Practices can be alienating and mis/mal-
recognising some forms of subversive political actions and expression as mental 
illness. In this way the ‘human-rights based approach’ to mental health care often 
slips back into medicalised rituals of performance on the basis of decisive doctor 
and passive patient roles. 
I have found that both staff and service-users are restricted in their opportunities 
to participate in public and political life through the structure and rituals of 
institutionalised mental health care. Policies frequently failed to engage or 
motivate people to vote or register to vote. In addition education sessions could 
expand psychiatric management and influence to the political field,  
Although reasonable accommodations are required to extend and enhance 
opportunities, political inclusion of people with mental health difficulties already 
exists, in dialogical processes of identity play, reformation and recognition. These 
processes can however be restricted and controlled according to the definition of 
politics applied by institutions and psychiatric staff. While moments of resistance 
to, and assimilation with the ritual order and institutional norms are often 
fragmented, chaotic and random, they reflect agency of persons with mental health 
difficulties to influence the political environments in which they find themselves. 
This supports the hope that ‘service-user empowerment’ in the politics of the 




institution as well as in the political community at large, are both possible and 
desirable.  
Creating de-medicalised and explicitly political environments, in which identities 
and worldviews can be experimented with, may lead to greater significance being 
attributed to law and policy as co-constructions over which people with mental 
health difficulties have a degree of power and ownership. In turn this could 
encourage greater opportunities for political participation for both service-users 
and staff within and outside mental health institutions.  
I have shown in this thesis that understanding power as exercised on all by all, is 
a more fruitful way of analysing participation in politics in psychiatric 
rehabilitation. This is likely to apply in similar contexts and so potentially has 
broad implications for both residential and community based mental health 
services. This analysis leads to the theorising of mental health practice, in its 
entirety, as embodying a process of political socialisation. In residential 
institutions this socialisation more often creates exclusion and alienation, than 
increased and enhanced opportunities for equal participation.  
I have posited the application of the anthrogogical approach, based on educational 
theory, as a possible way to improve practice in this area. When the patient-doctor 
act collapses, and/or mental health diagnosis is not reified as a fundamental aspect 
of service-users identities, a wider range of conversation topics, political positions 
and behaviours become possible for both residents and staff. They are then able 
to negotiate the emerging conversational dynamic using roles and scripts that are 
not necessarily derived from institutional ascriptions. Going off-script in this way 
can develop political capabilities and increase opportunities for participation in 
both the short and long term. Coercive treatment based on assessment, risk and 
containment reduce such opportunities. 
This understanding may help practitioners and service-users, as well as other 
stakeholders, design spaces in which law, policy and protocol can be freely 




questioned. In this way context/person specific adaptations to the law’s 
application may be co-constructed to allow service-users a stake in the rules and 
rituals that govern their everyday lives. This practice could be improved through 
engagement with educational theory rather than psychiatric and psychological 
methods of discipline and treatment. Political opportunities may be better 
enhanced and increased in the course of providing rehabilitative treatment if 
environments are adapted to accommodate bottom up conceptions of power, 
incorporating interchangeable teacher and student roles, rather than relying on 
the letter of law and policy to redistribute power from the top down as if it were 
a simple resource. 
Achieving enhanced participation for service-users is fraught with real and difficult 
dilemmas for practitioners especially in the light of the deep and systemic logics 
of the institution that work against fully meeting the challenge. In addition, 
challenging behaviours and the real difficulties presented by psychosis, 
schizophrenia, paranoia and personality disorder must be carefully negotiated. 
More research is required to establish whether different mental health conditions 
have a significant effect on the process of politicisation and if so how these 
subgroups might be best supported to engage. It is therefore inappropriate to 
consider success or failure as primarily a matter of individual practitioner’s 
actions. However, neither should it be seen as an inevitable result of service-user’s 
illness, incapability or disillusionment. Blame and condemnation of practitioners 
or service-users has been avoided throughout the thesis as an inappropriate 
register. This is in line with an appreciative approach to the enquiry. 
In suggesting possible reforms and developments of law, policy and practice on 
the basis of my findings I do not imply that there are clear solutions to the 
problem of supporting political inclusion in these settings. Politics inevitably 
involves contextual determinations and choices based on the ‘appropriateness’ of 
conflict and cooperation that cannot be captured by universalised law, policy or 
protocol. Further study on the anthrogogies of ethics and citizenship that shape 




political worldviews, identity and action for both service-users and staff is 
therefore an important item for future research agendas. In addition, the 
embedding of participatory design in the development and implementation of such 
policies is an area ripe for further research.  
The process of supporting political participation in psychiatric rehabilitation has 
presented a number of complexities. Rather than seeing these complexities as 
problems to be denied we need to welcome the potential for political dissensus 
they generate. Dilemmas and conflicts can be used as positive tools for 
anthrogogical practice and for social and ethical thinking; a way of bringing more 
egalitarian social relations into the UK mental health service. Issues of 
discrimination, alienation and indoctrination in politicising practice create 
uncertainty for practitioners and restrictions for service-users.  
The mandate to interact as equal political citizens created opportunities for 
welcoming difference, valuing diversity and respecting alternative ways of thinking 
and relating to others. Expansion of policies of political inclusion could in theory 
provide a valuable avenue of professional and institutional accountability. A great 
many possibilities and opportunities open up if we are prepared to expose mental 
health practice to ongoing processes of respectful negotiation, situated ethics and 
critical reflexivity. 
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Article 4(3) States are required to consult with and 
actively involve persons with 
disabilities, including children with 
disabilities, through their 
representative organizations in the 
development and implementation of the 
UNCRPD and in other decision-making 
processes concerning issues relating to 
persons with disabilities. 
Article 8 Requires states to undertake awareness 
raising to foster respect for the rights 
and dignity of persons with disabilities 
and to combat stereotypes, prejudices 
and harmful practices relating to 
persons with disabilities. 
Article 12 The right to recognition everywhere as 
persons before the law, legal capacity 
on an equal basis with others in all 
aspects of life, and to the support 
required in exercising legal capacity. 
State parties are required, in 
supporting legal capacity, to respect the 
rights, will and preferences of the 
person, restrict circumstances in which 
support represents a conflict of interest 
and undue influence, are proportional 




and tailored to the person’s 
circumstances. 
Article 19  The right to live independently and be 
included in the community means that 
States must take effective and 
appropriate measures to facilitate full 
enjoyment by persons with disabilities 
of this right and their full inclusion and 
participation in the community.  
Article 21 The right to freedom of expression and 
opinion, and access to information 
requires that States take all appropriate 
measures to ensure that persons with 
disabilities can exercise the right to 
freedom of expression and opinion, 
including the freedom to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas on an 
equal basis with others and through all 
forms of communication of their choice. 
Article 22 The right to education requires 
provision of educational services to aid 
the development of identity, talents and 
creativity, as well as their mental and 
physical abilities, to their fullest 
potential. Reasonable accommodations 
must be made to allow people with 
disabilities to participate ‘in a free 
society’. The article also requires states 
to establish effective individualized 
support measures which are provided in 




environments that maximize academic 
and social development. It further 
specifies that these measures must be 
‘consistent with the goal of full 
inclusion’. Finally it requires states 
make reasonable accommodations to 
enable persons with disabilities to learn 
life and social development skills to 
facilitate their full and equal 
participation as members of the 
community. 
Article 24 States are required to recognize the 
right of persons with disabilities to 
education and to ensure an inclusive 
education system at all levels. 
Education must aim to support the full 
development of human potential and 
sense of dignity and self-worth; the 
development by persons with 
disabilities of their personality, talents 
and creativity, as well as their mental 
and physical abilities, to their fullest 
potential; and enable effective 
participation in a free society. 
Article 29 States Are required to guarantee 
persons with disabilities political rights 
and the opportunity to enjoy them on 
an equal basis with others. States must 
ensure that persons with disabilities 
can effectively and fully participate in 




political and public life on an equal 
basis with others, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives. States are 
also required to actively promote an 
environment in which persons with 
disabilities can effectively and fully 
participate in the conduct of public 
affairs, without discrimination and on 
an equal basis with others, and 
encourage their participation in public 
affairs. States should encourage 
participation in non-governmental 
organizations and associations 
concerned with the public and political 
life of the country, and in the activities 
and administration of political parties. 
They should also facilitate the 
formation and participation in 
organizations of persons with 
disabilities to represent persons with 
disabilities at international, national, 
regional and local levels. 
Article 33 In national implementation and 
monitoring States are required to 
ensure that civil society, (in particular 
persons with disabilities and their 
representative organizations), shall be 
involved and participate fully in the 
monitoring process. 
























Care Planning Guidance for Staff and Residents of Rehabilitation 
Services: 
Information on Patient Rights: Notes: 
 
 You have the right to vote  
 
Certain offenders detained in mental hospitals are 
disenfranchised: these are those detained, or 
unlawfully at large, under s37, s38, s44, s51(5), 
s45A, s46 (now repealed) or s47 MHA; s5(2)(a) 
CPIA 1964; and s6(2)(a) or 14(2)(a) Criminal 
Appeal Act 1968.  
 
Those remanded in custody under s35, s36 or s48 




 All persons with disabilities, whether mental or 
physical, have the right to participate in civic and 
political life the same as any other citizen. 
 
(This right is derived from the UN Convention of 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities section 29 
and applies to ALL patients) 
 






 The hospital has responsibilities to make reasonable 
adjustments so that you have equal opportunities to 
exercise your rights. 
 
 To give you Section 17 leave will be facilitated 
where appropriate so that you can leave the hospital 
to vote, attend meetings with political 
representatives or for other reasons related to 
political action or expression. 
 
 You can ask for information and support be 
provided by someone that you trust (family, friends, 




 You have the right to express your opinions.  
 
(When discussing your views within the hospital you 
should be respectful and courteous to the views of 
other patients as well as staff) 
 
 Staff will refrain from monitoring or recording 
reasonable political opinions in medical documents. 
 
 
Registration on the Electoral Roll:  
  




 Are you already registered to vote? 
 Where? 
 Would you like to be registered at the hospital so 
that you can vote in the local constituency?  
 
 
 Would you like to apply for a postal/online vote? 
 
(Alternatively, would you like to nominate a friend, 
family member or member of staff to vote on your 
behalf by proxy?) 
 
 




 If you want to express your views to the person who 
represents you in parliament, your local MP’s 













 To express your views regarding local services, 
planning decisions and other local issues you can 








 If you have any further questions or want to learn 
more about what you can be involved in, the 



















Appendix 4                                           
                                                
                                                
Staff: Interview schedule  
1. INFORMATION SHEET 
2. CONSENT FORM 
 
Interview Code: ---------- 
Confirm that the interviewee is aware that the interview is recorded 
and is happy to participate 
Begin Recording 
 
Demographic data:  
Could you tell me a little bit about yourself? 
 Occupation: 
 
 How long have you been working in the mental health trust? 
 
 Are you a politically engaged person yourself? 
 




 Why is supporting patient’s engagement in politics a part of your role here? 
 
This interview will deal with the polices currently in place dealing with patient’s 
opportunity to register for, and to vote in elections should they wish to.  
I’m going to give you a few minutes to read through these vignettes, one at a 
time, and then ask you to discuss how staff should deal with these situations. 
 
Vignettes:  
1) A patient is detained under s.3 MHA. She has acute symptoms of bi-polar disorder 
and is demanding that she be allowed leave to vote in a coming ballot. When this 
was discussed with her MH advocate it was clear that she had little understanding 
of the political arguments and is wilfully avoiding thinking about negative 
consequences of the decision. This reflects the argumentation of a large proportion 
of voters not diagnosed as mentally ill. She wants to vote but has no concern for 
the question on the ballot. She simply wants to punish a particular party leader 
for a perceived slight. She can’t fill out the registration forms on her own. 
a. What would be the response of the ward staff? 
b. Postal vote? 
c. How would you use treatment to increase her opportunities? 
2) A variety of patients detained under s.2, s.3 of the MHA are discussing an up-
coming general election in the community meeting. An individual with paranoid 
schizophrenia is discussing the Israel/Palestine conflict and a local MPs views on 
it. He is becoming increasingly passionate and angry. Another patient challenges 
the narrative being espoused and the meeting becomes increasingly adversarial, 
loud and gruelling. Some other patients are become uncomfortable and distressed. 




a. Basically in a community meeting and a political argument broke out what would 
be the response? 
b. What would be the response of the ward staff? 
3) A clinically depressed patient detained under s.3 MHA is adamant that he wants 
to cast a vote as he wants to feel like he has made a civic contribution. He is 
experiencing suicidal thoughts but has not been self-harming recently. He does 
not trust that his postal vote will not be tampered with (on the basis of media 
reports) and insists on casting his vote in person. He is demanding leave without 
supervision on the day of the election to cast his vote. He argues that if he is 
accompanied then he will not be able to cast his vote 
a. What would be the response of the ward staff? 
b. MAYBE but probably not mention human right litigation 
 
4) The staff have identified 3 patients who are registered and want to vote in the 
local constituency in a general election. They all have problems with retention 
and although the manifestos and constitutional structure of elections has been 
accessibly explained beforehand, when the group arrive at the polling station it is 
clear that the patients will need help and support to make the decision they seem 
to have previously preferred. 
a. When is it appropriate for clinical staff to accompany patient’s into the polling 
booth and physically direct which box to tick? 
b. When is it inappropriate? 
c. What information would be needed to make this decision? 
I am now going to ask you a few questions about the policy, its implementation 
and its effects. 
 
Questions: 
Ask if they are aware of/familiar with the policy in question. 




1. Could you tell me a little about the day-to-day care needs of a typical patient on 
this ward? 
2. How severely would such care needs impact a person’s ability to register and vote 
in elections? 
a. The actual act of voting  
b. The decision as to who to vote for 
3. Do you think voting is a person’s civic responsibility? 
4. Do you think patients here have a responsibility to vote? 
5. Could you give me an overview of how this policy has been implemented so far? 
a. What work have you done in supporting patient’s political rights since you have 
been here 
b. When did activity in this area first start? 
c. What prompted these initiatives? 
6. During the last election, did many patients request help in registering to vote or 
casting a ballot? 
a. General election 2017 
b. Local elections 2017 
7. Could you take me through what support service-users received on the ward to 
help them cast a ballot during the last election or referendum? 
a. What kinds of patients asked for help? 
8. Do service-users often communicate a need for support in registering and voting 
in elections? 
a. What types of patient are those who typically make such requests? 
b. What help was requested? 
c. Why do you think there was so few patients wanting to cast a vote? 
9. If a patient is having difficulty fill in the required forms to register to vote what 
are the practical steps that you would usually follow?  
a. Assessment of eligibility? 
b. Meet with social worker or Speech and Language therapist? 
c. Meet with Mental Health advocate 




d. Meeting with care planning team? 
10. Are mental capacity assessments necessary? 
a. To determine whether providing support is reasonable? 
b. To determine what kind of support should be provided? 
c. To exclude those who it would be inappropriate to support to participate? 
11. What factors would you consider in assessing a patient’s mental capacity to vote 
and register to vote? 
a. Mental capacity act?  
12. How would you know if a patient was incapable of participating and voting in an 
election? 
13. Do patients that meet those criteria receive any help to support the relevant 
capacities even if they don’t cast a vote? 
14. Would you say there is a difference in the way individuals with different disorders 
are reacting to the support for political engagement? 
a. Anxiety disorders 
b. Mood disorders 
c. Psychotic disorders 
d. Eating disorders  
e. Learning disabilities – these were the most engaged 
15. Would ‘extreme’ political preferences ever be a factor in assessing a person as 
mentally ill or incapable? 
16. Some mental health patients are not aware of their right to register and vote, or 
feel that they were in practice restricted in exercising their rights. What are your 
thoughts on why this is? 
17. What difficulties have you encountered in implementing the policy? 
a. Distrust between the patient and staff? 
b. Time and resources? 
18. Do you think it is a worthwhile policy? – in terms of treatment  
a. Why? 
b. Why not? 




19. How important do you think it is that detained patients on mental health wards 
should be able to cast a vote?  








                                                                           
 
ENGAGE AND BUILD RAPPOR DON’T JUST ASK QUESTIONS OR IT 
WONT WORK 
Patients: Interview schedule 
1. INFORMATION SHEET 
2. CONSENT FORM 
 






 How frequently have you been in contact 
with mental health services? 
 













Confirm that the interviewee is 
aware that the interview is recorded 




1. Last week we went to the polling station and you cast a vote 
a. Why did you want to vote in the election last week? 
2. Have you ever voted previously? 
a. When did you vote previously? 
b. What happened? 
 
3. What support did you receive so that you could vote? 
a. Did the staff here help you to register to vote? 
b. Were you already registered? 
4. Do you think voting is something everyone should do? 
5. Was your mental ability to vote assessed at any time before you registered? 
6. Who was the main person who helped you to register or vote? 
7. What support did they give you? 
a. Were you given any information about the vote? 




b. Was the vote brought up at community meetings? 
c. Were there any events organised? 
d. Did you discuss the election with other people on the ward? 
8. What help would you want from staff to give you the next time there is an 
election? 
9. Apart from the staff on the ward, is there anyone else, who has helped you to 
register or vote? 
10. Do you mind that staff are encouraging you to vote? 
a. Do you feel pressured to vote? 
11. Was going out to vote a positive or negative experience?  
12. In your view, is there anything about your mental health that would have made 
it difficult for you to vote? 
13. Is there anything about your personal circumstances that would have made it 
difficult for you to vote? 
14. Was there anything that happened on the ward that might have stopped you from 
voting? 
a. Could you explain? 
15. When would you say a person should lose the ability to cast a vote? 
16. How important do you think it is that detained patients on mental health wards 
should be able to cast a vote? 
17. Do you identify as a disabled person? 
18. What do you think would help you to keep joining in in future elections? 
19. Is there a political opinion that you would like to state? – I am recording  
20. Is there anything else that you think I should know?























political inclusion  








Early childhood experiences, 
Primary educations, Secondary 
Education, Higher Educations, 




Social care, Relationships, Culture, 
Recreation, Justice 
Advocacy, Community mobilisation, political 
participation, Self-help, Disabled peoples NGOs 




APPENDIX 6 Social integration  Economic Independence  
Education 
Health 
Promoting healthy lifestyles, 
Prevention, Access to medical 
care, Rehabilitation, Recovery, 
Technology, Mental health 
advocacy, Community 
integration, politics of 
institutions, Escaping confines of 
Early childhood experiences, 
Primary, Secondary & Higher 
Education, Life experience, Adult 
learning, Developing worldviews 
and narratives, Community 
education, political education, 
independent research 
Skills, Employment, Financial 
independence, Financial 
security, Union advocacy, 
Community mobilisation, 
political participation, Self-
employment, NGOs for people 
with disabilities 
Social care, Relationships, 
Culture, Recreation, Justice, 
Interpersonal politics, 
Community networks, politically 
engaged peers, Social identity, 
Charitable work, volunteering 
Empowerment & 
political inclusion  
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